Summary

Shifting away from the Public to Miscellaneous:
The Case of Korean Schools in Tokyo

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There used to be 15 public Korean schools in Tokyo, Japan until March 1955. These schools were closed and restarted as miscellaneous schools from April 1955. Miscellaneous is a legal status of schools in Japan besides public and private. Due to this legal status Korean schools have been facing difficulties such as not receiving financial support from the Japanese government.

The aim of this paper is to analyze how public Korean schools in Tokyo closed in March 1955 and turned into miscellaneous schools in April 1955. This research was conducted through historical review of documents from the official record, diaries, and newspapers.

On 8th September 1951, the Treaty of San Francisco was concluded. Article 2-a of this treaty prescribed the change of territory between Japan and Korea, but there was no legal decision about the nationality of Korean residents in Japan. The Japanese government’s interpretation of Article 2-a was that Korean residents in Japan should not be allowed to keep their Japanese nationality. As a consequence the Japanese government declared an official notification changing the status of Korean residents from Japanese nationals to “Alien” in April 1952. The Ministry of Education intended to close public Korean schools and to end compulsory education for Korean residents in Japan. Moreover, in the mid-1950s, communist ideas were spreading among some Japanese schools and Korean schools in Tokyo. This led the Ministry of Education to make a law towards teachers to stop them teaching communist ideas, while at the same time, the Board of Education in Tokyo imposed six specific rules towards Korean schools in the Tokyo area to force these schools to comply with Japanese law. Otherwise, if they did not comply with the law, schools would be closed. Even though Korean schools complied with the rules, the Ministry of Education and the Board of Education in Tokyo closed public Korean schools in Tokyo on 31st March 1955.

Furthermore, the representatives of Korean schools wanted to be isolated in their own community to keep their own education, so the representatives decided not to contest the notification to close the schools from the Board of Education in Tokyo. This decision from the representatives could not
happen without the support from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) government. In the early 1950s, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) had already started instructing Korean residents’ movements to make a communist revolution in Japan. On the other hand, the DPRK also intended for Korean residents in Japan to work for the revolution for their fatherland, not for Japan. On 30th August 1954, the DPRK officially declared that Korean residents in Japan were overseas citizens. The declaration from the DPRK aimed to criticize the Japanese government who discriminated against Korean residents in Japan. At the same time, the declaration can be interpreted as a victory for the DPRK government over the JCP on who would instruct Korean residents in Japan. Furthermore, some nationalist Korean residents in Japan also desired to convert their movement for their fatherland. This conversion towards the DPRK also affected the instruction of Korean schools in Tokyo. For example the number of classes of Korean language and Korean history were increased and the overall education became more patriotic.

The closing of public Korean schools in Tokyo was important for both Japanese government and Korean residents’ representatives. Keeping their schools public meant that Korean schools had to accept interference from the Japanese government. To eliminate the interference from the Japanese government, the only way was to accept the closing of public schools and to become miscellaneous schools. Thus, from April 1955, Korean schools in Tokyo were closed and turned into miscellaneous schools —— a state which continues to this day.

Recently some studies have shed light on public Korean schools in Tokyo. However, the focus of these studies are inside Japan. Therefore, these studies claim that the closing of public Korean schools in Tokyo was decided by the Japanese government single-handedly.

This paper attempts to combine both domestic and transnational frameworks to have a broader perspective. Since Korean residents living in Japan kept an active relationship with the Korean peninsula, and still do, a transnational perspective is needed to study the topic. The main finding of this research is that the Japanese government and some nationalist Koreans who were in charge of Korean schools shared a mutual interest in closing public Korean schools in Tokyo.
In the mid-1930s, small-scale incidents occurred at the border zone between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union. To avoid expanding a dangerous situation, Japan and the Soviet Union tried to establish a border committee and conducted negotiations on many occasions. But these efforts reached no valid conclusion. In June 1937 at the Ganchaz Island Incident, the use of military power by the Japanese army gave Japan an advantage in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Following this experience, within the Japanese military clique, a new policy gained power. They advocated the following idea: border disputes should be resolved by military power rather than by diplomatic negotiation. It is thought that this policy led to the Battle of Khasan and the Battle of Khalkhin Gol.

Previous studies regard the middle of the 1930s as a precursive stage to the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. However, these studies only introduce some small incidents. Contrary to these studies, this paper considers that this period was the critical moment for the worsening of the Japan-Soviet relationship. Focusing on the reason why border disputes increased, I examine what factors blocked negotiations for the border setting committee. Although primary sources on the border dispute of the 1930s are scarce, I use official publications by Japan and the USSR and try to shed light on the facts of the border disputes.

