Introduction

The rise of Chinese migrants in the Russian Far East has come parallel to an influx of Korean-Chinese people (Chaoxianzu in Chinese, Chosonjok in Korean). The Korean-Chinese ethnic group, who is classified as one of “55 minority nationalities” by the Chinese government, has almost two million people in China. Ninety-five percent of the Korean-Chinese have their registration of residence in the three provinces of Northeast China, formerly called Manchuria, which shares a long border with the Russian Far East.¹

The Korean-Chinese people have never been a main topic of research concerning human security and migration in the Russian Far East. There are several reasons for this. First, the number of Korean-Chinese people is relatively small compared to the much larger number of Han Chinese among foreign migrants in the Russian Far East. Second, it is difficult to do research on the Korean-Chinese in the Far East. Some Korean-Chinese people are living with other ethnic Korean residents including Korean-Russians, South Koreans and North Koreans. But it is widely believed that they are also living with other ethnic groups such as the Han Chinese; therefore, their ethnic identity cannot be easily revealed. Third, the problems of cross-border

migration are deemed important enough to be highlighted in the bilateral politics between Russia and China. A joint declaration signed by Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, on May 27, 2003 shows deep concern towards the uncontrolled movement of Chinese people into Russia. However, Korean-Chinese people are ethnically Korean, yet Chinese by nationality at the same time. So, the Korean-Chinese people are ethnic minorities even among the Chinese migrant communities in the Russian Far East.

However, the issue of the Korean-Chinese migrants in the Russian Far East can be one of the most important features of the Chinese migration. Also, the Korean-Chinese presence in the Russian Far East is a unique feature in the ethnic mosaic of the region and it needs to be scrutinized. First, they are ethnically Korean but Chinese citizens and can be potentially integrated into ethnic Korean communities in the Russian Far East. Historical memory is vivid among the ethnic Korean settlers in the Russian Far East. They recall that Korean-Russians were scapegoats in the international politics between Japan and the Soviet Union during the 1930s, the Stalin era. Although most of the Korean-Russians in the Soviet Far East were Russian citizens, they were deported to Central Asia under the accusation that they were alleged spies for Japan. Korea was colonized by Japan in 1910, but most Korean-Russians became naturalized in the Soviet Union well before the 1930s. At present, some Korean-Chinese people worry about their human security caused by their unique identity in the Russian Far East. They fear that they would be an easy scapegoat in plausible ethnic feuds between migrated Chinese people and local Russians, triggered by the burgeoning Chinese migration, concerning territorial and economic security of the Russian Far East and the manipulation of the local fear by the regional politicians.

Second, on the contrary, the Korean-Chinese people are intermediaries between the Han Chinese and the Koreans, including Korean-Russians, South and North Koreans, in the Russian Far East. Also, many of them are local representatives of Han Chinese wholesalers in China. This “middleman” role of the Korean-Chinese people in the multi-ethnic Russian Far East may be a good indicator of the real ethnic fabrics and foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns associated with the influx of Chinese into the Far East. Although the
role of the Korean-Chinese people may not be influential enough to be considered by Russia and China, shared characteristics, such as cohabitation with Russians, the ethnic identity of Koreans, and the national identity of Chinese citizens could prove to be useful for maintaining a peaceful multi-ethnic coexistence in the future Russian Far East.

There are virtually no previous works on the Korean-Chinese presence in the Russian Far East. Moreover, the question of North Korean refugees became internationalized after the massively publicized events of May 2002 in Shenyang, Northeast China. Mainly, questions concerning North Korean refugees have focused on those in China. Recently however, at the time of writing this paper, a North Korean construction worker entered the Consulate Office of the United State of America located in Vladivostok. This may explain how the issues of ethnic Korean migration and ethnicity in the Russian Far East are intermingled. Therefore, the study of the Korean-Chinese presence in the Russian Far East is related, not only to the issues of Chinese migration, but also to the issues of ethnic Korean migration as a whole, including North Korean refugees, Korean-Russian returnees and South Korean activities in the region. Yet, the study of Korean-Chinese migration is still in its very early stages.

In this brief analysis, I will examine the nature of Korean-Chinese migration into the Russian Far East and discuss its implications for the development of ethnic Korean identity and peaceful regional cooperation in the region. The empirical material for this analysis mainly comes from two short field trips conducted in 2004 in the Russian Far East. Also, my visit to Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture of Jilin Province in 2002, as well as a survey conducted in 2003, proved helpful to analyze the issue more profoundly.

2 A construction company worker, one of an estimated 4,000 North Koreans working in the Russian Far East, entered the United States Consulate in Vladivostok on October 28. He will be a test case for Russia and the United States for the issue of freedom for North Koreans after the North Korean Human Rights Act signed by George W. Bush.
An Ethnic Mosaic: Koreans in the Russian Far East

The History of Korean Immigration to the Russian Far East

Korean immigration to Russia officially started after the Treaty of Beijing (1860) when Russia became a neighbor of Korea. However, Koreans had already moved into Primorskaia oblast when the land was under Qing control and forbidden for Korean migrants.3 There were also seasonal, irregular, and illegal migrants. The number of settlers reached 100 families in 1866. As a bad drought came in 1869, the Korean population jumped to 8,400 people. The Koreans crossed the Tumen River on the Korean-Russian border but also on the Russian-Manchuria border. By 1923, the number of Korean immigrants had exceeded 100,000 and by 1927 their number had reached 170,000. During the 1920s, however, the Korean population in the Russian Far East had reached an estimated 250,000.4 The motivation of the Korean immigration to Russia at that time was the same as that of the Korean migrants in Manchuria – to escape hunger and the harsh Japanese rule in Korea.

