Resentment and Reorganization: Anti-Western Discourse and the Making of Eurasianism in Hungary

Umut Korkut

INTRODUCTION

A pro-European but anti-Western discourse has historically characterized Hungary’s nationalist, conservative, right-wing discourse. For certain segments of the right-wing political and cultural elite, the “non-domestic” has always been the West. In its resentment towards the West, this faction’s ideology has ranged from liberalism, autonomy and partitioning, capitalism, economic and political liberalization to—most recently—federalist European integration. The rejection of such implications of Westernism or westernization has caused the right-wing elite to forge a counter-discourse to the historical understanding of the West. This segment has ideologically separated the West from Europe. Insomuch as the elite have scorned the former, they have believed that transformation of the latter is possible with the help of Hungarian national virtues. Western Christianity as a religion has occupied a crucial place in this quest. At times, this faction has emphasized Hungary as a bastion of Christianity, in contrast to the West’s tendency towards secularization. The implication is that Hungarians chose Catholicism and stood by Western Christianity despite the West’s tendency to drift from its religious foundations. More recently, this attitude has become the underlying factor in anti-immigrant policies and politics. At other times, the right-wing elite has depicted Hungarian society as the westernmost extension of Eurasian peoples—and as religious, family-oriented, and traditional.

Moreover, the nationalist, conservative elite pursued an anti-Western discourse in the international arena to accrue economic gains in non-Western Eurasia. Anti-Westernism came with a search for distant cousins in a broad Eurasian geography that extends all the way to Japan. Anti-Westernism gained strength during times of crisis—political and economic. Overall, it has been a useful tool for the Hungarian political elite to bolster the morale of the nation by offering an alternative geopolitical affiliation with probable economic gains, even if these gains have remained mythical (i.e. never to be accrued). This has been the most permanent element of Hungarian Eurasianism since the 19th century; further, it is the focus of this article.

To shed light on these processes, this article deals with the discursive framing of Hungary as an extension of Eurasia in Europe. The main supporting narrative has been Hungarians’ kinship with the Turanian people (i.e. non-Slavic and non-Chinese people of the East). This article depicts the polit-
ical and economic references to “what makes Hungary” or “who is Hungarian” as representative of a new and anti-Western morality that has guided the nationalist and conservative right. Furthermore, this article elaborates on the formulation of kinship and references to Eurasian people on the part of the political elite as mechanisms of social control when seeking to economize social and political relations.

The period studied was from the interwar period to the present. First, this article delineates the discursive Eurasian framework within which the right-wing political and cultural elites have historically framed the Hungarian polity. Second, how this historical legacy currently manifests itself is examined—that is, in resentment to the liberal and progressive values of the West, especially lately with the failure of left-liberal transformation in Hungary under the guidance of the Europeanisation metanarrative.¹

The argument is as follows. A reframing of Hungary’s past and a parallel mythical construction of the East, either as homeland in faraway lands or as a space that has hosted true Hungarianness, have qualified resentment towards the West. It has become more obvious since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008. This resentment has not been merely towards the West geographically, but also to those who have subscribed to progressive Western ideals. As an alternative, the nationalist and conservative right-wing segment has proposed more traditional, religious, patriarchal, communitarian values vis-à-vis the individualism that the liberal West has represented. At times, this segment has responded to westernization in the form of Europeanisation imbued with Hungarianness; at other times, it has rejected the West entirely, going as far as propagating a Turanian (Eastern) alternative.

The nationalist and conservative right have pursued “symbolic creations to manipulate social relationships,”² social representation,³ and collective memory. On the one hand, they have generated images of a “new past” to produce a stock of common knowledge and information that people share as common sense, arming themselves with a new identity and discursive tools against those of their liberal, westernized opponents. More recently, the “creation of a new past,” though fictitious and not empirically grounded, has served to economize social and political relations.⁴ Therefore, the new past is social construc-

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tion mainly—if not wholly—shaped by concerns of the present. It propagates “images and symbolic constructions of the past” to serve current political goals. To that extent, the political elite has also embedded economization of social and political relations into the recent phase of Eurasianism, with the aim of redefining the current civic and private spheres as the exalted centers of power for neoliberalism. Eventually, insomuch as this transformation of the collective memory of the past succeeds, the right-wing ideology can contravene the earlier influence of liberalism and establish its own hegemonic neoliberalism.

In the first section, I will present how anti-Westernism has historically gained a fundamental place within the intellectual traditions of the Hungarian conservative and nationalist right. I will foreground a history of ideas in Hungary that has substantiated anti-Western intellectual traditions. To this extent, I will give an overview of Eurasian and Turanist thought patterns that gripped the interwar identity debates. In the following section, I will illustrate my understanding of moral politics as an essential tool of the right-wing segment to contravene the liberal influence. Moral politics refers to the vying for a new political system that not only supports an ideologically defined morality, but also strives to govern it. Then, I will shift my attention to Hungarian anti-Westernism as a discursive tool to consolidate a new type of domestic moral politics, implying social control aligned with nationalist and conservative political identities. Regarding moral politics, I will pursue three research questions: (1) What is new in moral politics in Hungary? (2) What ideological tenets of moral politics promote alternative geopolitical orientation? and (3) How can new moral politics seek social control over its opponents? In conclusion, I will explain how the reintroduction of Eurasianism serves to promote a new elite hegemony.

