INTRODUCTION

During the last several years the history of the Russian Empire has attracted unusual academic interest. Conferences and workshops focused on nationalities, regions, religions, and languages of this empire are held every few months in various cities of the world – Moscow, New York, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Sapporo, Vilnius, Warsaw, Voronezh, and others. Most of these conferences subsequently produced collections of essays. Similarly, this volume includes the papers presented at a series of conferences focused on the Russian Empire, held in Japan during 2004-05 under the aegis of the Twenty First Century Program, “Making a Discipline of Slavic Eurasian Studies: Meso-areas and Globalization.” This collection divides the thirteen essays into four parts under the titles of “A Mega-System of Empires, “Contact Zones and Ethnoconfessional

1 To name but a few, David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis, eds., Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge and Practices (New York, 2000); Hayashi Tadayuki, ed., The Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia (Sapporo, 2003); Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber, eds., Imperial Rule (Budapest, 2004); M. D. Karpacheva et al., eds., Rossiiskaia imperiiia: strategii stabilizatsii i opyty obnovleniia (Voronezh, 2004); Darius Staliūnas, Raidžių draudimo metai (Vilnius, 2004); Kimitaka Matsuzato, ed., Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries: Histories Revived or Improvised? (Sapporo, 2005); and Andrzej Nowak, ed., Russia and Eastern Europe: Applied “Imperiology” / Rosja i Europa Wschodnia: “imperiologia” stosowana (Krakow, 2006).

Politics,” “Thorny Paths from Empire to Nations,” and “Distant but Central: The Far East Fringes of the Russian Empire.”

The epoch making events for Russian imperiology were the founding of the two journals, *Ab Imperio* and *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, in 2000, which the emerging imperiologists, in turn, promoted. The impact of imperiology reached far beyond historical studies per se, but no doubt facilitated the transformation of the former study of socialist countries into Slavic Eurasian studies by nursing a new spatial perception of this region.3

Mainly focusing on ethno-confessional issues, Russian imperiology enriched constructivist analyses of history. No approach prior to imperiology was so successful in incorporating the Soviet period into the general history of Russia.4 With all respect to these achievements, however, readers of the recent literature on the Russian Empire may perhaps gain the impression that a poorly equipped vessel of theory has been overwhelmed by a tempest of empirical descriptions.5 This is a normal phenomenon for the first stage of any breakthrough in historical studies. However, several years have passed since the boom of Russian imperiology began, and an academic community of historians, sharing a certain methodological consensus, has surely taken shape. The time seems to have come to summarize the accumulated empirical studies and to abstract widely applicable theories from these studies. Keeping this historiographic situation in mind, most authors of this collection tried to examine as many arguments as possible, while evading excessive demonstration of facts and data. In other words, they tried to set (or just confirm) a research agenda, rather than to demonstrate their

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3 See my “Russian Imperiology and Area Studies (Impressions on the ICCEES Berlin Congress),” *Ab Imperio* 3 (2005), pp. 443-445.


5 Even the collection *New Imperial History of the Post-Soviet Space* [*Novaia imperiskaia istoriia postsovetskogo prostranstva*] (Kazan, 2004), compiled by the editors of *Ab Imperio* obviously for the purpose of theorizing imperial studies of Russia, does not change this impression.
empirical findings, expecting that owls of Minerva can sometimes be more innovative than ambitious harbingers.

Whereas imperiology as a current intellectual fashion has been inspired by the rise of contemporary empires (USA’s superpower monopoly and the EU’s eastern expansion), its Russian version was motivated by the collapse of the “last multinational empire in human history,” namely the Soviet Union. This event facilitated the globalization of historical studies of Russia. Foreign historians for the first time enjoyed the possibility to go beyond the borders of Leningrad and Moscow and work at regional archives. Under the previous limited access to archival sources, these historians tended to perceive the Russian Empire as something like a cone with the imperial center and the Great Russians at its top and the ruled nations in imperial peripheries at its bottom. Moreover, they often projected retrospectively the present national territories (the Union Republics and later the former Soviet countries) into the past. In this sense, Western historiography was no less primordialist than its Soviet counterparts. Acquaintance with abundant archival sources after 1990 made foreign historians reexamine the Great Russians’ apparent cultural hegemony, as well as the government’s administrative resources, available for assimilation. Because of the insufficiency of resources, the government could only maintain the empire by manipulating the existing ethnic relations in peripheries. Considering this, historians began to analyze interethnic relations in the empire not through a bipolar scheme of the imperial center and the ruled nations, but rather a tripolar scheme of the imperial center, “aristocratic” / dominant nation(s), and “peasant” / unprivileged nation(s) of the region. The Russian Empire began to be seen as a conglomerate of macro-regions, such as the Volga-Ural, Left Bank Ukrainian, Western, and Ostzei provinces, Steppe, and West and East Siberia. All of these regions had relatively autonomous historical dynamics. Interactions between the imperial center and these macro-re-

