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IS IT EASY TO GLOBALIZE THE WORLD?
THE EXPANSION OF THE SCHENGEN TERRITORY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN A WIDER EUROPE

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BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE SCHENGEN AGREEMENTS

The full scale of the Schengen agreements, such as the introduction of a common visa regime, the abolition of police and customs controls on the internal borders and the common set of rules for external border control, came into force in seven European Union countries\(^1\) on April 1, 1995. The Schengen law was fully introduced in Italy and Austria in October 1997, in Greece in 1998, and in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland in 2001. Norway and Iceland have also been participating in the Schengen system \textit{de facto} since 1999,\(^2\) and the full package of agreements was adopted in these countries in 2001. The UK and Ireland are not bound by the Schengen law, but they participate in a part of this legal framework (excluding, however, the common visa regime, which is the main subject of this chapter).

\(^1\) Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, and Portugal.
\(^2\) Together with Sweden, Finland and Denmark, Iceland and Norway belong to the Nordic passport union, which abolished their internal border checks. Sweden, Finland and Denmark became members of the Schengen group when they joined the EU. Iceland and Norway have been associated with the development of the agreements since December 19, 1996. Although they did not have voting rights on the Schengen Executive Committee, they were able to express opinions and formulate proposals. An agreement was signed between Iceland, Norway, and the EU on May 18, 1999 in order to extend that association \textit{[Official Journal L 176 of 10.07.1999]}. They continue to participate in the drafting of new legal instruments, building on the Schengen \textit{acquis}. These acts are adopted by the EU Member States individually. They apply to Iceland and Norway as well. See URL: http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33020.htm
At present, among the range of problems facing Russia in its relations with the European Union, the issues of mutual border crossing and visa regime are perhaps the most pressing ones.

What are the basic legal frameworks of the Schengen system of border crossing and common visa regime? The term Schengen Law and other related definitions like Schengen visa (Schengen area, Schengen zone, Schengen territory, and so on) originated from the name of the old castle and village of Schengen, located in Luxembourg near the border with France and Germany. Because of this symbolic location (on the crossroads of three member states of the EU), in the late 1980s, Schengen was selected as the place for the signing of two important documents by several member-states of the European Community (at that time the Schengen law was not considered to be a part of European Community law). These documents were historically named the Schengen agreements.

The first agreement was signed only by five EC countries; on June 14, 1985 France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the Schengen agreement, the aim of which was to create a territory without internal borders. The second agreement, officially known as the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, was signed on June 19, 1990 (more often this document is called the Schengen Convention). The former agreement is considered as a main legal mechanism of the so-called Schengen law. The latter could be seen just as a basic legal framework; it created a preliminary basis for this law and as a legal source is now only of historical interest. The Schengen agreements were signed later by other EU member states. Italy signed the agreement on November 27, 1990, Spain and Portugal joined on June 25, 1991, Greece followed on November 6, 1992, then Austria on April 28, 1995 and finally Denmark, Finland, and Sweden joined on December 19, 1996. (Part of the agreements was adopted by the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1999-2002, but, as mentioned above, the common visa regime procedures were not accepted by these member states).

After the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in May 1999, the Schengen agreements became part of the European Union Law. The so-called Schengen acquis began to be integrated into EU law. The scope of application of the Schengen law can be considered in terms of territories and of subjects. In the former case we can speak of countries and
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territories where the Schengen law is binding (paragraph one of the agreement). In the latter, we may consider the objects of Schengen law and the social relations that are affected by it. The term “Schengen territory” or “Schengen area” refers to the territory where all the norms of this law are put into practice. As was mentioned above, at present, this territory includes twelve EU countries (plus the two non-member states, Norway and Iceland).

In legal terms, the Schengen territory is characterized by the permeability of internal borders. It implies the absence of personal checks on the borders connecting the member states. The Schengen zone also implies the introduction of common police controls on the external borders, that is on the border with countries not participating in the Schengen agreements. Finally, it refers to a common visa regime.

After the EU enlargement in May 2004, new EU members in Central Europe will not be included into the Schengen area automatically. The negotiations on the final date for their full accession to Schengen are still going on. It is, however, known that the preliminary date of full accession of these new members to the Schengen territory is to be set for 2007.