**Anti-Westernism in Hungarian Intellectual Traditions**

Why should we study anti-Westernism in Hungary? Hungary is geographically located in Europe; culturally and politically, it has been associated with Western Christianity for centuries. However, the nation maintains an ambiguous link with Eurasia, possibly as a result of being at the periphery of the European system for a long time. Surely, the recent recourse to novel geopolitical aspirations—such as Eurasianism—of the conservative and nationalist right-wing political elite serves to maintain this ambiguous relationship and foster strategic gains. Furthermore, given Hungary’s geopolitical position at

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the outer flank of the European Union (EU) and as a neighbor of Ukraine, Russia, and the Caucasus, Eurasian narratives and networks in Hungary—venues for the expression of this narrative and alternative political ideologies and lifestyles—find themselves largely at home in Hungary. This situation is not a recent phenomenon; as I will delineate, it has its historical roots dating back to the interwar period.8

Whereas anti-Westernism has emerged as a political discourse in other Eastern and south-eastern European states intermittently, the Hungarian sentiment has distinctly aspired for a geopolitical alternative. This goal sets Hungarian anti-Westernism apart from similar trends in other EU states, including the Baltics.9 This alternative has been an elite-constructed, mythical, nostalgic East that has promised Hungary greater prosperity, peaceful relations, a hospitable environment, and a kind of homely feeling. In their quest, those of the conservative and nationalist political right have deliberately described an Eastern myth for Hungary’s collective imagination. The East has been a space offering a more confident political and economic existence for Hungary, either thanks to collaborative, friendly relations with Eastern people extending all the way to Japan, or prosperity and peace in the mythical land of Turan. Thereby, proponents of the Eastern myth endeavored to establish a “community by discourse”10 and turn resentment into geopolitical alternation. As Eurasian and Turanist ideals overlapped significantly, I will discuss them collaboratively.

Turanism apparently originated with linguist Max Müller’s 1854 book entitled The Classification of Turanian Languages. The linguist grouped all languages that did not fit in with existing language groups into the Turanian language group. Although this practice was a haphazard generalization, the qualifier generated the Turanian myth for nationalist soul-searching at Europe’s semi-periphery.11 The Huns and Attila were celebrated in the Renaissance, and rulers and their historians sought to create a national history for an emerging state by reaching back beyond the Magyar conquests of the 9th and 10th centuries to imagine the foundation of Hungary by the Huns. The emphasis on Hunnic relations in Hungary dates back to the 15th century. Hungary’s King Matthias Corvinus claimed Attila as his ancestor, and as János Thuróczi’s Chronica de gestis Hungarorum (1488) set out, Attila—like Corvinus—was a skillful general and an enlightened monarch.12

As Hungarians felt the brunt of being a part of the Habsburg Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries, this relationship with the “victorious” East also implied kinship with the Turks. With respect to the 16th century battles with the Ottoman Empire, as an example, the conservative journalist historian Sándor Pethő wrote: “Among the people of [the] Turkic race storming Europe, only the Hungarians remained as a genus without a brotherly branch. As Bulgarians and Bessenyők disappeared off [sic] the stage of history, the Hungarians stood alone against the solidarity of the Aryan universe of Christendom. The question was either to become Christian or disappear.” However, later religious differences unleashed a life and death duel between the two rokonfajta (kin nations) [Hungarians and Ottoman Turks], which the Turks won with military superiority and religious fanaticism, transforming the entire Turkish nation into an army. Later, Hungarians joined the bandwagon that Farkas described as “the attention toward[s] the East, as foreign policy of the [Austro-Hungarian] monarchy, and the eastern fashion that could globally be felt.” This situation had the remarkable impact of enhancing the Asian-oriented interest in Hungary. In Hungary, we can find the sources of the modern manifestation of keletiség (easternness) as a political ideology at the end of the 19th century. The Eastern interest in this respect was an expression of disappointment with Europe and a glance towards the East as the real address of brotherhood. As we will see later, this sentiment eventually became an undertone in relations with Eurasia, especially during the interwar period.

Such sentimental stimulation encouraged the Hungarian Turanists—most notably, well-known academics, politicians, and nobles—to inaugurate the Turan Tarsaság (Turan Society) in the same year. The founding book of the society states its aim as to teach, develop, and recognize the sciences, arts, and economies of Asian and kin nations of Hungary in Europe and harmonize them with Hungarian interests. In brief, the activities of the Turan Society include organizing informative conferences about other Turanic societies and anthropological, socioeconomic research trips to Anatolia, the Caspian Sea region, the Caucasus, and inner Asian lands to study the economic conditions of these locations. According to Önen, favorable public opinion towards these activities was limited in the initial years, but with the support of official institutions, public interest in such activities increased over time.
Though Turanism contributed to the Hungarian intellectual sphere prior to World War II (WWII), it was also divisive. Some considered it merely geographical—not linguistic historical, ethno-geographical, or political. For others, Turanism signified civilizational, racial, or simply historical associations sometimes in the face of maltreatment by the West. At the extremes, we have reactionary works such as those by Miklós I. Gömbös, which state that Hungarians are not without kin and they can turn to their Asiatic brethren in the face of their deceptions by the West at the end of WWI. Hereby, the reference is to the 1920 Trianon Treaty, which cost Hungary a large part of its territory. A parallel reflection on the Hungarians’ relationship with the West was the presentation of Hungarians as civilization makers. One can note Paikert’s work on Hungarians’ relation with the original creators of civilizations, such as Sumerians, Hittites, and Cretans, as well as lost civilizations of the Himalayas and Central Asia. Paikert emphasized that Turanian creativity is immemorial—great in the past and in the future.