The attitudes of the local Russians towards the Korean immigrants ranged from one of welcoming them for the cheap laborers they needed to develop the area, to one of concern about the potential vulnerability to the advance of Koreans along the strategic coast of the Pacific Ocean.5 The Russian authorities registered Korean immigrants and started to permit them to obtain Russian citizenship.6 By 1914, a third of the Korean immigrants had become Russian citizens. Unlike in Manchuria, there were visible signs of successful assimilation of Koreans into the Russian communities. Many were converted to Orthodox Christianity and russified their names.

The October Revolution in 1917 brought great changes to the Koreans in Russia. Because most of the Korean activists were engaged in the anti-Japanese struggle, few Koreans were available to join the

5 Daesook Suh, ed., Han’gukkwa Reosia Kwan’gye, pp. 66-71.
6 Songmoo Kho, Koreans in Soviet Central Asia, p. 17.
Bolsheviks. But, the Japanese intervention in Siberia and the Far East from 1918 to 1922, followed by the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic as a buffer state, prompted the Korean partisans to join the Bolsheviks in the fight against the Entente intervention. Following the establishment of the Soviet Union, therefore, Koreans in the country were permitted to become Soviet citizens and sovietization started in the Korean regions.

The sovietization of the Koreans was completed in the 1920s. An important incident during this period was that the Koreans sent a petition for the establishment of a Far Eastern Korean National District to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The move was influenced by the decision of the Soviet government to form the Jewish Autonomous District in Birobidzhan. The petition was denied in 1929. Along with the petition, some Korean farmers protested and clashed with Russians over the fact that the Russian collective farms got more land and were better provided with agricultural machinery. The Soviet local government was also alarmed by the waves of Korean and Chinese migrants into the Soviet Far East.

Stalin’s forcible transfer of Koreans along with other ethnic minorities, including Germans and Chinese, began in the early 1930s. These minorities were mainly classified as “class enemies” and sent to the gulags, the labor camps. It was not until 1936 that the scale of Koreans sent to Central Asia became massive. At least 118,000 Koreans were forced to move to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. By 1939, the number of Koreans in Central Asia had reached 182,300. Before the transfer, the Soviet government executed more than 2,500 Korean Communists, mostly leaders of the Korean community in the Far

11 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
East. The reason for the forced migration of Koreans was political; the Soviet Union felt threatened by the aggressive policy of Japan in China, particularly in Manchuria. Nor did the Soviet government trust the Koreans in the Far East.

Thus, Koreans in the former Soviet Union lived in various republics until the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1989, the number of Koreans was 438,650 in fifteen republics, including the 43,000 residents of Sakhalin Island who were forced to move and work mainly as mine workers before World War II when the southern part of the island became Japanese territory. Yet, the proportion of the Koreans in these republics did not reach 1 percent of the total local population. They were truly ethnic minorities wherever they were, and their russification was particularly fast in Central Asia.

The Perestroika led by Gorbachev opened the way in the 1990s to restore the rights of ethnic Koreans who were forcibly deported from the Russian Far East. The 1993 decree on the restoration of ethnic Korean rights in the Russian Federation was adopted in the Supreme Assembly. Here, “individual and voluntary return to the former place of residence” was permitted (Article 2) and Russian citizenship could be obtained by migrants from outside the newly independent Russia (Article 4). The decree also stated that the local authorities should provide “residential houses and lands for farming and other activities for ethnic Korean returnees as far as they want to do so” (Article 5).

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12 Kwangkyu Lee and Kyungssoo Jeon, *Chaeso Hanin [Koreans in the Soviet Union]* (Seoul: Jipmundang, 1992), p. 78. This fact was newly revealed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

13 Vladimir Kim, a Korean-Russian scholar, revealed the process of the deportation and re-settlement of the Koreans based on the newly declassified Soviet documents. See Vladimir Kim, *Reosia Hanin Kangje Ijusa [History of the Enforced Migration of the Korean in Russia, originally, Pravda polveka spustia]* (Seoul: Kyeongdang, 2001).


15 Korean-Russians from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan can apply for Russian nationality after their “residence certificate” is confirmed due to the bilateral agreement between Russia and the Central Asian Republics above. But there is no such an agreement between Russia and Uzbekistan where most of the Korean-Russian would-be returnees to the Russian Far East live. Therefore, the process of acquisition of residence as well as citizenship is complicated and difficult for most Korean-Russian returnees. (Interview with the vice president of...
Resurgent nationalism in the new-born Central Asian republics accelerated the massive transfer of ethnic Koreans to Russia and the Russian Far East. According to an incomplete source of the Russian government, the population of ethnic Koreans in the former Soviet Union excluding foreign nationals exceeded 470,000 in 1999. Seven republics had more than 1,000 ethnic Koreans (Table 1).

Table 1. Ethnic Korean Population in 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>198,000</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>Other Republics</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Current Ethnic Korean Groups in the Russian Far East

The Russian Far East is an ethnically complex place for Koreans. South Korea normalized its diplomatic relations with Russia in 1991, meanwhile North Korea maintained its relations with the Soviet Union/Russia relatively firmly since World War II. Newcomers to the Russian Far East, including South Koreans, North Koreans, Koreans from Central Asia, and ethnic Koreans from Sakhalin in the 1990s made the ethnic map of Koreans in the region more complicated.

Korean Revival Fund in Ussuriisk, Viktor Alekseevich Kim, in March 25, 2004.)

