One of the first and program-type documents of President V. Putin was the Informational Security Doctrine approved by him on September 9, 2000, less than half a year after he was elected. The need for its adoption was justified by the following reasons:

1. The society was caught in a deep and lingering moral and psychological crisis, it was disoriented in the face of global and domestic challenges. Constant expectation of a catastrophe was the factor provoking social cataclysms.

2. Russia turned out to be unprepared for informational and psychological warfare. As a result, its strategic interests in various regions of the world and social life realms were infringed.

3. The world got an image of Russia as a corrupt state, constantly feeding bad news which resulted in serious international investors avoiding it and Russian companies’ stocks remained significantly undervalued in worldwide stock markets.

4. The integrated information zone of the country got split into separate and weakly-linked segments. As a result the social threads binding society into a single whole were broken.

The Doctrine ascertained “low efficiency of the public policy information support in the Russian Federation.” This in particular could be seen in the government facing an objective necessity to take tough and unpopular decisions (housing and communal services reforms; reduction of the social liabilities of the state; withdrawal of the system of internal tariffs on energy resources which was required for Russia to be able to enter the World Trade Organization). However, none of the seven Yeltsin governments ever brought themselves to implement these measures, keeping
off strong negative public reaction and restoration of the old totalitarian system. The mechanisms to correct public perception of the policy of the state were simply unavailable for those governments.

Though the state held the control stocks in the biggest TV companies of the country, in reality their informational policy substance was determined not based on public interests but on the corporative interests of individual shadow structures. A vivid example of this is the situation which existed in 1999 when a team of newsmen, who often were called “political killers,” led by S. Dorenko executing an order of B. Berezovskii, started a campaign on the 1st (governmental) TV channel to discredit the Prime Minister Y. Primakov who declared it necessary to counteract corruption at the highest level.

Putin’s statements on the need to carry out active public informational policy were interpreted by many observers both in Russia and abroad as striving to avoid recurrence of a similar situation by way of imposing strict control over the media. The same conclusions were also suggested by the actions of the representatives of power structures relating to property redistribution at the NTV and TV-6 channels. Certainly the strive to implement the project “of the introduction of like-mindedness in Russia” has always been one of the longed-for targets of Russian bureaucracy.

However, it would be wrong to reduce the entire governmental information policy only to the aspiration to control the mass media. The problem is more complex. Implementation of the majority of public development programs in Russia is impossible without the active participation of the population and civil society institutions. Therefore the formation of a favorable social and psychological climate for the implementation of programs of reform and development, ensuring competent participation of the citizens in this process and a dialog between the state and civil society, have been one of the fundamental conditions for the realization of reforms in Russia. Those reforms will allow Russia to modernize itself and be integrated into the world economy.

The purpose of this report is to try to render an analysis of what changes occurred over the last three years in the system of
mass communications in Russia and what effect they had on the solution of the above strategic task.

1. Sociocultural Changes

As the results of sociological surveys show, the social awareness of Russians has been fatigued from the negative information coming to them every day from TV, newspapers and magazines over the last two decades. The scale of such “black” propaganda can be seen from the following figures:

**Fig. 1. Tonality of Subjects of News Broadcasts of TV Channels (January-April 2003)**

(Based on mass media monitoring performed by the Information Policy Department under the Samara Oblast Administration)

The mass media outlets are still intimidating people, but they are significantly less scared than three, five and, a fortiori, ten years ago. This can be proved in particular by the following public poll data:
Fig. 2. How, in Your Opinion, Will the Situation in the Country Change in the Near Future?  

In the endless exaggerating of bad news, admiration of self-abasement is now perceived by society somewhat differently from what it was ten years ago. Not only does this demoralize the society and undermine trust in governmental and public institutions, but it also affects the credibility of the mass media outlets themselves, which in terms of degree of trust are now generally inferior to such public and non-governmental institutions as the President, the government, the army, the church, and the national security agencies, while only five years ago in the degree of trust only the church could compete with them. This is clearly seen from the following diagram.