In the post-Trianon Treaty political landscape in which Hungary lost chunks of its territory after WWI, the most important institutions that defined and controlled the terms of public speech were government bodies and social organizations of the right and extreme nationalist right. Here is where I believe the social control mechanism resided. The interwar irredentist public atmosphere was a factor that official politics could utilize, neglect, or stifle. Controllers of public life grasped the first, instinctively and consciously; thus, the content and tone of dominant anti-Trianon emotions were defined by domestic propaganda with the government’s approval or exactly to its liking. In this way, public opinion became a projection of the propaganda. Under these circumstances, public thinking was essentially defined by simplifying voices, which, on the one hand, provided an understandable, comforting, and self-absolving explanation for the break-up—such as the formula of an honest victim and a cruel enemy for demonizing opponents. At the same time, it tamed the partition of the country insofar as it put it on a moral level away from the world of political realities. Instead of realistically exploring the causes and consequences, the mythical concept aimed at national self-therapy and mobilization made public thinking schematic and public opinion more uniform. The irredentist theme became a part of everyday life. As we will see later, this irredentism fed into the development of Turanism at its later stages to formulate the terms of an alliance with Eastern nations in the face of disappointment with the West.

21 Ablonczy, Teleki Pál.
22 Miklós Gömbös, Turáni Kérdés (Bonyhád: At Raubitschek Izór, 1922).
23 Alajos Paikert, Turáni Mult, Turáni Jövő (Különlenyomat a Turán, 1931), pp. 3–7.
Beyond intellectual history, the racial roots of Hungarians were in the background of the more “scientific” debates about Turanism. Hereby, one can mention the conflict over the possibility of a mixed bloodline for Hungarians (i.e. between the Finn-Ugor and Ural-Altay nations), as advocated by Hungarian Turkologist Ármin Vámbéry, and more racially fixed elaborations on Hungarian genes by the racist biologist Lajos Méhely (spelled also as Méhelÿ). According to the latter, though the Hungarian peasantry bore the characteristics of Finn-Ugor nations physically and in their work habits, the Hungarian nobility should have been of Turkic origin given their gallantry, statesmanship, and strong physical features. According to this ideology, the Turanian people always established major and powerful empires, glorious deeds of war, and magnificent leaders; therefore, achievements of civilization bear their names.

Yet, as Ablonczy underscored, along debates regarding civilizations or race, the Turanist movement sought economic advantages in enhancing Hungary’s relations with Eastern nations. For Hungary, Turanism practically promised new markets in its competition with Germany and Austria as well as a political position to balance Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism. At a meeting of the Turan Society on January 31, 1914, Paikert, the vice-president (also cited previously), stated that Hungary did not have any colonies nor did it endeavor to possess any. However, there was a need for economic expansion to support the other brotherly nations of Turan and instigate exalted feelings of reciprocity and togetherness. One can perceive a tone of “white men’s burden” in Paikert’s conceptualization of the role that the Hungarians were to play vis-à-vis their Turanian brethren. Gömbös went as far as calling for “digging out the hard clot of the Asia.” His mantra included “dig, dig, dig out the past, [not only that but also] the Hungarian past.” As such, the Hungarian elite pursued Turanism as a quest to seek political and economic benefits beyond their borders. The Turanic symbols of pagan warriors on horseback—roaming the Asian steppes—were elements emphasizing the rhetoric to which Turanists aspired.

As an extension of the ideal, Japan is also featured in Turanist dreams as a frame of reference. Crucially, references to Japan in Hungarian Turanism have also fed into what we call “Hungarian imperialism.” As Farkas indicates regarding the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, as a part of an influential major power, Hungary could present itself in Europe as a “kingmaker” politically. The political elite at the time had framed the millennial celebrations of Hungar-

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26 János Gyurgyák, Magyar Fajvedők (Budapest: Osiris, 2012).
28 Ablonczy, Teleki Pál, p. 90.
30 Gömbös, Turáni Kérdés, p. 9.
ian honfoglalás (Hungarian settlements in the Carpathian Basin) as a manifestation of the fundamental position Hungary occupied in the Danube area. The idea of Hungarian self-contained imperialism was illustrated in a Hungarian display of “major power consciousness.” This imperialism configured the expansionist version of Turanism and the spread of Hungarian industry towards the East (primarily the Balkans), establishing economic space and then political space eastward. This inclination of the Turanists fostered friendship beyond the two European Turanian nations of Bulgaria and Turkey to Japan, a victor in the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War.32