First, there existed asymmetry of information on the definition of the border. The land border of China’s north east area where many disputes occurred was “demarcated” in some treaties in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. But comparing these treaties, borders and landmarks were not set precisely. In particular, the “Additional Article to the Treaty of Peking” that was signed in 1861 to demarcate the border that runs from Lake Khanka to the Tumen River included a different interpretation. There is considerable variation between the Chinese text of this article and the Russian one. In addition, Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union did not publish consistent maps related to this article.

The Soviet Union repeatedly requested Japan not violate the border. But, because of the above article, it was very difficult for Japan to recognize the precise border. This situation caused the
Japanese army to violate the border unintentionally. The Soviet Union regarded this action as a provocation.

Second, the Soviet Union’s diplomatic attitude toward Manchukuo changed in the mid-1930s. From 1932 to 1935 the Soviet Union’s attitude was moderate. For example, the Soviet Union agreed to receive consuls of Manchukuo and carried out negotiations with Manchukuo for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway until 1935. From these facts, it is thought that the Soviet Union gave Manchukuo “de facto” recognition. But the Soviet Union’s intention was to indicate the limit of its modest attitude through the sale of the railway. The USSR was determined to make no further compromises. After the sale of the railway, the Soviet Union reduced its diplomatic relationship with Manchukuo by closing some of its consulates.

In 1932 Japan proposed to the USSR to establish the border committee. Japan stated that the representatives for the committee should be composed of three states, namely Japan, Manchukuo and the Soviet Union. At that time, the Soviet Union did not oppose this idea. After the Jinchanggou Incident which occurred in January 1936, Japan and the Soviet Union started negotiations for establishing a border committee. The Soviet Union never agreed with the plan by Japan on which states should compose the committee. On the contrary, the Soviet Union did not recognize Manchukuo as an independent state de jure because of the Japan–Manchukuo Protocol. The USSR stated that the committee should have a joint representative from Japan and Manchukuo. It was impossible for Japan to agree with this condition which ignored diplomatic premises.

I conclude that because of these factors, negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union broke down.

Ballet and Politics: The Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School (1960–1964) and the Soviet Union’s Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War

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Through an examination of the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School, this article investigates the means by which the Ministry of Culture of the USSR disseminated Soviet ballet
around the world. One of the reasons for the establishment of the school was the first visit of the Bolshoi Ballet Company to Japan in 1957. Thanks to this tour, Japanese people could watch Soviet dance live, not merely in films. Few Japanese academic reports have taken into account the political dimension of the tour, which was one of the political activities planned by the Ministry of Culture of the USSR with regard to Japan. The theme ‘Classical Ballet and Politics’ has rarely been chosen as an object of study in Japan, and this article is one of the first to do so.

In the paper, I explain how the Ministry of Culture of the USSR used the ballet to promote friendly relationships between Russia and Japan. I also note that Japan was one of the most successful countries for the popularization of Soviet ballet.

In the first section, I briefly review the cultural diplomacy of the United States and USSR in Japan. It is well known that during the Cold War, culture was used as a weapon because national leaders wanted to avoid the use of nuclear weapons and to find an alternative in culture.

The Korean War (1950–1953) caused Japan to become one of these cultural “battle fields.” The United States wanted Japan to play the role of a barrier against the USSR. On other hand, the USSR sought to win Japan over to the Soviet side because Japan had inclined towards the United States after World War two. The USSR signed the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration in 1956. In the 1950s significant numbers of cultural delegations from both countries were dispatched to Japan.

The second section discusses the first visit of the Bolshoi ballet to Japan in 1957 and its result. This section is divided into three parts. In the first part, I mention a few episodes which indicate that the Ministry of Culture of the USSR had hostile feelings towards the United States when preparing the Bolshoi Ballet tour to Japan. In the second part, I explain the high level of interest in Japan towards the Soviet ballet before the Bolshoi Ballet tour. I also explain the difference in the USSR’s preparation for the tour compared to its ballet tours to other countries. In the third part, I examine the results of the Bolshoi Ballet tour by comparing it with the New York City Ballet Japan tour held one year later.

In the third section, I analyze the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School as one of the first three ballet schools outside of Russia in which Soviet teachers were involved from the time of opening. The first three were the schools in China (established in 1954), Egypt (1958), and Japan (1960). The first two were governmental organizations but the Japanese one was not even an incorporated school. I describe the process of how the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School contributed to the popularization of Soviet ballet in Japan during the Cold War.