According to the regional sociological surveys conducted by the Samara State University, only 44.7% of the oblast residents are inclined to give credit to national periodicals, 52.4% to local press stories, and 65.3% to local publications.

Under these conditions even objective and constructive criticism of the authorities from public structures and newsmen will not hit the target since a significant part of society is still in a state of social anemia. For instance, if ten years ago to accuse a political figure of corruption would mean to kill his career, now neither politicians themselves nor the electorate pay any attention to these accusations.

In short, from a mass communication instrument the mass media turned into a people-alienating instrument of social structure atomization.

More and more people perceive the mass media not as an instrument for the purpose of getting information about the events of socio-political life but as a means of entertainment. This can be proved by the TV viewers’ interest comparison data of 1996 and 2002:
Fig. 4. What Telecasts Do You Prefer to Watch?²

In this respect the tendency of falling ratings of the main social and political TV channels and, vice versa, the growing ratings of TV channels positioning themselves as entertainment television does not appear unrelated:

Fig. 5. Shares of TV Channels in Russia³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Channel</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTV</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNT</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REN-TV</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² The data is presented by the Samara Social Technologies Fund. The surveys were conducted in the Samara Oblast (N=1200).
³ Based on TV viewer monitoring conducted by the sociological center KOMKON-2.
In this situation, the still quite high ratings of TV channels can be explained by the underdeveloped entertainment infrastructure in Russia.

The thesis about the decreasing influence of the mass media on social and public orientation becomes even more obvious when comparing circulation of periodicals in the pre-reform period and today. Thus, as compared to 1990, circulation of the main social and political periodicals in the Samara Oblast, which in many respects is typical for Russia, dropped in the following proportions:

Table 1: Circulation of Main Periodicals in the Samara Oblast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication title</th>
<th>Circulated editions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(second half-year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Argumenty i fakty</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Izvestiia</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Komsomol’skaia Pravda</td>
<td>137,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Rossiiskaia gazeta (^4)</td>
<td>34,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Trud</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Sel’skaia zhizn’</td>
<td>36,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) Year 1992.
Table 2: Circulation of Regional Publications in the Samara Oblast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication title</th>
<th>Circulated editions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volzhskaya kommuna</td>
<td>72,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarskie izvestiia</td>
<td>84,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarskaia gazeta</td>
<td>58,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volzhskaya zaria</td>
<td>46,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, in 2000-2002 two more daily newspapers ("Budni" and "Chisla"), which in the mid-nineties had circulations of more than 50,000 copies, ceased publishing.

To a lesser extent this drop affected district newspapers. The number of these publications increased from 29 in 1997 to 34 in 2002. In 1990 their cumulative circulation amounted to 327,000 copies, but in the second half of 2002 it equaled 196,000 copies, an increase of 27,000 copies as compared to 2000.

A significantly lesser drop in the circulation of municipal and regional newspapers at first sight seems paradoxical, the level of journalism there being incommensurable with the metropolitan publications. But it is easy to explain this paradox: during these years localization of public awareness took place and interests of common citizens got focused on their city or area. Furthermore, local publications hardly ever contain negative information of which people are simply tired.

The data shown above indicate that in Russia today there is a deficit of positive thinking oriented not to the destruction of old values but to the creation of new ones. But this deficit still has not been realized. The sublimated expression of this demand evidently is the cult of personality of V. Putin, showing itself in the far-too-high ratings which do not get affected either by the absence of real positive changes in citizen’s lives or individual failures in his policy.

Satisfaction of this demand would allow transformation positive public awareness from the currently primitive form of “Putin is our everything!” into some constructive ideology. If “Yedinaia
Rossiia” succeeds in the formulation of such an ideology and bringing it home to the electorate then they will have a chance of converting themselves from a speculative political project into a long-term and system-forming factor of the Russian political system. If not, then this party will face the fate of Chernomyrdin’s NDR.

How great the demand is for positive political awareness can also be demonstrated by the data of a sociological survey carried out in June 2003 by the Samara State University with a comparison to the similar parameters of September 1999 (close to the previous State Duma elections).

