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Dār al-Islām under Russian Rule As Understood by Turkestani Muslim Intellectuals

Since the Perestroika period, studies in the modern history of Turkestan have made great progress. Most of them, with critical attitudes to Soviet historiography, have been distinguished by their new interpretation and approaches. While the creation of national histories has advanced in the newly independent republics of Central Asia, researchers abroad, making use of a great amount of newly obtained source materials, have begun to explore various aspects of political, social, and intellectual history of modern Turkestan.¹

Among these research trends, studies of the intellectual history during the Tsarist period have great significance and possibilities. They will enable us to understand the historical dynamism of modern Turkestan from within; in other words, through the various discourses of Muslim intellectuals. Faced with a series of great changes following the Russian invasion in the second half of the nineteenth century, they played a leading role in directing their Muslim communities and sometimes in social and cultural reform movements such as Jadidism.² At the same

1 Stéphane A. Dudoignon and KOMATSU Hisao, eds., *Research Trends in Modern Central Eurasian Studies (18th–20th Centuries): A Selective and Critical Bibliography of Works Published between 1985 and 2000*, pts. 1–2 (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 2003–2006).

2 For the details see Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in*

time, studies of intellectual history will contribute to examining contemporary issues such as Islamic resurgence and politics in post-Soviet Central Asia in a historical perspective.³

This paper aims to present some preliminary observations as well as prospects for further research in this field. Three topics are to be discussed: first, how did Muslim intellectuals, especially the first generation who witnessed the Russian invasion, understand their own society under Russian rule; second, how did they answer to the Andijan uprising in 1898 that threatened “the peaceful order” under Russian rule; and third, how did the next generation conceive the future of their *Dār al-Islām* [The Land of Islam where Islamic law prevails].

***Dār al-Islām* under Russian Rule**

How did Muslim intellectuals, especially the first generation who witnessed the Russian invasion, understand their own society under Russian rule? According to a strict interpretation of Islamic law, believers should fight the invasion of infidels to defend the *Dār al-Islām* and, when they were put under the rule of infidels, they should leave this *Dār al-Harb* [the Land of war] to migrate to a nearby *Dār al-Islām* where their rights would be protected by an Islamic state. In fact, in the 1820s, the *Mujāhidīns* led by Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi (1786–1831) left India, which turned into a *Dār al-Harb* due to British occupation, and established bases for their *jihād* movements under the protection of Afghanistan. As far as we know, however, such rigorous interpretation was rarely found in modern Central Eurasia, except for the North Caucasus.

One of these rare cases we may cite is that of a renowned Tatar mullah, ‘Abd al-Rahim bin ‘Uthman al-Bulghari (al-‘Utuz al-Imani 1754–1835).

Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

3 For example, see Bakhtiyar Babadjanov and Muzaffar Kamilov, “Muhammadjan Hindustani (1882–1989) and the Beginning of the ‘Great Schism’ among the Muslims of Uzbekistan,” in Stéphane A. Dudoignon and KOMATSU Hisao, eds., *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia: Early 18th to Late 20th Centuries* (London: Kegan Paul, 2001), pp. 195–219; B. M. Babadzhanov, A. K. Muminov, M. B. Olcott, “Mukhammadzhan Khindustani (1892–1989) i religioznaia sreda ego epokhi (predvaritel’nye razmyshleniia o formirovaniu ‘sovetskogo islama’ v Srednei Azii),” *Vostok* 5 (2004), pp. 43–59.

Having studied in holy cities in Ma wara' al-nahr such as Bukhara and Samarkand, he mastered Islamic teachings that were inaccessible in the Volga-Ural region under Russian rule after the latter half of the sixteenth century. During his stay in Samarkand he made efforts to repair the famous manuscript of the holy Qur'an preserved in the Khwaja Ahrar madrasa under the title of *Mushaf-i Imām 'Uthmān*. In Bukhara he dared to criticize the religious practices permitted in this holy city, in order to attract the interests of Amir Shahmurad (r. 1785–1800) known as a pious ruler of the Amirate of Bukhara.⁴ According to the recent studies by Michael Kemper, 'Abd al-Rahim held an exceptionally hard-line position in the problems of the relationship between Muslims and Christians. Against the general agreement of the Tatar ulama, he considered the Volga-Ural region under Russian rule not as a *Dār al-Islām* but as a *Dār al-Harb*, and condemned the Friday prayers addressed to any Tsar to be invalid.⁵ However, his arguments could not gain the support of a majority of the Muslim community. Rather, we consider that Tatar ulama's acceptance of Russian rule as well as the official institution of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly⁶ made it easy for Turkestanī ulama to adapt to the new conditions of obedience after initial years of confrontation with the Russian army.

In the case of Turkestan we have some treatises written by Muslim intellectuals who discussed the conditions of Muslim society under Russian rule. Among others, Muhammad Yunus Khwaja Ta'ib's Persian work *Tuhfa-yi Tā'ib* [*A Gift of Ta'ib*]⁷ presents us with the most compre-

4 Shihāb al-Dīn al-Marjānī al-Qazānī, *Mustafād al-Akhbār fī Aḥwāl Qazān wa Bulghār* [The Collection of Information on Kazan and Bulghar], vol. 2 (Kazan, 1900), pp. 239–241.

