

Vladivostok and Odessa just before the First World War: Rethinking the Geopolitics of the Russian Empire

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This is a comparative economic study of the eastern and western peripheries of the Russian Empire just before the First World War. I attempt to reveal similarities between Vladivostok and Odessa (in other words, Northeast Asia and the Near East) by focusing on transportation issues. As space is limited, I will concentrate on ports and shipping and will not discuss railways, which are also a very important issue. Today's discussion will provide a framework to consider the relationships between the regional economy and international relations at the beginning of the twentieth century.

John P. LeDonne, a well-known specialist in the Russian Empire, observes, “The Russians thus implicitly recognized that their possessions in the Pacific frontier would gravitate toward Japan and not toward the Heartland....the more settlements there were, the more they would have to depend on outside support, if not on the sea route from the Baltic.”¹ Teruyuki Hara, an eminent Japanese historian of the Russian Far East and Russo-Japanese relations, pointed out that Russia advanced into Asia for thirty years until the Russo-Japanese war caused Russia to become much more dependent on Asia. After the war, Russia had to try its best to remove its dependency.²

Porto-franco (порто-франко), which is usually translated as “free port” in English, was a suitable subject by which to consider Russo-Asian economic relations before the First World War. However, it is important to remember that in the Russian Empire there were two types of “free port.” The first was porto-franco, the aim of which was the supply of food and goods to special regions. The second was volnaia gavan' (вольная гавань), the aim of which was the facilitation of the transit trade. In this article, “free port” means the second type. Many historians, especially Japanese ones, have studied the issues surrounding the abolishment of porto-franco in 1909, because it damaged the Russo-Japanese trade. Moreover, the Japanese historians Teruyuki Hara, Kenichi Yoshii, and Tadao Furumaya have attempted to describe Russia's and Japan's regional histories from an international perspective, using the concept of

¹ John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment* (Oxford, 1997). p. 222.

² Teruyuki Hara, “Kindai touhoku azia koueki nettowaku no seiritsu: kan nihon kai ken wo chushin ni,” in Yukimura Sakon, ed., *Kindai touhoku azia no tanjo: kokyoushi no kokoromi* (Sapporo, 2008), p. 54.

“kan-nihon-kai (the Sea of Japan Rim Area),”³ although they have given little attention to the issues of free port. On the other hand, Natalia Beliaeva, a Russian historian, has described the history of porto-franco in Vladivostok, paying attention to the discussion of free port.⁴ In view of their research, I attempt to describe “kan-nihon-kai” at the beginning of the twentieth century, comparing it with the Black Sea region.

Just before the First World War, Russian merchants and officials were discussing the plan to introduce free port into some Russian ports, including Odessa and Vladivostok, paying attention to the increasing economic influence of Germany and Austria-Hungary on the Balkans and that of Japan on Manchuria. Through a study of free port issues, we can understand the relationship between the diplomatic strategy and economic policy of the Russian Empire from a general perspective.

First, I will present an outline of the history of porto-franco in Vladivostok and deal with the results of its abolishment. Second, I will describe the competition between Russia and Japan, focusing on the circumstances of Tsuruga. Third, I will turn to an outline of the history of Odessa and the Black Sea before the First World War.

1. Vladivostok after the Russo-Japanese war

In 1860, the Russian government decided to apply the status of porto-franco to all ports of Maritime province to help economic development. Since 1880, the Russian Volunteer Fleet, the regular line between Odessa and Vladivostok or Sakhalin, carried a lot of soldiers, exiles, and peasants to the Russian Far East. Although at first it made five round trips per year, around 1900 it made about twenty round trips. In 1885, Maritime province (excluding the area north of Nikolaevsk) had a population of about 75,000,⁵ but in 1901 it exceeded 250,000.⁶

