

Chapter 13

Małopolska or Galicia: Cracow's Dilemmas in Central Europe

Jacek Purchla

1. Central Europe—Europe Minor: The European Core

The history of the Czechs and the Slovaks, Poles and Hungarians, is grounded in Western European civilisation: the tradition of Antiquity, Christianity, constitutions of self-governance and respect for the rights of the individual. The question then arises what, if anything, accounts for the distinctiveness of these countries and nations in the culture of Europe?

A fundamental issue is the obsession of location, especially patent in the case of Poland. Interjacency between two of the largest nations in Europe, the Germans and the Russians, has always given rise to a feeling of threat. With respect to Russia, and for some time also to Turkey, the threat was associated with a sense of mission as a bulwark of the Latin civilisation. Not only has the region's difficult and turbulent history enforced a struggle for survival, consolidating the sense of national and European identity, but it has also prompted, and still today prompts the question whether Europe Minor belongs to the East or the West of the continent. Characteristically, the simultaneous division into North and South—so legible in the eighteenth century in the division according to the criterion of a Protestant, rapidly developing North, and a Catholic South engrossed in stagnation—has not been of such paramount importance for the countries of the 'New Europe'.

The answer to the East-West question, which might seem trivial, is nevertheless of crucial importance for the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians and their sense of identity, determining the political realities not only in the central part of Europe, but in the whole continent. This is the genesis of the concept of Central Europe, not in the geographical sense, but above all in the categories of history and culture. Whether one belongs to the East or West is not a question of borders, but of belonging to a particular culture, economic zone, and political system. It is obvious that the struggle of the nations of Central Europe against Soviet domination, which ended in victory in 1989, was not just a struggle against the Communist system, but also just as much of a struggle for a return to the Atlantic civilisation. The strong adherence to the civilisation they had been contributing to for a millennium and the half-century experience of resistance to a totalitarian system—unknown to Western Europe—constitutes not so much the ballast as the capital which the nations of Europe Minor are bringing in with them.

For Central Europe a new era began after 1989. One of the most topical questions in this respect became the question of identity. It is an ambiguous question, especially after the lesson of Communism, since Central Europe is that part of the continent, where political borders, especially in the twentieth century, have changed more often than cultural frontiers. After 1989 the essence of this experience cannot be separated from the broader context of our specific experiences and long historical perspective.

Central Europe can be described in many ways. As a historian I would like to draw attention to two characteristic associations. First, one hundred years ago in Vienna, so popular and so useful in describing the Kafkaesque reality of the Habsburg monarchy, is ambivalence. The other, often disregarded, is a great complex of the residents of Central Europe, a specific trauma releasing the necessity of being supported with history, in seeking strength and identity in the past. This was just the reason why throughout the nineteenth century both the romantic need of fostering the past and a considerably deepened attitude towards what today we call heritage have been developed in this part of Europe. This attitude resulted from such essential elements of the specific situation of the nations of Central Europe in the nineteenth century as: the lack of independence, the delay of industrial revolution, or the so-called long-lasting feudalism, backwardness and stagnation. In effect, for a long time we have lacked

conflict between modernisation and accelerated development and heritage, which was characteristic of the societies of the industrial era.

Europe Minor has never been outside of the European civilisation. But it has preserved a distinctiveness which today is a value. That value is perhaps most patent in the fabric of its cities. Their particular identity is the result not only of geographical location, but above all of a long-lasting historical process which started a thousand years ago. The twentieth century has been the culmination and sum of all the contradictions and conflicts on which the development of the fascinating core of Europe has been built. This is also confirmed by the experience of Cracow, metropolis of the European Core.

2. Cracow in the European Core

With a population of around 750,000, Cracow today is much bigger than the planners had envisaged half a century ago. Significantly, it is now going through a period of demographic stabilisation. By no means does this imply a halt in development, rather a slowing down in the rate of expansion accomplished in the previous period at the expense of quality of life. Stabilisation raises the question of Cracow's metropolitan future, primarily of the city's functions in the settlement network and of the extent of its impact.

What determines a community's metropolitan or central position is more than just its power or its function. The places which deserve the title of metropolis are the diversified cities—that is those with a complex set of functions, including a considerable complexity of superior functions. The question of Cracow's metropolitan status today is thus a question relating to the functions of municipality formation relevant to its situation today and the prospects for their change in the future. This is certainly a timely question. It is a question prompted by the restitution in 1990 of Cracow's status as an autonomous corporation and of its local government empowering it to make its own decisions in local politics and economics. It is also prompted by the great economic and political transformation we are witnesses to, which has brought change in the settlement structure as well, including the roles and mutual relationships of the largest cities in Europe Minor.