5 M. K. [Michael Kemper], "al-Bulgari," *Islam na territorii byoshei Rossiiskoi imperii: Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, vyp. 2 (Moscow: "Vostochnaia literatura" RAN, 1999), pp. 18–19.

6 Since Ivan IV (r. 1533–1584)'s conquest of the Kazan Khanate in 1552, Muslims in the Russian Empire suffered harsh treatment of the Russian authorities and Islamic institutions were ignored by them. However Catherine II (r. 1762–1796) introduced rather tolerant policies toward her Muslim subjects. The Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, established by her order in 1789, supervised Muslim communities in European Russia and Siberia, and contributed to the integration and revitalization of Muslim communities in the Russian Empire.

7 Muḥammad Yūnus Khwāja b. Muḥammad Amīn-Khwāja (Tā'ib), *Tuhfa-yi Tā'ib*, podgotovka k izdaniiu i predislovie: B. M. Babadzhinov, Sh. Kh. Vakhidov, Kh. Komattsu [KOMATSU Hisao], Islamic Area Studies Project Central Asian Research Series 6 (Tashkent

hensive accounts, based on his considerable experience and deep knowledge of Islamic law. This work, completed in the spring of 1905, is full of quotations from the Qur'an and the *hadīth* [record of the sayings and acts of the Prophet].

Ta'ib (1830–1905) witnessed great changes in Turkestan after the Russian conquest in the 1860s. Born in Tashkent and having studied Islamic teachings in Tashkent and Kokand, he served the commander of the Kokand army, 'Alimqul Amir-i Lashkar (?–1865) as a *shighāvul* (senior master of ceremonies). Distinguished by his talents as a secretary, he engaged in diplomatic negotiations with Russia, Afghanistan, China, and Britain, and participated in defensive campaigns led by 'Alimqul against the Russian army. After the heroic death of his master and the fall of Tashkent, he emigrated into Kashghar to serve a new Muslim ruler in Xinjiang, Ya'qub Bek (?–1877), who appointed him the governor of Yarkand. Losing his second master, he left for India and at the beginning of 1880 returned to Kokand, which was then under Russian rule. In 1886 he was elected a qadi (civil judge) in Kokand and continued to work as a Muslim official under the Russian administration. In his last years he dedicated himself to writing historical works and other treatises including *The Life of 'Alimqul*⁸ and *A Gift of Ta'ib*.

In this treatise we see his positive evaluation of Russian rule in Turkestan despite his early experiences of battles with Russians. He says:

In those days when the sun of the khanate of Ferghana and Turkestan [the Khanate of Kokand] declined and at last the period of their sovereignty came to an end, Russian and Christian governors and lieutenants occupied the regions of this country and the foundations of their authority strengthened. Since then, Russians and Muslims have mingled with each other to reinforce their mutual relationship.⁹

Having witnessed the military and technical superiority of Russia, Ta'ib realized that Muslim resistance to the Russian army was futile, as dem-

and Tokyo, 2002).

8 Recently the Chaghatay Turkic text with English translation and notes was published. Mulla Muhammad Yunus Djan Shighavul Dadkhah Tashkandi [Ta'ib], *The Life of 'Alimqul: A Native Chronicle of Nineteenth Century Central Asia*, ed. and trans. Timur K. Beisembiev (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

9 *Tuhfa-yi Tā'ib*, p. 3 [24b].

onstrated by many defeats. While condemning the pointless fights conducted by ‘Abd al-Rahman Aftabachi and Fulat khan against the Russian army in the Ferghana Valley, he praises the Bukharan Amir Muzaffar’s (r. 1860–1885) decision of “opening the gate of peace” with Russians “in order not to lose his country and sovereignty.”¹⁰ Here we can remember that Ta’ib’s contemporary, a historian of East Turkestan, Mulla Musa (1836?–1917?), who also participated in the *jihād* against Qing rule and witnessed the collapse of the Muslim state established by Ya’qub Bek in Xinjiang, in later years justified his fellow Muslims’ submission to the Qing Emperor, repudiating the attempts of *jihād*. If Mulla Musa justified the submission by a moral norm of ancient Turkic origin, the “obligation of salt,” (the obedience of the obligee to his benefactor), Ta’ib did it based on the Hanafi law school tradition in Turkestan.¹¹

Accepting Russian rule, Ta’ib did not admit to any need of *jihād* and admonished against any *fitna* [rebellion], because he believed that the situation of Turkestan was *Dār al-Islām*.

At present, the population of the Ferghana Valley and Turkestan should make use of their positive conditions as much as possible. This country can be considered *Dār al-Islām*, where Muslim *qādīs* and officials work. Islamic law, *Shari’a*, is enforced by those in power. It is a great situation for them to be able to solve any legal issues according to *Shari’a*. They should give thanks . . . [However,] it is known that if [Muslim] officials neither undertake work nor accept the responsibilities of their offices, and Christian governors who rule these countries leave legal matters in the hands of Christian judges [here the author uses the Russian term *sud’ya*], and other civil affairs in the hands of Russians, then this province would become *Dār al-Harb*. It would be no use to regret this later on.¹²

According to Ta’ib, Muslim *qādīs* and officials were essential to keep order in Muslim society, in other words, to sustain the *Dār al-Islām* even under Russian rule. When Muslim *qādīs* and officials failed to carry out their responsibilities, Muslim society turned into *Dār al-Harb* and lost its

10 *Tuhfa-yi Tā’ib*, p. 22 [40a/40b].

