Karafuto as a Border Island of the Empire of Japan: In Comparison with Okinawa

Naoki Amano

Abstract

This paper aims at reconsidering the history of Karafuto (the southern part of Sakhalin Island under Japanese rule) from the viewpoint of border studies. I will review the history of Karafuto (1905–1945) as a border island of the Empire of Japan in comparison to another Japanese border island, Okinawa. This historical research allows us to develop some characteristics which define border islands. Firstly, border islands were always in an unstable situation: they could be incorporated into or excluded from the homeland, depending on the wishes of the central government. Secondly, border islands needed close co-operation with large corporations from the economic core of the homeland during the process of internalization and colonization. Thirdly, political internalization and economic colonization of border islands could be inconsistent. Paradoxically, it is because they were politically incorporated into the homeland that border islands could be de-bordered and economically excluded from the homeland market.

Introduction

This paper aims at reconsidering the history of Karafuto in comparison with Okinawa. Karafuto is the Japanese name for the southern part of Sakhalin Island, which is located north of Hokkaido, Japan. Although the island is now governed by the Russian Federation, the southern part, below the 50th parallel north, belonged to the Japanese Empire from 1905 to 1945. As this paper focuses on the history of the southern part of Sakhalin Island under the Japanese Empire, it will refer to Karafuto. Over the past decade, a considerable number of studies on Karafuto history have been conducted in Japan. I have also published several works based on empirical research concerning

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various, restricted, periods of Karafuto history.\textsuperscript{2} In this paper, based on these previous works, I would like to reconsider the history of Karafuto from the viewpoint of border studies.

To analyze the historical experience of Karafuto, I will introduce the concept of “border islands.” Border islands are literally located on national borders. Border islands have common features as islands called \textit{insularity}: oceanic, small, and remote.\textsuperscript{3} The insularity, especially the remoteness, can create a border between the islands and their homeland in the legal and administrative system.\textsuperscript{4} The internal border, as will be stated later, also divides human groups between the homeland people and among ethnic groups or classes inside the islands.

In addition to this insularity, let me point out a feature of border-islandness: \textit{uneasiness}. The uneasiness of border islands refers to unstable status or functions of the islands, and the complex identities of islanders. The uneasiness stems from the bordering / de-bordering / re-bordering process on border islands. The central government can include or exclude the border islands into / from their homeland due to national security and the benefit / cost of rule. The geopolitical strategy of the central government can make border islands a fortress or sacrificial stones defending the mainland. If an empire aims at further expansion in the direction of border islands, the islands can function as bases of imperial actions or just stepping-stones. If the imperial government regards border islands as stepping-stones, the government pays less strategic attention to the peripheral islands. When such islands are exposed to invasion by foreign powers, the islands are likely to be discarded and to function as sacrificial stones in order to delay the invasion of the homeland.

The uneasiness of border islands affects the identity of the island people.\textsuperscript{5} Their identity is diverse and often conflicting. Some border island people may show strong loyalty to the nation called peripheral nationalism, fearing being discarded and excluded from the country. Others on the same island may regard themselves as different from the homeland people and even view their island as a

\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{Notes}
\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{AK2} Hiroshi Kakazu, \textit{Toshogaku [Nissology]} (Tokyo: Kokonsaion, 2019), 3.
\bibitem{TAK} For the legal and administrative differences in Japanese islands, see Masaya Takaesu, \textit{Kindai Nihon no chihoto to “tosho” [The Rule over Locals and Islands of Modern Japan]} (Tokyo: Yumani Shobo, 2009).
\end{thebibliography}
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colony of the mainland. This colonial identity does not only stem from the inferiority to the homeland, but from the pride of their cultural uniqueness.6

Typical border islands in the Japanese Empire were Karafuto and the Okinawa Islands.7 Karafuto served as the border between the Japanese Empire and Russia / USSR on the island, while Okinawa is located at the southern edge of Japan. In this paper I will analyze the history of Karafuto as a border island in comparison with Okinawa.

The first section describes the common historical experiences of Karafuto and Okinawa in the second half of nineteenth century. The Tokugawa shogunate and the new Meiji government both had to contend with the process of bordering and re-bordering their national territory. The subjects of this bordering and re-bordering included the border islands of Karafuto (Sakhalin Island) and the Ryukyu / Okinawa. During this process these border islands were in an unstable situation with ambiguous relations to the main body of Japan proper. These relations, moreover, were also affected by the West and subsequent Japanese expansion.

The second section highlights the processes for the internalizing and colonizing of Karafuto in the 1920s. To internalize Karafuto, or make Karafuto a true “Japanese” territory, the Empire of Japan tried to settle labor migrants throughout the border island. These migrations were also necessary to colonize Karafuto, or make Karafuto an economic dependency of the imperial core. These mutual processes saved Karafuto from depression after

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7 Hokkaido is not an “island.” Though the area of Hokkaido (78,073km²) is a little larger than that of Sakhalin Island (76,400km²), the Hokkaido people do not identify themselves as island people. This shows the relativity of smallness as insularity. This insularity depends not only on geographical scale, but also on the size of population, the degree of cultivation, and status as a main island or not. Well cultivated, Hokkaido has more than five million inhabitants and a lot of rito (remote islands or islands annex). By the end of World War II, Hokkaido had been well internalized into the homeland and regarded as an integral part of Japan, and its people did not feel the uneasiness of border island.
World War I, although the postwar recession led to Okinawa’s economic collapse.