European Border Crossing Regimes for Russian Citizens from Historical Perspective

The Schengen zone is the region geographically and culturally closest to the western part of the Slavic Eurasian mega-area. As far as the Russian Federation is concerned, the EU countries are not only its main economic partners, but also the area that Russian citizens most frequently visit. This has been especially true in recent years, when relative prosperity in the RF has led more and more people to cross the Schengen borders. They are traveling for many reasons: personal visits (meeting with relatives, friends, and acquaintances), sight-seeing, or educational purposes. The most striking example of the increase in mobility is tourism; in 2002, about five million Russians visited the EU countries as tourists.

\[ \text{In 2003, 39 percent of all Russian trade was with the EU.} \]
Although the famous longing of Russians to travel abroad is on the rise, the overall percentage of Russians among those who visit Europe is still small. Although sometimes it might seem like every other tourist on the Costa Brava or in Nice is Russian, visits to these particular places are increasing largely as a result of the work of Russian travel agencies, which prefer traditional destinations (identified mostly during last decade) because of language problems. So, even in Spain, the most popular Schengen destination for Russian citizens, just 370,000 Russians crossed the Spanish border in 2002; they made up only 0.8 percent of the total number of foreign visitors to Spain, while in the same year Russians made up only 0.4 percent of the total number of tourists in France.

By contrast, for instance, in 2003, about 0.8 million Russians visited Egypt and more than 2 million traveled to Turkey as tourists or on business (making up 17 percent of the overall tourist population in Turkey). In both these countries the total number of Russians crossing the borders was second only to that of German citizens. It is known that both Egypt and Turkey have non-visa regimes with Russia (so-called visas permitting a two-month stay can be bought by any Russian citizen for 20 USD (in Turkey) or for 15 USD (in Egypt) at airports and other points of entry to these countries, simply upon submission of a passport).

Conversely, after Poland introduced a visa regime for Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia on October 1, 2003, the number of Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russian crossing the Polish border decreased by December 2003 by 60 percent. During the three months from July 1, 2003 (the day Lithuania introduced a visa regime for the Kaliningrad region) the number of Lithuanians visiting Kaliningrad Oblast decreased almost by 90 percent; the number of Russians visiting Lithuania exclusively (excluding those in transit to or from mainland Russia) decreased by 75 percent.¹

These examples show that the EU visa regime (including the Schengen visa regime and relevant visa regimes introduced by accession countries, like good pupils of the EU, in advance of accession) at border crossing presents a real human rights problem for Russians. Despite Russia having been moved unofficially from the so-called grey list to

¹ URL: http://www.russiantravelmonitor.com
the white list in the consulates of the Schengen territory states, officially acquiring a Schengen visa is a difficult enterprise for Russian citizens. This difficulty has both a subjective dimension (like the time limits fixed by consulates for the processing of visas) and an objective one, since people in regions geographically remote from Moscow and St. Petersburg (where the majority of EU consulates are located) suffer big disadvantages in terms of the cost of time-consuming trips to the capital cities for interviews and applications for a Schengen visa.

These constraints on Russians’ legal acquisition of the Schengen visa, which operate in the majority of RF regions, lead to a situation in which so-called budget tourism (e.g. automobile tourism), the most popular in Europe, is in fact prohibited for the vast majority of Russians. The majority of Russian tourists in the Schengen zone are people with a family income equal to that of the upper middle class of the richest EU countries. This contrasts sharply with the economic circumstances of the average tourist going to the EU from Central European countries.

From 1815 to 1917 citizens of the Russian Empire could travel freely in all European countries using only a so-called foreign passport. For instance, it is well known that a number of Russian revolutionaries used this opportunity to escape from prosecution, and the “diasporas” of Russian students in Germany and France were among the biggest foreign student populations in these countries. Some European cities were even Russified in many aspects; for instance, the famous German resort Baden-Baden was frequently called the third capital of Russian literature at the beginning of twentieth century, when 15 percent of its permanent population were citizens of the Russian Empire.