On June 1, 1924, the Magyar-Nippon Society33 was established, and István Mezey played an active role. The society originated thanks to the role that Japan played during the return of the Hungarian prisoners of war from Siberia after WWI. The Hungarians noted the role that Japan played in protecting and providing for the safe return of these prisoners of war, and the Magyar-Nippon Society presented the case for deepening the relations between the two countries.34 Like the Turanian movement, diverging interests within the Magyar-Nippon Society were noted. Enhancing mutual knowledge for Hungary and Japan was one of the aims of the society, and the general theme of its work partially related to Turanism.35 In this context, in 1925, the Society emphasized the differences between Hungarian and Japanese Turanism. Having noted that the “Asia is for Asians” slogan of Japanese Turanism attracted the interest of Turanian nations, the cultivation of economic and cultural links received more emphasis in the Hungarian Turanian movement than political alliances.36 Nonetheless, exchanges between Hungarian and Japanese Turanists occurred during this period. The travels of Benedek Baráthosi Balogh from 1903 to 1914 resulted in the collection of more information about ancient Hungarians in the Amur River, Sakhalin, and Hokkaido regions, as well as Manchu and Ainu artefacts.37 In the 1920s, Baráthosi Balogh and his Japanese counterpart Juichiro Imaoka became the voices of Turanism in Japan, integrating the earlier Tungus theory of Kitagawa Shikazo with the Turanist movement in Hungary.38

32 Farkas, “A turánizmus,” p. 862.
33 Instead of the Hungarian-Japanese Society, I refer to the Magyar-Nippon Society throughout the text to reflect the origins of this society in Hungarian and Japanese rather than fully anglicizing the term.
36 Ibid., p. 93.
Amidst these exchanges, Japan was featured as a country with which Hungary could establish industrial, economic, and commercial links. To this extent, it is crucial to acknowledge Nándor Metzger, the correspondent for the Hungarian News Agency in Tokyo, who reported the following about his evening program:

The evening time serves for me to extend with societal propaganda the import of Tokaji wine, Szeged paprika, and Hungarian medicinal specialties in Japan. [...] Us, poor Hungarians, we lack money for expensive advertising in newspapers. Here, only after establishing personal connections, we can echo the Hungarian case only through establishing personal acquaintances, either intellectual or material.39

As we will see below, this economizing approach to Eurasianism and an emphasis on the “bridge” function of Hungary for connecting East and West have been recurrent themes in Hungarian foreign policy.40

In the second half of the 1930s, as the Turanists still called for unity between Turanian nations and acknowledged the bridging role that Hungary could play between Europe and Asia, there also emerged a bifurcation in Turanian ideology. Its expansionist and defensive segments had become separated. The former pursued an ideology, following the desired alliance between Turanian nations such as Bulgaria and Japan and emphasizing the racist character of Turanist ideology.41 In this context, the defensive segment of Turanism wished to establish an alliance with Turanian nations to balance the pan-German and pan-Slavic influences on Hungary. In this vein, the Turanists called for an “end to the age of servility to the West,” pledging not to “shed more blood in the defense of the Occident” and calling for the “unification of all Turanians” against the dual evils of “Semitic corruption and Aryan decadence.”

In the first half of the 20th century, Turanism became part of the extreme rights’ official rhetoric.42 The turning point for the Hungarian Turanists in the 20th century was the emergence of Italian fascism. Turanists started to admire Mussolini, considering him the leader of a bloodless revolution. They admired his resistance to socialist irrationality and anarchy and his struggle to establish rule and order.43 There were conspicuous efforts to implement fascism in Hungary during this period; reaching beyond Italy, Hungarian Turanists also looked for ways to cooperate with their Turkish counterparts.44 Despite their previous emphasis on economic and cultural links, some proponents of Turanism in Hungary—primarily István Mezey—adopted a pro-Japanese tone with

42 Rudolf Paksa, A magyar szélsőjobboldal története (Budapest: Jaffa, 2012).
44 Demirkan, Macar Turancılar, p. 58.
response to Japan’s troubles internationally in the aftermath of its occupation of Manchuria.

Mezey justified Japanese expansionism, referring to the increasing population in Japan without any possibilities for migrating and the need for raw materials and markets for the [growing] Japanese economy.\textsuperscript{45} Hence, the Hungarian-Japanese rapprochement under the frame of Turanism turned into an emphasis on common aims and a symbol of Hungarian expansionism as Japan joined Germany over the course of WWII.\textsuperscript{46} In this respect, supporters of Hungarian-Japanese relations emphasized the special interest of Japan towards Hungary, the special position of Hungary between the East and West, and recognition of Hungary’s corresponding bridge role.\textsuperscript{47} Furthermore, a mutual fear of the Soviet Union strengthened the political ideological service of Turanism as a basis for rapprochement between Japan and Hungary. The participation of Hungary in a military bloc in Central Europe and the country’s friendship with Japan and opposition to the Soviet Union (in case Japan were to begin reckoning with the Soviet Union in the Far East) found support within Hungarian diplomatic circles.\textsuperscript{48} Overall, the discursive construction of Hungarians as alone and without any relatives in Europe—especially following agreement to the Treaty of Trianon—or among foreign nations contributed to a search for alliances in Turanian lands by the Hungarian elite.\textsuperscript{49} In the aftermath of the catastrophic WWII and installation of the communist regime, however, the Turanist discourse ebbed away and the alleged Scythian-Hunnish roots of Hungarians became at best marginalized.