In the third section I will examine the re-bordering of the Empire of Japan during wartime and the influence of this process on Karafuto. The Empire of Japan tried to expand its sphere of influence and consolidate the *Dai Toa Kyoeiken* (the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere) in the late 1930s and the early 1940s. Karafuto was politically internalized and re-bordered as a part of the homeland during this period. However, this internalization paradoxically caused exclusion of Karafuto out of the imperial economic sphere, as Okinawa had been excluded in the 1920s. This paradox will be analyzed in the end of this paper.

**Uneasiness of Being a Border Island: Bordering and Expansion in the Japanese Empire**

In July 1945, the Japanese government requested the USSR to mediate between Japan and the United States in order to start peace talks. In return for this mediation, Tokyo was ready to transfer Karafuto to the USSR.8 As enumerated later, Karafuto had already been made a part of *naichi* (homeland) by this time, and was therefore not officially a colony. However, this offer would suggest that the Japanese central government did not really view Karafuto as an integral part of the Japanese homeland. The same can be said of Okinawa. A document entitled “The Main Principles for Peace Negotiations,” prepared in July 1945, stated, “As for an interpretation of the realm of inherent territory, we can exclude Okinawa, Ogasawara [the Bonin Islands] and Karafuto from the integral part of Japan…”9 Although the attempt to end the war through the USSR’s mediation failed, this process shows how ambiguous and unstable the status of border islands was. Whether border islands are regarded as part of the homeland or not depends on the situation of their central government. This is one of the main characteristics of border islands. You can find this unstable status, which I call the uneasiness of border islands, from the beginning of Japan’s modern history.

The modern history of Japan began with the bordering of territory in the second half of nineteenth century. On 7 February 1855, the Tokugawa shogunate and the Russian Empire concluded the Treaty of Shimoda. The Russo-Japanese border in the Kurile Islands was fixed between the islands of Iturup and Urup, leaving Kunashir and Iturup to Japan while Urup and the islands to the north belonged to Russia. And Sakhalin Island was declared a “joint possession of Russia and Japan.” Sakhalin stayed an island jointly possessed by Russia and Japan until 1875. Concerning another northern island, *Ezo*, the shogunate did not look on the island as a part of the homeland except for the southernmost area. After the Meiji Restoration, the new government renamed it *Hokkaido* in 1869 and began governing the whole island.

During this bordering process we should highlight how the shogunate treated Okinawa. Until the 1870s, Okinawa was called the Ryukyu Kingdom, which was an independent state, signaling its allegiance to both the shogunate and the Qing Dynasty. In the second half of 1850s the shogunate

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allowed the Ryukyu Kingdom to conclude a series of treaties with the United States, France and the Netherlands. The shogunate wished to limit the validity of the treaties to within the Ryukyu Islands, and to guard the shogunate regime from Western powers. In other words, the shogunate exploited Ryukyu as a seawall to protect the homeland, as Tokyo again attempted towards the end of World War II.  

The bordering of Ryukyu after the Meiji Restoration was relevant to the bordering of Sakhalin Island and the imperial expansion of Japan. The Ryukyu Kingdom was forcibly incorporated into Japan in the 1870s. This process, called *Ryukyu shobun* [Disposition of Ryukyu], ended with the replacement of Ryukyu with Okinawa prefecture in 1879. The disposition had a connection with Japanese imperial expansion to Taiwan (Formosa). Japan had dispatched troops to Taiwan in 1874 to punish the indigenous Taiwanese, because they had killed castaways from Ryukyu, i.e., “Japanese” castaways. Already by this time, the Japanese government was asserting that the Ryukyu people were Japanese, and exploited Ryukyu as a stepping stone for imperial expansion.

In the 1870s the Japanese government tried to border and expand its territory at the same time. In the northern border area, Sakhalin and Korea were the focus of attention. In 1873 the *Seikanron*, a political debate regarding a punitive expedition against Korea, split the Meiji government. The debate was essentially over the question of whether to prioritize expansion to Korea over bordering Sakhalin and internalizing Okinawa, where the process of disposition was occurring. Takamori Saigo, the leader of the expansionists, insisted that Japan should dispatch troops and force Korea to open up the country to the outside world. This is why he also insisted that Japan give up Sakhalin to concentrate its attention and energy on Korea. Shigenobu Okuma was opposed to Saigo, claiming that Japan should pay attention to Sakhalin, not Korea or Taiwan, because Sakhalin was inherent Japanese territory and Japan must not cede the island to Russia. He wrote that, “Ryukyu was exterior, while Karafuto [Sakhalin] was interior.” In his opinion, internalization of Sakhalin should be granted priority over the incorporation of Ryukyu. Other leading politicians against the expedition to Korea also insisted that Japan should place a higher priority on the bordering of Sakhalin than on expanding to Korea. The *Seikanron* debate ended in Saigo’s defeat, and the Meiji government gave up expansion to Korea for the time being, and concentrated instead on the demarcation issue on Sakhalin Island.