Two reports are noteworthy for the resettlement of Korean-Russians from the Central Asian Republics to the Russian regions such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, Volgograd, South Ukraine, and North Caucasus: Institute of History and Culture (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies), Dongnib gukayonhap Koryeoin sahoe yonku [Studies on the Korean-Russian Societies in the CIS] (Seoul: Overseas Korean Foundation, 2003) and Institute of History and Culture (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies), Dongnib gukayonhap chiyok ui sinheung Koryeoin sahoe network [Social Network of the Newly Formed Korean-Russian Societies in the CIS] (Seoul: Overseas Korean Foundation, 2003).

A nationwide population census was taken in Russia in 2002. At the time of this writing, I do not have the new census statistics.
Koreans in the Russian Far East are mainly concentrated in Primorski krai, where an eighteen-kilometer border is shared between Russia and North Korea. Among the 125,000 ethnic Koreans living in Russia, at least 33,000 are living in Primorski krai. Other regions of the Russian Far East with ethnic Korean populations range from Khabarovsk to Kamchatka.

Their place of origin, nationality, socio-economic background, and history make them different from each other (Table 2). There are at least nine different types of ethnic Koreans in the Russian Far East. There are three Korean-Russian groups, two North Korean groups, two Korean-Chinese, and two South Korean groups. There are also ethnic Koreans from other countries not mentioned above, such as Japan. The nine groups are not only different in their nationalities but also separate in their use of language and culture. Thus, studies of inter-ethnic relations among them will be quite interesting and important in addition to research on their relations with other ethnic groups such as the Russians.

Table 2. Ethnic Korean Groups in the Russian Far East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Time of move</th>
<th>Main Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koryoin 1</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>18th century</td>
<td>various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koryoin 2</td>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Farmers/ various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koryoin 3</td>
<td>Sakhalin</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korean 1</td>
<td>Contracted workers</td>
<td>4,000-12,000</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Forestry/ Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korean 2</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Less than 1,000</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean 1</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Business/students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean 2</td>
<td>US Other nationals</td>
<td>More than 200</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Mainly missionaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosonjok 1</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Shuttle traders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosonjok 2</td>
<td>Yanbian</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Market traders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Korean-Russians can be divided into three groups. The first is the group of Korean-Russians who were not forcibly moved in the Stalin era and continued to live in the Russian Far East. The second group is composed of ethnic Koreans from Sakhalin Island. Those are descendants of the people who were forced to move to the island before World War II. They have come to the Russian Far East in search of a better chance in Keunddang (literally “big territory” in Korean, which means Continental Russia). The third group is from the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Most of them are descendants of those who were scattered to various regions in Central Asia during the Stalin era. Today they are coming back to their former homeland. These three groups are called “Korean-Russians” (Koryoin in Korean). Most of the Korean-Russians do not speak the Korean language and are heavily russified in culture. The number of Korean-Russians including the new immigrants from Central Asia was not more than 33,000 in 2001 (Table 3).18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Approximate numbers</th>
<th>Note (including)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vladivostok</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ussuriisk</td>
<td>17,200</td>
<td>Novonikol’sk, Mikhailovka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakhodka</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>Partizanskii Raion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partizansk</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>Lazovskii Raion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artem</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>Shkotovskii Raion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spassk-Dal’nii</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Chernigovskii Raion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other regions</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


North Koreans in the Russian Far East are mainly contract workers under an agreement between Russia and North Korea. The exact number is not known. In 1997, there were 4,149 North Korean

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workers in Primorskii krai. Some estimated the numbers around 3,000 in 1999. According to the South Korean Intelligence Agency, the number hit a record of 20,000 in 1996 but dropped to 12,000 in 1999. It is widely believed that the decrease was due to the Russian government’s investigations of drugs, arms and human trafficking as well as an initiative to decrease construction workers. Another North Korean group is refugees from North Korea. North Korean refugees/defectors (Talbukja) in Northeast China are widely known but the reality in the Russian Far East is still difficult to grasp.

Due to the probable political sensitivity of Primorskii krai as a place of meeting with North Koreans, the South Korean government does not publish separate data of the South Koreans in the region on the official homepage of the Korean Embassy in Russia. A consulate office of South Korea is located in Vladivostok and North Koreans have theirs in Nakhodka. Also, South Korean missionaries are unique in the ethnic setting of the Russian Far East. It is widely believed that more than 200 Christian missionaries are active in the Russian Far East. Although they are ethnically Korean, many of them have foreign passports from such countries as the United States.

Another ethnic Korean group in the Russian Far East is Korean-Chinese (Chosonjok), which will be discussed in this paper.

Korean-Chinese Presence in Primorskii Krai

Push and Pull Factors of the Korean-Chinese Migration

Korean-Chinese migration into the Russian Far East is a part of Chinese migration in the region. Therefore, it is essential to know the

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20 Ibid.

push and pull factors of Chinese migration in general, in order to know the specific case of the Korean-Chinese.22

From the Chinese side, the Open Door Policy, which was proclaimed in 1978, was the main push factor of the Chinese migration into the Russian Far East. The policy was extended to open border regions and the Chinese central government permitted some “border trade zones” in 1991. In Northeast China along with the borders of Russia, at least 10 zones were chosen for improving trade with Russia. Also, the central government encouraged the local government to take measures of “exporting labor workers” to foreign countries. In a population of more than 100 million, three provinces of the Northeast (Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Jilin) had to solve the pressure of xiagang (unemployment caused by a restructuring of state-owned companies). Exporting labor workers to foreign countries including Russia, South Korea and Japan, and promoting border trade with Russia became good alternatives to solve the unemployment problem. The 1992

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agreement on the principle of sending and employing Chinese citizens in Russian enterprises, joint ventures, and companies between Russian and China promoted frontier trade and mutual visits. As a result, the Chinese population in Russia increased rapidly.

