such sentiments are nearly inversely proportional to the number of Chinese actually coming to Russia. Therefore, alarmist sentiments were intense in the 1990s, but now they are probably at their lowest level. Meanwhile, the number of Chinese coming to Russia is actually increasing. Nevertheless, alarmist sentiments are fueled by poor transparency in Russian-Chinese cooperation in the context of Russia’s eastern pivot. They are also encouraged by internal interests. For example, those who address the problem of resettlement of the Russian Far East cite Chinese expansion as one argument for why money should be given to them.

**Discussant’s Comments**

**Jong Seok Park (Kyushu University)**

Regarding the first speaker’s presentation I’d like to raise several small questions and one big one.

First, two small questions: What do you mean by the term “first marriage”? Marriage by who? Secondly, you describe the ‘feminization of immigrants’. Do you think this is a new phenomenon, or not?

Secondly, my big question. I understand that your approach is strongly based on your sense of altruism or idealism about this topic. Overall, I agree with your attitude and approach, but I also feel some concerns about such an approach. There is a possibility of demonizing men seeking foreign brides in South Korea and Japan. Conversely, there might also be a possibility of victimizing female marriage migrants. I think such marriages are based on mutual interest and/or mutual consent. Your approach might fail to capture the harsh realities of human life. For example, you assume that human beings should not be treated as a commodity. I agree with this but isn’t the essence of marriage basically about commoditification? For example, you explained about a South Korean man who married a Vietnamese woman after only knowing each other for a few hours. What does this mean? This is a negotiation and a transaction. I think we need to capture the harsh realities of human relationships. Only through such an understanding might we construct a better solution.

Now I will move on to the second presentation by Yuji Fukuhara and Mitsuhiro Mimura. Firstly, I appreciate your hard-earned information about North Korean workers in Mongolia. This kind of information is hard to get. As Yuji Fukuhara explained, he had to use special connections to get this kind of information.

Now my comments and questions. I have a comment about naming. In the paper, the authors simplified ‘North Korea’ to ‘Korea’. If you use North Korea to describe Korea, and there is no reference to ‘South Korea’ then such a simplification is not a problem. However, the paper also refers to South Korea. Korea and South Korea are even used in the same sentence with Korea indicating North Korea. This is, I think, not so desirable.
Now for my first question. Do you feel some resistance in the response of Mongolian companies to the US pressure to send back North Korean workers, or not?

My second question is about the gap between the kind of workers Mongolian companies ask for, and the kind of workers North Korea provides. As you explained, Mongolian companies usually want unskilled labor. However, the workers they receive are, in many cases, highly skilled. Where does this gap come from? Perhaps there are two reasons. One is North Korea’s weak economic situation. Even professionals in North Korea might want to go to Mongolia as unskilled labor. Another reason might be North Korea’s ideological concern.

My third question is why North Korea sends a smaller number of workers compared to the original agreement?

Lastly, my questions for Serghei Golunov. Firstly, why does Russia prevent Chinatowns from being formed? Secondly, aren’t there some problems with the categories you used? Why is ‘law-breakers’ a separate category when the others are all mutually exclusive?

Finally, you described the response of Russia with the expressions “alarmism” and “utilitarianism”. What’s your own view about which of these terms is more accurate?

[Chi] Park-san, thank you for your questions and comments. Just quickly, the short question that you asked me, were you referring to the phrase “first marriage” — was that what you were asking? Ok, a certain percentage of men that marry foreign brides, their marriage is not the first marriage, it’s the second marriage. Some have — referred to them as being undesirable men in their respective countries. So, sometimes the marriage — it’s the first marriage for the foreign brides but it sometimes may be the second or third marriage for the Korean or the Japanese man. Also, your question about feminization of migration being a new phenomenon or not — women have been migrating for a very long time, but previously they would migrate as part of the family. Now, in East Asia, since the 1980s, women have been migrating on their own because there are gaps that have been created because of women in developed countries participating in the labor market. So, it is relatively new, I would say, in terms of these women filling these gaps for care and for domestic work, because now they have families with working moms and whatnot. Also, the question about the sending countries, now, there has been increased awareness and concern in Vietnam and also in the Philippines about their women’s safety, so there are laws in Vietnam and the Philippines concerning brokerage. So, marriage brokerage is regulated in both countries. And since 2008 in Korea, Korea also has a brokerage law. And one of the laws is that the Korean brokerage company working in these two countries, they need to abide by local domestic laws, so there is concern, of course, within Korea and also within the sending countries.