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11 For Disposition of Ryukyu, see Tsuneo Namihira, *Kindai Higashi-Asia no naka-no Ryukyu heigo: Chuka sekai chitsujo kara shokuminchi teikoku Nihon he [Disposition of Ryukyu in Modern East Asia: from Chinese World Order to Colonial Empire of Japan]* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014).  
15 For details of *Seikanron* debate and Sakhalin problem, see, Nisizato, “Ryukyu shobun to Karafuto-Chishima koukan joyaku,” 178–179.
On 7 May 1875, Admiral Takeaki Enomoto and Prince Aleksandr Gorchakov signed the Treaty of St. Petersburg. Japan renounced its claims to the island of Sakhalin in exchange for the Kurile Islands north of Urup. The whole of the Kurile Islands chain was governed by the Japanese government until 1945, while the whole of Sakhalin Island was under Russian rule until 1905. It is noteworthy that Enomoto asked Russia to recognize Japanese interests to Korea in return for Sakhalin Island during these negotiations. Enomoto thought that Japan could renounce its claims to Sakhalin Island if the Russian Empire tacitly condoned Japanese expansion in Korea. In other words, imperial expansion in Korea would be considered “proportional” compensation for the abandonment of Sakhalin.\(^{16}\)

The problem of Japanese expansion to Korea was once again linked to Sakhalin Island in 1905. On July 7, 1905, during the final phase of the Russo-Japanese War, the thirteenth Japanese Infantry Division landed on Sakhalin and occupied the whole island by July 24. The Japanese continued mopping-up operations until 1 September, five days before signing the Treaty of Portsmouth.\(^ {17}\)

Before its occupation by the Japanese army, Sakhalin Island was a penal colony of the Russian Empire. In 1902 the island had a population of 36,595, most of which was made up of convicts or ex-convict peasants.\(^ {18}\) The Japanese occupation army tried to mop-up the settlers and make the island “uninhabited” by force. In several places, Russian citizens and POWs were slaughtered,\(^ {19}\) though the exact numbers are unknown. The majority of the slaughtered POWs were local volunteer soldiers from the ex-convict peasants, who accounted for 40 percent of the total number of Russian troops on Sakhalin.

Many local survivors were forcibly repatriated to the continental part of Russia, the expenses for which were borne by the Japanese occupation authorities. From the end of August to the beginning of September 1905, 3,962 Russians were forced to leave from the southern part of the island and 2,758 were shipped off from the northern part.\(^ {20}\) As a result of the massacres and repatriations, as of December 1905, 5,487 lived on the northern part of the island, while only about 500 Russians remained in the southern part, more than half of whom left the island over the course of 1906.\(^ {21}\)

The Japanese army division was transferred to Korea soon after finishing its operations in Sakhalin. In the course of the annexation process there, it repeated many of the same activities in Korea that had been witnessed in Sakhalin. The thirteenth Infantry Division committed mopping-up exercises on the Korean citizenry later in 1907. Some of the officers and soldiers involved had engaged in the

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\(^{16}\) Nihongaikoubunsho [Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy], Vol. 7 (1874), 445; Vol. 8 (1875), 174.

\(^{17}\) For details on the Russo-Japanese War in Sakhalin, see, Amano, “Misuterareta shima deno senso,” 35–64.


\(^{19}\) RGVIA (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voeno-istoricheskii archiv [Russian State Milatry History Archive]), file no. 846–16–10064, 73; GIASO (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii archiv Sakhalinskoi oblasti [Russian State History Archive of Sakhalin Oblast]), file no. 23i-2-104, 27–29.


\(^{21}\) Amano, “Sakhalin / Karafuto: the Colony between Empires,” 128.
Sakhalin operation, too.\textsuperscript{22} When building colonies, the Empire of Japan tried to “empty” land not only in Sakhalin, but also in Taiwan and Korea, so that the empire could achieve security in foreign lands and encourage Japanese to immigrate to new colonies.\textsuperscript{23}

It seems that such activities during the imperial expansion process reflected a traditional Japanese perception of homeland. In Japan, it was thought that the territory where the “Japanese” lived was their homeland. During the bordering process in the second half of nineteenth century, the Okinawa people and the Ainu people were seen as “Japanese,” because they were descended from the same parent source as the “true” Japanese people. This idea made it possible and necessary for the Meiji government to incorporate Okinawa.\textsuperscript{24} The Tokugawa shogunate also claimed Sakhalin Island during demarcation negotiations with Russia, because the Ainu people lived in the southern part of the island, thus, making it a part of Japanese territory.\textsuperscript{25}

Although it was impossible for the Empire of Japan to “empty” Taiwan and Korea, Japanese colonialists were greatly aided when settling lands emptied of foreign inhabitants. They succeeded in making Sakhalin uninhabited. After the Russo-Japanese War Japanese immigrants flocked to the “empty” island.