From the Russian side, an economic decline and the consequent population decrease became the main factors attracting Chinese migrants. A narrow consumer market, stagnating industry, unfavorable climate and the “red tape” of the officials were not issues within the Russian Far East, but the Russian economic issues as a whole. However, particular conditions were added in the Russian Far East. Expanding Chinese consumer goods had comparative advantages in price excluding the expense of logistics. Also, the Russian population in the Russian Far East decreased due to their emigration to European Russia. New workers in construction, lumbering, and even market places became needed.

At the macro level, Korean-Chinese migration into the Russian Far East happened within the same structure of the Chinese migration. However, there were unique factors at the micro level as well, which were related to South Korea’s policy towards the overseas Koreans and their vicinity of location. After the normalization with China in 1992, the South Korean government tried to introduce a new policy for overseas Koreans, which would allow preferential treatment such as visa status, social welfare, and length of residence. It developed to a bill which contains provisions for foreign citizens of Korean descent as having almost the same rights as Korean nationals. The 1998 Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans was finally ratified but it did not include the Korean-Chinese. However, other policies to give preferential treatment to the Korean-Chinese were introduced. As a result, more than 200,000 Korean-Chinese are living in South Korea, legally and illegally.23 Therefore, Korean-Chinese who could not enter South Korea started to divert their destination, including the Russian Far East which is adjacent to their home place.

In September 2002, there was a week of celebration for the 50th anniversary of the establishment of Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture in Jilin province. I participated in a seminar sponsored by the Association of Korean and Chinese Lawyers, and the prefecture government. Some delegations were from Heilongjiang, Shanghai, and Beijing among other cities. I found that there were no systematic works on the Korean-Chinese migration to other countries by Korean-Chinese themselves. Moreover, the prefecture government does not have any statistical data on the Korean-Chinese migration from Heilongjiang province. No systematic research is being carried out across the provincial boundaries of Northeast China in which most of the two million Korean-Chinese reside.

I collected limited secondary source information on Chinese shuttle traders’ routes to Russia and periodical changes of the their migration patterns. There are four outpost cities for most of the Korean-Chinese who wish to go to Russia including Hunchun in Jilin province, and Heihe in Heilongjiang province. Korean-Chinese from Jilin Province normally use the Hunchun route when they go to Russia but often use other routes in Heilongjiang when they come back from Russia. The situation changed in 1997. Tourist companies in Yanbian sponsored by the prefecture government emerged. At least four companies are involved in the Russian tour business. After advertisements for a group tour to the Russian Far East are announced in newspapers or in other ways, they make a group and hire a bus to Russia. They use the Hunchun route and most visitors come back in the same bus after a week-long visit in Russia. It is an organized method for Korean-Chinese shuttle traders from Yanbian. But it is obvious that shuttle traders from Heilongjiang use different ways to go to Russia. At present, there are chartered bus services at least three times a week from Ussuriisk to Hunchun. It takes around six to ten hours depending on the immigration procedure at the border. Institutionalization becomes evident in the human flows of the Korean-Chinese into the Russian Far East.
Population, Occupations, and Residence
(1) Population
It is extremely difficult to figure out the exact numbers of Korean-Chinese who go to Russia from Chinese sources. I was informed that there were problems in calculating the number of shuttle traders, even if some statistics were available. Although some traders go to Russia three or more times a year, we do not know the proportion of them in the statistics unless the tour companies give the full names of the visitors/traders. Therefore, for more reliable numbers, we should see the Russian data from the four posts, but they do not include ethnic identification.

From the interviews I conducted, the number of Korean-Chinese in the Russian Far East could be ascertained. The best way to obtain such data would be to use official statistics from the Russian and Chinese governments. On the departure and entry cards of China, each traveler is supposed to indicate his/her ethnicity. Therefore, we should be able to know how many Korean-Chinese go to the Russian Far East. As far as I know, such information has not been officially published. I am not sure if the Russian side has separate statistics on Korean-Chinese. Another way to collect these much needed statistics is to use statistics from such groups as the Ethnic Korean Revival Program and the Ethnic Korean Association of Culture and Autonomy.

There are two Korean-Chinese groups in terms of departure points: Heilongjiang and Yanbian. The problem is that we do not know the respective numbers. Moreover, it is not clear how long the visitors stay in Russia and how many times a year they go to Russia. Multiple entries and duration of stay are important to analyze the Korean-Chinese presence in the Russian Far East. Therefore, I use indirect data of the Korean-Russians and others in discussing the problems of Korean-Russians in the Russian Far East.

Among the ethnic Koreans, which include 33,000 Korean-Russians, the population of Korean-Chinese is not known. Moreover, it is not known how many Korean-Chinese are included among the Chinese residents/citizens. The Heilongjiang Daily estimated that around 30,000 Korean-Chinese are living (temporarily or permanently) in the Russian Far East. But the source of information
and the settlement pattern of the Korean-Chinese in Russia are not revealed. According to unconfirmed data, in 2003, “more than 140,000 foreigners came to Primorskii krai. 85 percent of the visitors were mostly Chinese and Vietnamese. It means that at least 100,000 Chinese came to visit the Russian Far East. Also, there were 15,000 legal and 5,000 illegal workers who came to work in the Russian Far East.”

Without short-term visitors, Chinese who are staying more than 6 months can be estimated at around 20,000 because there were 12,000 officially contracted workers, 5,000 illegal workers “who were mostly regarded as Chinese” and other persons who can stay in the Russian Far East legally. Among the Chinese, “Korean-Chinese can be less than 3,000.”