11 As to Mulla Musa see HAMADA Masami, “‘Shio no gimu’ to ‘seisen’ tono aida de,” *Toyoshi kenkyū* 52, no. 2 (1993), pp. 122–148; HAMADA Masami, “Jihād, hijra et «devoir du sel» dans l’histoire du Turkestan oriental,” *Turcica* 33 (2001), pp. 35–61.

12 *Tuhfa-yi Tā’ib*, p. 17 [36a–36b].

communal identity and social cohesion. We find such understanding in writings of other intellectuals. For example, one of the first reformists in the Ferghana Valley, Ishaqkhan Tura ibn Junaydallah Khwaja 'Ibrat (1862–1937)¹³ writes in his Turkic treatise *Mizān al-Zamān* in a more optimistic way:

In former years [under the reign of the Kokand khans] the guidance of ordinary people [according to *Shari'a*] was under the jurisdiction of the president of Islam (*ra'īs-i Islām*). In these days, all the works belong to the ulama and learned men, who are leading people to the right way to progress and improvement. Their service is considered a great national contribution.¹⁴

As is well known, Russian authorities in Turkestan, avoiding interference in socio-cultural issues in Muslim society, put Islamic jurisprudence and local administration into the hands of Muslim representatives, civil judges (*qādīs*) and county chiefs (*mingbāshis*) with some institutional reforms such as the introduction of election system. Although Ta'ib elaborated the logic of *Dār al-Islām* under Russian rule, it is undeniable that in reality the concept of *Dār al-Islām* was maintained by the Russian policy of “disregarding” Islam in colonial Turkestan introduced by the first governor-general K. P. von Kaufman (r. 1867–1882).

In general, both Ta'ib and 'Ibrat were receptive to the new civilization brought about by Russians. The latter, citing an alleged *hadīth* “Seek for science even from China,”¹⁵ encouraged people to obtain modern science and to spread the New Method schools in Turkestan. They are

13 Born in Turaqurgan, near Namangan, and having studied in a madrasa in Kokand (1878–1886), 'Ibrat opened a New Method school in his village. On the occasion of the *hajj* he traveled extensively in the Ottoman lands and India, and later made a trip into Kashghar and China. Endowed with extensive learning, he published a wide range of works. From 1908 to 1917 he worked as a *qādī* in his birth place. His treatise *Mizān al-Zamān* is supposed to have been written just after the October Revolution in 1917. Later engaged in educational works under the Soviet regime, he disappeared in the waves of repression in 1937.

14 Ishaqkhan Tura ibn Junaydallah Khwaja, *Mizān al-Zamān*, podgotovka k izdaniiu, predislovie, redaktsiia teksta: Khisao Komattsu [KOMATSU Hisao], Bakhtiyar Babadzhanov, Islamic Area Studies Project Central Asian Research Series 2 (Tashkent and Tokyo, 2001), p. 15 [14a].

15 *Mizān al-Zamān*, p. 4 [3b]. Most of the Jadid intellectuals used this *hadīth* to legitimate their arguments for introducing foreign but modern culture into Muslim society.

common in evaluating the economic and cultural development in Turkestan under Russian rule. 'Ibrat describes a remarkable change in the way of life among the ordinary people who abandoned an idle life to adopt a punctual and diligent way of doing business under the new conditions.¹⁶

In his discussion 'Ibrat does not forget to mention his opponents who exhibited fanaticism against every innovation and foreign product and denounced them heretical (*bid'a*).¹⁷ He describes an example of these fanatical mullahs who prohibited in a mosque the use of an oil lamp filled with oil produced in Russia. Despite its usefulness for the public it was declared unlawful (*harām*). Only about five years later he found that those mullahs were making use of the same oil lamps.¹⁸ It is true that 'Ibrat considered these mullahs as a great obstacle to socio-cultural reform. However, these conservative or simple-minded mullahs were not the major opponents for Ta'ib.

The Andijan Uprising and Muslim Intellectuals' Responses to It

In the end of the introductory part of the *Tuhfa-yi Tā'ib*, after relating the peaceful relationship between Russians and Muslims, Ta'ib writes as follows:

[However] A group of ignorant Sufis, who neither provided any learning nor gained any knowledge, was absorbed in hypocritical devotions and self-adoring diversions. . . . According to their corrupt thinking, houses where Russians and Christians lived, carpets on which they sat, and food served on dishes that were touched or used by them were to be considered impure and deficient . . . [Furthermore] they dared to have contempt and make fun of *qādīs* in front of people, although *qādīs* undertook their legal duties with the consent of Muslims to make legal decisions and to satisfy the

16 *Mizān al-Zamān*, p. 20 [19b]. As to positive evaluation of Russian rule see also Mullā 'Ālim Makhdūm Hājji, *Ta'rikh-i Turkistān* (Tashkent, 1915), pp. 164–168.

17 *Mizān al-Zamān*, p. 25 [24b].