Cracow's functional model has been and is still characterised by heterogeneity. This is a positive phenomenon. Its constructive effects may

be appreciated in the period after 1989 as well. The city passed through this difficult period of political and economic transformation fairly well. The answer to the question regarding Cracow's functions should explain the form and extent of the city's metropolitan model that will be the object of discussion. In my opinion the metropolitan type we should be after is one which will generate qualitative change while not interfering with the historical heritage amassed in Cracow. This is connected with the need to return to a sustainable model of development. Cracow, which since 1999 has been the capital of a large region (Małopolska), must fairly soon delineate the sphere it envisages for its metropolitan influence. It also has to clearly define its position in the network of European cities. These are strategic issues.

Cracow is one of those ancient cities on the continent of Europe where tradition and the past exert a fundamental influence on current development. It is the only large city between Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Bratislava, and Budapest with a set of historically shaped metropolitan functions which has been degraded to the role of a provincial centre. It is with this feature that the need to decipher Cracow's role is connected—not only for the national but also for the regional dimension of the capital of Małopolska.

3. Małopolska (Lesser Poland) in the European Core

The history of Małopolska as a historical region reaches as far back as the division of Poland into principalities in 1138. The fusion of the Sandomir and Cracow principalities later in the twelfth century gave rise to the region of Małopolska. Unlike the other units—Silesia, Pomerania, Mazovia or Wielkopolska (Greater Poland), it did not undergo further fragmentation and soon became the core of the uniting nation. Not incidentally, the process of restoring the Polish Kingdom was concluded in 1320 with the coronation of Ladislaus the Short, Duke of Cuiavia, at the Wawel Cathedral in Cracow.

By and large, the administrative borders of Małopolska were determined in the fifteenth century, and survived mostly unaltered until the partitions of Poland in the late eighteenth century. Contiguous to Hungary in the Carpathians in the south, Małopolska was bordered in the west by the Rivers Biała and Pilica, the latter forming, at the same time, the northern frontier of the region. On the orographically right bank of the

River Vistula, the northernmost end of Małopolska was at Łuków, and in the south, its eastern frontage ran through the towns of Tarnów, Pilzno, Biecz and Jasło. The heyday of serfdom-based manorial economy in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was an additionally integrating factor for the areas of Małopolska located in the upper and lower basin of the Vistula. Extremely powerful was the 50,000-square-metre Cracow Bishopric, which covered the whole of Małopolska as well as Częstochowa, Radom and Lublin. The Cracow bishop's throne was a magnet for the most eminent men of the country for its religious prestige and, perhaps more importantly, for its political and financial significance. Scattered around the north and west of Małopolska, Bishop-Dukes' lands, among them Siewierz and Kielce, provided more impulse for the region to seek unification with Cracow.

The partitioning of Poland by Russia, Austria and Prussia in the late eighteenth century split Małopolska up and caused it to disintegrate gradually. For the whole of the nineteenth century, the section of the Vistula between Cracow and Sandomir became a natural border between the monarchies, which would drift steadily apart. The borders of the partitional zones destroyed the enormous Cracow Bishopric permanently, opening opportunities for establishing numerous new dioceses, for example in Kielce and Tarnow. Thus the church, too, ceased to be a uniting factor for the vast historical province around Cracow.

The growing distrust between Russia and Austria was exacerbated in the second half of the nineteenth century by two opposing systems that dominated on respective sides of the cordon: the tsar's authoritarian rule in the northern section of Małopolska, and the liberal and constitutional Austria in the south. That opposition fostered the still-present mental difference between the residents of the former Congress Poland and Galicia. What is more, Congress Poland and Galicia superseded the historical concept of Małopolska in the nineteenth century. Note also the dynamic changes in the settlement pattern at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as the fall of Sandomir and the advancing status of Małopolska in the Russian zone (Kielce, Radom or Lublin), which also started to lean more and more towards Warsaw. The isolation of northern Małopolska was additionally aggravated by the lack of railway connections between Russia and Galicia.