Also, the Korean-Chinese can be estimated from the market place of Ussuriisk. There are around 2,300 stores in the market. Among them, 80 percent are occupied by Chinese. Also, Korean-Chinese make up more than 70 percent of the Chinese merchants. Therefore, 1,000-1,200 Korean-Chinese sellers are working in the market place of Ussuriisk. There may be some Korean-Russians in that number.

Evgeni Kang, the head of the Korea Revival Program, also confirmed that there are at least 150 Korean-Chinese households around the market place. He also told me that Ussuriisk is the only area where a concentration of Korean-Chinese can be found. Korean-Chinese are found in some cities such as Vladivostok and Nakhodka. Therefore, it is reasonable to estimate that the Korean-Chinese population in the Russian Far East ranges from 2,000 to 3,000.

(2) Occupation
Korean-Chinese can be seen selling mainly vegetables, side dishes and other light goods for everyday use in the market place of Ussuriisk. But others are doing joint venture business with other ethnic Koreans such as South Koreans or Korean-Russians. Many of them are believed to be representatives of firms, including South Korean firms. Some are

24 Interview with the vice-director of the Immigration Office of Primorskii krai (March 26, 2004).
running restaurants and tourist companies with Korean-Chinese guides and helpers. Others are teachers of the Korean language, and housemaids for South Korean businessmen.

In the market place of Ussuriisk, Korean-Chinese are working individually. The market, which has a pyramid structure, is divided into five parts. The owner/guardians of the quarters rent out their selling-stands. Some people rent whole or part of their stands again to other individual merchants. Most Korean-Chinese are individual merchants. Unlike the Han Chinese, they do not have their own associations in the market.

Rather, they join smaller gatherings, such as irregular meetings based on locality, occupation, and educational backgrounds. Most Korean-Chinese in the Russian Far East, especially in the market place of Ussuriisk, are believed to come from the Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture or other places in Jilin province. On the other hand, Korean-Chinese from Heilongjiang are mainly shuttle traders and their places of work range all the way from Vladivostok to cities in European Russia, such as Moscow and Volgograd. Therefore, Korean-Chinese from Heilongjiang are mainly middlemen between Korean-Chinese merchants and Han Chinese wholesalers. These are interesting speculations that require verification.

(3) Residence halls
Korean-Chinese who are working in the market place of Ussuriisk show a unique pattern of residence. They often live in a complex near the market which is run by the very company who owns the market. It is similar to a dormitory, including storage quarters of goods, and is guarded by Russian security guards. The rent is not cheap. Each person pays up to $120 a month per room – this fee does not include meals. Each person shares a room with two or three other merchants. Satellite TV and a cafeteria are available.

Therefore, Korean-Chinese merchants staying in this dormitory get up, eat in the cafeteria and go to the market via the storage quarter to sell their goods. Then, they come back to the dormitory via the storage at night, eat dinner in the cafeteria or prepare food for themselves, and watch Chinese or Korean TV programs. Some gamble
while others sleep in the dormitory. Korean-Chinese who are not working in the market place live separately from these merchants.

**Identity and Relations with Other Ethnic Groups**

Relations with other ethnic groups can be divided into two parts: relations with local Russians and relations with other Chinese such as the Han Chinese.

**(1) Relations with the Han Chinese**

One of the emerging characteristics of the Korean Chinese in the Russian Far East is a partnership with the Han Chinese. According to a Korean-Chinese businessman and people in Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture, Korean-Chinese firstly formed a group among themselves, usually according to their place of origin. However, some changes have taken place since 1999. I offer the following changes, which need to be verified. Business conducted by Korean-Chinese changed: 1) from shuttle trade to wholesale; 2) from local Russian Far East to the whole of Siberia, and; 3) from ethnically segregated trade to mixed trade.

There seems to be a hierarchical ethnic division of labor in shuttle trade in the Russian Far East. Most people told me that shuttle traders along the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) are occupied by the Han Chinese from Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces. Particularly along the western stretches of the TSR, west of Irkutsk, shuttle trade is dominated by people from Zhejiang. In the Russian Far East, there are some Heilongjiang traders who were among the first shuttle traders in the Russian Far East. These Korean-Chinese traders are hired by the big hands of the Han Chinese traders. Also, Korean-Chinese residents in the Russian Far East are mostly representatives of the Han Chinese wholesalers or traders. Therefore, except for the market place of Ussuriisk, there is a possibility that many Korean-Chinese shuttle traders are living or doing business with Han Chinese.

During the first period from 1993 to 1997, negative stories about Korean-Chinese shuttle traders were rarely reported in ethnic Korean newspapers in Northeast China. But the situation changed after 1997. Korean-Chinese newspapers started to report on extramarital affairs among the shuttle traders who were temporary visitors to the Russian
Temporary co-habitation between Korean-Chinese shuttle traders became commonplace. But ethnic Koreans began to co-habitate with Han Chinese after the hierarchical relationship between Korean-Chinese and Han Chinese emerged. How widely this practice has spread is unclear, as are the social implications of this practice.

Apart from the shuttle traders, Korean-Chinese merchants in the marketplace have limited contacts with the Han Chinese, the very same merchants in the market and dormitory. It is known that contacts with these Han Chinese are very limited because of time limitations and associations with other Korean-Chinese merchants.

(2) Relations with the Russians
There are some tensions between Russians and Korean-Russians, particularly Korean-Russians from the Central Asian republics. According to Evegenii Kang, ethnic friction started from the early period of the formation of the CIS. He also suggests that all historical documents on Russian policy towards the Korean-Russians should be declassified to settle the disputes he says exist between Russians and ethnic Koreans in Russia. As a gesture of goodwill to improve inter-ethnic relations, Korean-Russians invited local Russians in Ussuriisk to participate in the Korean Day celebrations.