2. The Fight for Information Space

The main role in building-up public awareness in Russia today, as well as several years ago, is played by television. Understanding its decisive role in election campaigns, governmental and municipal authorities of all levels in recent years strived to establish control over existing TV companies or found their own information resources. Leading national TV channels – ORT, VGTRK, NTV – were placed under dual control. On the one hand they were far more strictly controlled than in Yeltsyn’s time by the Ministry of Press, Television and Radio Broadcasting. On the other hand, the financial flows of these companies from advertising activities were monopolized by the Video International Company controlled by the Minister M. Lesin. In a number of regions, TV broadcasting channels joined an open information war with governors.

In their turn, regional authorities, feeling that they were losing control over the local informational space, started founding their own TV channels. As of the end of 2002, 30 subjects of the Russian Federation already had their own governmental TV channels independent of the VGTRK and 12 more had governmental satellite TV broadcasting.

Heads of towns and districts considered it to be their duty to establish their own municipal TV companies with the purpose of political promotion within their dependent territories. Thus in the
Samara Oblast, for example, within the period from 1997 (right after the first direct elections of local administration heads) through 2002, municipal TV companies were founded in 19 towns and communities.

Taking into account the above-mentioned tendency to localization of public awareness, these local TV companies could seriously compete with nation-wide TV companies occupying the pro-Kremlin position. In particular, in rural areas of Samara Oblast municipal TV companies broadcast ratings exceed similar parameters of informational broadcasts of federal TV channels by a factor of 1.2-1.5 and regional TV broadcasts by 3-3.5 times. All this happens in spite of the fact that many of these TV companies do not have either professional equipment or qualified TV newspeople.

In its turn, the federal government continues to struggle for control over informational space using financial and legislative mechanisms.

The point is that regional and local authorities, by means of launching their own public-opinion-forming-channels, usually completely ignored issues of cost efficiency of these media outlets, giving them funds from their budget. For example, in the Samara Oblast the total amount of support provided by the local authorities to municipal mass media in 2002 equaled RUB 48.6 million, including:

- printed mass media – RUB 26.4 million
- local radio broadcasting stations – RUB 3.7 million
- local TV channels – RUB 18.5 million

In addition to that, local newspapers received annual subsidies from the Ministry of Press, Television and Radio Broadcasting in accordance with the federal law “On economic support to newspapers in areas (cities)” to the amount of RUB 4.066 million (data for the year 2002). These subsidies equal approximately 70% of their budget.

Naturally such dependence of local newspapers and TV companies on subsidies from the authorities does not allow us to consider them as civil society elements. Therefore the Administration of the President worrying about vertical power strength-
ening and preventing manifestations of independence in the provinces today disputes the very existence of the municipal mass media. The new revision draft of the federal laws “On general principles of organization of local governments in the RF” and “On general principles of organization of the governmental authorities in the RF entities” comprehensively lists the issues referring to the competence of regional and local authorities. Budgetary funds as per these laws may be spent only to resolve these issues and support to local and regional mass media is not on this list. Along with this, the Ministry of Press, Television and Radio Broadcasting announced that the financial support to municipal (area) newspapers will be stopped from 2005. Taking into account the fact that out of 89 subjects of the Russian Federation, 76 depend on subsidies, governmental, area and municipal mass media there may lose their means of subsistence.

In 2002 the All-Russia Governmental TV Company (VGTRK) assumed an offensive attitude against local radio stations, forcing them into changing their broadcasting time from the evening high rating hours to the middle-day hours.

