Maktab or School? Introduction of Universal Primary Education among the Volga-Ural Muslims

Introduction

In marked contrast with Muslims in Turkestan and the Kazakh steppe, the Volga-Ural Muslims could enjoy zemstvo, local self-government at province and county levels, which was one of the constituents of Alexander II’s Great Reforms. Zemstvos had been local promoters of universal primary education before the government began to show a serious commitment to primary education by the turn of the century and escalated its spread by reinforcing subsidies to zemstvos after the 1905 Revolution. Since the Regulations on non-Russian education in 1870, the Ministry of Education (MNP) had made a great effort to cultivate Russian education among the Muslim subjects by means of non-Russian schools and Russian language classes within maktabs and madrasas. During the same period Muslims themselves had begun to reorganize their confessional schools by introducing a new method (uṣūl-i jadīd). Zemstvos’ participation in the expansion of primary education among the Muslims, important tax payers equal to the Russian peasants, complicated the question of the Muslim schooling. After 1905 competition between the MNP and zemstvos for leadership in non-Russian education
became fiercer than ever, and two alternatives appeared before Muslims: continuing to reform Jadid maktabs for their entrance to an official school network (shkol’naia set’), or adapting ministry and zemstvo schools for Muslims’ interests.

Comparing Kazan, Ufa and Orenburg provinces, this chapter illustrates how the Volga-Ural Muslims were involved in the national project of universal primary education. It also examines different strategies that the Muslim intellectuals and villagers employed in relations with the state institutions in general and zemstvos in particular. Although historians have noticed distinctions between zemstvos and the MNP, study of imperial education policy toward Muslims has usually dealt with legislative processes in the ministries and the State Duma, operations of the local MNP officials or the Orthodox missionaries and, though not in any substantial way, Muslims’ reactions to these measures.¹ As concerns the Ufa zemstvos, Charles Steinwedel depicts their activities within the political scene on both provincial and imperial levels.² But generally, unique cooperative relationships between the local self-government and the Muslims have not been well understood.³ Dissertations on the zemstvo schools appeared only recently in Ufa and Kazan, which reflects today’s vital interest in the education policy of the Republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan.⁴ However, they accept such a stereotype as conservative Muslims’ resistance to zemstvo schools from local works of

¹ A. Kh. Makhmutova, Stanovlenie svetskogo obrazovaniia u tatar: bor’ba vokrug shkol’nogo вопrosa, 1861–1917 (Kazan, 1982); M. N. Farkhshatov, Narodnoe obrazowanie v Bashkirii v poreformennyi period, 60–90e gody XIX v. (Moscow, 1994); idem, Samoderzhavie i traditsionnye shkoly bashkir i tatar v nachale XX veka, 1900–1917 gg. (Ufa, 2000); Wayne Dowler, Classroom and Empire: The Politics of Schooling Russia’s Eastern Nationalities (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001).


³ For a valuable exception, R. Salikhov, Tatardskaia burzhuaziia Kazani i natsional’nye reformy vtoroi poloviny XIX – nachala XX v. (Kazan, 2001), chap. 3.

“national history” as well as imperial literature including Muslim intellectuals’ critiques. We will contextualize this sweeping image by considering political and administrative conditions in which Muslim communities (mahallas) and zemstvos existed.

This chapter is located also in the general context of the zemstvo study. That helps to reconsider experiences apparently peculiar to Muslims within a broader context of modernization of Russian society. The Ufa zemstvos and later the Orenburg zemstvos tried to supplement their school construction by making use of existing new-method maktabs. We can find precedent efforts in 1864–1890, when zemstvos worked for the spread of primary education by formalizing existing peasant-sponsored literacy schools. Moreover, we aim to challenge the post-1905 “zemstvo reaction” paradigm, as S. Seregny did by drawing evidence mainly from Ufa province. It has usually been said that the increase in MNP funding of universal primary schools brought about greater ministry control of the schools and insulation of zemstvo authority from the schools. However, zemstvos in this period went on to mount the most ambitious peasant-oriented campaigns in education in their entire fifty-year history. Ben Eklof’s point that the zemstvos took advantage of control over the administration of education to give shape and emphasis to policy is well applicable to the Ufa and Orenburg zemstvos’ positive measures to non-Russian schools. Indeed, rivalry between the MNP and zemtsy (zemstvo workers) was all the more serious in non-Russian education; school policy depended on what kind of “Russian citizenship” should be implanted among the non-Russians.

5 The phonetic method was “progressive” in zemstvo schools as well as Jadid schools. It caused protest also among the Russian peasants, who had learned literacy by the old method. Zhelezniakova, “Zemskaia shkola,” pp. 53, 106.
9 Steinwedel, “Invisible Threads of Empire,” chap. 7.
In administrative terms the Volga-Ural region was divided into the Kazan and Orenburg Education Districts. While the Kazan District played a leading role in planting missionary schools, the Orenburg District put its priority on organization of non-Russian schools sponsored by the zemstvos and the Ministry of Education. In 1910 almost half of non-Russian schools in the Orenburg District were operating in Ufa province. Such a situation exacerbated conflict between the Ufa zemstvos and the MNP over jurisdiction: while the ministry tried to confine the zemstvos’ participation to the financial sphere of schools, Ufa zemtsy made an effort to organize the pedagogic sphere, too. In 1909, when the introduction of universal education started from Zlatoust county, Ufa zemtsy began to take maktabs and madrasas into serious consideration.

Ufa province deserves special attention not only in terms of the relations between zemstvos and the MNP. Ufa province had the second largest Muslim population after Ferghana province in the empire, and Muslims made up half of the population in Ufa province. The zemstvos could make use of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly in Ufa, the sole Muslim authority in the Volga-Ural region, for promotion of their schooling projects among the Muslims. Importantly, Ufa zemstvos provided Muslims and zemstvos of neighbouring provinces with models of creative cooperation with Muslims in education policy. In comparison with Ufa province, Kazan zemtsy put their emphasis on the building of roads, bridges, etc. A Kazan Muslim newspaper, highly evaluating Ufa zemstvo’s contribution to Muslim education, complained that roads and

10 The Kazan District included Astrakhan, Kazan, Samara, Saratov, Simbirsk and Viatka provinces. The Orenburg District included Orenburg, Perm, Ufa provinces and two steppe provinces, Torghay and Ural’sk.


12 Zhurnaly zasedanii s’ezd direktorov i inspektov narodnykh uchilishch Orenburgskogo uchebnogo Okruga v g. Ufe 11–16 iyunia 1912 goda (Ufa, 1913), p. 316.

13 Azamatova, “Deiatel’nost’ Ufimskogo zemstva,” pp. 158, 203. Zlatoust county stood in a leading position in the province, for it was a centre of mining and metallurgical industry, which motivated the workers to have education. Farkhshatov, Narodnoe obrazovanie v Bashkirii, pp. 112.

14 Mir islama 2 (1913), p. 761.
bridges were the second or third most important needs for the people. After the introduction of zemstvos to Orenburg province in 1913, the zemtsy often referred to Ufa colleagues’ experience and directly collaborated with them. Muslims in the neighbouring Western Siberia Education District eagerly observed experiments of Ufa zemstvos.

As the introduction of universal primary education revealed disagreement between the MNP and the zemtsy over the cause of non-Russian education, the spread of standardized schools caused a polemic among the Muslim intellectuals over the coexistence of Russian citizenship and nationality. That was well reflected in a series of articles titled “Maktab or School? (Maktab mī Usqūlā mī?)” in the Muslim press during 1913–1916. The debate spread in the northern periphery of Central Eurasia, from Kazan to Tomsk. We will analyze two aspects of the argument: financial management of maḥalla, and identification of maktabs in the modernization of the imperial school system. The polemic started in a Kazan journal, Maktab in terms of the first aspect. After 1905 the new-method maktabs’ education program was increasingly approaching that of zemstvo schools. Issues in the debate developed from alternatives between maktab and school to elaboration of “a third type” of Muslim school.