\textbf{Anti-Western Resentment, New Moral Politics, and Social Control}

Moreh has stated that the best way to conceive of Turanism old and new is as a search for the “ancestral homeland (őshaza).” In this sense, home is more than a place; it is an emotionally based and meaningful relationship between people and their environment. Thus, being at home is a mode of being whereby we are oriented within a spatial, temporal, and sociocultural order that we understand.\textsuperscript{50} However, what is particularly of interest in the Hungarian case is how

\textsuperscript{46} Farkas, “A Magyar-Nippon Tarsaság,” p. 103.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 105.
\textsuperscript{49} Farkas, “A turánizmus,” p. 867; Ablonczy, “Lándzahegy, néprokonság, small talk.”
political and cultural resentment towards the West in the shape of Eurasianism offered an alternative to the morality that the West represented. The mode of prevalent anti-Westernism adopted in Eurasianism following the global financial crisis, particularly, propagated a mythically constructed East resting on social representations of a community alternative to the West. Consequently, a new type of moral politics as a counter-discourse to westernization fostered a tone of resentment. This does not mean that nationalist conservative politics became fully rejectionist of Europe per se. Yet, they emphasized certain value systems of non-Europeans to correct the wrongdoings of the West. To explore the unfolding of this process, in this section, I will first illustrate how moral politics and recent Hungarian anti-Westernism led by the conservative, right-wing Fidesz party and the extreme right-wing Jobbik Party operate as discursive tools to promote a new domestic moral politics following the historical legacies depicted above.

The Fidesz victory in the April 2010 election in Hungary delivered a conservative revolution called the “revolution of ballot boxes.” In the words of Orbán, the constitutional revolution of Fidesz is a citizen/bourgeois revolution—not a bloody one like the Bolshevik Revolution—aimed at ensuring that revolutionary morale is anchored in Hungarian democracy.\textsuperscript{51} In an assertive and defiant manner, Fidesz produced its own constitution to create a culture in Hungary that the right wing had craved for decades. Fidesz veered away extensively from its liberal origins during the political transformation; furthermore, it could introduce nationalist conservative politics adopted in the late 1990s fully into Hungarian politics, thanks to the two-thirds parliamentary majority. Simultaneously, Fidesz commenced a revolutionary economic transformation to beat the two inherent problems of the Hungarian economy: high debt and unemployment. The hegemony-aspirant program of Fidesz has pursued alternatives to modernization, a strong state, and a nation vis-à-vis its liberal foes. Furthermore, the global economic crisis and the resultant insecurity fueled Orbán’s new economic project that qualified being in debt as anti-Hungarian and immoral. Fidesz represented the 2008–09 crisis not only as a global crisis but as a crisis of Western values, or defined more broadly, of the Western system.\textsuperscript{52} Under such circumstances, political discourse is shifting again, driven by the rediscovery of yet another new/old theory that would place Hungary at the heart of the new system in an “ethical” home untainted by the West’s “crisis of values.”\textsuperscript{53}

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\item[53] Korkut, \textit{Liberalization Challenges in Hungary}.
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To this extent, the underlying element of anti-Westernism and the emphasis on the need for a new morality illustrate how fundamentally the reacquisition of morality as an alternative to its Western element has been embedded into new conservative politics in Hungary. Thus, we need to understand what differentiates the new moral politics from its Western version.

Morality is an imaginative concept. Our fundamental moral concepts, our understanding of situations, and our reasoning about these situations are imaginatively structured. Moral politics vies for a political system that not only bolsters an ideologically defined morality but also strives to govern it. Many people in liberal democratic and illiberal electoral democratic systems believe that the way out of our present moral confusion is to gain clarity about the ultimate moral principles or laws that ought to govern our lives and learn how to apply them rationally to concrete situations we encounter every day. Though people disagree about the sources of moral principles, they all agree that living morally is principally a matter of insight into definitive moral rules, combined with the strength of will to do the right thing required by those rules. In this context, moral politics is extensively studied in the US. It has been considered a tool of the conservative or neo-conservative political agendas in this literature, although Lakoff has referred to conflicting moral action between the liberals and conservatives to indicate that we should not write off the liberal stance as immoral at the outset.

In the European context, moral politics is a research theme that is developing in studies of populism and reactions of the right wing to the European liberal agenda. Essentially, the new proponents of moral politics reject the agenda of liberalism as non-domestic. In the Hungarian context, this rejection comes with a search for a more beneficial alternative geopolitical association that manifests itself in the form of Eurasianism. Moving further from “integralist forms” described by Holmes as applicable to supporters of conservative

55 Ibid., p. ix.
57 Lakoff, Moral Politics.
58 Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, Populists in Power (London: Routledge, 2015); Korkut, Liberalization Challenges in Hungary; Laurelle, ed., Relations between Russia and the Extreme Right Parties in Europe.
traditionalist socio-political relations, we can note four registers. They are, in order, framework of meaning, practices of everyday life, the idiom of solidarity, and a consciousness of belonging to a specific cultural milieu. I argue that moral politics offers a comprehensive category whereby these registers can find expression. The emergence, consolidation, and long-term maintenance of moral politics derive from the capacity of political actors to convince the wider public on the tenets of their ideologies. Thereby, the emergence of the micro foundations of moral politics indicates the consolidation of a new moral order in the long term. In this article, I propose that we need to understand how mythically constructed geopolitical alternatives help to reformulate identities and thus bolster new moral agendas.

The Western association for the Hungarian liberal elite has always signified a level of civilization characterized by economic and political openness. Initially, this ideology implied a more equal restratification of society, land reform, freedoms, and rights for all—including Jews. It also suggested economic transition to industry and trade and a general embourgeoisement of society. In the 1990s, EU membership became the anchor in the process of westernization. The European claim in the 1990s was crucial, as East European nationalism at that time was based on the idea that these nations were no longer the “poor relatives” of Europe but full-fledged “civilized” nations just being allowed to join their “natural homeland Europe.” The main perspective was that of scorning the East, against which countries like Hungary represent the bridgehead of the West. Overall, the Western orientation has implied rapid changes in socio-economic relations such as privatization, gender rights, social policy reforms, and a more developed regime of rights and freedoms for ethnic and sexual minorities. This orientation also triggered a comprehensive shake-up in domestic and public life as well as the remaking of socioeconomic relations.