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6 For a typical example, see Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Mass., 2000).


8 Aleksei Miller, Imperii Romanovykh i natsionalizm (Moscow, 2006), p. 31.
gions and between these macro-regions themselves determined imperial management. The Russian Empire was unique in the sense that these peripheral macro-regions were largely wrapped by the institution of the governor generalships.

On the other hand, academic contacts with foreign historians, as well as acquaintance with Western historiography, made historians of the former Soviet countries critically reexamine their traditional national histories. In contrast to its widespread image of the second edition of the “prison of nations,” the Soviet regime encouraged non-Russian historians to create their own national historiographies, even though some of these nations (typically Ukrainians) had no universally accepted ethnonyms before the revolution of 1917. However, national historiographies were promoted for the purpose of justifying the existing hierarchy of nations (in particular, the privileged status of union republics vis-à-vis autonomous republics) and administrative borders, a significant part of which became state borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union adopted the Leninist method of state building, which required the convergence of territorial ethnic distribution and administrative division. This method generated a specific concept of “titular nation,” for which the hegemonic position in the ethnic administrative territory was granted. Soviet historiography advocated the concept of aborigine-ness (avtokhtonnost’) as a “historical” basis for this hegemony.9 With amazing ease Soviet historiography forsook the Marxist view that nations are an attribute of the “bourgeois” (modern) stage of history and, instead, embraced primordialism in its most eccentric form, according to which origins of nations can be traced to the tens of thousand years past.10 In contrast to the domination of constructivism in Western historiography, the Soviet Union looked like an island of primordialism. The nationalist sentiment prevalent among the national intelligentsia in the late perestroika and early independence period made this tendency even more extreme.

9 On the other side of the same coin, the Soviet regime tacitly prohibited Moscow and Leningrad historians to study histories of the union republics. Miller, Imperiia Romanovykh, p. 20.

10 Many studies have been done concerning primordialism in post-Soviet national historiographies. See, for example, Victor A. Shnirelman, The Value of the Past: Myths, Identity and Politics in Transcaucasia (Osaka, 2001).
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It appears that post-Soviet historiography took shape through harsh criticism of Soviet “internationalist” historiography, exactly as Soviet historiography emerged after devastating criticism of Romantic nationalist historiographies of the pre-revolutionary era. However, Tomohiko Uyama argues that there has been a tangible continuity between these three stages of historiography; despite apparent criticism of the preceding historiography, primordialism and the concept of aboriginalness consolidated consistently throughout the entire pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods.11

This was the historiographic situation which the nascent Russian imperiology faced ten years ago. Imperiologists worked hard to construct a more balanced, multifaceted, and less politicized multinational history. Now, historians of Slavic Eurasia do not regard nations as self-evident entities, but analyze them in interactions with other ethnic groups of the region—a method which Andreas Kappeler called the regional approach.12 Recent studies show more interest in actual interactions between ethnic groups than in disputes among their representatives. For example, if previous studies underlined anti-Tatar motives in the introduction of the Il’minskii system, recent studies pay more attention to its pedagogic effects and influence on the consciousness of small nations, such as the Chuvashi, Udmurts, and Maris. In other words, methods in ethnic histories converged with those of anthropology. In this volume, this tendency is represented by Valentyna Nadolska and Leonid Taimasov, who focus on two typical contact zones of the Russian Empire, Volyn and the Middle Volga region (Chapters 5 and 6). Nadolska maintains that in Volyn interactions between Polish and Ukrainian traditions and languages were mutual, not one-sided from dominant Polish to dominated Ukrainian tradition.13