The main orators of the debate were “secular” intellectuals (diyālīlar) and maktab teachers (muʿallims). Having studied in new-method

15 Yūrduz, April 10, 1914, pp. 2–3.
16 The question of introduction of zemstvos to the south-eastern frontiers (Astrakhan, Orenburg and Stavropol’ provinces) was on the agenda at nearly the same time as the western frontiers. The Muslim press also kept up with the legislative process. Waqt, November 13, 1911, p. 1; January 26, 1912, pp. 1–2.
18 I located this question in the broader context of organization of mahalla. See my “Molding the Muslim Community through the Tsarist Administration: Maḥalla under the Jurisdiction of Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly after 1905,” Acta Slavica Iaponica 23 (2006), pp. 101–123.
maktabs or non-Russian schools, they preferred pedagogic and writing activities under private patronage of mullahs or merchants, to clerical duties that were subordinated to unstable mahalla economy. The appearance of Muslim journalism in the wake of the 1905 Revolution widened their sphere of activity. Thereby, the Muslim intelligentsia, distinct from the clergy (rüḥānîlar), came into being. The introduction of universal primary education could threaten the presence of muallims: is it possible to make new-method maktabs compete with standardized state schools by mahalla’s limited sources? If these maktabs were replaced by the schools, could muallims find work there? The arguments clearly reflected the development of interaction with zemstvos and local conditions in which participants of the debate lived.

Muslims’ Attitudes toward Zemstvos’ Education Activity

The 1906 reforms and the general mobilization of the Muslim community for Duma elections had ambiguous effects on Muslim participation in zemstvo affairs. This section challenges a dichotomy in explaining Muslims’ attitudes toward schooling reform in general and zemstvos’ enterprise in particular: Jadid intellectuals as the only force of social reorganization on one hand, and the isolated, traditional, static, inward-looking common Muslim peasants, on the other. At the beginning of the twentieth century Muslim reformists exploited these stereotypes to identify their mission in the Muslim community. Today’s “national” historiographies of Kazan and Ufa contribute to the reproduction of these representations. However, we contend that it was the “national” rhetoric of the Muslim intellectuals that sometimes rendered difficult

20 Stéphane A. Dudoignon, “Status, Strategies and Discourses of a Muslim ‘Clergy’ under a Christian Law: Polemics about the Collection of the Zakât in Late Imperial Russia,” in Stéphane A. Dudoignon and Komatsu Hisao, eds., Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia: Early Eighteenth to Late Twentieth Century (London: Kegan Paul, 2001), pp. 57, 59; The reform of mahalla was needed in order to attract the young to the clerical job. Türmush, November 23, 1914, p. 1.
Maktab or School?

their negotiation with zemstvos.

After 1905 Muslim villagers increasingly began to see zemstvo support as an alternative to parish resources. In June 1905, a meeting of Bashkir representatives of Ufa province petitioned against any restrictions on Muslims’ election to zemstvo assemblies, and for sending Muslims to zemstvo executive boards in counties. Those present at the meeting also thought it necessary to open trade schools at zemstvos’ expense so that Muslim peasants could live by trade in years of bad harvest. They petitioned for sending Muslims to zemstvo executive boards in counties. Those present at the meeting also thought it necessary to open trade schools at zemstvos’ expense so that Muslim peasants could live by trade in years of bad harvest.23

The congregation of the fourth mahalla in Safarovo village, Ufa county was too poor to build maktab or madrasa by themselves, which compelled them to depend on zemstvo subsidies. However, neighbouring mullahs condemned them for infringement of the Islamic law (shari‘a). Responding to a petition from an imam of the fourth parish, the Spiritual Assembly on August 8, 1906 pronounced an opinion (fatwā) that the shari‘a did not prohibit the use of zemstvo subsidies for construction and maintenance of confessional schools.24 An Orenburg newspaper Waqt considered the fatwa “crucial for all the community (millat)” and attracted readers’ special attention.25 Later, in Safarovo, except maktabs for boys and girls, Russian-Tatar schools were opened, where 50 boys and 70 girls separately studied Russian and “Muslim language (muslimāncha).”26 At the end of 1913, when the provincial zemstvo began to establish 6 non-Russian regional libraries, one of them was placed in this village.27

The most familiar reasoning for zemstvo schools’ unpopularity has been religious conservativeness among the Muslims and mullahs’ stub-

23 Protokol Ufimskogo Gubernskogo Soveshchaniia, obrazovannogo s razresheniiia G. Ministra Vnutrennikh Del iz doverennykh bashkirskikh volostei Ufimskoi gubernii dlia obsuzhdeniiia voprosov, kasaushchikhsia magometanskoi religii i vooobshche nuzhd bashkirskogo naseleniia: 22, 23 i 25 iyunia 1905 goda (Ufa, 1905), pp. 18–19.


25 Waqt, August 19, 1906, p. 3; August 26, 1906, p. 1.

26 Waqt, January 15, 1914, p. 3.

27 Waqt, December 10, 1913, p. 2. One of the libraries was also placed in Yāngā Qārā-māli village, Sterlitamak county, where Mirsaid Sultangaliev was appointed as library head.
born resistance against “the centres of Christianization.” But first of all, it is worthwhile comparing the Muslim case with a history of Russian literacy schools in the latter half of the nineteenth century; seeing the existence of literacy schools as an indicator of latent demand for education, zemstvos incorporated them into the primary schooling system. In this process the Russian peasants also stressed religious instruction, and teachers found that its inclusion was a way to win their support for the school. While zemstvo funds were limited, peasant communes retained the initiative not only in funding schools but also in school curricula. As “Maktab or School” debate suggested, Muslims also tried to share in school management with zemtsy so that maktabs and schools lived up to “national spirit (millī rūḥ).”

The extent to which officials of the Ministry of the Interior intervened in Muslim affairs also defined the range of zemstvo operations and Muslims’ participation in them. While persecution of Jadids equated with “Pan-Islamists” was in full swing after 1905 especially in Kazan province, the Ufa and Orenburg governors even refuted arguments of central MVD officials, pointing out that “fanatical” mullahs denounced “the progressive” lest the former lose their prestige and material base. To be sure, the Ufa governor tried to eliminate Muslim deputies from zemstvos, just as Stolypin did against the Poles in the western provinces. However, Petr Koropachinskii, provincial zemstvo chairman with Kadet sympathies, managed to avoid conflicts with the governor. It was his initiative that promoted the collaboration with Jadid intellectuals.

Moreover, recent studies of various Muslim communities in Central Eurasia demonstrate the existence of internal politics that were caused by competition over the state’s patronage and distribution of “cultural”

30 Farkhshatov, Samoderzhavie i traditsionnye shkoly, pp. 67–68, 211–218. It should be added that the Orthodox missionaries’ influence on the MVD operations was obvious in Kazan province. See my paper presented at the VII ICCEES World Congress in Berlin (July 28, 2005), “Political Reliability: The Kazan Provincial Governorship and the Control of the Muslim Clergies (1905–1917).”
Maktab or School?

and financial capital. It follows from these arguments that the growing interaction with the Russian authorities after 1905 activated the politics inside the Muslim communities, and that conflicts of interests thereby limited their approach to zemstvos. While some tried to make use of zemstvos to maintain the mahalla life, others could invite the security police to stop such an innovation under the rubric of defence of the shari‘a. In Kazan province, where police intervention intensified after 1905, it might not have been easy for the Muslims to call for zemstvo support. Peasants of Shemiakovo village in Mamadysh county agreed to build a madrasa with a Russian language class by accepting financial assistance from the county zemstvo and Ni‘mat Allâh ‘Abbâsuf, a fellow-villager merchant living in Irgiz, Torghay province. But this enraged their mullah Davletsha Ibatullin, who had studied in Bukhara and stuck to “Bukharan order.” In order to remove the mullah, the parishioners informed on him to the provincial authorities, claiming that he had been once in contact with “Mukhamedgalii,” i.e., Dukchi Ishan, a leader of the Andizhan uprising. The mullah and his supporters tried to convince the police of the merchant’s “political disloyalty,” depicting him as a “Pan-Islamist.”