\textbf{Internalizing and Colonizing Karafuto in the Interwar Period}

On 5 September 1905 the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed. Sakhalin Island was portioned at the 50th parallel of latitude, the southern half of which became Japanese territory and was named \textit{Karafuto}. In the first five years more than 50,000 Japanese immigrants settled in Karafuto, making up 96 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{26} Half of this border island was made into “Japanese” territory.

As the American historian John J. Stephan, author of the first complete history of Sakhalin Island, points out, the goals in Karafuto were economic, not strategic. Karafuto’s rich fisheries, forests, coal deposits offered promising opportunities.\textsuperscript{27} This is reflected in the trend of Karafuto studies. Most works on Karafuto history have focused on economic history: industrial development, the trend of

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\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, 131.


\textsuperscript{24} Tsuneo Namihira points out that the Japanese Empire applied the same theory as Okinawa to the Korean people. Namihira, \textit{Kindai Higashi-Asia no naakano Ryukyu heigeo}, 343–359.

\textsuperscript{25} Other indigenous people in Sakhalin Island, such as Nivkh and Uilta people, lived in the northern part, so Japanese did not view the northern part of Sakhalin as Japanese territory. Toshiyuki Akizuki, \textit{Nichiro-kankei to Sakhalin-to: Bakumatsu Meiji-shonen no ryodo-mondai [Russo-Japanese Relations and Sakhalin Island: the Territorial Problem in the end of the Tokugawa shogunate period and the beginning of Meiji]} (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1994), 116–135.

\textsuperscript{26} Takumusho (Ministry of Colonial Affairs), \textit{Nihon oyobi kakkoku shokuminchi zuhyo [Maps and Charts of Colonies of Japan and the World]} (Tokyo: Takumusyo, 1912), 12.

migration and its colonial character. Studies of Okinawa history, by contrast, have focused on political history. Although many more books and articles have been published on Okinawa history than Karafuto history, you will only find a few books on economic history. This seems to reflect the fact that the Japanese Empire did not count on the potential of Okinawa economy.

As Stephan A. Royle says, it is useful to analyze island economic history from the viewpoint of internal colonialism. The point of internal colonialism is: (1) officials from the core of the country make up the elite strata in peripheral internal colonies, so local people’s wishes cannot be reflected in local political decision making; (2) internal colonies exclusively supply raw materials to the core, so the pattern of development is dependent, and complementary to the core; (3) the trend of migration to internal colonies depends on the economy of the homeland; (4) settlers in internal colonies can have a different identity from citizens in the homeland, even if they are identical in ethnicity.

In order to investigate the history of border islands, it is important to understand that the course of internal colonization is a reversible process, because, as stated above, the status of border islands is unstable and ambiguous. They may be incorporated into or excluded from the homeland at the wishes of core. Border islands can be politically internal but economically external at the same time, and vice versa. In this paper, I will analyze the process of internal colonization of Karafuto from these two mutual viewpoints: the process of being internalized and of being colonized. The process of being internalized means politically incorporating border islands into homelands. On the other hand, the process of being colonized makes border islands economically dependent and complementary to the core. These mutual processes can be reversible, and they do not always coincide with each other.

Some Okinawan and Karafuto people often identified their homeland islands with colonies of the Japanese Empire, even though the border islands had been politically incorporated into parts of the homeland. The uneasiness of being border lands and the paradox of the internal-colonizing process made the island people uneasy and feel that they did not live in Japan.

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32 For examples of the colonial identities of the border island people, see Fuyu Ifa, Ifa Fuyu zenshu [Fuyu Ifa’s complete works], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1974); Kotoharu Kokuba, Okinawa no ayumi [Historical Course of Okinawa] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2019, originally published in 1973); Katsutarou Arasawa, Karafuto bungakushi [A History of Karafuto literature], vol. 3 (Kushiro: Sojinsha, 1987). Also see Masanao Kano, Okinawa no fuchi: Ifa Fuyu to sono jidai [The Edge of Okinawa: Fuyu Ifa and his age] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2018).
On 31 March 1907 the Karafuto-cho (Karafuto office) was established at Toyohara (present-day Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk City). The governor of Karafuto-cho exercised a much more wide-ranging authority than governors of prefectural governments on the mainland. The Karafuto-cho governor’s authority included the direct control of police, construction, taxation, and education. Karafuto was administered as a colony like Taiwan and Korea.

In the early days, Karafuto-cho drew up a document entitled “National Policy on Governance of Karafuto.” The document said, “All of the colonies of the Empire of Japan should be regarded as a part of the homeland.” According to the document, Japanese colonies are temporary, and different from the permanent colonies of European empires. The Karafuto-cho’s goal was the internalization of Karafuto into an inherent part of the mainland. In order to achieve this goal, Karafuto had to be economically developed enough for the core to recognize the advantages of its absorption. Karafuto-cho, therefore, was incentivized to invite a large number of permanent settlers to the colony, in order to begin establishing a basis for development.