To counter these tendencies, anti-Western inclinations in the nationalist, conservative right-wing discourse have proposed a type of moral politics permeated by social representations of a Hungarian society that is an alternative to the West. There were also nativist opponents to this transformation during the early years of transformation—including Csurka and his MIÉP (The Hungarian Justice and Life Party)—after he broke from the conservative MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) and gained office after the first democratic election.

In their case, though, anti-Bolshevik, anti-liberal, and anti-Semitic stances were more important than the course of westernization in Hungary.62

In the aftermath of EU membership, an alternative socioeconomic framework, inspired by a mythically constructed East and representative of a more traditional, patriarchal, religious society, implied an alternative to the westernization goal of liberals. Within this myth, the nationalist conservatives among the ranks of Fidesz and Jobbik claimed, Hungarians could be more confident of and comfortable with their lifestyles, gender relations, and general socioeconomic system. This myth made the East an illiberal alternative to the liberal West. This alternative system required a reorganization of society, which I have introduced as the basis of social control to undo the Western effect on family systems, economic production and markets, social stratification, and the role of religion in society. Let us examine how Eurasianism related to this system building.

**Economization of Social Relations to Follow the Eurasian Paradigm**

To depict the social control mechanism that Eurasianism pursues more clearly, I will depart from Wendy Brown’s work on the role that “economization of subjects.”63 Çalışkan and Callon described economization as a process defining the dissemination of neoliberal market metrics to all other spheres of life and human activity.64 Hence, according to Brown, neoliberal *homo oeconomicus* takes its shape as human capital, seeking to strengthen its competitive position and increase its value. *Homo oeconomicus* as human capital is concerned with enhancing its portfolio value in all domains of life through investing in itself and attracting other investors. This type of economization configures the state as the manager of a firm and the subject as a unit of entrepreneurial and self-investing capital.65 Henceforth, human capital replaces labor, as all market actors are rendered as capital. Foucault argued that multiplying an enterprise from within the social body is what is at stake in neoliberal policy and what makes neoliberalism much more than a set of economic policies. Rather, it is a matter of making the market, competition, and so the enterprise into what could be called the formative power of the society.66

To this extent, the search for new geopolitical alliances in Hungary should be understood within Prime Minister Orbán’s role of shifting people from one

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64 Çalışkan and Callon, “Economization, part 1.”
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comfortable reality to a new and less familiar one in a new environment within which a new sensible system takes place. The rest of this section explores how a new definition of morality surfaced in Hungary as the prime minister appealed to the collective rationality of the public to endorse his search for geopolitical alternatives that would alleviate the impact of the crisis and failure of liberalism. I consider this new morality as the narrative that contributes to the economization of society following non-Western and illiberal social relations.

In 2010, in his first speech after becoming the prime minister (delivered to the Hungarian Permanent Conference, a body that represents Hungarian ethnics in neighboring countries), Orbán stated that though there should be no doubt that they belonged to the Western world, “from now on, this fact will suggest another connotation. In a simplified or caricaturized way, we are sailing under the Western flag, but in [the] world economy an Eastern wind blows. And the sailor that does not take into consideration according to which wind to rotate the sails will doom himself and his cargo.” What started then as keleti nyitás—that is, an opening to the East, as initially required by the new economic realities—has come to mean a new political identification.

In July 2014, Orbán promised to institutionalize an illiberal state in Hungary so that the country could manage a post-2008 crisis world where “anything became possible”; simultaneously, he alluded to the “success of illiberal and perhaps non-democratic countries such as Singapore, China, India, Russia and Turkey” as “stars” in international economic performance. Emphasizing the achievements of illiberal countries, Orbán contended that Hungary should explore ways to tear itself away from the dogmas and ideologies of Western Europe (e.g. liberalism) if it wished to prosper in the race for global competitiveness. This discourse simultaneously pervaded and responded to a sense of insecurity felt in the Hungarian public sphere and legitimized the broad positioning of Orbán vis-à-vis the liberal metanarrative of Europeanisation that had gripped Hungarian politics since 1989.

Ideologically, conservative right-wing proponents of the policy that supports opening to the East primarily list problems in the European economy such as its current political structures, the introduction of the euro as an economic project, and the center-periphery conflict leading to “colonization of the periphery” by the center. However, Orbán’s opposition to the West had deep-

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68 Orbán’s speech delivered at the Hungarian Permanent Conference on 5 November 2010, available at http://index.hu/belfold/2010/11/05/orban_keleti_szel_fuj/
er roots than the economy. In 2007, Orbán stated, “a new political and spiritual era started in Europe and a new type of politics is evolving.” He pointed to the dawn of liberalism in 1968 with its moral relativism, demands for individual freedoms, and feeble communal bonds. According to Orbán, this form of liberalism resembled neoliberalism, and instead they needed a renewed emphasis on national character and a social market economy to remain competitive and preserve society, individual freedom, and communal interest. Instrumentally, this renewed emphasis would curtail “individual freedom [which] after a while batters away the order of procreation and forces unnatural lifestyles upon the European peoples.” Although critical of neoliberalism, Orbán also uttered a clear message that increased freedom would promote unnatural and sinful lifestyles.

