Shinichi Ogawa

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Limaye. Again, good morning, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I want to thank Professor Iwashita of the Hokkaido University, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and East-West Center in Washington for inviting me to this project. I’m very pleased to be here and feel honored to make a presentation before distinguished guests and experts, and I’m happy to have discussion after my presentation.

The topic of my presentation is rather specific. The topic is no-first-use of nuclear weapons and U.S. extended deterrence for Japan. Now, let me start my presentation by just explaining or clarifying the meaning of terminology I used in the title of my presentation. Nuclear no-first-use, we just call it NFU in abbreviation. NFU means that nuclear-armed states will not initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the course of warfare or in conflict but reserve the option to retaliate by using such weapons against nuclear attack. In other words, a declaration of nuclear no-first-use is a pledge not to use nuclear weapons unless the country announcing such a commitment or its ally is attacked with nuclear weapons.

The term extended deterrence refers to a situation in which defending states threatens retaliation against the challenger or potential attacker to prevent the challenger from attacking against its allies. It means literally extending the deterrent effect derived from defender’s military power to friends and allies. Depending on the type of military power the defender employs, in theory, extended deterrence can be subdivided into extended nuclear deterrence which is so-called nuclear umbrella and extended conventional deterrence. In other words, extended deterrence is composed of extended nuclear deterrence and extended conventional deterrence.

Many people in the arms control community demand that nuclear-armed states should commit to a policy of a nuclear no-first-use, and there is good reason for the demand. The institutionalization of nuclear no-first-use among nuclear-armed states can generate a powerful momentum for nuclear arms reduction, and even total elimination of nuclear weapons will be a possibility. This is because if the only or the sole reason for deploying nuclear weapons is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other nuclear-armed states, logically we can say that even if all nuclear powers uniformly cut down their nuclear weapons and then completely scrap their nuclear weapons, they will not lose anything in matters of defense.

In terms of deterrence, however, the story is not so bright and positive. A nuclear-armed state that has pledged NFU will become to employ its nuclear forces
solely as a deterrent against nuclear attack and not as a deterrent against non-nuclear attack. As a consequence, a U.S. shift in its declaratory nuclear policy from current “calculated ambiguity,” namely preserving or not ruling-out first-use option, to NFU, is perceived to radically narrow down the scope of America’s nuclear umbrella for the defense of its allies. In such circumstances, U.S. allies will inevitably feel less confidence in the U.S. extended deterrence. Much less confident in the case of Japan that faces North Korea that has been extremely hostile and apparently maintains chemical weapons and biological agents.

Some Americans, including top officials in government, argue that effectiveness of U.S. conventional weapons has grown to be a level sufficient for deterring chemical or biological weapons attacks on U.S. allies. It might be so.

America’s high-tech conventional weapons, thanks to their improved accuracy and capability to discriminate a wide range of attack objectives, have drastically enhanced their destructive power and have even become able to destroy hardened military bases and command post. This capability was previously possessed only by nuclear weapons. They further advocate the increased reliance on conventional power on the ground that a threat to use of conventional weapons is more credible than the threat derived from nuclear weapons and therefore generates more powerful deterrence.

But emphasizing high tech conventional capabilities may run the risk of reviving chemical weapons and accelerating weaponization of biological agents among adversaries of the U.S. and its allies, and can make it more difficult for some nuclear-armed states to adopt nuclear no-first-use. This risk can be added by the prospects of America’s stepped-up increase in its conventional military might in order to reassure U.S. allies about its security commitment and by inclination on the part of U.S. allies toward more potent conventional capabilities in order to make up for the deterrent role previously assumed by America’s nuclear forces.

Furthermore, despite U.S. confidence in its conventional military capabilities, some may not always perceive or calculate as the U.S. does. Each nation has its own “strategic culture” or its own view of military power, and certain leaders may be unmoved or unaffected by the magnitude of destruction that the U.S. high tech conventional forces can inflict. Particularly, the question remains in the so-called “intra-war deterrence” situation or capabilities to stop combat action from escalation. In other words, under circumstances where an attacker is already experiencing effects of high tech conventional strikes as part of ongoing war, it is doubtful that a threat of additional high tech conventional strikes could powerfully deter the opponent’s start of using chemical and the biological weapons.
There can be no way of verifying the promise of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and, therefore, the positive implication of nuclear no-first-use tends to be compromised as long as conceivable scenarios of nuclear retaliation other than nuclear attack continue to exist in the minds of decision-makers.

Therefore, the first job we have to do is to eradicate or eliminate causes provoking the first use of nuclear weapons rather than discussing pros and cons of nuclear no-first-use.

As a start, efforts should be made to universalize Chemical Weapon Convention and to make work the challenge inspection system set up in the Convention. The other needed undertaking for the international community is to devise effective verification measures to prevent weaponization of biological agents, thereby strengthening Biological Weapon Convention.

In the meantime, the international community would be advised to re-examine merits and demerits of a no-first-use of weapon of mass destruction as a transitional measure to a nuclear no-first-use. A policy of NFU of weapon of mass destruction appears to be able to contain chemical and biological weapons and to promote the elimination of those weapons.

Finally, I would like to make a few words concerning the implication of U.S. nuclear no-first-use pledge for the U.S. nuclear umbrella covering Japan against the recognized nuclear weapon states (China and Russia) in Northeast Asia. In terms of nuclear capabilities, the credibility of nuclear umbrella vis-à-vis other nuclear-armed states depends not merely on the deployment of survivable nuclear forces, but also on the maintenance of a sort of escalation control capability that compels a potential nuclear adversary to take the threat of nuclear retaliation seriously. Such capabilities are shaped and underpinned by a superior damage-limiting capability made possible by a powerful counterforce capability against the potential aggressor’s nuclear force and effective strategic defenses.

If we compare the U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities with those of China and Russia, there’s no doubt that the U.S. damage-limiting capability, specifically counterforce capability, is overwhelmingly greater than that of China and superior to that of Russia. Therefore, assuming that both China and Russia continue to refrain from chemical and biological weapons as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapon Convention dictate and assuming that combined U.S. and Japanese Naval and Air Forces continue to maintain an adequate military balance vis-à-vis Chinese and Russian forces in the Far East, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan would not be seriously damaged even if the U.S. conclude an agreement of
nuclear no-first-use with China or Russia. That concludes my presentation. I believe my presentation was brief but I very much look forward to have a discussion. Thank you.