In the 1890s, Sergei Witte, the Russian Minister of Finance, went ahead with the construction of the trans-Siberian railway, expecting it to facilitate the economic integration of the whole empire. On the other hand, porto-franco in the Russian Far East was abolished in 1901, as Witte considered it an obstacle to his plan and stated that the Russian Far East could develop through the railway connecting it with European Russia. Actually, exposed to the keen competition with Dalian in trade,

³ Teruyuki Hara, *Uraziosutoku monogatari: Roshia to azia ga maziwaru machi* (Sanseido, 1998). Tadao Furumaya, ed., *Tohokuajia-shi no saihakken: Rekishi-zo no kyoyu wo motomete* (Yuushindo, 1994). Ken'ichi Yoshii, *Kan-nihon-kai chiikisyakai no henyou: “manmou” “kantou” to “Uranihon,”* (Aoki shoten, 2000).

⁴ *Беляева, Н.А.* От порто-франко к таможене. Очерк региональной истории российского протекционизма. Владивосток, 2003.

⁵ Всеподданнейший отчет Приамурского Генерал-Губернатора за 1884 и 1885. С. 10.

⁶ *Закревский, В.А.* Земское хозяйство в связи с общественным и административным устройством и управлением в Амурской и Приморской областях. Труды командированной по высочайшему повелению Амурской экспедиции. Выпуск 9. СПб.. 1911, Приложение, № 4.

merchants in Vladivostok requested reinstatement as a free port. After the outbreak of Russo-Japanese war in 1904, however, porto-franco was reestablished in the Russian Far East.

Several studies have been made on the process of the abolishment of porto-franco in 1909. The Russian officials and journals, which were the driving force behind the campaign to abolish it, emphasized the necessity of reducing Japan's economic influence on the Far East. Even after 1909, different items of unprocessed goods and food were exempted from taxation; however, the abolishment resulted in a big reduction in the Russo-Japanese trade, as mentioned above. For example, Sugiura Sotyen, the biggest Japanese store in Vladivostok, was forced to withdraw in 1908.⁷

As Table 1 shows, the number of Russian ships coming through Vladivostok doubled from 1908 to 1910. After the Russo-Japanese war, Russian officials were aware of the necessity of reinforcing Russian shipping in the Far East, with the Volunteer Fleet at the head of the list. Therefore, the Council of Ministers decided to change the competent authority of the Volunteer Fleet from the Minister of the Navy to the Minister of Trade and Industry in December of 1908.⁸

It is necessary, however, to bear in mind that Table 1 does not show the whole trend. Some historians have pointed out that Chinese and Korean junks supported Russo-Asian economic relations in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. For example, they carried much coal to Vladivostok just before the Battle of Tsushima in 1905.⁹ According to the Russian statistics, 8,619 junks from China and Korea to Vladivostok carried about six million poods of goods, 20% of the total imports in 1910.¹⁰ Moreover, I would like to emphasize that many Chinese were working in the Russian ships in the Far East. In 1909, for example, 1,084 Russian sailors and 231 Chinese sailors worked in the Russian ships connecting Vladivostok or Nikolaevsk with foreign ports. Concerning the ships chartered by the Volunteer Fleet making round trips between Vladivostok and Nikolaevsk, sailors consisted of sixteen Russians, thirty-six Chinese, five Japanese, and seventeen Koreans.¹¹ Regarding this issue, in July of 1909, the Imperial Russian consul in San Francisco mentioned the following: it was very difficult to find good crews in Vladivostok, while the situation of ports on the Black Sea

⁷ Hara, *Uraziosutoku monogatari*, pp. 264-275; Teruyuki Hara, "Nichiro sensou-go no rosia kyokutou: Chiiki seisaku to kokusai kankyou," *Roshiashi-kenkyu*, No. 72. 2003, p. 11.

⁸ По вопросу о пересмотре положения о Добровольном флоте // Особый журнал Совета Министров. 9 Декабря 1908 года. № 223. С. 10-11.

⁹ Hara, "Kindai tohoku azia koueki nettowaku," pp. 52-55.