Although Poland regained its independence in 1918, the feeling of common regional identity has not until now been restored amongst the

people living within the pre-1772 borders of Małopolska. The power of the disintegration processes that continued throughout the nineteenth century proved insuperable in the twentieth century. Instead, the twentieth century brought attempts to extend the concept of Małopolska to cover also the entire region of Galicia. In the interwar period, Eastern Galicia, which stretched up to the River Zbruch, was supplanted by the concept of Eastern Małopolska, momentarily pushing the region's border way beyond its historical area. This is why the prevailing opinion today is that Przemyśl is in Lesser Poland, while Kielce and Radom are not.

In defiance of these complex disintegration processes, Cracow remained the unchallenged capital of Małopolska and a stronghold of regional identity. The bugle call from St. Mary's Church Tower, the Wawel Hill, the Lajkonik (or Prancing Horse with a rider in Tartar disguise, a character from a local legend), the vernacular culture of the Bronowice village and the Kościusko tradition are but a few examples of elements that integrate the regional identity of Cracow and Małopolska.

However, after 1945 that identity was systematically obfuscated and destroyed. Particularly severe damage and conceptual confusion were caused by the administrative reform of 1975, which not only cut Cracow off from the majority of Małopolska cities, but also fostered new relationships and new regional identities that emerged around the new voivodship (regional) capitals: Bielsko-Biała, Tarnów, Tarnobrzeg and Nowy Sącz. A lot of changes triggered in the quarter-century following 1975 came forcibly to the fore in 1998 with a new administrative reform. Examples include 'the defence of Kielce against unification with Cracow', the creation of the Świętokrzyskie region, or the incorporation of the Żywiec lands to Silesia. On the other hand, we should take note of how enthusiastic the highlanders were about the region of Podhale joining Małopolska.

Despite a series of administrative reforms Cracow remained a metropolis that bears heavily on the historical area of Małopolska. It is here that Małopolska natives are educated or come for specialist medical therapies. The folklore of Bronowice is a standard for Cracovians, including those left outside the boundaries of the new region, the label of Żywiec, a popular beer brand, being one example.

4. Małopolska Today

What is, or what can be, contemporary Małopolska, and is there only one Małopolska today? These days Małopolska means one of the 16 new Polish voivodships, which comprise also slices of other historical regions of distinctly different tradition, such as Spis or Orava. Yet the concept of Małopolska exceeds the new administrative bounds. In both cases the common denominator for the two Małopolskas is Cracow: its metropolitan functions are instrumental in its radiation onto areas outside the official voivodship. As a global centre Cracow should seek to bind the region, both internally and with the external world, through better functionalities and communication. There is no region without a metropolis, just like there is no metropolis without a region. Administrative borders are of secondary significance in this case.

A fundamental issue in the shaping of the new borders of Małopolska are relationships with its neighbours, Upper Silesia in the first place. The political and economic strength of the Silesia conurbation, centred around the city of Katowice, was recently conducive to Małopolska losing such non-Silesian towns as Żywiec, Biała or Jaworzno. While Upper Silesia is a region with powerful identity and a strong civilisational centre in the region's urban areas, other cities like Kielce or Rzeszów—which since 1945 has had the role of a substitute for Lviv in the areas between the Rivers Visłoka and San—are much less influential in their respective regions.

Another challenge for Cracow is the region's southern border, which rests on the Carpathian watershed. The Małopolska-Slovak border should be Małopolska's window on Central Europe. Integration and close cooperation between Małopolska and Slovakia, including the Spis region, which the countries share, is one of the strategic challenges the regional self-government faces because the strength of the new region should be confronted in open cooperation, both economic and cultural. The merit of Małopolska lies in its great diversity: today's Małopolska is not only the Cracovians and the Highlanders, but also the folk of Spis, Orava and the Lemkos. It is a region of National Parks that protect the unique environment of the Jurassic Upland, the Beskidy, the Pieniny and the Tatras. It is a region of what seems to be outstandingly preserved folk culture. What also needs emphasising is that people in Małopolska, especially in Podhale, have a good understanding of the economic

dimension of regional identity. The potential of Małopolska's heritage requires conscious policing. In this respect Małopolska is, in a sense, nearing Bavaria. Bavaria is a guiding light for Tarnów, Nowy Sącz, Bielsko-Biała and other centres which wrongly look on Cracow as a threat to their development. It is in Bavaria that we can fully understand the complementary character of a settlement pattern where Munich, a glocal metropolis of a huge historical region, coexists with subregional centres: Augsburg, Regensburg, Nuremberg and Würzburg.

