Positioning Asia and Kyushu in Shifting Global Politics

A Reflection on East Asian IR Theory Building: From Here to Where?

Yong-Chool Ha (University of Washington)

Good morning ladies and gentleman. It is my honor to make a keynote speech today. Before I start my speech, let me begin by expressing my deep gratitude to Professor Iwashita at the Center for Asia-Pacific Future Studies, Kyushu University for organizing this timely and important conference. Professor Iwashita has been a long-time friend and colleague of mine who has been tirelessly working for new visions for the future of East Asia and Eurasia and beyond. He has been a leader, innovator and true entrepreneur in initiating many projects and ideas to promote a better future for East Asia and Eurasia. By now we all are familiar with border studies, which is his signature project. I only wish him further success in whatever he chooses to do in the future.

Today I would like to make a few reflections on the current status of studies in East Asia with a particular focus on East Asian international relations theories and regional integration. I will raise two broad questions regarding building East Asian IR theories: One concerns how to identify distinctive aspects of East Asia in thinking about international relations theories. The second is the level of analysis in the current discussions of building IR theories in East Asia.

For the last two decades, scholars have paid attention to the challenging quest for IR theories which are germane to East Asia. Most agree that the mainstream international theories are limited in being able to capture international phenomena in the East Asian region. Theories based on Western, and especially West European experience, are of limited value in making sense of the Asian context. The reason for the limited value of mainstream international relations theories is that they are based on Western experiences, which include histories, experiences and traditions of the United States and Western Europe.

The initial effort to apply Western frameworks to East Asia turned out to be limited and most scholars agree that further exploration of the distinctive aspects of East
Asia is necessary to build new international theories for the region. Distinctions include the hierarchical nature of the regional order, Asian state behaviors that cannot be explained by current IR theories and limited liberal institutionalism due to variations in economic and social systems. The admission that Western frameworks are limited is welcome. However, this list of distinctive features is not exhaustive. A critical question is whether Asia’s distinctive qualities which are relevant to new international relations theory can be fully grasped by the current international relations theories, or not. I contend that we should go beyond the IR field in preparing a base for new international relations theories in East Asia. The intellectual history of Western international relations theories demonstrates that building international theories involves so many areas, such as history, economy and psychology. The current training background of the IR field is inadequate for new theory building because of the artificial disciplinary boundaries to which scholars in the IR field cling.

The existing situation in East Asia international theory building is analogous to long forgotten modernization theory in comparative politics and sociology. More specifically, I am referring to the debates on the validity of modernization theory in understanding the third world development in the late 1960s and 1970s. Modernization theory assumed unidirectional social and economic change and was based on the assumption of universal change. It projected the future of the non-Western world based on Western experiences. Ultimately, modernization theory was criticized logically and empirically. The sources of challenge were varied, and included political economy, BA regime theory and sociology of late development.

The analogy between the contemporary status of IR in East Asia and modernization theory cannot be more vivid in that the initial application of Western frameworks turned out to be inadequate to explain the non-Western world. If this analogy stands, reviewing intellectual trends in the aftermath modernization theory to derive any hints in developing East Asian IR theories would be useful.

The assumption of uni-directionality of modernization theory has been severely criticized by the counter argument that history goes through multiple paths. The assumption of universality has also been challenged by diversity in the patterns of social change in the non-Western world. In short, universal claims by the modernization paradigm shifted to the efforts to contextualize each case of modernization. Contextualization arose in different fields and in different forms: varieties of capitalism in political economy and democratic transition in political science are good examples. What is most notable in challenging the modernization paradigm, however, was recognition of the role of tradition in understanding social change in the non-Western world.

Tradition is assumed to disappear in modernization theory. Contrary to this claim, however, later findings indicate that the role and impact of tradition varies widely depending on different contexts for change. Sometimes tradition even plays a positive role in economic development. As the cases of late industrialization illustrate, traditional institutions and values facilitate institutional workings in non-Western industrialization. In fact, the role of tradition in modernization in the non-Western world turned out to be the most important factor in differentiating non-Western modernization from that
of Western Europe.