¹⁰ Ведомости о движении морских и речных судов и грузов в водах области за 1910 год (Приложение №23) // Обзор Приморской области за 1910 и 1911 гг. С. 2-3.

¹¹ Российский Государственный Исторический Архив Дальнего Востока (РГИА ДВ). Ф. 702. Оп. 2. Д. 755. Л. 45-48.

was better, but generally very bad. In ports of the Baltic Sea, the condition was very good.¹²

Vladimir Kokovtsov, the Russian Minister of Finance, wrote in his report to the tsar about his inspection tour to the Russian Far East in fall of 1909 that it was still uncertain whether Russian goods would replace foreign ones in Vladivostok, and he insisted that they make various improvements to the port facilities¹³ (concerning the size of Vladivostok port in 1910, see Table 2).

As Table 3 shows, not only goods from Russia but also ones imported from Japan increased after the abolishment, and the total doubled in two years. The export of Manchurian soybeans from Vladivostok to Britain from 1909 (see Table 4) demanded an extension of the commercial port in Vladivostok. After the Russo-Japanese war, the rival for Vladivostok in the export of Manchurian soybeans was Dalian, a free port managed by Japan. Until 1917, soybeans were exported from Vladivostok, and soybean oil and cake were exported from Dalian.¹⁴

In addition, Chongjin (清津), a port in North Hamgyong (咸鏡北道), Northern Korea, was on the rise then as Japan exempted goods transiting Chongjin from taxation to compete with Vladivostok.¹⁵ Chongjin was constructed rapidly as a commercial port after the war and opened in 1908, while the Japanese government tried to use it to gain not only an economic but also a military foothold in northern Korea in opposition to Russia. According to a Japanese report of 1911, the trade between North Hamgyong and Vladivostok had declined since 1909.¹⁶ Then, merchants in Chongjin paid attention to the trade between Manchuria and Japanese cities on the Sea of Japan, especially Tsuruga.¹⁷

2. The competition between Russia and Japan on the Sea of Japan

Now we turn to the situation on the Sea of Japan during the Meiji period (1868–1912). Tadao Furumaya described the decline of this region in the age of the Japanese Industrial Revolution. Concerning transportation, railways and shipyards were constructed mainly on the Pacific Ocean. Although during the Edo period merchants living on the Sea of Japan made Kitamaebune, shipping trade with Hokkaido, profitable, after the Meiji Revolution in 1868 most of them failed to change

¹² РГИА ДВ. Ф. 702. Оп. 2. Д. 755. Л. 26.

¹³ Российский Государственный Исторический Архив (РГИА). Ф. 560. Оп. 28. Д. 1128. Л. 27.

¹⁴ Ken'ichi Yoshii, "Dairen-ko wo chushin to suru kan-nihonkai chiiki no butsureyū", *Kan-nihonkai ronsou*, No. 17, 2000, pp. 26-50.

¹⁵ Ryota Ishikawa, "1910-nen-dai Manshu ni okeru chosenginkouken no ryutsu to chiiki keizai," *Shakai keizai shigaku*, Vol. 68, No. 2, 2002, pp. 5-6.

¹⁶ Yoshii, *Kan-nihon-kai chiikisyakai no henyō*. p. 91.

¹⁷ Yoshii, *Kan-nihon-kai chiikisyakai no henyō*. p. 89-95.

from sail to steam.¹⁸ Recognizing that the region was falling behind the times, local intellectuals began to call it “Ura Nihon”—the backside of Japan—after the Chino-Japanese war in 1894. After the Russo-Japanese war in 1904–05, “Ura Nihon” became a well-known epithet.¹⁹