18 *Mizān al-Zamān*, p. 16 [15a/15b].

needs of believers.¹⁹

Despite the established order in Turkestan under Russian rule, Ta'ib was much annoyed with "ignorant Sufis" who hated Russians and every foreign element. Furthermore these hypocritical Sufis publicly held contempt for Muslim judges, probably including Ta'ib himself. Given that Muslim judges were a pillar of the *Dār al-Islām* under Russian rule, such an insult was intolerable for him. Further reading leads us to understand who the main opponent for the author was. In the latter part of the *Tuhfa-yi Tā'ib*, reflecting the recent history of Turkestan and Ferghana, Ta'ib writes as follows:

However, in this country there are so many wretches, rascals, and Sufis who are worse than mad dogs in bazaars and doing nothing other than mischievous acts . . . Oppressed people, being under their control, could not afford to eliminate these instigators of *fitna* [rebellion]. Muhammad 'Ali, the mischievous shaykh of Mingtepa, once he was poor, was engaged in spindle making, and later pretended to be a great *murshid* [spiritual guide in Sufism]. By serving meals to ordinary people, he succeeded in inciting common people to obey him. Mean-spirited men from various groups and tribes rushed to his *khānqāh* [monastery]. Due to their extreme ignorance they gave high praise to this stupid man. Although Russian governors and officials witnessed the great mass of these rascals, they did not take enough measures to control them . . . In 1313 A.H., Muhammad 'Ali incited a rebellion [against Russians]. This revolt deprived Islam of its shine, and all the Muslims were driven away from the house of peace. Peaceful Egypt was damaged and the ease of the Nile turned into a mirage. Many people were executed and expelled from the country. The shaykh himself was sentenced to death due to this disgrace.²⁰

It was Muhammad 'Ali, widely known as Dukchi Ishan,²¹ in the Ferghana Valley who Ta'ib described as the main opponent in his *Tuhfa-yi Tā'ib*. Dukchi Ishan was the leader of the Andijan Uprising in 1898, which aimed to expel the Russians from the Ferghana Valley to establish a Muslim state. This rebellion is known as one of the most significant events in Russian Turkestan. On the dawn of May 18, 1898, two thou-

19 *Tuhfa-yi Tā'ib*, p. 3 [24b/25a].

20 *Tuhfa-yi Tā'ib*, p. 23 [41a/41b].

21 *Īshān* is a Central Asian term for Sufi shaykhs and their "noble" descendants.

sand Muslim partisans commanded by Dukchi Ishan attacked Russian troops stationed at Andijan. This sudden attack ended unsuccessfully and the leaders, including Dukchi Ishan, were executed; however, it was the first true threat to Russian rule in Turkestan since its conquest in the middle of the 1860s. In order to consider the position and thoughts of Ta'ib regarding the uprising we need to look at Dukchi Ishan and his followers briefly.²²

Muhammad 'Ali [Madali] was born around 1856 at Chimion qishlaq, located in the southeastern Ferghana Valley. His father, Muhammad Sabir, was supposedly an émigré from Kashghar. Many Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, called *Qashgharlik* in the Ferghana Valley, immigrated to that valley when Muslim rebellions were suppressed repeatedly by the Qing authorities during the nineteenth century.²³ After serving some local *ishāns*, Muhammad 'Ali became a *murīd* [disciple] of a Naqshbandiya-Mujaddidiya shaykh, Ishan Sultankhan Torä, who enjoyed considerable status in the eastern Ferghana Valley.²⁴ Through devoted service to this *ishān*, Madali succeeded in gaining his master's confidence, and at last he was appointed a *khalīfa* [successor] of his venerable master. After his death in 1882 Madali began to work as an independent *ishān*. In the mid-1890s he was known a prominent Muslim leader in the Ferghana Valley, the most fertile and densely populated region in Russian Turkestan. We can consider some factors that promoted him to the position of an eminent *ishān*.

First, in 1886, when he was thirty-three years old, Dukchi Ishan made

22 For the details of the Andijan Uprising, see KOMATSU Hisao, "The Andijan Uprising Reconsidered," in SATO Tsugitaka, ed., *Muslim Societies: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 29–61.

23 For example, according to a Russian source, in the late 1820s after an unsuccessful intervention in the Muslim revolt in Kashgharia, Muhammad 'Ali Khān of Kokand decided to immigrate 70,000 Muslim families from Kashgharia under Qing rule to the Ferghana Valley. Although most of them returned to their homeland after the conclusion of the peace treaty, the town of Shahrikhan and its suburbs were inhabited mostly by the Kashgharis. "Obozrenie kokandskogo khanstva v nyneshnem ego sostoianii," *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva* 3 (1849), p. 196.

24 As to Sultankhan Torä see, KAWAHARA Yayoi, "Kokando hankoku ni okeru Maruginan no tora tachi: Nakushubandi kyodan kei no seija ichizoku ni kansuru ichi kosatsu [The Türas of Margilan in the Kokand Khanate: A Consideration on a Naqshbandi Saint Family]," *Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies*, no. 20-2 (2005), pp. 277, 282–283.

his pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. In general the pilgrimage gave *īshāns* an even better reputation among their followers. In Dukchi Ishan's case he claimed to have received some spiritual instructions from the Prophet in a dream during his stay in Medina. According to his work *'Ibrat al-Ghāfilīn*,²⁵ the Prophet, attended by Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman and 'Ali, appointed him a Caliph to guide fellow Muslims in the right way.