The question about the re-victimization of these marriage migrants is a really important question, and I think Professor Ishii’s question about agency. This is where we are kind of split. That is to say, we should recognize that these women have choices, and they have certain priorities and objectives. And marriage should be one of them. We should not consider it being a bad thing. But at the same time, when we
look at it that way, then sometimes we fail to actually see the dangers these women are facing. On the other hand, when we talk about these women being victims, and when we talk about these women being targets of modern-day human trafficking, then again, the question is, many of these women choose to come. Many of them are not even coming through a brokerage. For instance, one of the Filipino women married to a Korean man that I interviewed married her husband not through a brokerage, but as a friend, and they dated, and they decided to get married, and now they live in Korea, but people all around her are like, did you marry him because you wanted a visa? So, she is getting all these questions asked, and everyone’s thinking that she must be one of the marriage migrants going through a brokerage, because she needed to get a visa to stay in Korea, but that’s not necessarily the case for some women. So, it’s a very important debate that we talk about all the time. We’re not saying that one side is correct and the other is wrong, but there needs to be a balance because the important thing is to minimize the violation of human rights for these women.

[Mimura] Naming is problematic. Originally, my paper was written in Japanese so North Korea was “Joseon” and South Korean was “Hanguk”. The translator rendered “Joseon” as Korea and “Hanguk” as South Korea. For the presentation I wrote North Korea as DPRK and South Korea as ROK. When we publish this paper, we will change the names appropriately.

As for US pressure I think, the economic benefit from the United States might be bigger than that of North Korean workers. As a result, Mongolia decided to listen to the US. I think it’s a very simple reason. For small countries, listening to the United States or Russia or China is very important to get economic benefits. And also for national security it is very important.

About North Korean workers, I think that working outside the country is very popular. In North Korea they say that once you go to a foreign country and work for three years the inside of your apartment is luxurious. It has a TV and new tiles, etcetera. The second time you go there, all the clothes you wear are better. And the third time you go to a foreign country, then you will buy a new apartment. So, people who have more power than just a worker, are more likely to be chosen to go to foreign countries. This is because they have some money to bribe to officials. So, power is number one, and number two is ideological concern. However, basically, since the North Korean economic condition situation is bad they want to go abroad to work.

In response to your last question about why only a small number come it is because the condition of work is not high in Mongolia. I think working in Russia earns more money as a construction worker. That’s why more don’t choose Mongolia as a destination. In Russia, Sakhalin is the most popular destination because they can go outside if they move with a group of two or more. In other parts of Russia, they have to walk around in groups due to fears that they will try to defect. In Sakhalin, however, they cannot leave the island without passports. They are comparatively free, having leisure time and more room for earning extra money by working overtime or weekends.

[Golunov] Why are Russian authorities and a large number of experts against Chinatowns? There are probably two reasons: the first is that geopolitical alarmism
together with conspiracy theories is deeply rooted in Russian political discourse. There is a fear of the creeping occupation of Russian territories, so Chinatowns could become the first step for occupation of Russian territories according to those who adhere to such discourse. Also, some experts are against Chinatowns because they are afraid that Chinatowns will become enclaves. In reality, Chinatowns can be an efficient form to prevent social disorganization. The problem is that the Russian police are heavily corrupted. Furthermore, they probably can’t be reformed efficiently under the current political regime.

Second, about the categorization of immigrants and law-breakers. This categorization is not intended to be academic. It is just for the purpose of a more convenient presentation.

Third, what is my opinion about choosing between alarmism and utilitarianism? First of all, I am not an alarmist. I am for more efficient regulation to prevent criminalization trends, diploma mills in Russian universities, and so on. But there is a problem with attracting immigrants — there are two main reasons: the first is that Chinese salaries have become higher than Russian ones and there is a trend of immigration of highly skilled Russian workers to China now. In the case of pilots, it is a very serious challenge for the Russian government this year. The second reason why it is difficult to attract Chinese immigrants is the anti-immigration crackdown policy of the Russian government. Last year, it even introduced the Russian language and fundamentals of Russian history and culture exam for almost all immigrants coming into Russia. For most Chinese it is very difficult to pass this exam.

[Question] My name is Akiko Sasaki, from the Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO. Today’s session title says ‘Migration and refugees in Northeast Asia’, so could tell me about the situation of refugees in Northeast Asia? When it comes to Northeast Asia, the ‘refugee problem’ doesn’t ring a bell for me. For me, it’s more like the Mediterranean areas or like the Rohingya in Myanmar.