Merchants there attempted to trade with Vladivostok, Manchuria, and North Hamgyong actively, expecting the economic development of “Ura Nihon” as Niigata and Tsuruga were fighting for leadership. While Niigata remained stagnant because of earth and sand in spite of the fact that in the Edo period it was one of five big ports in Japan, the amount of trade increased rapidly in Tsuruga, which had been connected with Osaka by railway in 1883.²⁰ The Niigata–Vladivostok line, managed by Shichihei Oie since 1896, did not perform very well. After all, Osaka shosen succeeded in his business and in 1907 opened a new line between Tsuruga and Vladivostok.²¹ As Table 5 shows, Tsuruga became the Japanese hub of trade with Vladivostok after the Russo-Japanese war. The abolishment of port-franco in 1909 did not cause such serious damage to Tsuruga, because unprocessed foods were exported from there.²²

On the other hand, in 1906 already the Russian East Asiatic Steamship Company, which was Russian, but whose parent company was in Copenhagen, entered the same line of business as Osaka shosen on a one-year contract with the Russian Ministry of Trade and Industry. The next year the Ministry did not renew the contract and made a new one with the Volunteer Fleet under the pretext that its estimate was less expensive.²³ In spite of the fact that until the First World War the Volunteer Fleet could not make a good profit on the Tsuruga–Vladivostok line, the Russian government continued to grant a subsidy of about 300,000 rubles to this line.²⁴

The Ministry of Trade and Industry was certainly cautious of the East Asiatic Steamship Company, considering it a non-Russian company.²⁵ Since the liners on the Sea of Japan were important from a political viewpoint, in 1907 the Ministry contracted with the Volunteer Fleet to display the Russian flag and were granted a subsidy.

In 1910, the Japanese government granted a subsidy of 288,000 yen to the Tsuruga–Vladivostok line (see Table 6). Bearing in mind that in the same year a subsidy

¹⁸ Tadao Furumaya, *Ura Nihon: Kindai nihon wo toinaosu* (Iwanami shinso, 1997), pp. 30-35.

¹⁹ Furumaya, *Ura Nihon*, pp. 6-7, 89-93.

²⁰ Furumaya, *Ura Nihon*, pp. 6-7, 59-64.

²¹ Teruyuki Hara, “Taigan kouro to taigan boueki: Nihonkai wo hasamu nichiro kaiun no rekishi kara,” *Roshia kenkyu*, No. 25, 1997, pp. 81-82; *Osaka shosen kabushiki gaisha goju nen shi* (Osaka, 1936), pp. 249-250.

²² Yoshii, *Kan-nihon-kai chiikisyakai no henyou*. p. 24.

²³ For Russia’s shipping policy on the Sea of Japan after the Russo-Japanese war, see РГИА Ф. 1276. Оп. 2. Д. 311.

²⁴ Отчеты Добровольного флота за 1910-1914 гг.

²⁵ For example, РГИА Ф. 1158. Оп. 1. Д. 360. (1911 г.) Л. 5.

to the Taiwan line was 503,000 yen while the liner carried goods of 616,000 tons and 51,000 people,²⁶ we can consider that the Japanese government attached greater importance to the line to Vladivostok. Kunio Katayama, describing the history of Japanese shipping in the modern era, pointed out that the line to Vladivostok was important for the Japanese government from a political rather than economic viewpoint.²⁷ To sum up, Russia and Japan were competing in shipping from a political perspective.

After the abolishment of porto-franco, merchants in Vladivostok appealed to the government for the introduction of free port, considering commercial and political competition with Japan. In the fifth All Russian Congress for Representatives of Commodity and Agriculture Exchanges, the delegates from Vladivostok insisted that Dalian would deprive Vladivostok of goods from North Manchuria and that the free port would change the circumstances around Vladivostok and facilitate Russian penetration of northern Korean markets.²⁸

In March of 1914, Vladivostok Commodity Exchange sent the Ministry of Trade and Industry some appeals, in which they emphasized the necessity to open the new line of the Volunteer Fleet between Vladivostok and ports on the Baltic Sea. They argued that it would help to export soybeans, lumber, fish, and ore from Vladivostok to Europe,²⁹ and the status as a free port would aid not only the region's economic development and independence but also the establishment of commercial influence on neighboring countries.³⁰ Actually, in March of 1913 the delegates from different Russian Ministries discussed the opening of the Volunteer Fleet's new line to activate the tea trade with Asia and bring the Far East close to European Russia, though they were not able to conclude at that time.³¹ The First World War broke out in July and ended the discussion of these matters.