Along with the persecution of Jadids, it was due to parallelism and egalitarianism in Kazan intellectuals’ rhetoric of “national” interests that negotiation with the zemtsy did not bring about the same results as in Ufa province. For protection of “national spirit,” they usually insisted on maktabs’ parallel existence with the state and zemstvo schools, and on the government’s equal subsidizing of both church-parish schools and maktabs. The distinction in formation of the Muslim intelligentsia in Kazan and Ufa provinces also seems to have told on their different


33 Natsional’nyi arkhiv Respubliki Tatarstan (NART), f. 1 (Kantseliariia kazanskogo gubernatora), op. 6, d. 835.
strategies in the negotiation with zemstvos. Kazan reformists were originally those peasants and their children who had moved to Kazan in the 1870s and 1880s. It was their success in business that enabled them to take the initiative in reorganizing urban Muslim life. On the other hand, many Ufa Muslim leaders were from noble families who had served in the state institutions and the local self-government in the province. This fact may account for their practiced collaboration with the zemtsy.

In October 1906 in the Kazan county zemstvo assembly, the executive board admitted the necessity of native-language zemstvo schools that should be freed of missionary and Russification tasks. However, the Muslim subcommittee headed by Galimjan Barudi (1857–1921), a founder of the first new-method maktab in Kazan, proposed that subsidies be allocated to existing maktabs and madrasas without the obligation of learning Russian, and that the schooling program be made exclusively on the resolutions of the third All-Russian Muslim Congress in August 1906. Hence the confessional schools should be under the supervision of the Spiritual Assembly. Criticizing the subcommittee, which only demanded money and dismissed Russian education and the zemstvo’s administration of schools, Waqt stressed that it was no use fearing the learning of Russian and zemstvo schools after the declaration of “freedom of conscience.”

Thus, whereas the Muslim peasants engaged in communal politics, resorting to “open” interactions with the state institutions, reform-minded Kazan intellectuals could not find common language with the zemtsy due to their “closed” understanding of “national” interests. In 1912 the head of police in Mamadysh county reported to the governor that the common people, not afraid of the MNP’s control, petitioned for zemstvo schools, although the Tatar intelligentsia, out of the fear of the people’s Russification, demanded the approval of their own general education program and the supervision of maktabs and madrasas under the Muslim clergy.

34 Salikhov, Tatarskaia burzhuziia Kazani, pp. 24, 29.
37 NART, f. 2 (Kazanskoe gubernskoe pravlenie), op. 2, d. 8958, ll. 17–19ob.
Maktab or School?

If the interpenetration of the imperial law and Islamic idioms was a principle of the organization of the Muslim community in the Volga-Ural region, then how did religious scholars, ṭūḥānīlar, try to interpret the support of the local self-government in theological terms? A former member (Qādī) of the Spiritual Assembly Riḍā’ al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn abandoned egalitarianism with the Orthodox parish schools. He considered permanent financial resources for maktabs and madrasas to be subsidies of the local self-government and Islamic income tax (zakāt) imposed on possessions of the rich according to the shari’a. Fakhr al-Dīn proved that expenditure of zakat on maktabs and madrasas lived up to “God’s Path (Ṣabīl Allāh)” in the sixtieth verse of the ninth chapter of Qur’ān which defines the use of zakat. Explaining that “God’s Path” comprised the reinforcement of Islam and public welfare (masāliḥ-i ʿāmma), he justified the self-government’s support by this concept of public welfare. However, as far as universal primary education is concerned, it is possible that Fakhr al-Dīn still could not detect what this state project would bring to the imperial Muslim community. Keeping parallelism with the state schools, he only called for the Muslims’ own efforts to secure religious and “national” knowledge (dīnī wa millī ʿilm).

The huge investment of the Ministry of Education in widening the school network subjected the imperial education system to unprecedented transformation. The predominance of the state expenditure was thought to allow the ministry officials to take over the pedagogic leadership from the local self-government. However, the Ufa zemstvos strove to maintain their authority over education in general and non-Russian schooling in particular. As zemstvos elaborated their own cause of education and unique approach to the non-Russian population, the Muslim intellectuals were in their turn compelled to employ other tactics, instead of parallelism and egalitarianism.

38 See my “Molding the Muslim Community.”
Zemstvo, Muslims, Ministry of Education in Ufa Province

Disagreement between zemstvos and the Ministry of Education over the perspective of universal primary education and reorganization of primary schools reached the highest stage in 1900–1907. On one hand, the ministry planned to introduce universal schooling by integrating all primary schools but Synod ones under its common direction and inspection. But in the State Duma, on the other hand, the ministry was obliged to promise allocation from its budget to zemstvos so that schools could be much more accessible to the local population.40

The law of May 3, 1908 on distribution of 6 million 900 thousand roubles to primary schools served as the first powerful spur for zemstvos. To be eligible, the county zemstvos had to submit a plan for realizing universal education within ten years. They were required to maintain existing outlays on education and to relieve the peasant communities of all obligations for school facilities. In addition, all schools had to have fully certified teachers and offer a four-year course of instruction.41 Muslims were also attracted to the liberation from the maintenance of schools; if they began to go to new state schools, there would be no need to take pains to seek resources for their maktabs. But was it possible to abandon maktabs altogether? That was the crux of the debate over “Maktab or School.”

In Ufa province the question about the school network for the Muslim population was on the agenda already in 1908. Before the provincial zemstvo assembly in that year, Muslim lawyer I. A. Akhtiamov, whose father had been head of the Belebei county board, presented a report to the school commission within the zemstvo executive board. He stressed that realization of universal education required the Muslims’ entrance into the school network. He considered it possible to achieve universal education for Muslim boys in ten years, if not for girls. It deserves attention that Akhtiamov considered it necessary to find a new type of Muslim school that would provide knowledge in the native language as well

41 Eklof, Russian Peasant Schools, p. 117.
Maktab or School?

as in Russian. In order to elaborate a program of the new schools, he suggested that the executive board invite to a conference representatives from both zemstvo and ministry schools and maktabs. Akhtiamov also insisted that teachers’ schools be opened in Ufa both for men and women. The school commission added to his report that stipends to the Kazan Tatar Teachers’ School should be intensified by county and provincial zemstvos.42

When the zemstvo assembly was convened in 1908, the provincial executive board criticized the county boards’ reluctance to incorporate the Muslims in the school network on grounds of their unwillingness to go to neither zemstvo nor ministry schools. The provincial executive board claimed that the fact that maktabs and madrasas were managed by the people themselves and were filled with pupils was a sufficient indicator of their aspiration for literacy and knowledge. The executive board recognized that Muslims had not seen any difference between the state policy of Russification and the zemstvo activity of enlightenment. Taking into account “the recent progress of Tatar language,” the executive board suggested that both Russian and Tatar languages acquire the same importance in the school. Those present agreed on Akhtiamov’s suggestion to convene a conference, which would be realized in 1911.43

One of the advantages on which the Ufa zemtsy could depend was the cooperation with the Muslim religious authority. Ufa county, where 3/8 of the population were Tatars and Bashkirs, had only five schools for them, which covered only 1.3 percent of the school-year children. According to its school-network project, the county zemstvo planned to build 103 schools for boys and 102 for girls. In 1909 the county executive board asked the Spiritual Assembly for information on the degree to which the Bashkir-Tatar population was ready for universal education. The Spiritual Assembly answered that Muslims stood at the same level

42 P. N. Grigor’ev, Ocherk deiatel’nosti Ufimskogo Gubernskogo Zemstva po narodnomu obrazovaniiu 1875–1910 (Ufa, 1910), p. 133. In 1914, for example, 14 students finished the Kazan Teachers’ School. Seven of them had received grant from the Treasury, six from zemstvo stipends, one from pious endowment, waqf of Orenburg commerce tycoon, Akhmad Khusainov. Ten out of fourteen were from Ufa province. Türmush, June 6, 1914, p. 3.
43 XXXIV Ufinskому ocherednomu Gubernskomu Sobraniiu: Doklad Gubernskoi upravy po voprosu o shkol’noi seti v otnoshenii musul’manskogo naseleniia gubernii (Ufa, 1908), pp. 1–4, 12.
as the Russians and that all the measures for development of the economy and culture would equally affect Muslims. The authority advised that mother tongue and religious education not be ignored in order to erase Muslims’ prejudice against schools.44

Both Ufa zemtsy and Muslims could find common interests also in training teachers of schools and maktabs, that is, _uchitel’s_ and _muallims_. Just as the expansion of the school network of universal education required certified teachers in the schools, so the lack of qualified _muallims_, especially women, _muallima_, was sharply felt in the development of new-method maktabs. In both cases, the absence of official certificates served as a good reason for the MNP inspectors to persecute schools and maktabs.