In order to see the relationship between Korean-Chinese and ethnic Russians in the Russian Far East, it is important to see the development of ethnic relations between Chinese and Russians. Korean-Chinese here are located in the middle. By nationality, Korean-Chinese are Chinese, but ethnically they share identities with other ethnic Koreans, especially with Korean-Russians. At present, local Russians are worried about a “peaceful invasion” of Chinese of the Russian Far East. Many works are written around this theme. However, it is not known if the local Russian government has a separate policy towards the Korean-Chinese apart from the Chinese and also from the Korean-Russians. But, it is true that most Korean-Chinese do not socialize with local Russians, except Korean-Chinese traders in the market place in Ussuriisk.

My research consisted of a survey, the first survey concerning the Korean-Chinese presence in the Russian Far East from the
The survey was conducted from July to August 2003 in two cities, Vladivostok and Ussuriisk, where the largest concentrations of Korean-Chinese are found. The collected surveys numbered 151. This survey has some limitations. First, the purpose of the survey was to collect information on the Russian perception of the Korean-Chinese presence in the Russian Far East. At this stage, it is difficult to conduct surveys on the Korean-Chinese people per se. Initially, I planned to interview some people of Korean-Chinese background in the market place of Ussuriisk, but I soon found it exceedingly difficult due to many factors: the reluctance of the Korean-Chinese people to complete the pilot survey (which was in Russian), their feelings concerning their illegal status, the threat of the local Mafia, as well as the Chinese Laoda, and the difficulty of finding interviewers or interpreters who speak the three relevant languages – Korean, Chinese, and Russian. Second, most of the interviewers that were available to me were female college students. Therefore, their age and gender groups are over-represented in the survey. For example, there are 23 young female students represented among a total of 27 women. The number of men in this age group comes to only six. Third, I did not have any chance to instruct the Russian interviewers in the Russian Far East before they conducted the surveys. Therefore, the surveys were not scientifically categorized according to the place of residence, date, or age group. Consequently, only 25 among 151 interviewees are from Ussuriisk. Therefore, the results of the survey overwhelmingly represent the city of Vladivostok.

In spite of these limitations, this survey can provide some useful information about the Russian perception of the Korean-Chinese people. Also, this survey can be compared with other surveys about the Russian perception of Chinese migration in general.

Completed surveys were collected from 151 interviewees. Among them, 46 are men, 102 women. Subjects under the age of 30 represent almost two-thirds of the sample. Among this age group, 32 are female.

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25 I could not personally visit the Russian Far East to conduct these surveys. Russian students in the Far Eastern University of Law and Economy carried out the interviews with 151 local Russians. I would like to express my gratitude to them, especially Munhee Jeon, a part-time lecturer of the Korean language program, for their efforts.
university or college students. The survey consists of 22 questions, including nine questions that require a written answer. Due to time constraints and lack of instruction for the interviewers prior to the interviews, the observations below are preliminary. Most of the Russians in the present sample reported that they did know the difference between Korean and Chinese people. But almost half of the respondents reported that they do not know about the existence of the Korean-Chinese population. Also, their answers seem to indicate many of them are confused about the ethnic identity of the Korean-Chinese. It also appears that the more educated people are able to differentiate between Koreans and Chinese more clearly than less educated people.

Surprisingly, however, more than one-fourth of the Russians in the sample report meeting Korean-Chinese people every day. The market and the workplace were reported to be the places where one is most likely to meet Korean-Chinese people. Also, at least 23 Russians reported an association, probably outside the work environment, with Korean-Chinese people. This may show that Korean-Chinese residents have become common in the communities where the respondents live. Also, it seems to support the assumption that the primary occupation of many Korean-Chinese is vendor in the market place. Almost two-thirds of the Russians in the present sample reported meeting Korean-Chinese in the market place.

Generally, the Russian respondents’ impressions of the Korean-Chinese people they have encountered in their work environments are positive. The favorable adjectives used to describe them include: polite, hard-working, good, positive, versatile in many languages, intelligent, and warm. Some negative answers include: impolite, incorrect, in-rush, and “so-so.” Two respondents referred to the Korean-Chinese people as Chinese-like and one respondent noted that they were the same as Koreans. But almost two-thirds of the respondents did not answer because they do not meet Korean-Chinese people in the workplace, as previously indicated.

Surprisingly, 84 among 151 Russians reported attending ethnic Korean events. Many of them visit the Annual Ethnic Korean Festival or other ethnic Korean food festivals. Some have ethnic Korean friends and visit them in places like cathedrals, churches, homes, etc. Some are learning the Korean language and regularly meet with ethnic Koreans for study or work purposes. About ten people reported visiting Korea. This seems to point towards a very positive base for future relationships between Russians and Koreans.

But the majority of the Russian respondents wrote that the impact of ethnic Koreans was very limited because (1) the population of Koreans was very small, (2) they were foreigners and could not have much of an impact on Russian society, (3) they easily accepted the Russian way of life, and (4) their occupational roles were limited. On the other hand, those who noted negative influences of the Korean presence in their community gave the following reasons: “They are stealing our jobs,” and “I do not like Koreans.” The respondents’ views on China were more off-key. Many respondents said that they admired China for its economic achievement as a socialist system, China’s cultural heritage, and the talents of the Chinese people. But others complained that the Chinese made irresponsible claims in the Russian Far East and created disputes, including territorial disputes. The Russian respondents said that the Chinese did not respect the Russians and that the Chinese were destroying the natural environment of the Russian Far East. Some respondents also wrote that they hated the Chinese migration to Russia. But amazingly, the Russian respondents still had favorable attitudes towards China.