Let me here summarize the main points of the issues of porto-franco and free port in Vladivostok. After the Russo-Japanese war, Russia competed with Japan for influence on the international politics of Northeast Asia by economic means. For example, in spite of a huge deficit balance of payments, the Vladivostok–Tsuruga line by the Volunteer Fleet was maintained, and the leaders of Russia expected the abolishment of porto-franco to decrease Japan's commercial power in the Russian Far

²⁶ Osaka shosen mitsui senpaku kabushiki gaisha, *Sougyou hyaku nen shi shiryou*, 1985, p. 63.

²⁷ Kunio Katayama, *Kindai kaiun to Ajia* (Ochanomizu syobou, 1996), pp. 314-315.

²⁸ Доклад и материалы по вопросам, включенным в программу Пятого Всероссийского Съезда Представителей Биржевой Торговли и Сельского Хозяйства. СПб., 1911. С. 214-216.

²⁹ РГИА Ф. 23. Оп. 27. Д. 547. Л. 5-6.

³⁰ РГИА Ф. 23. Оп. 27. Д. 547. Л. 10об-12.

³¹ РГИА Ф. 111. Оп. 1. Д. 53. Л. 25-32об.

East and the Sea of Japan. Then, merchants in Vladivostok petitioned the government for the status of a free port instead of porto-franco to compete with other ports, considering the above-mentioned Russo-Japanese relations.

In opposition to Russia, Japan tried to attract goods from Manchuria to Dalian and Chongjin by lowering the tariff. Supported by a national subsidy, Osaka shosen opened the new line between Tsuruga and Vladivostok in 1907, too, while people on the Sea of Japan were looking for ways to develop the regional economy.

3. Odessa at the beginning of the twentieth century

Here I would like to point out that not only the delegates from Vladivostok but also those from other cities appealed to apply for status as a free port to some Russian ports at the fifth All Russian Congress for Representatives of Commodity and Agriculture Exchanges, while Odessa took the most positive attitude toward the acquisition of the status of a free port.³²

In the first Congress of South Russia of Trade and Industry in Odessa in 1910, engineer V. F. Eckerle addressed the need for a free port in Odessa to oppose German and Australian “economic invasion”—the opening of a new market for industrial goods through the expansion of the railway—of Balkan, Asia Minor, and Persian markets. He argued that they could consider Berlin and Vienna as hubs of a water network that included the Baltic Sea and Black Sea.³³

Eckerle listed fifteen advantages of the free port. The first was that Odessa would be a distribution center, especially for exotic productions, and a transit point for imported goods to neighboring states, mainly in the Near East. The second was that imports into Odessa would be independent of foreign agencies. The third was the increase of imports into Odessa, because Congress Poland, importing goods and products from Trieste, Hamburg, Bremen, and others, would import them from Odessa. The eighth was that the development of the transit service would allow Russian commercial ships to participate in international trade.³⁴ Eckerle also expected the development of trade between Odessa and London and the Baltic Sea, as well as South East Asia, the Far East, and North and South America.³⁵ Eckerle’s statement was acceptable to the government, and actually, the Ministry of Trade and Industry expected the establishment of the free port on the Black Sea,³⁶ although the First World War

³² Доклад и материалы по вопросам. С. 214-221.

³³ Экерле, В.Ф. и Гай, Ю.Э. Вольные гавани и необходимость учреждения их в России. Одесса, 1910. С. 45-46.

³⁴ Экерле, В.Ф. и Гай, Ю.Э. Вольные гавани. С. 40-43.