At the same time, governmental and semi-governmental TV channels occupying dominant positions in the market of electronic mass media in the near future will face very tough competition with satellite and cable TV belonging as a rule to private companies, both Russian and foreign (mostly American). The pioneer of this broadcasting trend in Russia, the NTV+ company belonging to V. Gusinskii now has about one million subscribers. Its further promotion in the information market is impeded only by a quite high subscription fee (US$9-27 with the average salary amounting to US$160). Cable broadcasting networks provide access to 20-25 channels with a subscription fee two to four times less than that of NTV+. As of today cable broadcasting networks have been built in 23 Russian cities. The dominating positions in them are occupied not by Russian but by foreign channels (CNN, Hallmark, Discovery, Euronews, Fashion, etc.). The software product of these channels is of far higher diversity and quality, and it is not overloaded with commercials in contrast to the on-air TV broadcasting.
Correspondingly, federal and regional TV companies have lost a significant part of their viewers and political institutions – traditional mechanisms of “brainwashing.” Along with this, the constantly-growing portion of the population constituting the target audience of these channels gets the possibility to integrate into world informational space. But this process is far from being an automatic one. It is impeded on the one hand by the defensive position of local and regional authorities and, on the other, by lack of interest of the world news agencies and TV companies in Russia. Russia comes into their field of vision only in the case of some cataclysms. The Russian people, as noted already, are tired of negative information about themselves and for this reason in case of reports on the next catastrophe or scandal they often simply switch to another channel.

One more property of the fight for informational space is the rise in the costs of informational services, especially in the period of the coming electoral cycle of 2003-2005. By expert assessments, the costs of services of all mass media in this period will rise by two to three times as compared to 2002 for a number of reasons:

A) Election campaigns themselves to a great extent stimulate agiotage-like rises in rates since candidates often pay for not only their presence on the screen but outbid the on-air time from their competitors.

B) Continuing economic growth gives an impetus to development of the advertisement market and given unchanged scope of supply this results in leaping prices. Thus with the economic growth of 8-10% per year, the advertisement market grows by 25-30%.

C) Active penetration of Moscow companies into regional markets in recent years contributes to the increase of the number of advertisers possessing significant financial resources. Since primary saturation of the market with goods is over, the struggle has started to promote company brands, which forces them to increase advertising expenses.

D) On the threshold of elections, TV channel management will be placed under such conditions where they are able to accept
political advertisements merely from a certain group of candidates. This will have the consequence of the political publicity market in the period of the coming elections shrinking instead of growing.

3. Old and New Technologies of Mass Communications

In recent years significant improvements took place in the informational space of Russia. If you compare present-day channels informing the population about events of social and political life, you will see that they underwent major changes in comparison to the corresponding parameters of five years ago and even more so of ten years ago. This can be seen from a comparison of sociological surveys data of different years:

**Fig. 6. What Are Your Main Sources of Information on Events of Social and Political Life?**

5 Polls were conducted by the Sociological Center of the Samara State University using representative sampling (N=1200). Total responses exceed 100% as respondents could choose several options of responses at the same time.
For the entire last decade, the influence of newspapers and magazines of social and political orientation has been declining. In particular, this manifests itself in a reduction of circulation of periodicals distributed by subscription and through the retail network as stated above.

At the same time, there is an obvious trend towards growth in the number of Internet users. By the expert assessments of SpyLOG Runet, the number of users is growing very fast. Their number doubles every 1.5 years and today equals \( \approx 25 \) million users, including not only Russians but also foreigners. Out of this number \( \approx 10 \) million are permanent users, the core of the audience.

Only five or six years ago the Internet was an exotic thing in Russia and was found mainly in Moscow, but now the Internet is regularly used by about 150,000 individuals in the typically provincial Samara Region. As specialists predict, by the year 2005 this figure will reach \( \approx 300-350,000 \) given a total population of 3.2 million.

At the same time, one cannot neglect the fact that mass communication is not only the receiving of information on events of social and political life but also the formation of public opinion on those events. And in this respect the process of mass communication appears as a complex model of information perception and its value interpretation. Without going deep into the theory of this problem let us consider only some aspects of practical importance. Conventionally three groups of public opinion carriers can be singled out: society in total, public opinion psychological leaders, and status leaders.

I – society in total which is a carrier of a certain circle of ideas, knowledge, notions, stereotypes, etc.;

II – public opinion psychological leaders; they are the ones who form a specific attitude towards any event, institution, or individual politician at the level of microgroups. Psychological tests show that the people possessing such leadership properties constitute between 25 to 35%. But the final opinion of all the rest depends on their viewpoint;

III – public opinion status leaders are those people who by virtue of their public status have control over the formation of
public attitudes to certain life phenomena (managers, teachers, journalists, etc.). They account for about 5% of the total population.