[Chi] I’m not an expert, but I can give you a really simple and short answer to that question. It’s difficult to label them as refugees, but we do have North Korean defectors that come to South Korea or to China, or sometimes they seek to go to a third country. I don’t know very much about it. Maybe Professor Mimura or Professor Fukuhara knows better than me, but from my understanding, depending on where they end up, they’re referred to as refugees or defectors. I know that in South Korea, when they do defect to South Korea, they are re-educated in this institution. There are quite a few problems, as I understand, in terms of these people once they leave the institution — it’s called Hanawon. Once they leave the institution, they have a lot of problems getting jobs. This is because you can detect them by their accent so have problems integrating to South Korean society. I know that there are a couple of NGOs in Canada that help those North Korean refugees that sought to go to Canada. I know there’s a big one in Toronto. I can’t remember the exact name of it, but these people wait two to three years for refugee status once they reach Canada.

[Mimura] Thank you for the good question. If we look at other regions, in comparison Northeast Asia is relatively stable. In Northeast Asia states have high borders so there is ‘defence’ from migrants. In the future there might be a refugee issue coming from North Korea.

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[Fukuhara] Yes, there are a lot of defectors and it’s difficult to define the North Korean people; China treats them as illegal immigrants. That means they don’t have passports and enter the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The South Korean government says officially that the Chinese government should send all these people to South Korea. However, this is just an official stance. Actually, the South Korean government asks the Chinese government not to send any, because it is too much for them. My feeling is that some North Korean defectors are real refugees, politically, and some part of them are economic immigrants.

Because of the North Korean regime, however, if someone crosses the border to China, then it’s very difficult for them to come back to North Korea. This is the case even if they later regret going to China because the working conditions are very bad. If a person goes back they would be arrested and sent to a camp for a year or two. As a result, definitions are difficult and the North Korean refugee problem is a deeply political one.

[Question] I have a question for Professors Mimura and Fukuhara. As far as I understand, these North Korean workers are working in private companies in Mongolia. But they are going to Mongolia based on the inter-governmental agreement. So, my question is how do they reach the employers?

[Fukuhara] A Mongolian company that needs a North Korean worker asks a labor agency for sending North Korean workers. That agency, if they gather the number of workers needed, then makes an application to receive North Korean workers to the Ministry of Labor of Mongolia. Then, the Mongolian Ministry of Labor contacts its North Korean counterpart. Next, inside North Korea they choose the workers and tell the Mongolian side who is coming. After that, the Mongolian Ministry of Labor tells the Embassy of Mongolia in Pyongyang to issue visas. Since there are no state-owned enterprises in Mongolia, all of the workers are working in private companies.

[Question] I have a question building on the earlier one about refugees. Because we are here in Japan, and it’s my first visit here, I would be interested to hear a little bit about Japan and Northeast Asia’s view on welcoming refugees from other regions. Has there been any discussion within the region, given the millions that are displaced internationally, that Japan, or other Northeast Asian countries, should be taking more refugees?

[Chi] Again, I am not an expert, but I can give you a simple and short answer to the question. I know that Japan has been criticized by various organizations and by the international community, for not accepting refugees. The Abe government has announced that they would be willing to take more. I know that there are three Syrian refugees that currently have refugee status in Japan. And there are also quite a few Rohingya people that have refugee status here in Japan. The Japanese government has a very strict definition of a refugee. Unless you can prove that your life is in danger, they are very hesitant to provide refugee status. I know that the Japanese government does offer a special residency for people that they feel are not in immediate danger, but who can be permitted to stay in Japan. It’s not a refugee status, so they don’t get any support from the government. It’s a special residency or a status to live in Japan for humanitarian purposes. I know that the Korean government has also stated that they are willing to accept more refugees, but because they have the North Korean
defectors coming it is a problematic issue.

[Iwashita] Just a symbolic episode but a couple years ago, when we discussed the Syrian crisis and how we deal with the refugees, our Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, was asked his views. He replied that there was no problem because we Japanese can tackle the shortage of labor force by ourselves. It means that he sees refugees as a Japanese shortage of labor force issue. Many Japanese were astonished by his comments.

[Question] About the refugee situation in Northeast Asia, 10 days ago the Deputy Prime Minister of Japan (Aso Taro), said that there would be some refugees from North Korea who are armed. What kind of impact do you think such comments have on the mindset of Japanese people?