Those non-Schengen countries whose citizens need to receive a Schengen visa are unofficially divided by the foreign ministries of Schengen states into three categories:

1. Black list: citizens from these countries can receive Schengen visas only if they represent official delegations (e.g. Sudan, Afganistan, Northern Korea),
2. Grey list: citizens can be denied a Schengen visa without explanation (this list includes Iran, Central Asian countries, and many African countries).
3. White list: the visa procedure is somewhat simplified

Unfortunately, there seems to be no published source for these lists. This information was received by the author during his study trip to the European Commission in 1996.

Such famous Russian authors as Zhukovskii and Turgenev lived there for many years, and Dostoevskii visited Baden-Baden many times. It was after his one day trip to a local Casino that he wrote his *Igrok* (*The Gambler*).
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Of course, travel and contacts with Europeans abroad were not always an important factor for personal and creative development in the Russian Empire. For instance, the world-famous Russian poet Alexander Pushkin never went abroad. Despite the fact that Pushkin served for many years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tsar Nicholas I never signed Pushkin’s application for a foreign (that is international) passport. However, such an obstacle did not influence the development of Pushkin’s genius. The history of the Russian Empire and the Soviet experience7 show clearly that Russians, as a rule, were welcomed in Europe and the main obstacle to this freedom of movement at those times was their own government.8

In the process of globalization of the contemporary world, freedom of movement for the purposes of tourism, study, and work in other countries will no doubt make individual life more harmonious and interesting, and the realization of this basic right will also increase people’s adaptability to rapid changes in social and economic spheres; this is particularly important for people who for many years lived behind an “iron curtain.” In today’s wider Europe, such basic rights as freedom of movement cannot be realized on a full scale as long as strict visa regimes like the Schengen one exist in this region. Modern visa regimes for border crossing appeared in Europe only in the twentieth century; they originated in two bloody world wars and the Cold War, which divided the continent into two camps. With the disappearance of the “iron curtain,” visa regimes for Europeans in Europe can be seen as an anachronism.

In this regard, the beginning of the “diplomatic struggle” with the Schengen area group for a non-visa border crossing regime seems very

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7 Until 1989, all Soviet citizens traveling from the USSR for the first time had to receive permission (officially it was conducted in the form of so-called ideological training, unofficially it was called an exit visa) from a party body. In the case of travel to the Warsaw Pact states, this permission was relatively formal and was usually issued by the Raikom (city district party committee). In case of first-time travel to other countries (including even some socialist countries like Cuba and Yugoslavia), the interviews were more rigorous and were conducted by the ideological organ of the Obkom or Kraikom (oblast or krai party committees).

8 Since the beginning of the 1990s, attempts to introduce exit visas or at least exit duties were undertaken in several post-Soviet states. They had some success only in Armenia, where since 1995 all citizens pay 10,000 Armenian drams, or 25 USD each time they leave the country.
belated, especially from the perspective of the Russian Federation, the main loser in this situation — but better late than never.

The symbolic commencement\(^9\) of these efforts was undertaken on August 27, 2002, when President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin sent messages about the problems of the vital supplies for Kaliningrad Oblast to European Commission President Romano Prodi and to the heads of member-states of the EU.\(^10\) These messages were sent after Lithuania and Poland, following the directives of the EU, made the decision in principle to introduce a visa regime for citizens of the Kaliningrad region in 2003, a decision that in reality meant the beginning of the next wave of expansion of the Schengen territory.

In the messages, it was stressed that Russia is ready for a further deepening of its cooperation with the European Union. Putin also emphasized that this cooperation should gradually lead to a real strategic partnership. The Russian President suggested to his European partners that they consider in depth the question of the unimpeded movement of transport and people between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia. It was pointed out, too, that a solution to the Kaliningrad problem must constitute part of a gradual transition towards the more ambitious goal of a non-visa border crossing regime between the Russian Federation and the European Union. Putin also emphasized that Russia expects due consideration to be given to its national interests in relation to free access to the Russian enclave, which will very soon be inside the European Union. The very day after Putin sent his messages, during negotiations with the Head of Russian Council of Federation, Sergei Mironov, in Warsaw, President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski expressed his approval of Putin’s initiative. Kwaśniewski pointed out that this is a twenty-first century approach, looking to the future rather than the past.