Second, Dukchi Ishan devoted himself to charitable services such as feeding the needy and medical care, as noted by Ta'ib. In the 1890s the Ferghana Valley went through both outbreaks of cholera, which resulted in ten thousand deaths in 1892, and repeated large famines. These famines may be considered artificial disasters, because a disorderly spread of cotton fields had deprived the Ferghana Valley of its original capacity to be self-sufficient for food. In such a critical situation the devoted *īshān* would have been recognized as a "*mahdī*" by the Ferghani Muslims.

Third, the image of the *Mahdī*-saint was circulated by many *karāmat* [miracle] stories created by Dukchi Ishan's sincere *murīds*. In fact they left an anonymous Turkic work, the so-called *Manāqib-i Dūkchī Īshān* [The Miracle Stories of Dukchi Ishan].²⁶ In this collection of miracle stories that succeeded the rich tradition of *Manāqib* literature in Central Asia, Dukchi Ishan is given the highest rank of *murshid*, equal to Baha' al-Din Naqshband (1318–1389). His miracle stories are found also in his *'Ibrat al-Ghāfilīn*, which tells how Dukchi Ishan often dreams of the Prophet and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, and receives their favors and spiritual instructions. Needless to say, the visible and invisible *karāmat* enhanced the charismatic authority of Dukchi Ishan in the Muslim society of the Ferghana Valley.

Fourth, he succeeded in gaining a great number of *murīds*, not only among the sedentary population such as Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kashgharis,

25 As to this work see B. M. Babadžanov, "Dūkchī Īshān und der Aufstand von Andīzan 1898," in Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper, Allen J. Frank, eds, *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, vol. 2, *Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1998), pp. 167–191.

26 *Manāqib-i Dūkchī Īshān (Anonim zhitīia Dūkchī Īshāna – predvoditelīa Andīzhanskogo vosstaniia 1898 goda)*, vvedenie, perevod i kommentarii: B. M. Babadžanov, Izdatel': A. fon Kiugel'gen (Almaty, 2004).

but also among the nomadic and semi-nomadic Kyrgyz people. Their Islamization began in the second half of the seventeenth century and the degree of Islamization was more remarkable in southern Kyrgyzstan surrounding the Ferghana Valley. It was the Naqshbandi *īshāns* who propagated Islam among these nomadic Kyrgyz who held their own pre-Islamic traditions and beliefs in southern Kyrgyzstan. *Īshāns* recruited their *murīds* patiently among Kyrgyz nomads and, visiting them periodically, received a great amount of livestock as *nazr* [dedications]. Dukchi Ishan succeeded such predecessors in southern Kyrgyzstan. Near the Kyrgyz area he built a small mosque, which served as one of the most active centers of his *tariqa* [Sufi order], and every summer he traveled among his Kyrgyz *murīds* that constituted the main body of his *tariqa*. At the same time they were enthusiastic advocates of the holy war to drive out Russian peasant immigrants from the Ferghana Valley.

Dukchi Ishan's firm position in the Muslim society of the eastern Ferghana Valley is testified by the following facts. First the *khānqāh* complex constructed in Mingtepa qishlaq located 35 kilometers south of Andijan is to be noted. Around his *khānqāh* with a mosque there existed a set of structures, such as a minaret 20 meters high, some *mihmānkhāna* or *hājjiikhānas* (guest houses), *āshkhāna* (soup kitchen), *maktab* (school) for 250 pupils, a large *atkhāna* (stable) accommodating 500 horses, and some workshops for brick making and milling. All of them were built and maintained by his *murīds*. The large scale of this complex appearing in the countryside of the Ferghana Valley would sufficiently demonstrate the prestige of Dukchi Ishan.

Secondly, we have a Persian document of agreement composed in Safer 1312 AH or August 1894 by ten *mingbāshis* (*volostnoi upravitel'*: county chief) and some elders in eastern Ferghana. The contents may be summarized as follows:

As it is all obvious to the almighty God, a part of the Muslim community, because of their excessive carelessness and complete ignorance, are committing abominable deeds such as abandonment of community (*tark-i jamā'at*), nonfulfillment of religious duties and orders, ingestion of intoxicating drinks, immorality of women, and injustice in bazaars. Thereupon, we will entrust Mulla Muhammad 'Ali Ishan, son of Muhammad Sabir Sufi, with all authority to instruct us on what is approved by canonical law, to prevent us from

committing unlawful acts, and to punish offenders according to *Shari'a*.²⁷

This document clearly shows that Dukchi Ishan was charged with the purification of the Muslim community from its corrupted situation. This coincides with the main spirit of the *'Ibrat al-Ghāfilīn*, which lacks any kind of mystical preaching and instructs fellow Muslims to live in accordance with *Shari'a*. As analyzed by Bakhtiyar Babadjanov,²⁸ Dukchi Ishan, recalling the glorious days of the Prophet and the first four Caliphs when true Islam prevailed, severely criticized fellow Muslims for their corruption, ignorance, and deviation from *Shari'a*. Among others he criticized Muslim notables, established ulama and hereditary *īshāns* for their ignorance and corruption. We find in his alleged sayings as follows:

Betrayers and those Muslims who act craftily in front of God and people exploit our people and deprave them by every method until they incur God's wrath and get a totally bad reputation with the help of Satan. Due to the temptation of disgusting Satan and the maneuvers of our betrayers, there is no *qādī* who is fair and impossible to bribe.²⁹

His criticism of *qādīs* reminds us of Ta'ib's blame for the "ignorant Sufis" who "made fun of *qādīs* in front of people." There was a clear opposition between Dukchi Ishan and Ta'ib as to the legitimacy of *qādīs*. As a matter of fact, the 1886 Statute for the Turkestan region (*krai*) introduced an election system for local administrators that replaced the former appointment system and gave extensive powers to the civil judge in place of *qādīs*. However, this new election system unfamiliar to Muslim people brought about all kinds of unlawful acts and misfeasance in the local administration, especially in judicial matters. It can be said that Dukchi Ishan's criticism was not misdirected on this point.