Thus, today we deal with two Małopolskas: one in the strict and the other in the broad sense of the term. (Do people living on the Pilica still remember that the river was the historical borderline between Małopolska and Mazovia?) Małopolska as delimited in 1999 should, in the first place, make sure that its internal bonds are rebuilt. Although no historical process can be reversed, we must not be forgetful of the 'Greater Małopolska', with the attraction and leverage of Cracow as its guarantors. While it is unimaginable that the Silesian cities of Bytom, Łuków or Warka should dream of joining Małopolska today, economic success has more than once in history been an essential argument in discussing identity. Restoration of Małopolska should, however, imply restoration of the identity and subjectivity of our part of Europe.

5. Galician Myth

A related issue is the surprising success of the Galician myth, also observable in Cracow. One might say that Galicia as part of the Central European myth vies with efforts to establish the regional identity of Lesser Poland. Identity is not just about people but also about the landscape.

Galicia is one of those cultural regions that essentially formed the history of Central Europe but in the twentieth century came to be almost completely destroyed through their inner plurality. Nevertheless, the interest in Galicia grew notably in recent years not only in Poland and Ukraine, but also in the United States, Israel and Europe. Located in today's Poland and Ukraine, the former Austrian Crown land of Galicia and Lodomeria represents itself as a model case of a cultural region with multiple identities, constructions of history and mythmaking processes.

From the perspective of Galicia and Western Europe, the transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe is tied with the

revival of historic myths and the search for ‘lost worlds of plurality’. From 1772 to 1918 today’s south-eastern Poland and western Ukraine constituted the Crown land of Galicia, the largest and poorest region of the Habsburg monarchy. The region had been designed by Habsburg Austria as an eastern flank of the Western world, as ‘semi-Asia’ and a ‘colonial base’ of the great power of Austria. At the same time it became a seedbed for Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish identities. It was here that modernity was tested and criticised but never turned into reality. In collective memory, Galicia is a living meta-tradition that permits individual traditions to continue in cultural plurality and affords opportunities for the coexistence of those who are different, being a part of Europe and preserving regional self-consciousness. The idea of Galicia as a cultural region challenges ethnic, religious and political boundaries, both historical and present. This raises the question of cultural identity, because Galicia is being rediscovered widely in Europe.

This is particularly true about both parts of Galicia, which these days is cut in half not only by the Polish-Ukrainian frontier, but also by the border of the European Union since 1 May 2004. This may be part of the reason why the Galician myth is becoming so popular in Western Ukraine (i.e. Eastern Galicia), particularly in Lviv. The Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak explains this phenomenon of collective memory as follows:

Since World War I, the political powers in Western Galicia have changed five times, and eight times in the Eastern part. On average, every regime held sway for 15 years in the West, and 10 years in the East. The never-ending changes of regimes were conducive to the annoying necessity to learn a new anthem every few years. More difficult was to survive each revolution. Those who managed to do so became living proof of the Eastern European joke about the average citizen, who has been to different countries without leaving home. It is not that the person visited these countries: they visited him.

No wonder, then, that nostalgia for the Habsburgs has proved so insistent. Judging by the criteria of the twentieth century, it was the most stable regime and with its collapse the twentieth-century frenzy began. Therefore it was quite natural for Galicians to miss the Habsburg monarchy. Moreover, it was more than just a stable regime. According to an English historian, the Empire can really be viewed by the countries of Eastern and Central Europe

as ‘the most rational among anything that existed in the region before and since . . .’.

No doubt memories of Austrian Galicia reflect a myth rather than reality. Those who lived under the Habsburg rule would have been fairly amazed to find out that their epoch would be referred to as ‘good old times’ by future generations. It was one of the least industrialised and most impoverished regions of the Habsburg monarchy, and ‘the Galician misery’ became its hallmark in the outside world. It takes Joseph Roth and his *Radetzky March* to see what Austrian Galicia looked like. For Austrian clerks who arrived here in large numbers, Galicia was a ‘semi-Asia’, an ‘Austrian Siberia’, and they felt they were going on a great civilizational mission to turn ‘these Sarmatian beasts into human beings’. For Vienna Jews, *Galizianern*, i.e. Jews coming from Galicia, were living symbols of backwardness, superstitions, and barbarism. Ukrainian intellectuals who came to Lviv in the 1870s from the Russian empire, were shocked by the poverty and provincialism of local intellectual life . . .