In the summer of 1961, diplomatic relations between Japan and Soviet Russia were strained. Each day, Japanese newspapers contained articles criticizing the Soviet Union’s behavior regarding territorial issues and Soviet nuclear tests. In contrast, over the same period, joint performances
by the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School and 11 Bolshoi dancers were a great success throughout Japan. The Bolshoi visit in 1957 had included only Tokyo and Osaka, but in this later tour, over the summer of 1961, the company gave 29 performances in 15 Japanese cities, spreading the fame of Soviet ballet throughout Japan.

Such an ambivalent situation was rare. In other countries, geopolitical relationships were capable influencing, or even forcing the cancelation of, a given tour or the dispatch of ballet teachers.

In other words, the Tchaikovsky Memorial Tokyo Ballet School helped the Ministry of Culture of USSR achieve its political ends. In the field of politics, Soviet Russia was in a sense defeated by the United States, but in the field of ballet, Russia was victorious.

**Toward Emergence of Planet Politics on Climate Change:**

**Interrogating Theoretical Premises Meeting Challenges of the Anthropocene**

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Two research questions to ask are: (1) why are we unable to appropriately tackle climate change issues as an existential threat through an understanding of the world based on conventional theoretical premises of the discipline of Politics and International Relations? and (2) which approaches we should adopt? This article is based on a concept of the *Anthropocene* to answer these questions and to set a new framework called “planet politics” for a different political imagining of the world. Related to the adoption of the concept of the *Anthropocene*, the framework of planet politics includes messages wherein it addresses the issue of survival/extinction of both nature and humans. It does so not by separating them as if the two consist of completely different occurrences, but by viewing them as a sequence of events. This differs from approaches that focus solely on human affairs like those employed in existing arguments in political sciences such as local politics, comparative politics, international politics and global politics.

This article provides the following suggestions to answer the above agenda setting. While climate change was previously dealt with as a conventional environmental issue, sections 1 and 2 reframe climate change as an issue of multiple extinction of species. Section 3 confirms the significance of
approaching this agenda with a concept of the Anthropocene by examining the arguments of the main critics against already existing concepts and by giving responses to these.

Section 4 investigates conventional theoretical premises of Politics and IR for tackling the age of the Anthropocene. Taking into consideration urbanization and natural deterioration through the exploitation of fossil fuels in the process of civilization, the section reconsiders and suggests altering the meanings of the concepts of “freedom” in political theory and a state of “nature” in the theory of social contract. It raises the problematique on the premises found in the English School of International Relations and even historical science.

Section 5 argues that new geo-politics has the potential to play a significant role, in which “planet politics” is imagined through such theoretical interrogation and reconstitution. Section 6 describes the potential for thinking that all “species”, including humans, floras and faunas, can be on equal standing rather than the idea that humans are superior to all other species. In doing so, it creates a comparison between Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolitics in order to emphasize the potential of the latter. Section 7 affirms the difficulty in making operational conventional frameworks of international relations, such as the UN Security Council and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and overcoming the issue of climate change through technical fixes.

The conclusion indicates the kinship approach to build a bridge between humans and non-humans, and proposes a means to work through and undertake such issues as engaged researchers in the field of Border Studies and even include all of us in the face of “planetary boundary.”

**Between Empires and on the Screen: The Russian Cossack in the Area of Chinese-Soviet Border Rivers**

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This article explores the living conditions of the Russian Cossack diaspora in northwestern Manchuria during the first half of the twentieth century and their representation in Manchukuo propaganda. The starting point is a movie fragment produced by the Manchukuo Film Association.
in 1937. Called “Three rivers” (Japanese: *Sanga*, Russian: *Trekhrech’e*) this silent movie depicts military service, farming techniques, Cossack traditions and Russian culture abroad – four key elements of how Japanese imagined the rural Russian diaspora during the Manchukuo period. In part one we explore the different waves of emigration of Russian farmers to the Three Rivers Delta, just across the Soviet border and the emergence of a rural Russian diaspora community. Part two examines the hybrid identities of the Russian Cossacks who were caught between the competing political interests of the Soviet Union, Warlord China and Manchukuo. Part three analyzes for what purposes the Manchukuo Film Association produced this movie and how the Cossack lifestyle can be interpreted as a model or exotic image of the “ethnic harmony” of Manchukuo.