In the introduction of the *'Ibrat al-Ghāfilīn*, he wrote that he aimed to explain the principles of Islam (such as *tawhīd* and *imān*), and to discuss approved acts and objectionable deeds according to the canonical law to

27 Fazilbek Atabekoghli, *Dukchi Ishan Vaqe'isi: Fārghanādā istibdad jālladlāri* (Samarkand, 1927), p. 29 [Facsimile of the Persian text].

28 Babadzanov, "Dūkčī Īšān," pp. 167-191; B. Babadzanov, "Andizhanskoe vosstanie 1898 goda: 'Dervishskii gazavat' ili antikolonial'noe vystuplenie?" *O'zbekiston Tarixi* 2 (2001), pp. 25-30.

29 V. P. Nalivkin, *Tuzemtsy ran'she i teper'* (Tashkent, 1913), p. 133.

rid their society of its present evils. In this work Dukchi Ishan explained the most elementary principles of Islam such as the Five Pillars as well as the manners of purification before worship and religious services. It seems that his followers did not have any fundamental knowledge of Islam. In other words, Dukchi Ishan engaged in the re-Islamization of the people through his preaching of a true Islam based on *Shari'a* and the *Sunna*.

Finally, we must consider the *ra'īs* office, one of the features of Dukchi Ishan's *tariqa*. It consisted of some *khalīfas*, who acted for the *īshān* in remote places, *ra'īs*es [supervisors of religious order and practice], and approximately twenty thousands common *murīds*, an outstanding number in those days. In such a *tariqa*, absolute obedience to their shaykh was generally emphasized and the *murīds* were often compared to a corpse before a washer of the dead. But according to a Russian official report, Dukchi Ishan did not require of his *murīds* unconditional submission and compelled neither dedication nor donation. Dukchi Ishan asked of them only observance of Islamic law and practice, and it was the *ra'īs* that were charged with their supervision. The appointment of *ra'īs* began in 1895. They are reported to have carried a *darra* (whip for punishments) granted by Dukchi Ishan. The comment of Lieutenant General Korol'kov on this *ra'īs* office is worth noting, because when "nominees of the ishan exercised authority parallel to ours," it meant the existence of dual power.³⁰ This situation also reminds us of the Adalat, the so-called Wahhabi organization that emerged in Namangan in the early 1990s.

In the mid-1890s Dukchi Ishan, commanding a large *tariqa* based in his *khānqāh*, was exercising an authority that paralleled the Russian power. He had become a prominent Muslim leader in the Ferghana Valley both in name and reality. A contemporary Muslim official, Muhammad 'Aziz, who was working at the district office of Marghilan at the time of the Andijan Uprising, describes Dukchi Ishan as follows:

He never spared efforts in offering his hospitality to every guest. The number of his *murīds* was superior to that of any other groups' (*tāyfa, jamā'alar*) and a great amount of provisions dedicated to this *īshān* was generously distributed to the poor. When he found ulama among his guests, he used to ask

30 "Andizhanskoe vosstanie v 1898 g.," *Krasnyi arkhiv* 88 (1938), pp. 146, 173.

questions regarding the regulations of namaz, fasting, and pilgrimage to the holy cities, and discussed issues regarding generosity toward poor widows and the righteous way of Muslims according to the Qur'an and *hadīth*.³¹

The large *tariqa* of Dukchi Ishan is worthy of note. It included all the ethnic groups in the Ferghana Valley, such as Turks, Kashgharis, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz. His active *tariqa* succeeded in integrating such various social groups as wanderers, peasants, nomads, and even some notables. It provides us with an example of the formation of a communal order in a Central Asian Muslim society. The *tariqa*, which penetrated even into the stratum of Muslim officials, would suggest the vitality of Isha-nism.

Dukchi Ishan's activities, while showing many aspects of folk Islam, clearly proclaimed Islamic orthodoxy, as seen in his adherence to *Sharī'a* and the Sunna. In the Ferghana Valley, where there were neither Muslim political powers nor the judicial organization of ulama who could defend *Sharī'a* sufficiently, he could pretend to realize a Muslim communal identity in social and political spheres. His *tariqa*, following the Naqshbandi tradition in Central Asia, operated for the re-Islamization in the Ferghana Valley that underwent great changes under Russian rule.