Once Ufa had a Tatar Teachers’ school which had been established in 1872 in accordance with the regulations of non-Russian education in 1870. However, the school was closed down before it moved to Orenburg in 1876 and its building was handed over to the Kirgiz [Kazakh] Teachers’ school in 1889.45 At the beginning of the twentieth century, three teachers’ schools existed for the Muslims: in Kazan and Simferopol’ for Tatars and in Orenburg for Kazakhs. The provincial zemstvo had not abandoned its efforts to bring a Tatar Teachers’ school back to Ufa; since 1898, when Muslim councilor ( _glasnyi_ ) Tevkelev had proposed this question first, by 1912 the zemstvo had petitioned six times to the Ministry of Education.46 The ministry in its turn recommended Muslims’ education with the Russians, arguing that separate education would lead to “undesired national isolation and Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic aspiration.”47 It was not until 1916 that the question was partly solved by the Ufa zemstvo’s establishment of a three-year pedagogic course for Muslim teachers.48 Taking it as a model, Orenburg

44 TsGIARB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 676, ll. 145–148.
45 A. V. Vasil’ev, _Istoricheskii ocherk russkogo obrazovaniia v Turgaiskoj oblasti i sovremennoe ego sostoianie_ (Orenburg, 1896), p. 57.
47 Zhurnalny zasedanii s’ezda direktorov i inspektorov narodnykh uchilishch Orenburgskogo uchebnogo Okruga v g.Ufe 11–16 iiunia 1912 goda (Ufa, 1913), p. 408.
48 For the curriculum of the course, see Efirov, _Nerusskie shkoly_, p. 66.
Maktab or School?

Zemstvo also produced a program for a pedagogic course, which was approved by the curator of the Education District in November 1916.49 Muslims themselves tried to take advantage of every opportunity to gain official recognition for the need for teachers’ schools. The first opportunity came with the 25th anniversary of the mufti M. Sultanov’s appointment in 1911. On May 21 a big conference took place in Ufa with the governor’s permission. Those present resolved to open male and female teachers’ schools named after the mufti. A special commission was organized to prepare regulations on the schools, and donations for the project amounted to 100 thousand roubles.50 Another opportunity arose in 1913, when the State Duma approved the establishment of 93 teachers’ seminaries in commemoration of the 300th anniversary of Romanov dynasty. However, the Muslim faction in the Duma could not gain allocation for Muslim teachers’ schools, which caused harsh criticism in the press.51

In May 23–25, 1911 as the zemstvo assembly had resolved in 1908, the Ufa provincial board held a conference to seek a possible type of new primary school for Muslims. Those present were 10 zemtsy, 2 officials from the MNP and 23 Muslim muallims and intellectuals including the State Duma deputies from Ufa and Kazan. The conference took place against a backdrop of the State Duma having passed a bill on universal education in February. The resolutions would be brought to the All-Zemstvo congress on education in August. It was meaningful that in the congress the Ufa delegate declared that enlightenment should be non-Russian schools’ sole aim, as Muslim representatives had insisted in the Ufa conference in May.52 Conflict between the needs of pedagogy

49 As male teachers (muallims) were mobilized to the war, roles of female teachers (muallimas) were reinforced. Orenburg provincial executive board planned to make a summer course for female teachers of maktabs and schools in 1917. Doklady Orenburgskoi Gubernskoi Zemskoi Upravy chetvertomu ocherednomu Gubernskomu Zemskomu Sobraniu: Podotdel obrazovaniia inorodtsev, Otdel narodnogo obrazovaniia (Orenburg, 1916), pp. 43–44, 50–57.

50 Maktab 1 (1914), pp. 7–11; 2 (1914), pp. 32–38; 3 (1914), pp. 55–61.

51 Maktab 2 (1913), pp. 40–42.

52 Zhurnal’ soveshchaniia pri Ufmskoi Gubernskoi Zemskoi Uprave po voprosu o tipe nachal’noi obshcheobrazovatel’noi musul’manskoj shkoly 23–25 maia 1911 g. (Ufa, 1911), pp. 9–11; Pervyi Obshchezemskii S”ezd po narodnomu obrazovaniu 1911 goda: Doklady, vol. 1
and the demands of politics had been at the heart of the debate on the language of schooling in the third State Duma.\footnote{Dowler, \textit{Classroom and Empire}, p. 204.}

In the Ufa conference the “Maktab or School” debate had already arisen between the Muslim representatives and the Ufa zemtsy. Steinwedel emphasizes a common position Ufa Muslims and zemtsy took, and distinguishes it from Kazan Muslims’ arguments. The Ufa group spoke for new schools with the native language, and Kazan Muslims persisted in keeping religiousness in both old and new-method maktabs.\footnote{Steinwedel, “Invisible Threads of Empire,” pp. 451–454.} Steinwedel describes “ethnic” organization of schooling which involved both Muslims and zemtsy. To be sure, as discussed above, the Kazan and Ufa zemstvos were working under distinct circumstances. However, the protocol of the conference permits us to extract a common “Muslim” position: Muslims, both from Kazan or Ufa, were together trying to locate new-method maktabs within the future school system. They took for granted old-method maktabs’ vanishing.

Kazan and Ufa Muslims shared an understanding that the program of new-method maktabs was approaching that of general-education schools. However, some Muslims predicted the replacement of these maktabs with new zemstvo schools, and others proposed the zemstvos to support existing maktabs. Those present\footnote{Two officials from the MNP did not participate in the debate.} agreed that the entrance of maktabs into the school network was possible if they accepted a program of a new type of primary school that the provincial zemstvo would elaborate. However, P. F. Koropachinskii, head of the provincial zemstvo board, indicated that the MNP could disagree with the entrance due to “the confessional shade” of maktabs. When Muslims asked for subsidies to maktabs until the realization of universal education, the zemtsy stressed the principle of “general secular schools,” according to which not only maktabs but also church-parish schools were not eligible for the subsidies.\footnote{\textit{Zhurnaly soveshchaniia}, pp. 41–51. One of those present was Fatikh Karimov, editor in-chief of \textit{Waqt}. For his high evaluation of the conference, see \textit{Waqt}, June 3, 1911, p. 2.}

In order to examine the extent to which maktabs acquired “construc-
Maktab or School?

tion of secular primary school,” the Ufa provincial zemstvo carried out a large-scale statistical investigation in 1912–1913. In May 1912, a special commission was organized for that purpose. It consisted of ten Muslims and four members of the executive board. In November forms with 115 questions written in “Tatar” were sent out to 2144 imams, i.e., leaders of mahallas throughout Ufa province, with the attachment of the Mufti’s appeal.57 Muslims met the investigation with sympathy; the organizer received 1579 responses. At nearly the same time the Menzelinsk county zemstvo, which already provided active support to maktabs and madrasas, also undertook a statistical investigation.58