To a certain extent Galicia resembled other Eastern European borderlands where confusion and ambivalence of identity prevailed. This multiethnic cultural landscape is another aspect of the Galician myth as a hip concept of coexistence . . . A dialogue between different cultures quite often meant assimilation of a minority group into the dominant culture, and minority cultures remained largely alien to one another. Galicia is a story of a failed multicultural experience: civic solidarity and cooperation among citizens did not succeed to cross religious, social, ethnic or national boundaries . . . As a result, instead of a single one, several competing civil societies developed along national lines . . .

This is the root of the ambivalent character of the Habsburg legacy. On the one hand, it helped to develop traditions of civic life, to an extent that has been unknown in territories north and east of Galicia. On the other hand, these were very nationalised civic societies.

(Hrytsak 2003: 13–15)

The revival of the Galician myth was driven by the lesson of the twentieth century, specifically the trauma of it. Before 1989, that phenomenon could be interpreted as an identity problem of the elite in the age of Social Realism: relegating evil history to the back of the mind, and historical romanticism. Especially in Cracow, the success of the Galician myth and the revival of Galician regional identity is a paradoxical situation.

6. Galician Cracow

Reactionary Austria treated Cracow not just as booty, but also as a dangerous hotbed of liberalism and conspiracy. A wave of severe repression was applied to the city. Annexation by Austria in 1846 brought about a complete change in its economic set-up. For a long time Cracow was to become a peripheral centre in a not very big local market. It had no communications or administrative role of any significance to play, either. It was the only large city in the Austrian Empire which was not even capital of its province. In the territorially vast Province of Galicia (78.5 thousand square kilometres), which made up 26 per cent of Cisleithania, this was a paradoxical situation, favouring the interests of Lviv, which was made provincial capital. These changes effected a profound economic crisis, and even a temporary drop in population following 1846. However the crisis had a systemic aspect to it as well, since Galicia was the most backward province in Austria. Economically, right until World War I Cracow was deprived of all chances of rapid metropolitan development.

A key factor was the transformation of Cracow after 1846 into a frontier garrison. For Austria it was in a strategic situation, on the border, on the left bank of the Vistula, a natural bridgehead of fundamental military importance in the event of war against Russia. The incidents of 1846 and 1848 in Cracow itself, seen by Austria as a symbol of the Polish drive for independence, were further arguments in favour of the establishment of a military fortress in the city. Especially the first phase of the fortification of Cracow had the distinctive character of military occupation, and the military authorities showed no consideration whatsoever for the interests of the city. Both Wawel Hill and the Kościuszko Mound, symbol of Polish aspirations of independence, were surrounded with fortifications.

Throughout the entire period Cracow's development was founded on a distinct antinomy between the city as a symbol of Poland and Polishness, and the fortress, symbol of foreign domination. Polish ideas on the relation between Cracow and Vienna in the nineteenth century therefore have a double nature. An ambivalence typical of Europe Minor is evoked by the well-preserved Austrian fortifications, which never actually played a crucial strategic role.

Nevertheless in this difficult and complicated situation a way was found in the second half of the century to give the city a chance of

development by means of the switch to liberalism that ensued in Austria in the 1860s on the one hand, and the power of the old metropolitan tradition on the other. This was the essence of the Cracow phenomenon of that period, showing that there was no simple relationship between a city's size and the metropolitan functions it played, and also that the power of tradition was an extremely important factor in a city's progress.

It was thanks to the power of its past that Cracow became the place that integrated all the Polish people, and hence it was Cracow, not the province's capital, Lviv, that became the heart of the life of the Polish nation. The pillars on which Cracow's political stance rested were the Stańczyk conservative group and the *émigré* Hotel Lambert group, which set up its chief outpost outside of Paris in Cracow. Within this framework—composed of the power of tradition, the symbolic and integrating role of Cracow, and in the political conditions of Austrian liberalism, there was a revival of Cracow's metropolitan function as the chief centre for Polish cultural and academic life.