As Table 1 indicates, fishery was the mainstay of the Karafuto economy in the first decade of governance. Fishing accounted for 56 percent of gross production in 1915. Japanese fishermen had been traditionally engaged in the fishing industry around Sakhalin Island before demarcation in the nineteenth century. They continued to work under the rule of the Russian Empire just before the Russo-Japanese War. As soon as the war finished, Japanese fishermen from Hokkaido rushed to work this newly-Japanese sea again.

Table 1: Share of Production by Industry in Karafuto 1910–1938

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agricultural</th>
<th>Forestry</th>
<th>Livestock</th>
<th>Fishery</th>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>T&amp;C</th>
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* Pulp and Paper account for more than 90 percent of manufacturing.
** T&C means government receipts from transportation and communication services.


33 Sakhalin to Karafuto-shi Kenkyukai [Association for Sakhalin & Karafuto History], ed., Ritsumeikan 100-nenshi hensanshitsu shozo Nakagawa Kojuro bunsho Karafuto kanrenhubun DVD [Nakagawa Kojuro’s Documents Concerning Karafuto in Possession of the Editorial Office of 100 years History of Ritsumeikan, Ritsumeikan University, DVD], file no. 1574.
34 Ibid.
However, fishermen could not form firm foundations for the development envisaged by the Karafuto-cho, because they were seasonal workers. They came to Karafuto to work when the sea ice melted and went back to Hokkaido before it froze over. \footnote{For details on the fishing industry in Karafuto, see, Hara and Amano, ed., *Karafuto 40-nen no rekishi*, 44–114.} Karafuto-cho needed permanent settlers and different industries to bring migrants.

Karafuto-cho’s strategy for attracting permanent migrants was close co-operation with large corporations from the core of the homeland. A document drawn up by the police department of Karafuto-cho called this strategy “Letting capitals bring settlers.” \footnote{Karafuto-cho Keisatsu-bu [Police Department of Karafuto-cho], *Karafuto zairyu Chosen-jin ippan [A Document on Koreans in Karafuto]* (unpublished documents in possession of Hakodate Municipal Library, 1927), 7.} Karafuto-cho tried to attract large industrial companies and encouraged them to build manufacturing factories in Karafuto. Karafuto-cho wanted such factories to let workers from the mainland permanently settle Karafuto.

The First World War enabled the fulfilment of Karafuto-cho’s dreams. Owing to World War I, pulp supplies available from Europe were depleted, and pulp prices were raised to unprecedented levels. This situation stimulated heavily capitalized firms to open pulp factories throughout Karafuto. Karafuto-cho helped large pulp corporations advance to this northern border island. Karafuto-cho sold off the vast virgin forests in the colony only to corporations which already had or had decided to build pulp factories in Karafuto. \footnote{Karafuto-cho, ed., *Karafuto shinrin houki [A Statute Book on Forests in Karafuto]* (Toyohara: Karafuto-cho, 1917), 12.} From 1914 to 1927 Karafuto-cho disposed of eight divisions of forests in various areas. Five corporations, including the biggest pulp-paper corporation Oji-seishi (Oji Paper), bought up forests at one-third of the price prevalent in Hokkaido, and built pulp factories there. \footnote{Koichi Hirai, *Nihon Shokuminch zaisei-shi kenkyu [Studies on History of Finance in Japanese Colonies]* (Tokyo: Minerva Shobo, 1997), 192–193.}

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The last two factories were built in the northern area. One was built in Esutoru (present-day Uglegorsk City) located on the northwestern coast in 1925; the other was built in Shiritoru (present-day Makarov City) on the northeastern coast in 1927. \footnote{Miki, *Iju-gata shokuminch Karafuto no keisei*, 245.} Although as of 1920 only 636 people lived in Esutoru and 698 people in Shiritoru, 10 years later, the population of Esutoru had increased to 17,774, while the population of Shiritoru to 19,275. The total population of Karafuto almost tripled during that decade, from 105,899 as of 1920 to 295,196 as of 1930. \footnote{Karafuto-cho, *Karafuto-cho kokusei chosa kekka houkoku Showa 10-nen [Report on National Census of Karafuto-cho in 1935]* (Toyohara: Karafuto-cho, 1937), statistics section, 8.} Before heavily capitalized pulp companies advanced to Karafuto, the northern half of Karafuto was sparsely settled. Migrants from the mainland inhabited developed cities in the southern half such as Toyohara, Odomari (present-day Korsakov City), and Maoka (present-day Kholmsk City). Karafuto-cho succeeded in “letting capital bring settlers” and spreading them throughout Karafuto.
Karafuto was very rich in wood, raw materials for pulp and paper. When the southern part of Sakhalin Island became Japanese territory, pine, spruce, larch, and birch trees covered 90 percent of Karafuto. As Table 1 shows, forestry and pulp-paper manufacturing were Karafuto’s largest industry after 1916. Pulp-paper manufacturing and forestry accounted for about 80 percent of Karafuto’s total product until the second half of 1930s. Karafuto’s pulp industry supplied the homeland with 70 percent of its pulp and paper production during the 1930s and early 1940s.