At the same time, Orbán raised issues regarding Europe, liberalism, and conservatism, instilling the message that liberalism was perilous for Europe and that Fidesz could counter this menace in Hungary and Europe. Orbán qualified the European and Christian credentials of Hungary but also promoted a series of conservative concepts and ideals for Europe's relationship with Hungary. These manifestations showed that Fidesz was sceptical, rejecting the liberal tradition of the West, but not on board with Orbán’s European affiliations—namely, national traditions and sovereignties, family, cohesion, and Christian solidarity. As I illustrate below, these issues appear as important to the Eurasian discourse as well.

What guides the belief that freedoms lead to decadence in the Fidesz-led elaboration of the crisis of the liberal system originates from Tilo Schabert’s post-liberal and autocratic political stance on leadership. Schabert’s writings, particularly on order, echo the illiberal democracy narrative of Fidesz. Schabert argued that human beings would hardly continue to exist, beyond savagery at least, if their lives were not maintained by some form of economic, social, and political order. Yet, as a paradigm of civilization, modernity means exactly the complete negation of any such order. The idea of modern civilization, therefore, embodies a paradox. Modernity stands in absolute contradiction to civilization. Neither a modernity of civilization—a modernized order of life—nor a civilization of modernity (i.e. an order of life amidst modern anarchy) can be

72 Ibid.
achieved. Instead, there is only continuing conflict. More succinctly, the modern may account for the crisis of modern civilization.\footnote{Tilo Schabert, “A Note on Modernity,” \textit{Political Theory} 7:1 (1979), pp. 123–137.} If these ideas appeared merely within the frame of increasing authoritarianism in the country, one could have imagined them as regression according to democratic standards. However, as they seemed to be tied to the bandwagon of increasing interest in Eastern semi-democracies or authoritarian systems, we have grounds to debate the anti-liberal narrative within the frame of Eurasianism. Moreover, if we consider this narrative within the frame of Orbán’s discourse on work and limitless freedom (noted above), we would have grounds to appreciate how social relations are economized following the “imagined” Asian work ethics that bring forth efficiency rather than the limitless freedom of liberalism.

The explanation for economization of political relations with the East is more straightforward. Under-Secretary of Foreign and External Economic Relations Péter Szijjártó, who became Foreign Minister in 2014, has suggested that the Hungarian opening to the East rests on four pillars. These pillars are as follows: first, building close ties with the Far East—especially with China; second, strengthening cooperation with Caucus countries such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, as their trade strategies fit well with the supply structure of the Hungarian market; third, paying more attention and refining the trade links with the Arab world; and finally, concentrating on the Western Balkans.\footnote{György Szretykó, “Az Európai Unió Válsága és a Keleti Nyitás Lehetőségei,” available at http://kgk.sze.hu/images/dokumentumok/kautzkiadvany2013/makropenzugy/szretyko.pdf (2013).} Truly, looking for new markets during the economic crisis has been a common trend in Austria, Germany, and the UK.\footnote{Ibid.} Yet, as Kálnoky stated, there is no talk of an Eastern opening in Germany in order to connote a basic market search with a new geopolitical direction.\footnote{Bálint Kálnoky, “Hungary’s ‘Opening to the East’ and Turkey,” \textit{Hungarian Review} 1 (2013), pp. 29–32.} When interviewed, the Hungarian ambassador to Kazakhstan suggested that though the Westerners go eastward to look for new markets, they go with their capital. Hungary lacks such capital, but it has historical and cultural capital with which it can reach out to the East.\footnote{Interview, February 2015, Astana.}

Regarding the relations with Japan, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the presentation of Suzuki’s new model in its factory at Esztergom is also noteworthy. Reflecting on the Hungarian car industry and Suzuki’s operations in Hungary over the past 25 years, Orbán stated:

There was a car manufacturing industry in Hungary before the Second World War, but it was swiftly ended by communism; we Hungarians only had the chance to tinker with our own COMECON cars at home in the privacy of our garages, so as to create the impression that they had something to do with us [...], with Suzuki Hungarian families [who] could at last own a “western”
car—which through an irony of fate is actually from the Far East. This is why we Hungarians still regard each and every model made by the company as our own.⁸⁰

In the same speech, Orbán highlighted the “work ethics” of the Japanese and how Hungarians also wish to ascribe to the Japanese belief that work alone can bring about long-term advancement and prosperity for the inhabitants of the country, but for the purposes of this article, what matters most is his identification of Hungarians with the Eastern that appears Western. In the interwar period, as I illustrated above, it was common to see Eastern markets promising new opportunities for Hungary. We can consider Orbán’s discourse in relation to Nándor Metzger’s attempts in the interwar period to promote visibility of Hungary in Japan. In both instances, the East was pragmatically connoted to Hungarian identity so that Hungarians could reach out and find their true economic potential.