³⁵ Вольная гавань в Одессе, ее значение и устройство. Одесса, 1915. С. 146-148.

³⁶ РГИА Ф. 23. Оп. 8. Д. 50. Л. 3.

prohibited its realization.

It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that not only international conditions but also internal rivalry influenced Odessa's appeal. Odessa enjoyed its status as a porto-franco from 1819 to 1857.³⁷ After the defeat in the Crimean War, Russia improved the transportation network on the Black Sea, constructing railways to facilitate cereal exports and in 1856, establishing the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, which later became the biggest shipping association in Imperial Russia. In both imports and exports, Odessa surpassed St. Petersburg in 1885 and became a representative international port in Russia.³⁸

As Figure 1 shows, however, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Odessa declined rapidly in the grain trade. Then, the British and French consuls reported that the exports of Odessa had not shown much increase.³⁹ Excluding the emergence of rivals, Lewis Siegelbaum pointed out two reasons why the grain trade at Odessa declined. The first was the exodus of thousands of Jewish merchants, brokers, shopkeepers, and tradesmen.⁴⁰ The second was the south-eastward shift of the wheat belt in favor of the Caucasian Black. In its search for a means of revival, one of the remedies that Odessa's *duma* proposed was the establishment of free port status.⁴¹

Here I would like to underline that the Greek diaspora supported shipping on the Black Sea, just as the Chinese and Korean diaspora supported trade in the Russian Far East. As Tables 7 and 8 show, in the eastern Black Sea the Greeks handled about 40% of the exports at the beginning of the twentieth century as the Greek-owned fleet accomplished the transition to steam.⁴² On the other hand, in the western area the Greek role decreased. According to Gelina Harlaftis, in Odessa after the 1860s, the Greek diaspora trading houses were partially replaced by Jewish brokers, speculators, merchants, agents, and firms. After the 1870s, there was specialization: the Greeks concentrated on shipping and the Jews on trade. Greeks and Jews both competed and collaborated.⁴³

³⁷ Доклад и материалы по вопросам. С. 206.

³⁸ Шафров Н.А. О современном положении русского торгового мореходства. М., 1895. С. 213-214.

³⁹ Patricia Herlihy, *Odessa: A History 1794-1914* (Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 230-231.

⁴⁰ For Jewish emigration from the Russian Empire to United States, see Gur Alroye "Patterns of Jewish Emigration from the Russian Empire from the 1870s to 1914", *Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe*, Winter (2) 57, 2006, pp. 24-51; Hans Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (University of California Press, 1986), pp. 176-187.

⁴¹ Lewis Siegelbaum, "The Odessa Grain Trade: A Case Study in Urban Growth and Development in Tsarist Russia," *The Journal of European Economic History*, Vol. 9, Num. 1, 1980, pp. 144-145.

⁴² Gelina Harlaftis, "From Diaspora Traders to Shipping Tycoons: The Vagliano Bros.," *Business History Review* No. 81, 2007, p. 247.

⁴³ Harlaftis, "From Diaspora Traders," pp. 248-249.

Concluding Remarks

The issues of free port symbolized the international circumstances surrounding the Russian Empire. There are some similarities between Vladivostok and Odessa just before the First World War. Both ports had been hubs of distribution in their respective areas and attempted to acquire the status of a free port to compete against other ports. Both paid attention to the increasing economic influence of Germany and Austria-Hungary on Balkan and that of Japan on Manchuria through the construction of railways, though Odessa was actually competing with some Russian ports. At the same time, there are some differences. For instance, whereas the rivalry on the western frontier was ended by the triggering of the First World War in 1914, on the eastern frontier, Russia and Japan competed until 1945.