I also have a question about economic sanctions on North Korea. Are economic sanctions ineffective because many North Koreans work in China and Mongolia, and send back remittances to support the DPRK economy?

[Fukuhara] We need to consider if stricter enforcement of economic sanctions will lead to the collapse of the North Korean regime. If the regime did collapse there would be millions of refugees and a humanitarian disaster. China is particularly concerned about such a possibility.

[Question] Can the three presenters explain how your papers connect with ‘security perspectives’ which is in the symposium title? I wasn’t entirely sure about the connection.

[Golunov] I think that this connection is prominent in my presentation. It connects with security perceptions which are related to the interests of some prominent actors. These actors put forward Chinese immigration as a security issue to domestic audiences in the Russian Far East. In some cases, raising such security questions legitimizes their power and gives them significant resources.

[Chi] In terms of a security perspective, I was asking that question myself. I have been thinking about this issue in terms of human security. In East Asia the population is aging and there aren’t enough young people to support the elderly. I don’t think we have any other option but to have people come from the outside. I mean, if we can’t find people on the inside, then we have to find them somewhere. Migration is becoming so politicized and if you look at some of these internet sites you see all sorts of these — just hate crimes. For instance, in Korea, they have people afraid that their children’s organs might be stolen by these Chinese nannies. All these sorts of things are real, and it’s being discussed on Facebook and so on. You can see that migration is being politicized, and there are people in danger because of these fake news and whatnot, and also the human rights violations too. I won’t say that law and institutions — they don’t solve the problem. I think we need more than that. That’s just the beginning. We need legal frameworks and institutions to prevent, as much as we can, the violations of human rights and whatnot, and illicit trafficking. But we also need people that are making these policies and implementing these policies, we need them to do a bit more, so in that sense, I think that in terms of those kinds of ideas, I think that my paper can be an approach to human security issues in Northeast Asia.
[Fukuhara] Well, it’s a little bit difficult to connect this simple case with the security perspectives of Northeast Asia. But at the same time, it’s workers working outside of North Korea, it’s a part of economic sanctions these days, and it’s keenly related to the North Korean nuclear development program. So, yes, in order to make a book or some brochure or something, yes, we have to add some part of that kind of security issues.

Anyway, what I want to say is that the small countries in Northeast Asia, they are doing their best to survive among the big powers like Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. The United States is not in Northeast Asia but they are eager to come to Northeast Asia and do something. If they do withdraw, we are very happy, I think, but anyway the United States is one of the stakeholders, so we have to write something about that.

[Iwashita] This is a question for Professor Golunov. As you know, since 2004, all of the boundary disputes between China and Russia are supposed to have been settled. But what do you think alarmists might think about the following point regarding China? In September 2017, I conducted a border tourism tour to Heixiazi, Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island. It was a problematic island dispute, but now it’s cut in half according to the 50/50 formula. Half of the western part went to China. We traveled from the China side to the Russian side. The western part of the island is very developed for sightseeing. There are big tour groups, a big park - many Chinese tourists come. The Russian side is not so developed — just leaving it as it were. We discovered a new map in China and Russia. In Russia, it’s a very honest map. Half of the island is depicted as the Chinese side. The new border was written on the middle line of the Heixiazi Dao, Bolshoi Ussuriysky. But in China, we were amazed. In China’s new map, all of the island belongs to China with no line in the middle! On the western part, many sightseeing places were written, but the whole island was represented as still belonging to China. I think it’s very provocative to Russian tourists to these places. I think it’s also highly combustible fuel for the alarmists. They might say ‘the Chinese, even after finalizing the dispute areas for ending all the disputes still have ambitions on the map’. What do you think of this in relation to the alarmist view in territorial disputes.

[Golunov] Alarmists argue that territorial disputes can be resurrected. Some of them even use the Crimean issue as an example for how the territorial disputes can lie dormant only to erupt later. This map issue is interesting and is one of the main arguments for alarmists. In the 1990s they argued that there are some maps in China that portray the Russian-Chinese border as it was before the 1860 Beijing treaty. They used this as proof that China still intended to make claims. It is also fascinating that there are multiple maps in China - so many versions and perceptions.

[Iwashita] To wrap up, migration studies are good because as scholars we have to think beyond regions. Today’s presentations are in three categories: the first presenter introduced Japan and South Korea as an example of social and civic democratized societies’ migration issues. The second presentation was a state-controlled case, which is one of the characteristics of Northeast Asia. Finally, the third presenter’s paper about China and Russia gave a more ‘in-between’ perspective.