Beyond Fidesz, more recently, this desire to reach out to Eastern nations finds expression in the politics of the extreme right-wing Jobbik in Hungary under the banner of neo-Turanism. This ideology aspires to terminate Hungary’s alliance with the Euro-Atlantic community and instead form a cultural, political, and economic alliance with the Uralo-Altaic tribes of Siberia and Russia—even Mongolians, Koreans, and the Japanese.⁸¹ The most daring declaration of Eurasianism among Jobbik ranks occurred in January 2010. Two Jobbik politicians, Márton Gyöngyösi and Tamás Hegedűs authored a long report entitled “The Strategic Turn towards the East” in the party newsletter Barikád. The emphasis was not only that the center of gravity in world economy was shifting towards the East because of the financial crisis in the West, but also that Eastern societies showed that they could maintain their integrity, traditional communities, and value systems more effectively than Westerners. The authors referred to the increasing importance acquired recently by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in its opposition to the unipolar American hegemony, the post-Cold War considerations of Huntington and Fukuyama on the future of Western domination that was bound to fail, and the deep crisis in Europe not only in terms of the economy but also in terms of values, demography, and Christianity. The authors depicted Hungary as lacking economic sovereignty and a national self-consciousness, as well as a rapid worsening of general health and demographic indicators. In other words, the Hungarian people had become frustrated, unhappy, and desperate. The authors suggested that a change in foreign policy could present the Hungarians with an economic and spiritual pedestal without which the country could not elevate itself from the crisis that they delineated. Hence, the country had to move away from the

⁸¹ Akçali and Korkut, “Neo-Turanism and Its Performance.”
aging and decadent West, which was buckling under the strain of internal cohesion and identity problems, and move towards the East, which represented economic and demographic advantages.\(^{82}\)

Reflecting on the crisis and the conservative and extreme right-wing response, Csizmadia, Csery, Jenei, Lakatos, Nagy, Novák, and Paár have indicated that there are many similarities between the modern politics of Hungary and politics during the global economic crisis of the interwar economic environment that generated Turanism, namely the importance of non-allied politics, economic unorthodoxy, and hostility to banks and elites.\(^{83}\) There were also significant ramifications of extreme right-wing positions for Orbán insomuch as he depicted Western liberals and international capitalists as the main actors that brought forth Hungary’s economic and political collapse in the 2000s. This has recently triggered a chauvinist, anti-immigrant discourse and a referendum against the migrant quota imposed by the EU, which is directed at proponents of multiculturalism in the West in the shape of left-wing, liberal politicians as those seeking to destroy European societies and Europe.\(^{84}\)

**Conclusion**

This article has placed the current anti-Westernism voiced and practiced by the conservative, right-wing Fidesz and Jobbik parties within a historical framework. It illustrates that their anti-Westernism is the culmination of a long tradition of a search for beneficial relations and moral politics for Hungary with Europe. In its current shape, this search expresses itself as a counter-discourse to the Europeanisation metanarrative that has set much of the tone for Hungary’s transformation since the early 1990s. In contrast, the nationalist and conservative right has proposed more traditional, religious, communitarian, patriarchal, and productive values vis-à-vis the individualism that the West has represented.

Theoretically, the article reflects on social representation and collective memory literature to illustrate that “identities are intentionally or deliberately chosen, used, and/or strategically manipulated.”\(^{85}\) Following Hopf’s theoretical work, this article shows that the conservative and nationalist political and cultural elite in Hungary engage in collective soul-searching on what formulates Hungarian identity, particularly at times of political and econom-

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\(^{84}\) Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Tusnádfürdő Hungarian Summer School, 27 July 2015, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vatM4R5Yr9k

ic turmoil. They foster new identities alternative to those of their conceived challengers. In this effort, they also refer to a commitment to traditional socio-economic relations within Hungarian society to generate the basis of a vigorous engagement with the modern world. Yet, they also deliberately associate new elements with these identities to oppose the non-domestic ideology that Westernism propagates. Given the economic productivity and benefits-oriented goals of the formulations of these new identities, I have contextualized them within the frame of economization.

This article has focused centrally on identity-making as an essential element of Eurasianism in Hungary. Coser noted that—for Halbwachs—the past is a social construction mainly, if not wholly, shaped by concerns of the present. In this context, Halbwachs argued that the beliefs, interests, and aspirations of the present shape the various views of the past as they are manifested respectively in every historical epoch. Thus, collective historical memory acquires both cumulative and presentist aspects, showing at least partial continuity as well as new readings of the past in terms of the present. A society’s current perceived needs may impel it to refashion the past, but successive epochs are being kept alive through a common code and common symbolic canon, even amidst contemporary revisions. In other words, Halbwachs has shown how the present affects the selective perception of past history insomuch as he has stressed that our conceptions of the past are affected by the mental images we employ to solve present problems; thus, collective memory is essentially a reconstruction of the past in light of the present. I have deliberated about not only the current emphasis on Eurasianism, but also the reflections of Hungary’s relations with Eurasian nations extending all the way to Japan.

Repeated attempts in the discourse of the Hungarian right-wing elite has been the making or revising of collective memory of the past to respond to current problems of the present in order to transform the problematic into non-problematic in collective rationality. The outcomes have included both the ideological transformation of the West and the East for the consumption of the Hungarian public. The image of a morally corrupt liberal system has been associated with the West, whereas all references to economic self-sufficiency, productivity, and family have been associated with the “illiberal” political-economic frame that Hungary should grow into following Eastern templates. The search for establishing social control over the public to this extent has been unique. Overall, this article depicts the formulation of a new hegemony in Hungary in the form of Eurasianism and shows the impact of this ambiguous ideology over Hungary’s political history.

86 Ibid.