13 These authors’ approaches are discussed also in Leonid Taimasov, “Nerusskie monastyri Kazanskogo kraia: orientiry konfessional’nogo obnovleniia (vtoraia polovina XIX veka),” Acta Slavica Iaponica 21 (2004), pp. 88-114; Valentina Nadol’skaia, “Khoziaistvennaia deiatel’nost’ inostrannykh kolonistov Volynskoi gubernii (vtoriaia pol. XIX – nachalo XX vv.),” Sotsial’naia transformatsiia i mezhetnicheskie otnosheniia na Pravoberezhnoi Ukraine XIX
As Mikhail Dolbilov argues in Chapter 7, imperiologists do not regard the relations between empires and nations as antipodal. If traditional national histories saw the possibility for ethnic minorities’ nation-building exclusively in their resistance to the policies conducted by the imperial center and dominant nations, imperiologists regard empires as contexts or arenas, in which various national projects competed and interacted. In contrast to the teleological understanding of nation-building in the traditional national historiographies, imperiologists highlight the plurality of nation-building projects, including the very categorization of nations (ethnonyms). If the traditional national histories took for granted the existence of a dominant imperial strategy of Russification, imperiologists underline the fact that Great Russians’ self-definitions and nation projects demonstrated no less diversity than their non-Russians counterparts.14 As Paul Werth (Chapter 3) and Norihiro Naganawa (Chapter 4) exemplify, recent studies highlight that non-Russians and non-Orthodox believers exploited imperial institutions, such as governor generalships and the Spiritual Boards of Muslims, for the promotion of their identities and interests. Not confrontation but cooperation between the state and religious communities institutionalized non-Orthodox religions in the empire.15

In the course of this (mostly unconscious) intra-empire nation-building, the relations between spatial ethnic distribution and administrative boundaries often became a serious issue. Based on a case study of a hardly known project of gubernia reform during the 1830-40s, Leonid Gorizontov (Chapter 9) argues that in this reform project, along with the traditional tendency to combine differing ethnicities in the same territory for the purpose of assimilation, there was already an attempt to consolidate more or less homogeneous national territories, even though

14 This problem is discussed in detail in A. I. Miller, “Ukrainskii vopros” v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (Vtoraia polovina XIX v.) (St. Petersburg, 2000).
the applicability of this strategy seems to be limited to non-defiant nations, such as Lithuanians. Tiit Rosenberg remarks that the request for national territorial division (Estonian and Latvian) vis-à-vis the existing three knighthoods (Estland, Livland, and Kurland) was an important landmark in the development of Estonian and Latvian nationalism.16 Alexei Miller and Mikhail Dolbilov share the opinion that the viability of the multinational Russian Empire was far from exhaustion at the beginning of the twentieth century and the reasons for the collapse of this empire should be traced to specific conditions caused by World War I.17 Tiit Rosenberg confirms this view through his case study of Estonian nationalism (Chapter 10).

In the post-Soviet context, imperiology emerged as a powerful opposition to traditional narratives of national history. In most of the former

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16 The Soviet Union made ethno-territorial autonomy a universal principle for socialist state building, while Western states prefer non-territorial, individual affirmative actions for the promotion of minority rights. However, the system of territorial affirmative action was bolstered by the communist party’s monopoly of the right to categorize nationalities, rank them to create a hierarchy of ethno-territorial entities, and, last but not least, mercilessly repress any “deviation from the Leninist principles of nationality policy.” When this monopoly collapsed, the principle of ethno-territorial autonomy, combined with the above mentioned fetishism of aborigine-ness, turned into a theoretical basis for military conflicts in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Today, the principle of ethno-territorial autonomy is discredited and criticized from both within (the Russian Federation) and outside (the European Union). The European Union, suffering from its own traditional separatism of Basque, North Ireland, etc., does not wish to have additional sources of headaches in the New Europe. Thus, the EU is critical, for example, of the Hungarian population’s quest for territorial autonomy in Transylvania. A typical criticism comes from Russia itself in President Putin’s policy of amalgamation of federal constituents. Some observers anticipate that having liquidated weak national districts, such as Komi-Permiak and Ust’-Orda, the Russian government will launch more serious amalgamations of national republics and Russian regions, marking a decisive departure from the Leninist principle of ethno-territorial autonomy.