After the First World War, European countries advanced on the Asian market again. This caused Japanese exports to plummet and led to an oversupply in the domestic market. Moreover, the Kanto Great Earthquake in 1923 did serious damage to the core of Japan. As indicated above, Karafuto’s pulp-paper industry was able to survive this recession after World War I. By contrast, though, the recession dealt a fatal blow to the Okinawan economy.

Okinawa also benefitted from the economic boom during World War I. Okinawa’s economy was largely based on sugar production. More than 70 percent of Okinawa farmers exclusively cultivated sugar cane. World War I caused an upswing in sugar prices, the profits of which were so great that a group of newly rich known as the “Sugar Rich” emerged in Okinawa. The price of Okinawan sugar remained high during the 1910s, but then fell sharply in 1920. This dealt the Okinawan people a fatal blow. The economic depression which gripped Okinawa was called *Sotetsu jigoku*, or “Cycad hell.” The starving people of Okinawa were forced to eat poisonous indigenous cycads because the agriculture of Okinawa was a sugar monoculture, with little land devoted to rice or potatoes for local consumption. With the collapse of sugar prices, the locals were unable to either buy or grow food, and a mass famine occurred. Because of this *Sotetsu jigoku*, the Okinawan people were compelled to

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44 For the details on the agricultural structure in Okinawa, see, Mukai, *Okinawa Kindai Keizai-shi*, 9–29.
leave their native land and to emigrate to the Philippines, South Pacific Mandate, South America and so on. A lot of emigrants also settled in Osaka, the second economic core of Japan.45

Why did Karafuto survive this recession, while Okinawa could not? Two factors could save peripheral islands from an economic downturn: alternative resources and aid from the governments. Ogasawara (or Bonin) Islands and Iwo-jima Islands, other Japanese border islands, also suffered from the collapse of sugar prices in the 1920s. But they succeeded in growing different agricultural products: tomatoes, pumpkins, coca,46 etc. Because these islands pulled out of a sugar monoculture, mass out-migrations were avoided.47

However, it is usually very difficult for islands to find another resource for revival due to the limited scale. Okinawa could not develop an alternative strategy by itself, so the Japanese government created plans to promote the economic development in 1932. This plan, however, only encouraged self-help for the Okinawan people. The government attached greater importance to another southern colony of the Japanese Empire, Taiwan, the economy of which was also based on sugar production. The core areas of the Japanese economy prioritized sugar production on Taiwan, and Okinawa lost out. The government concluded that it did not need to protect Okinawa and stopped colonizing the border islands.48 Okinawa was discarded and excluded by the homeland.

In contrast, the Japanese government of the early 1930s tried to protect the Karafuto economy. The government also planned for the promotion of development in Karafuto in 1933.49 This plan encouraged the development of coal mines, as the available deposits had mostly not been mined yet. As shown below, the coal industry in Karafuto made remarkable progress in the late 1930s. Karafuto, like Okinawa, depended on the homeland for food. Rice could not be cultivated in Karafuto because of the cold weather, and Karafuto imported rice from Hokkaido. Okinawa sold sugar to the core and bought rice from the mainland. So did Karafuto. The Okinawa people had no choice but to starve when the market for their sugar collapsed, but Karafuto had another option, coal.

Karafuto’s survival also depended on a piece of “luck.” Karafuto forests were seriously damaged by the matsugareha (pine moth) in 1924. Karafuto-cho decided to sell the damaged woods at a loss to the pulp-paper companies. The damage did not affect the manufacturing of pulp. Thanks to the low prices, Karafuto pulp manufacturing proved more competitive than Hokkaido pulp, and it continued to be the main supplier of pulp to the Japanese paper industry until the early 1940s.50

Karafuto was being colonized by Karafuto-cho and the heavily capitalized corporations after World War I. The Karafuto economy was more and more dependent on the core during the inter-war

45 Goto, Kindai Nihon no “nanshin” to Okinawa, 90–97, 121–125.
46 Coca began to be cultivated and refined in Iwo-jima Islands and Okinawa in the late 1920s. Refined coca, cocaine, was used as anesthetics and in greater demand in the Japanese Army during the World War II. The cultivation of coca in the Japanese border islands stopped by the end of the World War II.
49 Miki, Iju-gata shokuminch Karafuto no keisei, 308–312.
years. Although Karafuto survived the recession, this dependency implied the possibility of exclusion, as experienced by Okinawa.

The Re-bordering and De-bordering of Karafuto during Wartime

Connectivity to the homelands was the basis of colonizing border lands. Karafuto relied heavily on sea communication, as very few airfields were constructed on Karafuto before World War II. Communications with the homeland were consolidated with the establishment of regular steamer service between Odomari and Wakkanai located about 160 kilometers south on the opposite side of the La Pérouse strait in 1923. It goes without saying that the establishment of this service, called Chi-Haku koro (Wakkanai-Odomari line), was encouraged by the “letting capital bring settlers” strategy. This line carried a lot of migrant workers from the homeland. Maoka Port and Honto Port were busier than Odomari as Karafuto’s main trade port, as Maoka and Honto were ice-free ports, while Odomari was frozen in winter. The selection of these as trade ports was carried out according to the wishes of the Karafuto-cho and the ports were heavily capitalized by companies such as Oji Paper and Mitsui.51