Lessons from the fate of the modernization paradigm for IR in East Asia should not be limited to abstract thinking that Western IR theories may not work and thus that they should be not applied to East Asia. We should think about what is involved in understanding the distinctiveness in East Asian experiences and what the implications are for IR theory building on East Asia.

Most important is recognition that building theory is not the same as its application. IR theory building is based on the totality of experiences from which IR theories can be formulated, as the backgrounds of Western IR theories clearly indicate. One critical variable in Western IR theories is the nation state. As we all are fully aware, the process for the nation state to emerge was a long and protracted one even after the Westphalian treaty. There was a constant interplay of dynamics between economy, ideology, politics and the military. In fact, the different orientations in Western IR tradition stem exactly from how to interpret this long historical process. It is also clear that Western IR theories are extensions of domestic political order, whether liberalism or Marxism.

What Western experiences show us is that IR theory building is a complicated process involving the close examination of all the relevant experiences to international relations. Viewed in this perspective IR theory building on East Asia has barely made a first step. All the phenomena that are suggested by IR specialists as unique to East Asia are restricted in scope as they are limited to only those that are different from Western experiences. One typical example is the so-called ‘Asian paradox’. The Asian paradox is a paradox largely because it is understood in neo-functional terms. Identifying differences is not the same as grasping the whole of which those differences are only a part. What is necessary is to scrutinize modernization going on in East Asia. This job clearly goes beyond the conventional territory of international relations. I question whether the current IR field is adequately equipped in terms of training and the coverage of fields needed for theory building.

There are many areas that require detailed analysis to flesh out international perspectives that will, in turn, become a foundation for building IR theories on East Asia. Among them I will point to history, industrialization and international development. History provides important clues to international experiences of peoples and nations, and as such, it is an essential part of new theory building. One historical question that has been mentioned in delineating the distinctiveness of the East Asian region is humiliation and the sense of inferiority from colonial rule or imperialism. There is no denying that they are important historical legacies. However, one cannot but wonder whether studies on the colonial and imperial legacies remain at a superficial level without being fully analyzed in conjunction with IR theory building in East Asia. For example, questions, such as how colonial rule affected the perception of war and peace and how the concept of enemy evolved in the process and aftermath of colonial rule need to be addressed.

Another question for East Asia IR theory building is whether, or not, a past regional order will remerge. This is certainly an interesting intellectual exercise. What is
at stake in the debate is how to understand the return of tradition. If indeed tradition comes back, will it be same as in the past or in changed forms? If the latter is the case, what determines the difference from the past?

Discussions on the invention of tradition in comparative politics are quite relevant. Tradition should not be taken as static; it should be distinguished from the traditional. Tradition is constantly redefined and upgraded depending on who takes up the task. When we discuss the reemergence of the 19th century Chinese world order we need to be very specific about the contexts in which tradition changed.

One of the most important contexts is industrialization and modernization. One clearly distinct aspect of East Asian industrialization is lateness, whether in Japan, Korea, China or elsewhere. Late industrialization always brings up the issue of tradition. Unlike the modernization paradigm claimed, traditional institutions and values are frequently invoked to facilitate late industrialization. This invocation of traditional institutions and values is bound to have a bearing on social and political development. Each case of late industrialization has its own unique way of assimilating its own tradition, causing diversity in patterns of social and political change. This diversity also means variety in international perspectives. Analyzing the distinct international perspectives that are developing in different countries is therefore necessary. One example is nationalism. Rather than developing different labels for nationalism, its contents need to be closely examined in specific contexts.