The statistics detected a “secularization” tendency of maktabs in terms of the education program: “purely” confessional schools accounted for 18.1 percent of all the examined maktabs; 28.7 percent were labelled “transitional” type of maktab which taught either the mother tongue or one general-education subject; 39.2 percent of maktabs taught arithmetic in addition to Islam and the mother tongue; and 14 percent of maktabs gave elementary knowledge of history, geography and natural science.59 The compiler of the final report was convinced that the assistance of the local self-government could accelerate maktabs’ transition to primary secular schools, and that secular and well-organized maktabs would serve as a means of cultural development and could enter the school network with the same qualification as Russian primary schools.60

However, the MNP officials were afraid that zemstvos would undermine the MNP’s pedagogic authority over primary schools. The law of May 3, 1908, which signalled the ministry’s reinforcement of investment in universal primary education, jeopardized the traditional conflict over demarcation of competence between the ministry and zemstvos.61 Edu-

57 Otchet Ufimskoi gubernskoi zemskoj upravy, pp. 30–32.
58 Azamatova, “Deiatel’nost’ Ufimskogo zemstva,” p. 154. The provincial statistics showed that Menzelinsk county had the largest number of maktabs, which was explained by the zemstvo’s subsidies. M. I. Obukhov, Mekteby Ufimskoi gubernii: Statisticheskii ocherk tatarskikh i bashkirskikh nizshikh shkol (mektebov) Ufimskoi gubernii po dannym issledovaniia Ufimskoi gubernskoi zemskoj upravy (Ufa, 1915), p. 9.
60 Ibid, p. 40.
61 For the situation before 1905, see Grigor’ev, Ocherk deiatel’nosti Ufimskogo Gubernskogo Zemstva, pp. 130–131.
cation Minister L. A. Kasso tried to intensify the local inspectors’ control over zemstvo schools. In reality, since zemstvos had their own financial resources, it was more difficult for the ministry to increase the number of inspectors than for zemstvos to increase the number of schools.\(^{62}\)

In 1912, when the congress of directors and inspectors of the Orenburg Education District was convened, the 1911 conference of the Ufa provincial zemstvo board was denounced as an infringement of the law. Special attention was focused on the zemstvo’s education program for languages and religious subjects for a new type of Muslim school; the Ufa conference had accepted that the teaching be done in the native language during the whole four years of schooling, and that the learning of Russian start from the second half of the first year. The zemstvo executive board had decided to entrust the elaboration of religious subjects to the Spiritual Assembly.\(^{63}\) The congress passed a resolution that the jurisdiction of the local self-government had to be strictly limited to a financial sphere of schools.\(^{64}\)

In contradiction of the Ufa zemtsy’s declaration, curator of the education district V. N. Vladimirov pronounced “merging with the Russians (sliianie s russkimi)” to be the task of non-Russian schools. Having experienced “struggle with the Catholics” in Vil’na Education District before his coming to Orenburg in 1910,\(^{65}\) he thought that learning Russian through the Tatar language served as a spur to “Tatarization” of Russian-Bashkir schools. On the whole those present launched a fierce attack on Il’minskii’s method; discarding “missionary” tasks of schools and cautioning against an excessive use of the native language, they put priority on learning Russian and acquisition of “Russian citizenship (russkaia grazhdanstvennost’).”\(^{66}\) The congress resolved non-Russians’ studying with Russians in the standardized four-year non-Russian schools\(^ {67}\) and the start of Russian learning within a few months after

\(^{62}\) Abramov, “Zemstvo, narodnoe obrazovanie,” p. 49.
\(^{63}\) Zhurnaly soveshchaniia, pp. 19, 54–55, 74.
\(^{64}\) Zhurnaly zasedanii s’ezda, pp. 12–36.
\(^{65}\) Farkhshatov, Samoderzhavie i traditsionnye shkoly, p. 69.
\(^{67}\) Non-Russian schools were not always “mixed” ones. Efirov, Nerusskie shkoly, pp. 29, 48–49.
Maktab or School?

Thus, Eklof’s revision of the paradigm of “a tug-of-war between a benevolent zemstvo and an obscurantist government” should be interpreted carefully. He emphasizes a form of “joint government-zemstvo venture” in establishing a school network, and thereby he tends to underestimate conflicting aspects in the relationship between zemstvos and the MNP. To be sure, he notices that huge subsidies from the ministry for primary schools blurred their jurisdiction after 1908. However, the conflict between the Ufa provincial zemstvo and the local ministry officers demonstrates that while the MNP recognized zemstvos’ financial contribution to school construction, it tried to keep them out of the pedagogic sphere of a non-Russian schooling project. The ministry and the Ufa zemstvo competed with each other not only for the control of schools, but for the cause of non-Russian education.

Zemstvos’ commitment to Muslim schooling was all the more intensified in the southern Urals with the introduction of zemstvos in Orenburg province in 1913. Naturally Ufa’s experiments served as valuable models there. At the end of 1914 Ibrahim Bikchentaev was appointed as chief of non-Russian education within the Orenburg provincial zemstvo board. The year of 1915 became a fruitful year for Muslim education. As Seregny illustrates, peasants’ interest in information on the war offered the key to awakening popular interest in enlightenment in general, and thereby offered a unique opportunity to nurture citizenship.

In 1915 Bikchentaev elaborated a four-year education program for maktabs; if maktabs accepted this program, they could receive zemstvo subsidies. The program was sent out not only to the county zemstvos in Orenburg province, but also to the Spiritual Assembly in Ufa and an influential Muslim paper Waqt in order to “present the program to Muslim public opinion.” Bikchentaev participated in the conference which was convened at the initiative of the Ufa provincial zemstvo to examine textbooks for Russian-Tatar schools and maktabs. In 1915 the Orenburg

---

68 It is possible that the resolution would affect the regulations on non-Russian education in 1913. Farkhshatov, Samoderzhavie i traditsionnye shkoly, pp. 87–88, 247.
69 Eklof, Russian Peasant Schools, pp. 88, 95, 118–119.
70 Seregny, “Zemstvos, Peasants, and Citizenship,” pp. 302, 304. Despite the war censorship, Waqt devoted many pages to the war and zemstvo activities.
zemstvo also carried out a statistical investigation on maktabs in the province. Six regional libraries each with three branches were opened for Muslims. The county zemstvos set the amount of subsidies to maktabs at: Orenburg 7,000 roubles, Orsk 15,000 roubles, Cheliabinsk 200 roubles per maktab, Verkhneural’sk and Troitsk 140 roubles per maktab. Waqt showed the Muslim public the procedure for receipt of the subsidies.71

The difference in the cause of non-Russian primary education between the Ministry of Education and the Ufa zemstvos became obvious: whereas the ministry aimed at their merging with the Russians through the Russian language, the zemtsy engaged in enlightenment through non-Russians’ mother tongues. However, a common principle the ministry and the zemstvo shared was “secularism” in schooling. Therefore, the process of secularization affected church-parish schools, with which Muslims wanted to equalize their maktabs.72 The Ufa provincial zemstvo declined Muslim intellectuals’ egalitarian demand for subsidies, and the ministry officials abandoned the schools’ missionary task. Nevertheless, while reformers of the State Duma had passed a bill of universal education that intended incorporation of church schools into the school network, the State Council dismissed the bill, arguing that “Russia should not be deprived of church schools and an independent administration of religious education.”73

The government applied this rigid separation between confessional

73 As an analogy, the law of June 13, 1884 on church-parish schools had also served as a “counterbalance” against zemstvo schools. Abramov, “Zemstvo, narodnoe obrazovanie,” pp. 46, 48.
and secular schools to Muslim schools. The Special Conference on the Muslim question, which was convened in 1910 at the initiative of the Interior Ministry, resolved that maktabs’ program be strictly confined to religious subjects.\textsuperscript{74} As long as the school policy went on accordingly, Muslims were forced to cling to parallelism, with new-method maktabs left as private schools alongside the state ones. However, when the Ufa and Orenburg zemstvos showed their positive commitment to new-method maktabs, negotiation started between the zemtsy and Muslims to seek the possibility of these maktabs’ entrance to a universal school network and “a third type” of Muslim school, neither existing maktabs nor schools.