The Andijan Uprising awakened wide responses among Turkestan Muslims. As far as published works and views are concerned, they were exclusively negative to Dukchi Ishan and his rebellion as seen in Ta'ib.³² For example, Mirza 'Abd al-'Azim Sami (1838–1907), a contemporary Bukharan historian, condemned "the reckless act" of Dukchi Ishan as follows:

After drawing his *murīds* from amongst many people in Ferghana, Tashkent, Osh and other cities, he was captured by a strong desire to be eminent because of his great wealth and great number of *murīds*. He decided to assault Christians and attacked the railway station at Andijan, but because of the

31 Muḥammad 'Aziz Marghilānī, *Tārīkh-i 'Azizī*, Biruni Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, Manuscript No. 11108, 184a–184b. This work is published in modern Uzbek: Muḥammād Āziz Mārghilāniy, *Tārīkhi Āzizii: Fārghanā char mustāmlākāsi dāvridā*, nāshrgā tāiyarlovchilār: Shadman Vahidov, Dilaram Sāngirova (Tashkent, 1999).

32 For a recent study see also Aftandil Erkinov, "Andizhanskoe vosstanie i ego predvoditel' v otsenkakh poetov epokhi," *Vestnik Evrazii* 1 (2003), pp. 111–137.

counterattack of the Russian army, his attempt ended in total failure. [They say,] when a member of a tribe commits a shameful act, all the members of the tribe, irrespective of age, lose their honor. During the reign of Tsar Alexander [*sic*], who brought peace to the country through his justice, the people of Andijan caused disturbances against the *fatvā-yi musālemat* [legal pronouncement on peace].³³

Although Sami gives no detail about the *fatvā-yi musālemat*, supposedly most of the Hanafi school ulama in Turkestan approved this legal order to accept Russian rule as seen in the *Tuhfa-yi Tā'ib*. They denounced Dukchi Ishan not only because he brought to Turkestan Muslims such great calamities as a number of Muslim casualties caused by the Russian repression and the heavy indemnities imposed by the authorities, but also because he broke the *fatva* accepted by most of the Turkestani ulama. The rebellion of Dukchi Ishan was considered nothing other than a thoughtless and harmful act by those Muslim intellectuals who had witnessed the overwhelming power of Russia that subjugated Central Asian khanates a few decades prior. They were keen to prevent any *fitna* that could not only break the peaceful order under Russian rule, but also bring about a great schism among Turkestani Muslims. We suppose Ta'ib observed the rising of Dukchi Ishan as a terrible challenge against the established order. His all manners of abuse against Dukchi Ishan makes it impossible for us to imagine him as a hero of the national liberation movement against the Tsarist rule as described in the recent Uzbek historiography.

Restraint of rebellion against Russian rule was not only the case of Turkestani ulama. In 1900 even Abdurreshid Ibrahim (1857–1944), an ardent Pan-Islamist Tatar intellectual in Russia, preferred enlightenment of Muslim peoples to any resistance or rebellion against Russian rule. He writes:

It does not matter if Tatars raise a rebellion [against Russian rule]. Indeed,

33 Mirzā 'Abd al-'Azīm Sāmī, *Ta'riḫ-i Salāṭīn-i Manghūṭīya*, Izdanie teksta, predislovie, perevod i primečaniia: L. M. Epifanova (Moscow, 1962), 121b–122a. As to Sāmī's life and thought see Jo-Ann Gross, "Historical Memory, Cultural Identity, and Change: Mirza 'Abd al-'Aziz Sami's Representation of the Russian Conquest of Bukhara," in Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzarini, eds., *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 203–226.

internal rebellions bring about much more destruction to a government than any wars [with external enemies]. However, once a rebellion has been instigated, the people, by totally committing themselves to the cause, can suffer greater disasters than the government concerned. Look at rebellious peoples. Most of them were destroyed. For example, remember what dire consequences Chinese Muslims who raised a rebellion [against Qing rule] suffered. The blood of Muslims flowed as a flood. In short, any rebellion is not free from risk. Therefore, by securing our safety from within the social order as much as possible and utilizing it to advocate for science and education, we should avoid a rebellion.³⁴

Needless to say, however, nobody could publicly dare praise or refer positively to an anti-Russian uprising during the Tsarist period. Among local Muslim intellectuals we find some that sympathized with or defended Dukchi Ishan and his *murīds* even in the late Tsarist period. In fact, four years later the military governor of the Ferghana province (*oblast'*) wrote in his secret report to the Governor-General of Turkestan that despite local representative's efforts to denounce Dukchi Ishan, Muslim people remembered him as a martyr who sacrificed himself for the sake of God, and referred to his name with respect.³⁵

A Prospect of the *Dār al-Islām*

While Russian authorities' brutal repression against the Andijan Uprising prevented the Muslim population from raising any banner of *ghazavat* [holy war] until 1916, Ta'ib's arguments of the *Dār al-Islām* might have been shared by Turkestanian intellectuals during the Tsarist period. However, apart from theoretical arguments of the status of Muslim society, there was no common idea of the future of their society. In other words, there remained almost untouched an essential problem: how to sustain and develop the Muslim society threatened by growing socio-economic changes in the Russian Empire as well as by socio-political tensions at local levels due to the shortcomings of the

34 [Abdurreshid Ibrahim], *Rusya'da Müslümanlar yahud Tatar Akvamının tarihçesi, İşbu tarihçe Kazan fuzalâsından bir zatın eseridir* (Mısır [Cairo], 1318 [1900]), p. 84.

35 Älinäzär Egämnäzärov, *Siz Bilgän Dukchi Eshan: Hujjätli qissä* (Tashkent, 1994), p. 119.

Russian administration in colonial Turkestan. The task of elaborating this strategy was left to a new generation following that of Ta'ib. From this point of view a document prepared two years after the *Tuhfa-yi Tā'ib* is interesting for our consideration.