The channels through which representatives of these three groups obtain information significantly differ from each other:

**Fig. 7. What Are Your Main Sources of Information on Events of Social and Political Life?**

![Bar chart showing sources of information for different groups.](image)

Based on the above data one can draw several conclusions. TV is the main source of information for all three groups but its significance is lower for psychological leaders and even less for public opinion status leaders. Instead, the significance of printed mass media and the Internet grows in proportion. To a greater extent the significance of radio goes down for these social groups.

In other words, if for the society in total only TV is of special significance, then for psychological leaders and especially for status leaders of public opinion, the printed media and high quality press is of the same importance. The Internet is reaching the third position here.

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6 Total responses exceed 100% as respondents could choose several options of responses at the same time.
Thus in the coming electoral cycle, of principal importance will be control over TV, the possibility to influence Internet users, and control over the promoted “intellectual monthlies” as a channel of the formation of the elite’s opinion. The role of daily mass newspapers in the period of future election campaigns may be leveled by ordinary leaflets and agitation papers or by one-day newspapers.

4. Legislative Changes and Limitations

The character of the coming election campaigns will also be greatly influenced by the legislative innovations introduced by the federal law “On securing electoral rights of citizens” passed in the summer of 2002. Following this law, possibilities of the mass media to influence the electoral process on their own will be significantly limited.

Previously the mass media could independently occupy a certain position in relation to candidates and could issue assessments of their promises and activities. Such assessments of the press were not considered as electoral campaigning but the new law introduces many procedures limiting the possibilities of the mass media to express such viewpoints.

This especially concerns governmental and municipal mass media that will be obliged to provide broadcasting time and printing space equally for all candidates and election associations. The editors will not have the right to accompany these data with any comments, headings or illustrations without the approval of the corresponding candidate. This refers to all mass media having a governmental share in their charter capital as well as the mass media that received subsidies for the last two years from the federal or municipal budget.

Actually, in the period of the election campaign itself the governmental and municipal mass media will be taken out of the process of pre-election agitation. The procedure of dissemination of information on candidates and parties which is included in the law will significantly limit the possibilities of governmental and municipal officials to interfere with the election process.
For instance, according to the law all TV channels with a governmental and municipal property share will be obliged to provide on-air broadcasting time free of charge (?) on an equal footing to all candidates. The law even specifies the duration of pre-election broadcasts – 30 minutes daily at prime-time. Not less than 50% of the pre-election broadcasting time shall be given to candidates for direct debates.

The law also introduces limitations on journalists’ criticisms of candidates. The mass media “shall refrain from publishing data (including those containing true information) that could damage a candidate’s honor, dignity or business reputation, if they cannot give the candidate the possibility to publish a refutation free of charge... before the end of the agitation period.”

However, in the law itself there are many “blank spots” that prejudice the very possibility of the realization of the procedures included in it. In particular, it is not clear who will pay for the on-air time in cases where candidates have different financial potentials. For the editors, of no small importance is the question of what the unavoidable losses of ratings and advertisement profits will be compensated with. Neither is the mechanism of control over adherence to the legislation developed, as shown by regional elections held in some subjects of the RF last year.

Participants of the political process reacted to these changes in electoral legislation by starting their State Duma election campaign 3-4 months earlier than usual while new limitations could not be used against them.

In general, one should note that the electoral legislation changes, if strictly followed by election committees and law machinery, will become a spiteful joke for many candidates representing the “party of power.” But for the communist opposition with a steadfast electorate they are advantageous. This is proved by the analysis of survey data conducted by FOM and ARPI showing that the formation of electorates of the biggest election associations during election campaigns proceeds not quite uniformly.

For example, prior to the elections of 1999, more than half of “Yedinstvo” supporters decided to vote for this movement less
than three weeks before the elections. At the same time, the electorate of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation shaped itself at 80% as early as the summer of 1999:

**Fig. 8. Subjective Assessments of When the Political Decision Was Taken**

Out of the legislative innovations, one more thing is worthwhile pointing out: in the forthcoming election campaigns certain preferences are given to oligarchs who stand for governmental authority offices and are founders of various periodicals. All these limitations do not apply to them (Article 56/6).