Nowadays, studying the commercial and maritime web, some historians assume a triple dimension: the local/regional, the national/peripheral, and the international.⁴⁴ This concept helps to summarize today's discussion. From the first viewpoint, the free port issue in Vladivostok was concerned with the economic network of kan-nihon-kai, the Sea of Japan Rim Area. From the second viewpoint, Vladivostok was on the frontier facing the Japanese Empire. From the third viewpoint, we can consider that Vladivostok tried to survive on the free port, which would facilitate the export of Manchurian soybeans to London, the center of the global economy. Similarly, Odessa's case was connected with the competition for trade on the Black Sea from the first viewpoint. From the second viewpoint, Odessa on the southern frontier was a bridgehead to expand the Russian Empire. From the third viewpoint, Odessa found a means of survival in transit within the global economy.

⁴⁴ For example, Harlaftis, "From Diaspora Traders," p. 242.

Table 1. The number and nationalities of ships coming to Vladivostok

Year	Russia	Britain	Japan	Germany	Norway	USA	France	Korea	China	Others	Total
1879	4	14		17	3	1				4	43
1880	15	25	1	23	1	2				4	71
1881	19	27	4	17		1				1	69
1882	19	18	11	21							69
1883	20	17	12	21							69 <i>sic</i>
1884	27	18	13	20		1					70 <i>sic</i>
1885	33	13	12	25	1	1				1	79 <i>sic</i>
1886	33	15	12	30		1	1				92
1887	31	20	14	20		2	2			1	92 <i>sic</i>
1888	30	9	12	28	4	3	1		3		90
1889	28	26	20	20	2		1				97
1890	28	10	21	35	14	7					115
1891	41	9	21	26	15	4				1	117
1892	43	8	31	39	6	2					129
1893	37	17	36	30	14	2					136
1894	53	13	27	52	1	1					153 <i>sic</i>
1895	59	28	24	49	17	5	1				183
1896	78	13	56	81	28	4		2		5	267
1897	62	21	50	80	26	4			1	2	246
1898	63	38	49	92	44	4	2		3	4	299
1899	106	34	69	88	28	4	3		4	8	344
1900	195	56	69	59	25	7		4		21	436
1901	208	26	120	35	22	18		4		6	439
1902-04						No data					
1905	31	21	3	52	41	2		2	2	3	157
1906	139	91	208	92	145	20		20	7	26	748
1907	131	39	209	128	51	1	1	17	23	3	603
1908	116	32	169	190	56	1	1	35	12		612
1909	318	56	139	146	72	3	1	33	23	4	795
1910	682	58	155	37	81	8		21	47	7	1096
1911	247	56	200	19	48	6	1		21	13	611
1912	258	42	179	16	47	14			19	13	588
1913	282	32	202	30	10	17			17	10	601 <i>sic</i>

Source: Обзор Приморской области за 1899-1913 гг.

Table 2: Vladivostok port in 1910

Embankment for custom	220 sazhen	4 ships
Embankment for Chinese Eastern Railway	100 sazhen	2 ships
Embankment for the Volunteer Fleet	46 sazhen	1 ship
Floating pier for the Volunteer Fleet	40 sazhen	1 ship
Floating pier for Chinese Eastern Railway	160 sazhen	4 ships
Jetty of the city	50 sazhen	2 ships
Total	616 sazhen	14 ships

Source: РГИА Ф. 1276. Оп. 2. Д. 341. Л. 303.