This Polish official opinion is especially symbolic. It was with the abolition of the visa regime between Germany and Poland in December 1989 that the contemporary history of the rapid integration of Central and Western Europe and rapprochement between Poland and the EU

\(^9\) The earlier sporadic attempts to raise this issue at a lower diplomatic level both in the Council of Europe and in the Russian Representation to EU did not influence either public opinion or actual policies.

\(^10\) URL: http://nw.rian.ru/news.html?nws_id=31234&date=2002-08-27
began. In some respects the Polish example can serve as a basis for solving the current difficulties in Russian-EU relations.

In December 1989, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl made a unilateral decision on the abolition of visas for Poles without any consultation with his EU partners. Germany, abolishing the visa regime with Poland, stressed the historical necessity of this step, which could symbolically close the last page in the post-war history of German-Polish antagonism. In 1989 Helmut Kohl and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher believed that in the context of German unification the historical agreement on the post-war German-Polish borders on the Oder and Neisse rivers (which was signed by their predecessor Willy Brandt) was no longer a necessary condition of the partnership and friendship with their Eastern neighbor. This non-visa regime could be considered an understandable gesture of friendship towards the Polish people. From the point of view of the German leadership, the measure was even more profitable for Germany, allowing full-scale pursuit of its national interests in relations with the Visegrad states.

While criticizing Germany's move, other EU countries also had to introduce the non-visa regime for Poland in 1990, despite substantial fears of illegal labor migration of Poles to Western Europe. The de facto permeability of the EU borders did not allow any other choice for Germany's partners in Western Europe. In 1990-1991, similar decisions were adopted towards Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and as early as the beginning of 1991 all citizens of the Visegrad countries were able to cross the borders of all EU and Scandinavian countries without visas. At the end of 1991, the Scandinavian countries and (in 1992) Great Britain abolished the visa regime for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Schengen visas were abolished for the citizens of these three Baltic countries in 1999. In April 2001 the non-visa regime with the Schengen area was introduced for Bulgaria and in December 2002 for Rumania.

11 One of the reasons behind this was again the scarcity of unskilled labor, which occurred after the abolition of agreements on guest workers from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Maghreb countries.

12 It should be stated that these two countries had non-visa regimes with some of the West European countries before Poland received this opportunity.
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If one considers the fact that the SFRY never in its post-war history had a visa regime with West European countries and that after the break-up of this country in the early 1990s such former Yugoslav republics as Slovenia and Croatia also benefited from a non-visa regime with the Schengen area states, it can be concluded that for the first time in 60 years, citizens of Western and Central European countries were able to enjoy full freedom of movement in their regions. The non-visa regime for Central Europeans meant that the citizens of former socialist block states could cross the borders of the EU states and could stay in a country for up to three months in succession without the right to work.

What was the situation in terms of freedom of movement for the citizens of the new Russia at that time? As early as the beginning of the 1990s, during the euphoria of the “velvet revolutions” and the rapid withdrawal of the Russian (former Soviet) troops from Central Europe, and without any diplomatic pressure from the Russian Federation, such countries as Hungary, Czechoslovakia (after 1993 the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Poland, Bulgaria and Romania introduced quite liberal non-visa regimes for some of the former Western USSR republics, including Russia.

Like Central Europeans in Western Europe, citizens of Russia could spend up to three months on the territory of these six Central European countries without visas. The mutual border crossing regime in the CIS allows CIS citizens to stay in any country of this region without a time limit. Moreover, all CIS citizens needed only an internal passport to cross the internal borders of the CIS.

These non-visa regimes can be regarded as very important voluntary institutional arrangements undertaken for the sake of continuing coexistence in one Slavic Eurasian mega-area. At the same time, differences between non-visa regimes, like those for RF citizens in Central Europe and in the CIS respectively, reflected differences between the changing political and even geographical forms of the emerging Slavic-Eurasian meso-areas.

At present, the border crossing situation in the CIS is more or less stable; with the exception of Turkmenistan and Georgia, the non-visa

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13 The internal passports of citizens of this group of the former USSR states did not even need to be stamped at the border.
regime established in the 1990s still exists in the CIS. The East European meso-area has proved to be the most changeable in the last decade, and in respect of the visa issue, these changes can be characterized as heavily externally influenced, very subjective and arbitrary.