**5. Expectations of the Electorate**

These improvements will surely affect the nature and results of coming elections in the new election cycle of 2003-2005. On the other hand, the coming elections will be significantly affected by the changed expectations and mass stereotypes of the population.

Among the many leadership theories in present-day political science, one of the main ones is the disciple determinism concept

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that, to me, also seems to most adequately describe reality. Its essence is that a person becomes a leader not so much owing to his status or personal qualities but only when he, or to be more precise his image, meets mass expectations and stereotypes. And these expectations and stereotypes change with time.

Therefore charismatic leaders of some epochs appear as mere graphomaniacs in different times and dim, indistinct, middling people become mouthpieces of public aspirations. This is how the phenomenon of Putin can be explained when ten years ago it was not possible to make him just a popular politician to say nothing of the nation’s leader. But will this situation stand in the future?

There is no doubt about the social perceptions of Russians having been significantly changed. If we compare the results of psychological tests on the electorate performed by the Samara Social Technologies Fund in April-May 2003 with corresponding parameters of 2000 we can draw a number of conclusions.

Having studied such things as the psychological tonus of the electorate, psychosocial motivation of behavior, people’s perception of their social status and psychological depth of socialization of a personality, the survey authors arrived at the conclusion that during the last three modifications the electorate perception system had the following tendencies.

The society has started to overcome the deep psychological shock condition from which it suffered in the early 1990s. Public awareness of this period can be characterized by a pronounced catastrophic perception of the world. Moreover this catastrophic perception resided not only in outsiders but also in people in the upper strata of the public pyramid. While the first simply stayed in a condition of social apathy with rare bursts of undirected aggression, representatives of the social and economic elite were also thrown out of their social niche and lived with a feeling of feasting in the middle of a plague.

People did not plan their future, lived for the moment, and took skeptically such values as health, family, and education. Team social values were also moved to the background. Dominating instead were values related to prosperity and present-day
success. Contentment with one’s social status was a rare exception just as was the willingness to stand for one’s way of life.

Now the perception of more and more people gradually settles in harmony with reality, but it is a new reality. Along with a severe rationalism and egocentrism typical also of the 1990s, values that are post-material per se are being moved to the forefront. People are trying to plan their future, think more about their health, education, children, and the value of a stable public order:

Fig. 9. Changes in the Social Perception Values System (2000-2003)

This means that the voter who will come to polling stations during the new electoral cycle of 2003-2005 is a different voter in comparison to even 2000. Therefore voters will need leaders capable of expressing adequately their demands and expectations.

8 Based on socio-psychological surveys performed by the Social Technologies Fund on request from the Samara Oblast Administration.
Before the 2000 elections, survey authors noted that public expectations of voters had a noticeable tendency towards charismatic authoritarianism.

The highest psychological resonance and correspondingly the highest electoral support went to political leaders demonstrating a striving for renewal, rigidity in their style of behavior and categoricity in assessments and judgments. Here the main psychological constituent is the willingness and urge towards assuming the burden of responsibility.

New socio-psychological conditions call for political leaders of a different type. This would be a person with an image of a reliable, predictable partner inclined more to effective management proven by experience of previous activities rather than to superficial epatage.

This has been confirmed by the results of other surveys. In particular, observations performed by Samara University sociologists in 1999 and 2003 show how people’s notion of an ideal candidate deputy has changed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. To What Kind of a Candidate Deputy Would You Give Your Preference?</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A professional manager with experience of political activities</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fighter for justice, an outstanding personality capable of trenchant deeds</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A potent business manager capable of running an enterprise successfully</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person capable of getting money required to solve problems of the constituency out of authorities</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A person having not only a program but implemented projects</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A businessman rendering charitable support to those in need</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A man of labor who understands the problems of common people</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A representative of a political party you sympathize with</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus the conclusion can be drawn that in Russia the time of leaders is gradually expiring and an epoch of managers is setting in. Politicians will be less and less assessed by the ideological values they personify and more by the degree of their efficiency.