A related factor that causes divergence is the international environment in which late industrialization occurs. For example, Japan’s industrialization unfolded in the context of imperialism, for South Korea in the context of the Cold War, and for China in the context of globalization. In each case, the international environment affected the mode of economic development differently and each case picked up distinct international perspectives. For example, Japan was able to justify its international behavior by way of the international standards of the time, while China is rapidly learning international norms in the context of globalization. Such distinctive international learning and its impact need to be considered in thinking about IR theories on East Asia. In this regard, the mundane issue of nationalism needs to be examined in the context of different late industrialization cases. In addition, at a domestic level late industrialization gives rise to distinct international perspectives separate from the international environment. As a result, the revival of the 19th century regional order should be approached in conjunction with modernization and industrialization processes going on in East Asia, especially from the perspective of how tradition is invented.

Another example which deserves attention in thinking about IR on East Asia is international development that has been evolving in the region. This goes beyond shifting military power balance. Unlike in Western Europe, East Asia has gone through a convoluted historical process. For a long time, East Asia has been under the influence of Western powers, most prominently American power. What is unfolding before our eyes is finally the beginning of what I call the de-Americanization process. The diminishing influence of the United States seems inevitable, and this process is not limited merely to policy shift; it has serious implications for structural changes in international
relations in East Asia. How to handle the de-Americanization process will have a profound impact on the future of the regional order.

As Western international relations theories are based on domestic, regional and international experiences as they pertain to international relations, so too should IR theories in East Asia. Beyond the stage of identification of differences from the West, IR theory builders should start looking into the totality of East Asian experiences that are relevant to IR theory building. As most nations in East Asia are latecomers to industrialization, so the process and nature of building a regional order in East Asia will certainly be different. While we should learn from Western experiences, we should not forget that the region will tread a different path. We must remember that the process of preparing new IR theories in East Asia goes beyond the conventional territory of the IR field. In this sense, we must change our position from theory application to theory building mode. Most important would be to flesh out the international orientations that may develop from the modernization and industrialization process unfolding in East Asia. From this perspective, perhaps it may be premature to take the job of IR theory building in East Asia.

Lastly, I would like to mention methodology in thinking about IR theories in East Asia. Mostly coming from the Western IR background there seems to exist a rigid conceptual barrier between macro and micro phenomena. This conceptual barrier leads to a tendency in the field that whatever happens at local levels or micro-levels is regarded as insignificant. The rigid distinction between macro-structural and micro-processes may be sensible in the already fixed international structure. However, in a region like East Asia where everything is so fluid, it is strategically important to pay attention to local and micro dynamics. To understand macro implications of micro phenomena is an essential part of our theoretical imagination. In this regard, I would like to direct our attention to so many happenings at the local level. For instance, local interactions among Japanese, Koreans and Chinese in Fukuoka, on Jeju Island, on Tsushima Island, at the Tuman River, and in the Dandong area are good examples where we can observe a possible divergence between the formal state level actions and those at the local level. As far as I can see, people in the region have increasingly experienced human interactions that sometimes overwhelm the central government’s formal policy directions. During my stay at Kyushu University I heard a moving story where local residents in Kyushu looked for family members of forced mining workers in Korea during the colonial period for reconciliation.

Most importantly the border study projects that Professor Iwashita launched have produced so many stories about border regions. North Korean border stories, the Okinawa situation and Sino-Russian border areas are good cases in point. In one of the conferences that he was involved in, as I distinctly remember, Professor Iwashita remarked that nationalism near the border is quite different from other regions. I propose here to start a project to collect all the micro cases of regional dynamics. These cases will provide us with important opportunities not only to understand local dynamics; they may open up new clues in thinking about macro-structural consequences in the future. I argue it is high time to loosen the shackles of macro-determinism, especially
when we are dealing with an ever-changing regional order.