### Recent Development in European Union Visa Regimes for the Russian Federation

Since 2000, the above-mentioned six Central European countries one by one (starting with Czech Republic in May 2000 and ending with Rumania in March 2004) have introduced a full-scale visa regime in relation to the Russian Federation. The main rationale for the introduction of the visa regime was the accession of these states to the European Union.

The political explanations offered for the quite unexpected introduction of Schengen rules for the RF by non-Schengen accession countries were typically simplistic: the fear of illegal labor migration (both permanent and “shuttle” migration), organized criminality, human and drug trafficking, and so on (concerning other problems relating to the conversion of the border-crossing problem into a security issue, please see the annex to this article).

Despite these fears and the significant conversion of the border crossing issue into a security one in the European Union, as early as January 1, 2003, 45 countries had non-visa agreements with the Schengen group; among them are Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, Romania and Bulgaria. The standards of living and average salaries in these countries are lower than in Russia. Even taking into account that the last two are going to be members of the EU in a few years, from the Russian point of view the Schengen visa regime looks like a typical example of double standards in European politics. In order to explain this point of view, let us go back to the nearest historical example of the introduction of a non-visa regime in Europe. From comparative perspective, the closest example is perhaps the Polish one.

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15 URL: http://www.russiantravelmonitor.com
At the point at which the non-visa regime with EU countries was introduced in the early 1990s, Poland was in the midst of a so-called “shock therapy” economic reform. This policy led to the rapid impoverishment of the already relatively poor population of this Central European giant, some 38 million people. Hyperinflation, unemployment and an average salary of about 30-40 USD per month were the reality for the majority of Poles at that time.

It is estimated that the number of illegal workers in the EU from Poland reached two million in 1995. Was this a consequence of the introducing a non-visa regime? The examples of other post-socialist states show us that it was not. If we consider the number of illegal immigrants per capita, the number of Albanians (from Albania) and Romanians working illegally in EU was higher than, or at least equal to the Polish illegal population in EU. The introduction by the Schengen group of a non-visa regime for Romanians in 2002 did not increase the illegal working population from this country.

The overall number of Russian illegal workers in the EU is difficult to estimate, but compared to the numbers mentioned above this population is very small. Thus, according to an official statement by the Belgian government, in 1999 about 1000 Russians were living illegally in Belgium (80 percent of them were accused of being involved in fake marriages), while in the same year the number of Poles illegally working in Belgium was 60,000. In 2001, the Portuguese government announced during the visit of Russian Prime Minister Kas’ianov that 800 Russian women enslaved in the illegal sex industry in Portugal would be granted Portuguese citizenship. After a passport check, only 60 women among 800 proved to be Russian citizens; the others were from 10 different countries.

Thanks to its huge territory and larger labor market as well as wider opportunities for relatively well-paid unskilled work, Russia has in the last decade become the second-ranking country among those accepting migrants (after the USA). Illegal migration, organized criminality, and human trafficking have been proven to be inadequate

16 In this case we are speaking about the so-called “shuttle migration,” which means that, benefiting from the non-visa regime, illegal workers work without permits and have to re-cross the border every three months (the maximum period allowed by the EU states to stay without visa on their territory) in order to remain legally in the EU.
and even misleading reasons for maintaining the visa regime for Russia on the part of the Schengen group. In almost all Russian newspapers that publish tourism advertisements there are announcements offering visas for any Schengen country in one day to anybody at the price of 100-300 Euros, while a multi-entry visa for six months will cost from 250 to 500 Euros (depending on the country). In order to get this visa a person needs only an international passport (without any invitation, or any other documents proving the necessity for a visa). These channels can of course be used by anybody from the unwelcome social groups (including organized crime). As far as human trafficking is concerned, the visa regime has proved to be more dangerous for its victims. It is much easier to enslave a person if she or he has had to use an illegal visa; in contrast, a non-visa regime gives a victim an extra chance to escape and contact the authorities of the host state.

The attempts of the European Commission to combat these visa agencies have already failed several times; even after the EU Commission issued a statement on this question in July 2002 the situation did not change. Since the dissolution of the “iron curtain,” Europe’s democracies share such a compact territory and such widespread human connections that rigid visa regimes cannot be sustained, particularly under the added pressure of globalization. In order to keep the borders shut, they need to institute or tolerate abuses of basic human rights (such as permanent street passport checks and systems of denunciation).