This is a draft for Muslim ecclesiastic and local administration in Turkestan (*Turkistān idāre-yi rūhānīya va dākhilīyasi*), in other words a proposal of Muslim autonomy in Turkestan. The author was one of the most influential Jadid intellectuals in Turkestan, Mahmudkhoja Behbudiy (1875–1919), who was in those days in charge of mufti [expounder of the Islamic law] in Samarkand and the members of the central committee of the Party of Muslim Union (*Ittifāq-i Muslimīn*). Encouraged by revolutionary waves in Russia, especially by political activism among Russian Muslims, Behbudiy submitted this draft of autonomy to the Muslim faction of the second and third *Duma* twice in April and November 1907.³⁶ In its preface he writes as follows:

It is necessary to provide much more autonomy (*aftānāmiya*) to Turkestan than to Muslims in European Russia because Turkestanis long ago conducted local administration by themselves and are much more eager to enjoy it than their brothers in European Russia. Turkestanis' only desire is to organize a Muslim ecclesiastic and local administration and to have men of insight as the officials. This administration is not only for ecclesiastic affairs. It should cover also civil and local administration as well as jurisdictions that are now at the disposal of *qādīs*.³⁷

This ambitious draft consists of seventy-four articles that regulate the organization and functions of the autonomy in detail. Turkestan autonomy was to be supervised by a five-year term *Shaykh al-Islām* elected from amongst the first class ulama who had a profound knowledge of *Shari'a* and contemporary affairs. The central administration of Turkestan autonomy was to be located in Tashkent, and its branches were to

36 Necip Hablomitoglu and Timur Kocaoglu, [eds.], "Behbudi'nin Türkistan Medeni Muhtariyeti Layihası / Behbudi's Project for Turkistan Cultural Autonomy," in Timur Kocaoglu, ed., *Türkistan'da Yenilik Hareketleri ve İhtilaller: 1900–1924, Osman Hoca Anısına İncelemeler* (Haarlem: SOTA, 2001), pp. 436–466. The original text is also presented. It is said that this document was preserved for many years in the archives of Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (1851–1914).

37 Ibid., pp. 439, 450–451.

be established in each province such as Syr Darya, Ferghana, Samarkand, Semirech'e (Yettisuv), and Transcaspia provinces. It is clear that this draft aimed to create a fair and appropriate judicial system which was lacking in Russian Turkestan. The seventh chapter, which contains ten articles, is dedicated to the detailed regulations of *qādīs*. The draft does not fail to mention the status of the Jews and foreigners, waqf endowments, school education, and water and land use in Turkestan. Apparently the author formulated a plan of high-degree autonomy in Turkestan. As for the echoes of the Andijan Uprising, Article 37 attracts our attention. It says:

To let Sufis, the owners of Sufi lodges, and *murīds* adapt the norms of *Sharī'a* without violating their freedom of conscience, and by this way to protect the common people from superstitions, idle talk, and waste of time.³⁸

It should be noted that this draft pays attention to the strict inspection of officials and prohibits the migration of non-Muslims into Turkestan without the request from local people. It is interesting that these two issues were related to the causes of the Andijan Uprising. Although it is unknown whether Behbudiy read the *Tuhfa-yi Tā'ib*, this draft clearly aimed to secure the cohesion of Muslim society in Turkestan by reorganizing and enhancing the two pillars of the *Dār al-Islām*. Here we can see the starting point of the Muslim autonomous movement in Turkestan.

Behbudiy's proposal regarding the establishment of Muslim ecclesiastic administration in Turkestan called for some responses from Muslim intellectuals in Russia. For example Mu'allim Karīm Qārli in Alma-Ata raised a question on the journal *Shūrā* about the status of this ecclesiastic administration in Turkestan—whether it should be independent or be attached to one of the existing Muslim Spiritual Boards in Russia.³⁹ To this question Behbudiy responded with an article "Turkestan administration" in the same journal in November 1908. In this article he described the characteristics of Russian administration in Turkestan in detail. Although admitting that Turkestani Muslims are enjoying juridical autonomy (*shar'ī āftānūmiya*) at the local level, he criticized disorder and

38 Ibid., pp. 442, 457.

39 Mu'allim Karīm Qārli, "Ālmātā shahrindan: Āsyā-yi vusṭāda muftilik haqqında su'al," *Shūrā* 20 (1908), p. 631.

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unsuitable conditions in juridical affairs. According to him these defects should have been attributed to the lack of the examination and control of *qādīs*, in other words, to the lack of central administration of juridical affairs. In conclusion, he argues for the establishment of an independent Muslim spiritual board in Turkestan. At the same time, he submitted his proposal to Count K. K. Palen (1861–1923) who conducted an extensive inspection of Russian administration in Turkestan in 1908–1909.⁴⁰ Although this plan for Turkestan autonomy was never realized, in 1917 we find Behbudiy once again in the drafting committee of the Turkic Federalist Party in Turkestan.⁴¹

40 Mahmūd Khwāja Behbūdī, "Turkistān idārasi," *Shūrā* 23 (1908), pp. 720–723.

41 For the details see "The program of the Turkic Federalist Party in Turkistan (1917)," introd. and trans. KOMATSU Hisao, in H. B. Paksoy, ed., *Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 117–126.