1 sazhen = 2.134 meter

Table 3 : The amount of transport into Vladivostok

Year	Russia	Britain	Japan	Germany	Norway	USA	Korea	China	Others	Total
1905	1,641,936	2,486,702	120,466	4,176,828	2,659,329	186,177	34,534		73,398	11,379,370
1906	7,702,000	4,314,652	3,360,349	4,571,172	5,801,361	1,047,786	56,002	57,821	1,136,972	28,048,115
1907	5,983,112	3,020,042	3,272,114	4,151,746	1,157,640		127,241	40,888	146,768	17,899,551
1908	5,318,405	1,646,715	2,221,202	4,338,447	725,773	166,585	204,586	120,381	72,511	14,814,605
1909	7,268,148	3,763,366	2,689,180	3,163,199	2,093,596	134,582	247,136	194,646	31,448	19,585,301
1910	10,972,057	3,419,399	3,914,298	2,269,909	1,939,230	413,348	158,398	969,867	243,967	24,300,473
1911	12,542,583	2,058,270	6,965,176	2,163,056	1,597,528	436,070		418,107	136,165	26,316,955
1912	16,767,610	2,389,397	6,401,561	2,379,556	1,349,138	557,758		357,605	479,008	30,681,633
1913	17,093,661	1,192,349	8,621,494	3,379,985	371,969	592,523		421,542	105,992	31,779,515

Unit: Pud

Table 4 : The amount of transport from Vladivostok

Year	Russia	Britain	Japan	Germany	Norway	USA	Korea	China	Others	Total
1905	7,895	12,725			434					210,054
1906	925,322	414,470	296,000	685,428	1,171,053	260,749	7,293	791	156,570	3,917,676
1907	936,423	220,764	1,973,316	860,323	412,902		35,413	20,803	35,506	4,495,450
1908	1,661,164	382,504	3,365,365	2,268,134	257,349		75,970	17,235	544	8,028,265
1909	639,999	12,303,033	548,716	705,161	957,268	805	4,372	7,907	452,216	15,619,477
1910	3,032,041	12,223,198	1,204,670	1,220,991	1,158,148	2,150	2,586	186,277	1,425,031	20,455,092
1911	2,241,041	16,492,158	2,630,636	3,971,916	251,189	51,130		260,488	4,934,471	30,833,029
1912	2,090,778	10,144,293	4,276,938	2,405,413	193,861	383,683		23,876	4,340,545	23,859,387
1913	3,568,701	7,134,296	6,455,282	3,985,462	103,392	219,172		141,025	3,289,705	24,898,035

Unit: Pud

Source: Обзор Приморской области за 1905-1913 гг

Table5: The export to Vladivostok

	Osaka	Kobe	Tsuruga
1906	4,597,962	1,470,824	635,548
1907	616,526	841,960	1,892,415
1908	30,770	75,354	3,391,504

Unit: Yen

Source: Kyuichiro Amano, *Tsuruga keizai hattatsu shi*, 1943, p. 530.

Table 6: Tsuruga - Vladivostok line by Osaka shosen

	goods (ton)	passengers	subsidy (yen)
1908	29,921	4,588	304,000
1909	36,059	3,208	299,000
1910	36,081	2,613	288,000
1911	38,443	2,949	304,000
1912	39,685	3,194	281,000
1913	45,778	2,722	251,000
1914	57,804	3,843	240,000
1915	89,367	4,374	212,000
1916	101,458	4,843	209,000
1917	133,354	8,121	199,000

Source: Osaka shosen mitsui senpaku kabushiki gaisha, *Sougyou hyaku nen shi shiryō*, 1985, p. 63, 73.

Table 7: Average of shipp clearing the ports of the Azov Sea, Taganrog, Kertch, Berdiansk, Mariupol (in NRT)

	Greek-owr	British
1841-50	46%	17%
1851-60	44%	18%
1861-70		
1871-80	33%	32%
1881-90	22%	62%
1891-1900	26%	54%
1901-1910	42%	40%


Table 8: Average of shipp clearing the ports of Odessa, Nikolaieff, Sevastopol and Theodosia (in NRT)

	Greek-owr	British
1831-40	25%	16%
1841-50	29%	20%
1851-60	22%	17%
1861-70		
1871-80	4%	46%
1881-90	2%	66%
1891-1900	3%	63%
1901-1910	7%	47%

Source: Gelina Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day* (Routledge, 1996),

Figure 1.

GRAIN EXPORTS FROM BLACK AND AZOV SEAPORTS, 1870-1913 (In Five Year Averages)



Source: Siegelbaum, "The Odessa Grain Trade," p. 150