\textit{Maktab or School?}

The law of May 3, 1908 and following expenditures of the MNP and zemstvos towards universal primary education compelled the Muslim intellectuals and muallims to answer a question about the coexistence of Russian citizenship (\textit{Rūsiya ghrāzhdānlīğı}) and nationality (\textit{millīyât}). On one hand, the introduction of uniform schools would relieve the mahalla people of all burdens of maktabs. The state schools would provide Muslim children with Russian and other indispensable knowledge for civic life. On the other hand, the intellectuals strove to find a way of guaranteeing the mother tongue and Islam in the curriculum. Otherwise, they would lose their roles in the “national” education in the future. Some expected maktabs’ entrance into the school network, and others suggested making schools live up to national spirit (\textit{millī rūḥ}). The course of the “Maktab or School” debate depended on local conditions, in which the dialog with zemstvos took place.

A spark rose in 1913 on the pages of a Kazan journal \textit{Maktab}, which represented the opinions of the “secular” intellectuals (\textit{diyālīlār}) in general and muallims in particular. By the word “nation (\textit{millat}),” almost all the contributors meant the Tatars. The first orator was Fuad Tuktarov,\textsuperscript{74} Robert P. Geraci, \textit{Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 285–295.\textsuperscript{75} In this case “Russian” means “rossiiskii.”
who had finished the Tatar Teachers’ School in Kazan and then had become one of the leaders of a socialist circle, Tângchîlar, during the 1905 Revolution. He posed a question, what would be the state of the relationship between state schools and maktabs after the spread of the schools in every Tatar village and “universalization (‘umūmlâşhdirû)” of primary education? He spoke for parallelism: despite the persecution of new-method maktabs, the government did not launch attacks against being Tatars and Muslims (Tätârlîq wa muslimânliq); the government should stop the pursuit of maktabs and madrasas, “historical institutions which had served as sources of religious and national spirit.”

Tuktarov saw a way for maktabs’ survival in a bill on private schools that the State Council passed on May 21, 1913. According to the law, decisions regarding the language of education should be entrusted to each private school with the proviso that Russian language, literature, history and geography should be taught in Russian. However, with regard to schools established and supported by the local self-government, all subjects except religion and the native language should be taught in Russian; for Russian language lessons, explanation in the native language would be permitted only in the first year. Tuktarov insisted that maktabs be considered as private schools, because they did not receive support either from the state or the local self-government.

In order to secure the funds for reforming new-method maktabs, he warned that unnecessary subdivision of mahalla be stopped. He pointed out that conflicts over the redistribution of mahalla capital between mullahs and muallims prevented maktabs’ development. To be sure, he paid an attention to the fact that Ufa zemstvos subsidized maktabs according to Muslims’ petitions. However, he claimed that the small presence of Tatars among zemtsy limited people’s reliance on zemstvos.

A contrary argument was sent to the Kazan journal from Tomsk, where the massive Russian immigration had driven the Muslims into a miserable economic situation. A muallim Ibrâhîm Bikqûluf pointed out that new-method maktabs in Siberia were now ready to yield their

76 Maktab 2 (1913), pp. 57–60; 5 (1913), pp. 121–123.
77 Maktab 6 (1913), pp. 145–149.
78 Maktab 1 (1913), pp. 30–32.
position to Russian-Muslim schools which corresponded much more to the needs of everyday life. Hinting at a criticism against such an idea as “maktabs as sources of religious and national spirit,” he claimed that Jadid reform had already lost its meaning to adapt maktabs to real life (tūrmush), because it had sacrificed this purpose simply for the benefit of religion (dīn). Hoping that the introduction of the zemstvo system to Siberia would reinforce the construction of schools, he expected the Muslims to implant “national spirit” in zemstvo schools. In Tomsk the question of public investment in the Muslims’ modernized education system was tied to the destiny of the City Duma. Therefore, the municipal elections called forth Muslims’ great interest. Moreover, educational and cultural activities of the City Duma and Russian regionalists and Narodniki since 1880 had provided the Muslims with the model of mobilization of communal resources.

Hence, Bikqūluf could even boast that Siberian Muslims’ “higher level of life” enabled them to notice a crisis of Jadid schools earlier than Muslims in Inner Russia.

Such an opinion, of course, caused fierce resonance from Kazan Tatars. However, defending new-method maktabs, they could only call for people’s consciousness and love of nation, thereby expecting intensification of private support and subsidies from Muslim charitable societies (jamʿīyat-i khairīya). Kazan Tatars’ adherence to parallelism may be explained by the failure in the negotiation with the local zemstvo. In January 1911, the Kazan county executive board invited Tatar representatives “to relax the distrust of Russian-Tatar schools.” In marked contrast to the Ufa conference in that year, the Kazan zemtsy tried to observe strictly the principle of the 1907 Regulations on non-Russian education; the schooling language should be the mother tongue in the first two years and then switch to Russian in the next two years. The zemtsy and Muslim delegates could only agree on the propagation of the

80 Maktab 3 (1913), pp. 90–92.  
83 It was disputable among Muslims whether the charitable societies were eligible to collect and administer Islamic income tax (zakāt). Dudoignon, “Status, Strategies and Discourses,” esp. pp. 51–54; Z. Minnullin, “Blagotvoritel’nuye obschestva i problema zakiiata u tatar (konets XIX – nach. XX vv.),” in Tatarskie musul’manskie prikhody v Rossiiskoi imperii (Kazan, 2006), pp. 30–41.
NAGANAWA Norihiro

necessity of Russian-Tatar schools to the “fanatic” Muslim population.\(^{84}\)

In Orenburg province, where zemstvos had been introduced only recently, ambivalent opinions first appeared on the pages of an Orenburg journal *Mu’allim*. Nūr’āli Nādiyīf proposed a new type of private or zemstvo school, where the Muslims themselves could participate in the management. He claimed that the lack of finance and the inadaptability to the demands of epoch would not make new-method maktabs competitors of the schools “in this world where the stronger prey upon the weaker.” In order to change schools into ones corresponding to Muslims’ interests, he suggested that courses be established for muallims to be trained as school teachers (*uchitel’*)s and for school teachers to study the mother tongue and Islam, that Muslims as well as zemstvos support the life of school teachers of the mother tongue and religion, and that Muslims as members of the trustees’ council of schools participate in school supervision.\(^{85}\)

On one hand, the editor of *M’allim* also admitted that people were choosing schools so that their children study Russian. On the other hand, he was afraid that it would be impossible to protect the national language and spirit in these schools where the instruction in the mother tongue was permitted only for the first two years. He insisted that maktabs remain as private schools under MNP jurisdiction with the introduction of Russian language classes according to the state program of universal compulsory education (’*umūmī majbūrī ‘ubū*).\(^{86}\) However, he was silent on how to secure the funds.

In *Waqt* the “Maktab or School” debate reflected the different roles of the intellectuals (*diyāilār*) and the clergy (*ruḥānilār*) in the Muslim community. Reviewing arguments in journals *Maktab* and *Mu’allim*, Jamāl al-Din Walīdī, a muallim of a famous new-method madrasa Ḥūsainīya in Orenburg, spoke for development of new-method maktabs. As he argued in his brochure about the concept of nation, Walīdī saw an awakening of the Tatars’ “national” identity in the emergence of Jadid

---


85 *Mu’allim* 4 (1913), pp. 50–52.

86 *Mu’allim* 5 (1914), pp. 66–68.
Maktab or School?

schools: it was the Jadid movement that “brought Tatars into national history.” To be sure, he admitted that efforts at transformation of schools according to national interests were a “national duty,” and that Muslims as Russian citizens had to enjoy universal education. However, he insisted that a “subjugated” nation engage in intellectual and cultural progress by “their own national power.” As a solution he suggested increasing the number of Muslim charitable societies.