Coal became one of the mainstays of the Karafuto economy in the early 1930s. The development of the coal industry demanded a larger labor force shipped by the steamships of Chi-Haku koro. Generally speaking, empires did not pay much attention to the origins of their labor force in developing colonies, as they mainly focused on the labor force’s efficiency.52 However, Karafuto-cho officials could not ignore the issue of the labor force’s nationality, because they had to not only colonize the border island but also internalize it. According to a document written by Karafuto-cho officials, Chinese laborers were the best in terms of efficiency. Yet although officials recognized that Chinese laborers worked much better than Japanese and Koreans, they were reluctant to let more Chinese migrants settle on the border island, because they were not subjects of the Empire of Japan. The Empire had to encourage its own subjects (Japanese and Koreans) to settle in Karafuto in order to internalize the border island.53

Korean migrants began to appear on Karafuto in the mid-1920s, after the Siberian intervention and the occupation of the northern part of Sakhalin Island by the Japanese Army was over.54 As the coal industry in Karafuto was developing, coal mines needed larger labor forces. The Empire of Japan began mobilizing Korean workers in July 1939, and Karafuto-cho decided to mobilize 6,456 laborers in 1939, and 13,000 laborers in 1940. Although it is difficult to know the exact number of the mobilized Korean settlers, more than 60 percent of them worked for the coal mines.55

It is not so hard to imagine that Korean migrants were exposed to discrimination by Japanese settlers. However, Japanese laborers working in coal mines, pulp factories, forestry and so on were also

51 Miki, Iju-gata shokuminch Karafuto no keisei, 233–258.
55 Miki, Iju-gata shokuminch Karafuto no keisei, 349–351.
looked down on by the core elite. The imperial elite tended to classify their subjects, especially the peripheral people, on the basis of work efficiency and productivity. Workers of low productivity were looked down on as lesser and unsound Japanese. The elite in Karafuto thought that sound Japanese from the mainland did not want to live in Karafuto, because the border land was full of lazy, down-and-out, and unsound Japanese laborers. The Karafuto-cho officials even regarded Korean and Chinese workers as more preferable in terms of work efficiency.

The Okinawan people also suffered from such discriminations. A lot of the Okinawan people were forced to move to the homeland after Sotetsu jigoku (Cycad hell) in the 1920s. The majority of them worked in the Kansai district. The homeland Japanese discriminated the Okinawan migrants not only because they had different cultures, but also because they looked lazy in their workplaces. The Okinawan workers were compelled to work and live in the same way as sound Japanese. In other words, the Okinawan people had to “become Japanese” in order to live in the mainland.

At the beginning of the 1940s, the Empire of Japan tried to consolidate its sphere of influence, and systematize it as the Dai Toa Kyoeiken (the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere). One of the goals of the sphere was to extend the boundaries of the imperial economy in order to establish an autarkic command economy within the empire. This caused a great deal of rivalry among the different colonies within the empire. Of course, the economic core of the homeland preferred those colonies which supplied raw materials at the lowest cost. If the core selected one colony and other colonies were discarded and excluded, this had little influence on gross domestic product, because the rivalry was “domestic” within the empire.

As stated above, Okinawa was rendered uncompetitive by Taiwan. The Empire of Japan preferred to protect Taiwan as the more important colony. This resulted in the exclusion of the Okinawa sugar industry from the imperial market. On the other hand, the pulp and paper industry of Karafuto proved to be more efficient than that of Hokkaido in the 1920s–1930s. However, the coal industry of Karafuto had to compete with a new strong rival, the coal industry of North China in the early 1940s, when Karafuto was to be politically incorporated into the homeland.

In general, the formal colonies of the Empire of Japan include Taiwan, Karafuto, Korea, the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Sea Islands. They became Japanese territories after 1899, when the Constitution of the Empire of Japan came into force. The colonies were often called gaichi (exterior or overseas territory) in contrast to naichi (interior territory or mainland). The Governor of

57 Karafuto-cho Keisatsu-bu, Karafuto zairyu Chosen-jin ippan, 7–9.
60 For the relations between extended imperial economic spheres and colonies, see, Kozo Uno, Uno Kozo chosakusyu [Collections of Kozo Uno’s works], vol. 8 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1974), 389–396.
the Karafuto-cho as well as the Governor-Generals of Chosen (Korea) and Taiwan were directly responsible to the minister of Takumusho (the minister of Colonial Affairs) from 1929 to 1943.62

On 1 September 1942 the Japanese government decided to abolish the Ministry of Colonial Affairs and establish the Ministry of Greater East Asia. While the governors of most of the Japanese colonies became responsible to the minister of this new ministry, Karafuto-cho fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs like other prefectural government offices of the mainland. The territory of the Japanese mainland was re-bordered, and the political internalization of Karafuto seemed to be completed. However, it was because Karafuto was internalized and became naichi, or interior territory of the homeland that Karafuto was paradoxically to be de-bordered, or excluded out of the imperial economic sphere.