Ironically, Russia, a country with too many still unsolved problems of democratic institution-building, can be considered an example of a “good globalizer” in terms of progressive migration and border crossing policies. Russia still maintains a very liberal non-visa regime with 10 CIS countries,\textsuperscript{17} and migration control is in much better shape than was predicted by many European experts.\textsuperscript{18} The per capita number of illegal immigrants in Russia is also lower than in the EU.

\textsuperscript{17} Here the argument of economic disparities does not play any role; for instance, the difference in the standard of living between the RF and Tajikistan is much higher than that between the RF and the biggest EU states.

\textsuperscript{18} For instance in the British Council’s report on Migration Problems in CIS and RF, issued in 1996, it was predicted that in the year 2000 the number of Chinese migrants in Russia would be more than five million – an obviously exaggerated number from the present point of view.
The current economic situation and even the living standards in the Russian Federation obviously look much better than for instance in Poland at the beginning of the 1990s. The opportunities for the introduction of a non-visa regime also look quite promising. The perception of the border crossing issue as a security one on the part of some EU countries seems to be waning, while Russia’s aspiration towards Europe at the level of humanitarian and cultural cooperation is receiving increasing support from the top EU state policy makers. The strongest supporter of the introduction of a non-visa regime between the Schengen group and the Russian Federation is Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Positive statements on the part of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, French President Jacques Chirac, and even from EU General Secretary Javier Solana have appeared in the European media. After the Russian-German summit in Ekaterinburg in 2003, Germany took the first real step towards the introduction of a non-visa regime for Russia; since December 2003, Russian students, academics, researchers and citizens who are involved in cultural exchanges can be granted five-year multi-entry visas for their visits to Germany.\(^{19}\) France and Italy introduced the same visa receiving procedures for Russian citizens in May 2004. These examples of the friendly actions of so-called “old Europe” towards Russia still contrast with the very “atlantically” dependent policies of Russia’s Central European neighbors.\(^{20}\) However, positive tendencies in this sphere also influence the emerging meso-areas in the Slavic Eurasian world, and in the wake of further globalization processes, they will lead to positive moves towards the realization of such basic human rights as freedom of movement.

\(^{19}\) It should be said that this German decision could be considered as significant deviation from the Schengen law.

\(^{20}\) However, it should be noted, that even some of these countries (experiencing some economic losses, because of the visa regime introduction with their big Eastern neighbor) using their new opportunities as members of the EU have already started some kind of lobbying campaign in favor of the return of the non-visa regime with Russia. For instance, in the statement of the Ministry of Regional Development of Czech Republic, it was stated that the introduction of the visa regime with Russia caused economic losses of 550.3 millions USD in a period of four years. These losses occurred after May 2000 (after the introduction of the visa regime between the Czech Republic and Russia) only due to the 60 percent decrease in the number of Russian tourists visiting Czech cities and resorts.
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**Annex. Positive and Negative Consequences of the Non-Visa Regime Border Crossing for a Wider Europe Compared**

**Positive**

- European Security
- Strategic Economic Cooperation
  - Direct Investments
- Indirect Investments
  - Regional Cooperation
  - Transportation Networks Development
  - Social Mobility
- Cultural Exchange
- Educational Exchange
- People-to-People Relations
- Air Tourism
  - Budget Tourism
  - Cross Border Small Trade

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<th>VISA REGIME</th>
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<td><strong>↑</strong> “Shuttle” Illegal Labor Migration</td>
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<td><strong>↓</strong> “Permanent” Illegal Labor Migration</td>
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<td><strong>↓</strong> Human Trafficking and Slavery</td>
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**Negative**

This scheme reflects the author’s opinion on the consequences of different visa regimes most frequently discussed in the European mass media in terms of the relative importance of each one to the introduction
and abolition of visa/non visa regimes. (The relative importance is shown by the position of the phenomenon on the grid: the further the sign “●” from the axis, the less related the issue is to the perception of border crossing problems as a security issue.)

The size and direction of the symbols “↑” and “↓” show the intensity (importance of the problem for safety and security) and the trends of the negative and positive phenomena (decreasing “↓”, or increasing “↑”) after the introduction of a non-visa regime.