While Walidi, as a secular intellectual, believed in the new-method maktabs’ mission as sources of national spirit, a local religious head (āk-hūnd) of Kungur in Perm province Zāhid Allāh ‘Ībād Allāh found the clergy’s role in confessional education of the middle maktab (rushdī), predicting the replacement of primary maktabs (ibtidā‘ī) with schools. In fact, Russian-Tatar schools in Kungur county attracted more pupils than in any other. The akhund also noticed that maktab pupils were moving toward schools. He said that the obligation of learning Russian in primary education would deprive primary maktabs of their activity. He suggested to the readers efforts to place muallims in schools for the protection of Islam and the mother tongue. He hoped that if two years of additional study of religion were permitted in these schools, it would meet the desire of those who wanted to study Islam intensively. Thus, while the secular intellectuals tried to maintain their roles in the “national” education by using “national” rhetoric, religious leaders more soberly identified their roles in the future education system.

Two articles from an Ufa newspaper Türmush demonstrate a tactical double standard of Ufa Muslim intellectuals. Both authors of the articles had attended the conference convened at the initiative of the Ufa provincial zemstvo in 1911. In the negotiation with the zemtsy, they eagerly participated in elaborating a new type of school, even indicating the disappearance of maktabs in the future. But in the Muslim paper, they insisted on continuing the existence of maktabs, emphasizing their role in nursing “national spirit.”

Selimgirei Dzhantiurin, deputy of the first State Duma who had

88 Waqt, February 18, 1914, pp. 2–3.
89 Zhurnal' zasedanii s'ezda, pp. 310–311.
90 Waqt, August 6, 1914, p. 1.
NAGANAWA Norihiro

graduated from the Orenburg Gymnasium and Moscow University, spoke for the maktabs’ inclusion in the universal school network. Criticizing Kungur akhund ‘Ībād Allāh, he claimed that while maktabs contributed to inculcating children with the love of nation, schools were now under the command of the MNP officers alien to “national spirit and needs.” He recognized the fact that maktabs were deprived of support from the Treasury and zemstvos because maktabs were “confessional.” However, he stressed that nothing prevented maktabs’ education program from approaching that of schools. As proof he referred to the mufti’s private conference in December 1913, where invited scholars (‘ulamā’) concluded that religious and general secular subjects were compatible. He thought that the disappearance of differences between maktabs and schools would make maktabs eligible for entrance into school network.

In negotiating with the zemtsy in 1911, Sharafutdin Makhmudov, deputy of the third State Duma from Sterlitamak, even predicted the whole replacement of maktabs with new zemstvo schools. However, in the pages of Ṭūrmush, he stuck to parallelism. He complained to the Kungur akhund that middle maktabs could not exist without primary maktabs, because a primary maktab was a “mother” of a middle maktab. Makhmudov doubted if those who were now studying in the state schools would be able to teach the mother tongue and Islam in the future: state schools, aiming at merging peoples in Russia into one, could not consistently cultivate national spirit. Mentioning the lack of legal grounds for subsidies of the local self-government, he stressed the necessity to support “national educational institutions” by Muslims themselves.

91 Akt chastnogo soveshchaniia dukhovnykh lit okruga Orenburgskogo Magometanskogo Dukhovnogo Sobraniia na 14 i 15 dekabria 1913 goda (Ufa, 1914). This brochure comprises Russian and Turkic versions. In 1915 the section of non-Russian education within the Orenburg provincial zemstvo distributed 300 copies of this brochure mainly to zemstvo libraries for Muslims. The section expected this brochure to eradicate from Muslims “a deep fanaticism” which confined maktabs and madrasas to an exclusively confessional character. Doklady Orenburgskoi Gubernskoi Zemskoi Upravy, pp. 9–10.
92 Ṭūrmush, August 24, 1914, pp. 2–3.
93 Zhurnaly soveshchaniia, p. 45.
94 Ṭūrmush, October 26, 1914, p. 2.
Sterlitamak as one of the historical centres of Islamic studies, where he himself had worked as a muallim. There religious institutions could rely on good profits from pious endowments (waqf). Makhmudov committed himself to the management of waqf in the first mahalla of the town.95

The atmosphere of the "Maktab or School" debate changed after the Orenburg zemstvos undertook to subsidize maktabs.96 Arguments in Waqt began to focus on how to reorganize existing maktabs and zemstvo schools by collaborating with zemstvos. In April 1915, when a conference on education was convened in the Orenburg provincial zemstvo board, Ibrahim Bikhchentaev expected maktabs’ inclusion in the school network to be feasible. Referring to the “Maktab or School” debate, he stressed that maktabs could develop into normally organized schools, just as Russian schools had developed. However, the zemtsy took for granted the replacement of maktabs with zemstvo schools. They only agreed on temporary subsidies to maktabs until the accomplishment of the school network. Then Bikhchentaev presented a four-year education program for maktabs as a condition for receipt of the subsidies, which was approved by the provincial assembly in that year.97

An imam of the first mahalla in Qârghâlî near Orenburg, Khair Allâh al-‘Uthmânî named his article “a solution to the ‘Maktab or School’ question.” In order to provide children with decent knowledge of Russian, he suggested that maktabs receive zemstvo subsidies by their acceptance of Bikhchentaev’s education program. The imam admitted the necessity of maktabs’ inclusion in the school network. Like akhund ‘Ibâd Allâh, the imam also thought that the Muslim community itself should support middle (rushdî) and preparatory (i’dâdî) courses for higher religious education of madrasa.98

It is worthwhile examining the content of Islamic education in Bik-

95 Waqt, August 31, 1916, p. 4.
97 Zhurnaly I i II soveshehanni, pp. 36–37, 41–47. By the end of 1915 not only zemstvos in Orenburg province but Birsk and Zlatoust county zemstvos in Ufa province adopted Bikhchentaev’s program. Doklady Orenburgskoi Gubernskoi Zemskoi Upravy, p. 4.
chentaev’s program. To satisfy the Orenburg zemstvo’s requirement of Russian language and other general subjects Bikchentaev was forced to decide what elements of Islamic knowledge to leave for future maktabs. Detecting the same act of selection in the education program of Jadids in Central Asia, Khalid called it “desacralization” of some sorts of Islamic knowledge. Thereby the new elites challenged the authority of the old.\textsuperscript{99} In Bikchentaev’s case it was his negotiation with the Orenburg zemstvo that molded the definition of Islamic knowledge.

Many constituents were common between Central Asian Jadids’ curriculum and Bikchentaev’s: art of reciting Qur’ān (tajwīd), ethics (akhlāq) and holy history (ta’rīkh-i muqaddas). As Khalid argues, implicit in Bikchentaev’s as well as Central Asians’ programs was the notion that “real knowledge” lay in the scriptural sources of Islam. According to Bikchentaev, study of Qur’ān had to continue throughout the four-year schooling. Pupils of the first grade should learn the meaning of the unity of God (tawḥīd) and profession of faith (shahāda). The second grade required knowledge of the Six Beliefs of Islam (i màn-i tafsīlī) and the way of prayers. In the third grade pupils had to go through all rules of the five pillars of Islam. The fourth grade gave them knowledge on oaths, marriage, divorce, lease, division of estate, alms, etc. from the books of shari’a.\textsuperscript{100}

When the Ufa and Orenburg provincial zemstvos planned a joint regional conference on Muslim education in autumn 1916,\textsuperscript{101} Waqt devoted its pages to readers’ suggestions to the conference. One of muallims from Troitsk, ‘Abd Allāh ‘Azīz said that Muslims in the town had tried to make a common education program of maktabs after the 1905 Revolution, but that they had failed to fulfill it effectively due to the absence of an overseeing organization. The mualлим proposed that maktabs be transformed in order to live up to “national needs and interests” under the zemstvo supervision. He formulated the cause of the reformed maktabs: “our children as subjects of great Russia and as free citizens of the great Russian state shall love Russia, . . . Still, as children of the great Muslim nation [Muslimān millātī] living in Russia they shall be inspired

\textsuperscript{100} Zhurnal I i II soveshchanii, pp. 115–119.
Maktab or School?

by national spirit.”