The incorporation of Karafuto into the mainland coincided with the transformation and re-bordering of the Empire of Japan. The more energies the empire devoted to further imperial expansion, the less the empire took into account the more established colonies. Even less attention was paid to a former colony, as the core of the homeland was less willing to protect a “normal prefecture.” The border islands of the Empire of Japan served as mere stepping-stones to the further expansions: Karafuto for a northward expansion, to Korea and Manchuria; Okinawa to the south, to Taiwan, the South Seas, and Southeast Asia.63

When the Empire of Japan was trying to establish the autarkic command economy of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, a rivalry arose between sources of coal supplies within the empire, i.e., between Karafuto and North China. Shortage of ships because of the war situation had a major influence on the rivalry. As the Empire of Japan was trying to expand further and further southward, fewer ships came to the northern border island to carry Karafuto coals to the core. The core of the imperial market preferred the coals of North China to those of Karafuto. The core did not need Karafuto coals and laborers any more.64 More than 9,000 Japanese and Korean male coal miners were forced to rapidly move to more important coal mines in the mainland from the border island in August 1944.65 Karafuto was excluded out of the imperial economy and de-bordered.

There is no doubt that the strategic priorities of the military in the empire granted an advantage to North China, as the Japanese Army engaged in a brutal campaign on the mainland. One of the significant features of Japanese border islands was comparative absence of the armed forces. The Japanese 32nd Army, which was to be annihilated during the battles against the United States on Okinawa, had been deployed there in March of 1944, just one year before the US. Army landed on this border island.66

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62 The Governor of the Karafuto-cho was directly responsible to the Minister of Home Affairs in 1907–1910 and 1912–1917; to the Prime Minister in 1910–1912 and 1917–1929.
63 Hara and Amano, eds., Karafuto 40-nen no rekishi, 277–284.
65 See, Makio Yano, Showa 19-nen natsu, Karafuto no tanko heizan [Closure of the coal mines in Karafuto in summer 1944] (Sapporo: Karafuto no rekishi wo manabu kai, 2006).
The Empire of Japan had not expected these border island stepping-stones to serve as fortresses protecting the homeland. The Japanese army was not deployed on Karafuto until 1939, as article IX of the Treaty of Portsmouth had prohibited military fortifications throughout Sakhalin Island. A Special Karafuto Mixed Brigade was created and assigned to the defense of Japan’s northern border on the island in May 1939, just as Japanese and Soviet army forces began to clash in an undeclared war at Nomonhan (Khalkhin Gol), on the Outer Mongolia-Manchukuo frontier. The Mixed Brigade was upgraded to the 88th Division in February 1945. However, the main forces, tanks and airplanes of the Division were deployed not in Karafuto, but in Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands which were expected to serve as the walls protecting the homeland against the United States, not USSR.67 Karafuto had already been discarded by the homeland before the battle against the USSR began on the border island on 9 August 1945.68 The Japanese border islands Okinawa and Karafuto only served as sacrificial stones for the enemies delaying the invasion of the homeland territory.

Conclusion

The outcome of World War II caused a total change in the composition of the inhabitants of Sakhalin Island again. Almost all the Japanese settlers were forced to repatriate between 1946 and 1949. Therefore, every time a battle ended on the island and this border island was re-bordered, occupying forces once again made the territory “uninhabited.”69

The paper has examined the characteristics of border islands, based on research on two border islands of the Empire of Japan, Karafuto and Okinawa. In the first section, it was pointed out that whether border islands were regarded as a part of the homeland depended on the capricious wishes of central governments. Border islands could be incorporated into the mainland at one time, but then they could be de-bordered and excluded in the future, in accordance with the governments’ wishes. This has been termed the unstable status “uneasiness of border islands.”

The second section analysed the process of border islands being politically internalized and economically colonized. These processes were mutual, but they did not always coincide with each other, and they could be reversible. A lack of labor force was one of the major obstacles to the colonization of border islands, which sought to make border islands economic dependencies of the homeland. Several factors, such as remoteness, inconvenience, severe climate, and the character of the local inhabitants, discouraged people of the homelands from migrating to border islands. To solve this problem, local governments co-operated closely with heavily capitalized corporations from the economic core of the Empire. The Karafuto-cho adopted a strategy which has been termed in the paper “letting capital bring settlers”: the Karafuto-cho let large pulp companies build their factories to attract labor migrants from the homeland.

67 Hara and Amano, eds., Karafuto 40-nen no rekishi, 288–289.
69 Hara and Amano, eds., Karafuto 40-nen no rekishi, 317–331.
The third section discussed a paradox in the processes of internalization and colonization. As for Karafuto, when the process of politically internalizing Karafuto was finished, Karafuto was debordered and excluded from the imperial economic sphere. Although protection by the core was essential for border islands to survive economically, the core was unwilling to give special treatment to the politically interior but economically peripheral parts.

While the research in this paper was limited to Japan, comparative analysis of these Japanese examples could be applied to the border islands of different countries or empires such as Quemoy, Jeju, Guam, Cyprus etc. This provides intriguing opportunities for future work on developing these concepts in a comparative context.