17 Eric Lohr refers to Roger Brubaker’s thesis on nationalism as “nullification of complex identities” to explain the abrupt emergence of German national assertion in the Russian Empire during World War I. Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens During World War I (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), p. 8. I examined the question of whether the Russian Empire collapsed because of the alleged failure of its modernization or the peculiar situation caused by World War I, arguing against the stereotype in historiography about the incompetent Russian total war regime as a result of its unsuccessful modernization. Kimitaka Matsuzato, “The Role of Zemstva in the Creation and Collapse of Tsarism’s War Efforts During World War One,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 46:3 (1998), pp. 321-337.
Soviet countries, traditional national histories, enjoying state support, had become dominant. Although constitutions of these countries declare their multi-national characteristics, in fact, their national histories were systematically substituted with the history of the titular nation both in education and research. However funny it might appear in hindsight, in Ukraine during the first half of the 1990s, some university lecturers requested to substitute the former scientific communism with “scientific nationalism.” Fortunately, in Ukraine this abnormal situation did not last long. The influx of constructivism and the regional approach from abroad resulted in the establishment of overtly revisionist historical institutes in prestigious state universities, such as Kyivo-Mohyla Academy, Lviv National, Kharkiv National Universities, and of historical journals of constructivist orientation, such as Ukrains’kyi Humanitarnyi Ohliad, Ukraina Moderna, and Skhid-Zakhid. The contemporary Ukrainian historiography reveals an amazing diversity. The Ukrainian diaspora’s historiography abroad, which contributed to the establishment of the Ukrainian national historiography in Ukraine at the beginning of the 1990s, changed as well. When I learnt the ABCs of Ukrainian studies at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute in the mid-1990s, it was very easy to identify the staff and graduate students of this institute by their names; only offspring of the Ukrainian diaspora entered into Ukrainian studies. Now ordinary youth without any Ukrainian origin en masse devote themselves to Ukrainian studies, which drastically de-ideologized Ukrainian studies in North America.

The last three chapters of this collection focus on economic, social, and geopolitical aspects of the management of the Russian Far East, Alaska, and the adjacent seas. The three authors maintain that acquisition and management of its peripheries represented crucial characteristics of the Russian Empire and that these characteristics can only be understood in trans-border context, as part of Northeast Asian history. Through a

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18 A reason for this relatively progressive characteristic of Ukrainian historiography, inconceivable for other historiographies of non-Russian CIS countries, is the existence of Ukraine’s own tradition of constructivism, originated by Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi. Debates between him and Mikhailo Hrushev’s’kyi during the 1920s, and between Ivan Rudnytskyi and George Grabowicz (the future director of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute) during the 1970s harbingered the contemporary debate between constructivists and primordialists. See Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “Observations on the Problem of ‘Historical’ and ‘Non-historical’ Nations,” Essays in Modern Ukrainian History (Edmonton, 1987), pp. 37-48.
case study of the Priamur governor generalship’s fishery policy, Eisuke Kaminaga (Chapter 13) elucidates the dilemma inherent in the management of imperial peripheries. The imperial government requested the peripheries to work out and implement prompt development strategies without relying upon the resources procurable from the center. This induced the peripheral actors to rely upon trans-border trade and cooperation, but this “globalist” strategy seemed to endanger the self-reliance of the national economy and state security of the border regions. Andrei Grinev (Chapter 12) sees a fundamental reason for the sale of Alaska in the “politarist” characteristics of Russian society. Describing the reshuffling of initiators of tsarist Far East policies, from Sergei Witte to the Bezobrazovites during the 1990s, Igor Lukoianov maintains that the fatal weakness of the empire’s Far East policies had already been imbedded in Witte’s initiative.

Irrespective of the readers’ judgment of the pessimistic view proposed by these St. Petersburg historians on the empire’s social and economic potentialities, these chapters’ focus on geopolitics, economy, and foreign trade is refreshing. Imperiologists have neglected these topics, while overconcentrating on ethno-confessional issues. As empires were not only multinational spaces but also vast territories, an imperiology disregarding macro-regional administration, economic development, military, geopolitics, transportation, and migration cannot be full fledged. Exactly in regard to these issues Russian imperiology needs fundamental self-reexamination and innovation. In other words, the study of nationalities should be reunited with general social and state history. Leonid Gorizontov’s discreet analysis (Chapter 9) reveals how closely imperial policy makers’ concerns with ethnic and general management were intertwined, and how rich research potentials imperiologists may secure, if they are released from the habit of artificial segregation of nationality studies from general history. I cannot but support Dominic Lieven’s statement:

“At present academic historians of empires are much more inclined to concentrate on questions of culture, epistemology, identity and race—for reasons linked to current trends in Western thinking and current issues in the domestic policies of Western states. …however, it is naïve to imagine
that these factors alone tell one all one needs to know about the emergence, survival and impact of empires.”