Already by the 1850s the democratic and seditious Cracow of the late 1840s was turning 'from recent hotbed of conspiracy into a grand aristocratic drawing room'. The increased interest on the part of the nobility was partly due also to the changed circumstances in which the Polish territories and the Polish national cause found themselves in the 1860s. The tragedy of the January Uprising of 1863 which Russia brutally crushed, and the profound changes in the Habsburg monarchy in the spirit of constitutionalism, a result of which was autonomy for Galicia, bestowed a new symbolic role on the city of Cracow for its Polish inhabitants.

The people of Cracow immediately grasped how exceptional the situation was, in contrast to the surge of repressions imposed on the Russian partitional zone and the resultant grief and despair in the aftermath of the suppressed uprising, and the rampant Germanisation afflicting the Prussian zone. The city of Cracow rapidly adopted the role of spiritual capital for the entire nation, bringing together all the Polish people. Wawel Cathedral assumed the symbolic image of royal burial place of the kings and queens of Poland. The implementation of this programme was a consequence of a new political concept, the 'Austro-Polish solution' adopted in the 1860s. Its success was made possible through the political power of the Galician conservatives in the Austro-Hungarian parliamentary system. There was also a fundamental change in

Cracow's relationship with Vienna and the Habsburg monarchy. A mark of the change could be seen in the triumphal visit Francis Joseph I made to Cracow in 1880, during which the Emperor gave his consent to the recognition of Wawel Castle as one of his official residences.

7. The Polish Acropolis

Cracow's development at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was based on numerous contradictions. The systemic deficiency in the city's economy was compensated for by its extraordinary significance to the Polish people. Its function as the nation's spiritual capital contrasted blatantly with its function as a frontier fortress and provincial garrison manned by a foreign army. From the vantage-point of the great cosmopolitan metropolis into which Vienna had turned as the centuries changed, Cracow was but a middling-sized peripheral town. From the point of view of Polish *raison d'être*, it was fulfilling the functions of the capital, albeit an impoverished capital, of a non-existent Polish state. These and other antinomies made up the Cracow phenomenon and accounted for the exceptionality of its situation under Austrian rule.

The contemporary Cracow was not merely the Polish Athens, but also the Polish Piedmont. At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Lviv performed the functions of provincial capital of Galicia, the largest province in Austria, while Cracow was the lynch-pin integrating Polish national affairs, especially after the 1905 Revolution was crushed in the Congress Kingdom (Russian partitional zone). On the eve of World War I it was in Cracow that the activities of the major independence groups were concentrated. Cracow was Headquarters for Józef Piłsudski, who in August 1914 led his Polish Legions out from this city to fight for independence—against Russia, but still as a partner of Austria. Four years later, on 31 October 1918, his legionaries set about the disarming of Austrian soldiers, thereby ending the period of Austrian rule in Cracow. There were two, or even three, distinct phases of that rule. The first was repressive in character, and the other two were based on liberalism and autonomy.

In the interwar period Cracow was the capital of a large voivodship and a centrally located focus for the entire area of the historical region of Małopolska. This set-up was favoured by the polycentric model of the

state which grew up as a legacy of the partitional period. It consisted of five large ‘civilisational centres’ as they were called at the time: Warsaw, Cracow, Poznań, Wilno, and Lviv. A particularly interesting concept was a proposal put forward at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s—to make Cracow the capital of the south-western corner of the country, as a counterbalance to the German Breslau. This implied the establishment in Cracow of a strong centre for the distribution of finance, and a civilisational centre which would exert an impact on the Polish part of Silesia.

8. Civilisational Centre

More than half a century ago, in 1930, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Cracow published a voluminous book entitled *Cracow as the Capital City of South-Western Borderland: a Study for the Country's New Administrative Division*. It was a response of Cracow's business and scientific circles to a questionnaire sent out by the government concerning modifications to the administrative division of Poland. The scientific editor of the publication, Kazimierz Władysław Kumaniecki, Professor of the Jagiellonian University, emphasised in the foreword that not only should the three-tier administrative division of the country be absolutely continued, but also regions should be delimited with respect to the following criteria:

1. Economic (business regionalism);
2. Transportation (railway, road, air and water transport);
3. Strategic (country frontiers and military industry);
4. Legal and self-government;
5. Existing relations (do not change for the sake of changes only);
6. National (the country's policy regarding national minorities);
7. Religious;
8. Cultural (educational coverage);
9. Breaking off post-partitional cordons.