‘Abd Allāh ‘Azīz showed a program that muallims in Troitsk had elaborated in 1915. In contrast to standardized four-year schools, maktabs planned to have a six-year system. According to the program, the entire six-year education should be carried out in the mother tongue; arithmetic and natural science should be taught besides Islam and the mother tongue; and Russian learning should start from the fourth year. Some muallims paid attention to the idea of making primary maktabs into preparatory institutions for the state middle schools. However, ‘Azīz disagreed with them, arguing that such an institution could not have more than five years of schooling, and that it would sacrifice national education (millī tarbiya) for Russian learning. He suggested taking into account the majority of peasants whose education usually ended in primary maktabs.102

Both Ufa and Orenburg chiefs of non-Russian education within the zemstvo executive boards agreed on elaborating “a third type” of Muslim school. The Ufa chief Gumer Telegulov, who had finished the Tatar Teachers’ School in Kazan and was appointed to the post in 1913, claimed that the regulations of non-Russian education since 1870 had dealt with the non-Russians not as independently developing peoples but as objects of Russification. He also recognized inadequacy in maktabs’ transformation into primary schools, despite Jadids’ efforts since the 1880s. As a result maktab pupils had to go to schools to learn Russian language. Telegulov thought a single well-organized primary school to be feasible if education authorities organized a new school in tune with “Muslims’ interests and spirit.”103

In April 1916 Bikchentaev posed nine questions on an ideal third type of Muslim school in Waqt.104 Answers came from muallims:105 the new Muslim school should have six years of schooling; instruction for the first three years should be done in the mother tongue; Russian learning should start from the fourth year, and the volume of Russian knowledge should be as much as in standardized four-year primary schools; and in

103 Biulleten’ otdela narodnogo obrazovaniia 2 (1916), pp. 73–79.
104 Waqt, April 8, 1916, pp. 1–2.
the fifth and sixth years, lectures in arithmetic and Russian geography and history should be read in Russian. The mother tongue as a subject should continue throughout the last three years and other subjects should be taught in the mother tongue. One contributor even proposed that Arabic, an important constituent of “national literature” be included two hours a week in the sixth year.

As far as the pedagogic and economic management was concerned, few spoke for the new schools’ subordination either to the Spiritual Assembly or the existing inspection of the Ministry of Education and school boards, *uchilishchne sovety*. One contributor suggested that trustees’ councils be organized as mediators with the local self-government and school boards, and another proposed that a commission consisting of trustees, muallims, teachers from schools and imams of mahallas be placed within zemstvos so that the executive boards could carry out the commission’s decisions.

Taking these opinions into consideration, Bikchentaev presented a report to a provincial conference on education in the summer. Based on the report, the conference resolved that the new six-year Muslim schools should enter the school network and should be supported by the Treasury and the local self-government; that Muslims themselves should manage both economic and pedagogic spheres of the schools; and that all existing ministry and zemstvo schools for Muslims should be gradually transformed into the planned six-year schools.106

Muallims’ agreement with zemstvos on cooperative supervision of the new schools reflected not only their changing attitude toward the local self-government, but also their understanding of “nation” itself. Muslim intellectuals had usually persisted in observation of maktabs and madrasas by the Spiritual Assembly, seeing it as the sole representative body of “national” interest.107 However, Muslim intellectuals’ negotiation with zemstvos gave the intellectuals an opportunity to reconsider such “isolated” tactics as parallelism and egalitarianism in defending “national


107 For example, see a bill on the reform of the Muslim administration, which was elaborated in 1914 by the Muslim representatives including the deputies of the State Duma. *Proekt polozheniia ob upravlenii duchovnymi delami Musul’man Rossiiskoi imperii* (St. Petersburg, 1914), p. 17.
Conclusion

The introduction of universal primary education motivated both the government and the Volga-Ural Muslims to identify the cause of “Russian citizenship.” While the 1905 Revolution compelled the government to put its priority on making loyal citizens, the revolution served as an event to make Muslims look into their conventional relationship with the state, and thereby commence reorganization of their community through negotiation with state. However, the strategy was distinct between the intelligentsia and common people of mahalla. The young intellectuals elaborated on various projects to mobilize people to their imagined community (millat) and simultaneously tried to reconcile it with Russian (rossiiskaia) citizenship. However, their rhetoric of egalitarianism and parallelism with the Russian (russkie) institutions often made the government suspicious of their political disloyalty and diminished their range of negotiation with zemstvos. As “Maktab or School” debate suggested, while “secular” intellectuals tried not to lose their leverage for “national” primary education, religious leaders of mahalla realistically accepted their possible withdrawal from primary education. Parishioners in their turn developed communal politics, where the state institutions also joined with their own intentions: people wanted to invite zemstvo schools which would facilitate the mahalla management, and they could maintain the Islamic order with the help of the security police, although their interests conflicted with each other. The mahalla life constituted a unique “public space,” quite contrary to the intellectuals’ “closed” national discourse.

Traditional controversy over the nature of Russification before 1905 had been what should define the “Russianness,” the acquisition of the Russian language or the assimilation of Russian Orthodox spiritual culture. While Il’minskii aimed at inculcation of Christian spirit through native languages, the Education Ministry put its accent on learning the Russian language in the regulation of non-Russians’ education of 1870,

108 Dowler, Classroom and Empire, p. 161.
NAGANAWA Norihiro

categorizing peoples according to their degree of “Russification.” The regulations obliged Muslims to study Russian either in state schools or in Russian language classes within maktabs and madrasas. The government instituted a varied and hybrid path toward “Russification.”

However, the emergence of European-oriented non-Russian intellectuals as a result of “Russification” policy made many Russifiers choose stricter linguistic and political measures as compensation. It seemed to them that religion’s time as an effective tool of imperial integration had passed decisively after the manifestation of religious tolerance in 1905.109 The government tried to give state schools the exclusive prerogative to cultivate “Russian citizenship,” rejecting Muslims’ own efforts to reform maktabs and even abandoning Russian language classes within maktabs and madrasas. As a result the MNP officials found themselves alienating the Muslims from “citizenship” and forcing them to defend their “isolated” parallelism.

The Ufa zemstvos recognized maktabs’ potentials in enlightenment of Muslims and retrieved maktabs from the alienation of the state policy. True, the MNP and the Ufa provincial zemstvo could share a common principle of secularization in schooling. But the fact that the Ufa zemtsy saw the native languages as means of enlightenment revealed fierce competition between the zemstvos and the ministry over the cause of non-Russian primary education. The local MNP officials assumed that predominance of the state expenditure on primary schools could overcome the discrepancy. However, the Ufa zemtsy could successfully cooperate with the Muslim intellectuals on the common project of enlightenment and hold their authority among the Muslim population both inside and outside the province.

The “Maktab or School” polemic reflected the trace of the collaboration between Muslim intellectuals and zemtsy. During World War I, which dramatically boosted people’s interest in war information, thereby in education in general, two models of Muslim schooling were being created in the southern Urals: some Muslims and zemtsy argued that inclusion of new-method maktabs in the school network would be feasible if they accepted the education programs the Ufa and Orenburg

zemstvos recommended, and others tried to produce plans of a new Muslim school. In both cases, negotiable points were the proportions of the mother tongue and Russian, between religious and secular subjects, and the degree to which Muslims and zemtsy would participate in supervision of schools and maktabs. It was this process that made Muslims articulate anew the definition of “Islamic” and “national.” Here we can see the concrete efforts of Muslims and zemtsy to find a new way of reconciliation between Russian citizenship and nationality.