Identity and Relations within Ethnic Koreans

The identity question of the Korean-Chinese is a very important one in the new ethnic setting in the Russian Far East. Wishnick argues that “these Chinese citizens speak Korean and potentially could be integrated more easily into Korean communities” in the Russian Far East.27 With the help from some South Korean NGOs discussed below, nine groups of ethnic Koreans are being brought together, making the

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27 Elizabeth Wishnick, “Migration Issues and Russia’s Economic Integration in Asia.”
Russian Far East a testing ground for the reunion of ethnic Koreans around the world.

(1) Relationship of Korean-Chinese with Korean-Russians
Firstly, three groups of Korean-Russians are now being incorporated after being allowed to form their own associations by the Russian government. Including the Ethnic Korean Revival Program, there are at least eleven Korean-Russian associations registered in Primorski krai. Another eighteen associations are reported to exist in other regions in Siberia and the Far East territories, being served by the South Korean consulate in Vladivostok – in such areas as Chita, Sakhalin, and Irkutsk. The associations are mainly locally organized and there is no umbrella organization of the Korean-Russians in the Russian Far East (http://www.mofat.go.kr/mission/emb/ww_intro_view.mof). There are also some feuds even among the Korean-Russian communities because of locality and power struggles. There are no Korean-Chinese associations in the Russian Far East. In short, in terms of institutionalization, there is no link between the Korean-Chinese and the Korean-Russians in the Russian Far East.

Secondly, ethnic and national identities of the Korean-Chinese are interchangeable. I heard that most Korean-Chinese do not share any indication of ethnic Korean identity except the Korean language in the market place of Ussuriisk. Most Korean-Chinese regard themselves as Chinese nationals and accept their Korean ethnic minority status. Their Korean-Chinese identity sets them apart from other Koreans in the Korean Peninsula. This is mainly due to the successful policy of the Chinese Communist Party towards the Korean minority in China. For the Korean-Chinese, national identity is most important. Language is an instrumental tool for communication with other ethnic Koreans in the Russian Far East, most of whom do not speak Korean fluently. There are some variations on the matter of ethnic identity. Some Korean-Chinese who are living with Korean-Russians are very conscious of their Korean ethnic identity. But most of the Korean-Chinese regard themselves as Chinese.

Thirdly, this became evident during the celebration of Ethnic Korean Day, which was held on October 5-6, 2002 at the City Stadium of Ussuriisk. That was the second Ethnic Korean Day sponsored by the
Northeast Asia Peace Solidarity (NAPS) and the Association for the Ethnic Culture and Autonomy led by Nikolai Petrovich Kim. Representatives from the North and South Korean consular offices came to participate in the celebrations. Around 20 Korean-Chinese from Yanbian participated at the invitation of the NAPS. But most Korean-Chinese residents in the Russian Far East were not present at the celebration. This can be interpreted in two ways. There were no formal institutional organizations of the Korean-Chinese in the Russian Far East, and it was not possible for them to participate in such a celebration. Or, ethnic affinity between the Korean-Chinese and the Korean-Russians is not very close. It is possible to say that there was a degree of self-censorship on the part of the Korean-Chinese who regarded participation in an ethnic Korean event as a possible violation of Chinese domestic laws and regulations. In the case of the Ethnic Korean Day in 2003, the situation had not changed.

In short, there seems to be some distance between the Korean-Chinese and the Korean-Russians in the Russian Far East. Although Korean-Chinese have their distinct “Korean” identity, it is rather a part of Chinese national identity than ethnic Korean identity. If ethnic Korean identity is accepted, the identity can be a sub-identity as a “minority nationality” within the realm of the Chinese nation. Therefore, ethnic Korean identity is a bit different among the Korean-Chinese. Also, a political barrier, as an “inseparable” part of the Chinese nation, can be seen as associated with other ethnic Koreans in the Russian Far East.

(2) South Korean NGOs and Korean-Chinese Identity
Ethnic Korean identity can be revived from education of the Korean language. Among the ethnic Korean communities overseas, Korean-Russians have the lowest level of Korean language proficiency. According to a study in 2000, 95 percent of Korean-Russians between the ages of 10 and 29, who belong to the third or fourth generation, speak Russian in everyday life and do not speak Korean apart from some basic expressions. Among those in their 40s, 10 percent have basic proficiency in Korean. Some Korean NGOs and semi-

28 Chaemoon Lee, “Nambuk hyopryok sidae rosia keukdong jiyok bukhan
governmental bodies provide language instruction to Korean-Russians in the Russian Far East. There are also departments and Korean language programs in universities for Russian students.29

A semi-governmental Education Center of Korea in Vladivostok provides various levels of Korean language instruction for beginners to advanced learners. In 1997, 132 students were enrolled. But 294 students were registered in 2001. Korean culture, including Taekwon Do is taught. Also, more than ten universities in the Russian Far East have a Korean-related program.

The Far Eastern State University in Vladivostok has a college of Korean studies which has more than 200 students. The Department of Korean Language in Usuriisk Teachers’ University has 80 students. Altogether, more than 2,000 students, including an unknown number of ethnic Koreans study Korean. For the Korean-Russians particularly, there are several part-time schools sponsored by Korean NGOs. At least 89 schools including almost 5,000 students are reported to be operating in many parts of the Russian Far East. For example, there are four schools in Usuriisk which open two days a week for mainly beginner-level Korean instruction. Teachers are Korean-Chinese who are hired by the NGOs or are working as volunteers. This means that some Korean-Chinese are in close contact with other ethnic Koreans on an individual basis.