(Kumaniecki 1930:2)

The result of Prof. Kumaniecki's team's work was not only a competent, interdisciplinary analysis of a new administrative division of the country,

but also a clear-cut concept of regional centres to be established in Cracow as well as in some other cities. That book should be looked at as possibly the latest modern concept of Cracow's development that leverages its metropolitan functions and the polycentric tradition of Polish settlement patterns.

9. Cracow's Metropolitan Functions and the New Regional Division of Poland

Stripping Cracow of its administrative and economic sovereignty, coupled with the vulgar centralism promoted by the Communist authorities and culminating in the 1975 administrative division, blighted for decades the chances of Cracow, as well as other cities like Poznań, Wrocław or Gdańsk, for metropolitan development.

All that was in stark conflict with the objectively instrumental role of the metropolis in the civilisational development of countries and nations, which has been proved empirically in various parts of the globalising world. Sceptics should refer to sections of the latest book by Saskia Sassen, *Cities in a World Economy*, published in 1994, or to a highly instructive study of the civilisational development of Asia written by John Naisbitt under the title of *Megatrends Asia: the Eight Asian Megatrends that are Changing the World*. What makes Poland's situation specific is the process of globalisation, which in this country has overlapped with the processes of shaking off Communism and system transformation under the conditions of rapid economic growth. The dynamics of change in Poland after 1989 hinder our understanding of the fundamental principle where metropolitan functions are long-term functions, formed over a prolonged historical process. On top of that they are largely determined by the political system, which can either hamper or support development. Controlled centrally by improving political solutions and by implementing development functions in various centres, regional and local development opens opportunities for more efficient use of the existing economic potential of a country.

However, from that perspective, the final shape of the administrative reform seems to be a failure, its underlying cause being a tangle of factors such as poor use of the potential of the still-centralised state to ordain change and to optimise the geographic distribution of developmental

functions, as well as, again, poor understanding of the role of the biggest Polish metropolises. It is a network of powerful metropolises that can do away with centralism and the untoward asymmetry between Warsaw and the country's other civilisational centres and regions. The alienation of Cracow and other big metropolises in Poland from their regions, which is our legacy of the command economy and the two-tier administrative division enacted in 1975, made its presence felt in the recently concluded political debate on a new administrative division in Poland. It was particularly evident in the fear of the largest and strongest Polish cities that was overtly manifested by representatives of many centres threatened by losing their status of voivodship capitals. Encumbered with pre-1989 experiences, that anxiety not only was ungrounded (except on bias) but also turned out to be detrimental for a number of small centres which developed an anti-metropolitan phobia in the months preceding the enforcement of the division, thus contributing to the inflation of the new regions. As a result, only half of the regions established by the Polish Parliament in July 1998 will be able to rely on powerful metropolitan centres for their development.

This situation is paradoxical in that no metropolis can exist without a powerful region, and no region can exist without a powerful metropolis. Today, only a few of the largest centres in Poland meet this requirement and are capable of shouldering the competitive challenge in an international network of glocal development centres. It is the metropolis that works to support the regions, it is contingent on the metropolis whether or not the region will be rich, and it is only a metropolis that can attract foreign capital. Ever since Adam Smith noted that economic processes are objective by nature, discussion has continued on the opportunities of controlling and regulating these processes. A city is an economic process too. In this sense, by striving for the region's success a metropolis strives for its own sustained development. The best cure is sharing the metropolis's wealth and resources with the region.

References

Hrytsak, Yaroslav (2003), 'The Importance of Being a Galician: the Issue of Identities in Borderlands', *The International Cultural Centre Yearly*, 11: 11–18.

- Kumaniecki, Kazimierz W. (1930), 'Uwagi o podziale administracyjnym państwa' [Notes on the Administrative Division of the State], *Kraków stolicą Kresów południowo-zachodnich: studia nad nowym podziałem administracyjnym państwa* [Krakow: a Capital City of South-West Borderlands. Studies over the New Administrative Division of the State] (Cracow: Izba Przemysłowo-Handlowa), 1–6.
- Purchla, Jacek (1998), 'Metropolitalne funkcje Krakowa a nowy podział regionalny Polski' [Metropolitan Functions of Krakow and the New Regional Division of Poland], in Jacek Purchla (ed.), *Metropolitalne funkcje Krakowa* [Metropolitan Functions of Krakow], i (Cracow: Międzynarodowe Centrum Kultury), 7–12.
- Purchla, Jacek (2000), *Cracow in the European Core* (Cracow: International Cultural Centre).