The Russian Empire’s territorial expansion during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was partly a result of its counter-reformative strategy. This empire easily attracted the Baltic Germans and the Polonized East Slavic and Lithuanian nobilities, who were dissatisfied with the centralizing and anti-serfdom policies conducted by Stockholm and Warsaw. The Russian Empire had actually become the last bastion of serfdom in Europe, and this fit the classic model of empire as a union of multiethnic nobles via dynastic loyalty. However, this model faced serious challenges under Nicholas I, the most threatening of which was the Polish uprising of 1830. The Slavophile intelligentsia (first) and the imperial government (reluctantly) rethought the traditional, pro-aristocratic method of imperial integration, and began to use “peasant” nations as the counterbalance against “aristocratic” nations, such as Poles and, to a lesser extent, Baltic Germans. Characteristic of the Russian Empire was that because of the ethnic heterogeneity and the insufficient demographic weight of Eastern Slavs, the image of peasants substituted for the image of a nation. This made Russia’s new course of imperial management even more populist and socially oriented. The interpretation of the abolition of serfdom of 1861 as an attempt to create an imperial nation via renewal of primordial justice belongs to Mikhail Dolbilov, who in this volume describes the self-contradictory characteristics of this populist strategy (Chapter 7). Takeshi Matsumura examines the viability of this strategy through the prism of agrarian history. He remarks that the form of peasant land ownership was inseparable from the structure of peasant domestic groups (families) and work organization of landowners’ estates. The proposed reform of peasant land ownership was unrealizable without changing the other two elements of the agrarian structure. A total reform of this triad could not be achieved without a


20 Orest Subtelny, Domination of Eastern Europe: Native Nobilities and Foreign Absolutism, 1500-1715 (Kingston, 1986).

devastating “cost of changes.” This is why the implemented peasant reform was modest enough to preserve the pre-emancipation agrarian structures in all of european Russia and why the pro-peasant discourse in government and public circles did not go beyond empty talk. Again, one would find it very revealing to bring social history back into Russian imperial studies.

Another neglected research strategy is comparison of empires, though specialists have always emphasized its importance. Even the rising academic interest in the Russian and Ottoman Empires has not changed this situation; even the rare exceptions that focus on multiple empires\(^{22}\) suffer a lack of articulated criteria for comparison. Perhaps, this unpopularity of inter-imperial comparison was not only caused by the requested additional endeavor to study other empires, in which one is not specialized, but also the poor results procurable from this endeavor. Neglected calls in the past for comparison often assumed that empires, even neighboring ones, had existed independently of each other. Alexei Miller, Jun Akiba, Paul Werth try to make inter-imperial comparisons more attractive and fruitful for historians by combining them with macro-systemic analyses of empires. Miller and Akiba advocate macro-systemic concepts, such as “contiguous empires,” “a common world time,” and argue that empires composed a single macro-system and thus were interdependent. Paul Werth confirms this view empirically, analyzing trans-border interaction and movement of religions and believers. The participation of Jun Akiba, a Japanese Ottoman specialist, in this collection is quite valuable. The readers will be surprised to see this Ottoman specialist’s knowledge of the Russian Empire. I honestly desire the continuation and expansion of dialogue between the specialists of the Ottoman and Romanov Empires.

The end of an empire (the Soviet Union) gave an impetus for the study of empires. Though the achievements of this new subdiscipline, called imperiology, have been largely empirical, it has emerged as a powerful opposition to traditional national histories. Russian imperiology has so far overconcentrated on ethno-confessional issues and been segregated from general and social history. This is a specific feature which

\(^{22}\) Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven, London, 2002); A. I. Miller, ed., Rossiiskaia imperiia v srovnitel’oi perspective (Moscow, 2004).
cannot be observed, for example, in the study of the Ottoman Empire. If this self-segregation is overcome and comparative studies of empires are enriched with the macro-systemic perspective, Russian imperiology will proceed to a new stage of its development.

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