For migrants from Central Asia, there are several programs for re-location and settlement based on agricultural education as noted above. Here, Korean-Chinese farmers who are invited by NGOs are playing a crucial role in agricultural education for the Korean-Russians. Korean-Chinese are also serving as intermediaries between Korean-Russians and South Koreans. Therefore, in some areas, relations among the ethnic Koreans are bound to grow.

Recently, two NGOs were established to aid ethnic Koreans in the former Soviet Union: “Northeast Asia Peace Solidarity” and “AID the

Koryo People Movement.” Northeast Asia Peace Solidarity (NAPS, dongbukapyonghwayondae) was established in October 2001 (http://wekorean.or.kr). Led by a former professor and anthropologist of Seoul National University, Kwangkyu Lee, it assists ethnic Koreans in China and the former Soviet Union. The main tasks of NAPS are twofold: to assist ethnic Korean migrants from the Central Asian republics to the Russian Far East and to help Korean-Chinese migrant workers in South Korea. Yet, NAPS does not have a separate program for the Korean-Chinese in the Russian Far East.

The activities of NAPS in the Russian Far East are mainly divided into two parts, culture and agriculture. One of the goals of the NAPS is to revive Korean culture in the Korean-Russian (Koryoin) community. For this, NAPS opened a Cultural Center in Ussuriisk for Koryoin (http://krec.ca.to/) in 2001.

The other program of NAPS is to assist agriculture. An Agricultural Center of Primorskii krai (Yonhaeju nongop senta,) was established in Mikhailovka with the aid of the local Russian government (http://wekorean.or.kr/2002/org/yh_nong_center.htm). With other NGOs of South Korea, the aim of the center is to provide agricultural opportunities for the Koryoin resettlers from Central Asia who are very poor.

Although NAPS has a long-term plan to establish a community of ethnic Koreans in the Russian Far East, such as Koryoin, Koreans from the North and South, and Korean-Chinese in harmony with local Russians, it does not have a separate recognition and program on the Korean-Chinese. AID the Koryo People Movement (KPM, Koryoin Dopki Undonghwi, http://www.koreiski.com) is a religious organization that provides aid to Koryoin resettlers. Active since February 2000, the KPM is mainly concerned with providing shelter to those resettling from Central Asia. With other NGOs such as NAPS, five resettlement camps were built. Volunteers, mainly South Korean married couples of the religious sect, assist Koryoin in teaching the Korean language and customs, give medical help, and help with agricultural techniques. The KPM does not have any interest in the Korean-Chinese there.

In short, South Korean NGO activities in the Russian Far East are in a primitive stage. Moreover, they are firstly concerned with the welfare of the Korean-Russians including the legal status of returnees,
agriculture, and re-settlement. The education of ethnic Koreans is only an afterthought. NGO activities have little to do with the Korean-Chinese in the Russian Far East.

**Conclusion**

South Korea and Russia recently agreed to build a memorial building to remember the 140 years of ethnic Korean migration into Russia. It will be built in Ussuriisk with four centers including information, education, ethnic culture, and a “wave” center for the Korean-Russian associations. The “wave movement” led by NAPS focuses on four factors to revive cultural identities of the Korean-Russians: 1) overcome the ordeals of deportation and its effect on the Korean-Russian societies; 2) pursue a new future with a new revived ethnic identity; 3) but, the movement must be based on peaceful co-habitation with local Russians, and finally; 4) the movement should be linked to the information age for fulfilling the welfare of the Korean-Russians.\(^{30}\)

Along with Korean-Russians, Korean-Chinese also expect to be able to serve as an intermediary in this new period of cooperation in Northeast Asia. Based on interviews and surveys, I have offered some preliminary findings. They all require verification in the future. The market place of Ussuriisk is the best place to see the Korean-Chinese situation in the Russian Far East. A separate study of shuttle traders in Heilongjiang province is needed.

Here is a summary of the tentative findings. There are no systematic and academic works on the Korean-Chinese to date. Therefore, the size of its population remains unknown. There are at least two groups of Korean-Chinese because of exit-routes and administrative differences: the Jilin route and Heilongjiang route. Ussuriisk has a large concentration of Korean-Chinese. At least 1,000 to 1,200 Korean-Chinese traders are found in the market place in Ussuriisk. Most of them are believed to be from Yanbian rather than

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\(^{30}\) See recently published material (October 2004) of NAPS, *Reosia hanin iju 140 chunyon kinyomkwan konrib charyojib [Assorted Materials for the Memorial Hall of the 140 years of Korean Migration into Russia]* (Seoul: NAPS, 2004).
Heilongjiang. Korean-Chinese from Heilongjiang are usually shuttle traders hired by Han Chinese settlers. Most Korean-Chinese do not have close ties with other ethnic Koreans. Most Korean-Chinese regard themselves as Chinese, and differentiate themselves from other ethnic Koreans. Some Korean-Chinese, including shuttle traders from Heilongjiang, live with the Han Chinese, while market traders stay in unique residence halls. Most Korean-Chinese do not socialize with local Russians except in the market place, or with other ethnic Koreans.

There are growing efforts to revive the cultural identity of the ethnic Koreans in the Russian Far East, including language education for the Korean-Russians. Korean-Chinese who speak Korean almost fluently do not join these efforts, but some are hired in these efforts while others volunteer. They serve as intermediaries between South Koreans and Korean-Russians. Daily interaction between Korean-Chinese and Korean-Russians is not common, but their contact is likely to grow. NGO activities to link the Korean-Chinese and the other ethnic Koreans are in a primitive stage, but they are also likely to grow in the near future.