Concluding my speech, I would like to make summarizing observations. First, we should realize that building new international theories requires close examination of the international implications of political, economic, historical and psychological changes that develop in a region. In this regard, East Asia is not an exception. From this perspective, in the current field of IR theories, East Asia has just completed the task of identifying the limited value of Western IR theories in understanding East Asian international dynamics. We should go beyond this initial stage to identify and analyze the totality of East Asian experiences from the perspective of IR theory building. This would require us to go beyond conventional IR fields. Our hands are full, and as late industrializations forge ahead, perhaps we need to hurry in catching up with the history and reality of East Asia.

SHAPEING EAST ASIA’S REGIONAL ORDER

T.J. Pempel (University of California, Berkeley)

I will talk about the changing order in East Asia, and the Asia-Pacific, and specifically Japan’s role within that changing order. Mine will be a rather macro-level perspective. But let me start with a very obvious point: the Asia-Pacific is undergoing a change in its order, reconfiguring both economics and security. This process has been going on with varying degrees of acceleration and deceleration over time. The result has been deeper and more encompassing lines of interdependence across the Asia-Pacific region. Yet within that general outline, the specific details of the emerging order remain murky and will remain subject to the actions of individuals and different states. The emerging order is thus very much a work in progress.

To sketch this changing order, I want to draw your attention to three major dimensions along which change is taking place. The first is the change in the nature of security. Changes in security have been going on since the end of bipolarity, which I mark from the 1972 visit of Richard Nixon to China and the changes in Chinese economic policy begun under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. There has been a significant improvement in the positive state-to-state interactions that have taken place, perhaps until very recently. In addition, there has been a parallel decline in the military confrontations across the region, along with a diminution in most countries’ reliance on military prowess as a tool of foreign policy.

The second big change involves economic shifts that blurred the ideological gaps that once separated the two sides in the Cold War, and that were erected to stymie economic interactions between China and America’s Cold War allies. These economic shifts have since been marked by extensive cross-border investments, interdependence, foreign direct investment in East Asian finance and investment and trade.

Third, we have seen substantial growth in the number of regional institutions that
span the arc of security and economics and pull together at the official level a number of different governments in a variety of different organizations.

I want to go into a little bit more detail on each of these. Let me start with ending bipolarity. The normalization of relations between China and the United States, Japan, South Korea, and a number of America’s Cold War allies, began this process, and it was accelerated with the economic changes introduced in China by President Deng Xiaoping. The end result has been the general diminution of state-to-state conflicts. The Cold War has hardly vanished in East Asia, but the degree of hard security conflict has been severely diminished. Despite the tensions that we see in the newspapers on a regular basis, we have had the benefits of what might be called an East Asia peace in Northeast Asia, since the end of the Korean conflict in 1953, and across Southeast Asia as well since 1979. So, while we do have tensions on the Korean peninsula and between Taiwan and the PRC, as well as over island disputes in the East and South China Seas, we should remember that, for the most part, these have not been generating state-to-state conflicts and major warfare.

The second point to stress is the deepening of intra-Asian economic relationships and financial interdependence. An important starting point is that as economic development across individual countries began to proceed in East Asia, numerous leaders began to pivot their domestic legitimacy on the provision of economic benefits to their citizens. They have moved away from focusing on military prowess and have instead emphasized domestic economic development as the main basis for their legitimacy. In this context we have seen national development projects within numerous countries becoming increasingly interwoven with one another through the development of regional production networks and cross-border investments. Consequently, intra-Asian trade is almost at the same level as intra-European trade levels. We have had a number of these corporate moves to weave together closer linkages across national borders in East Asia.

Meanwhile, intra-Asian investment has risen, particularly since the 1990s, the cumulative effect of which has been the increase in cross-border production and deepening levels of interdependence within East Asia. A further effect has been the reduced dependence of individual East Asian countries on the markets within the United States, even though the US ultimately remains a major market for many of the goods that are sent from the collective Asian development effort.

Finally, the third point is deepening regional institutionalization. Bottom-up corporate development in investment and trade ties has been enhanced by a build-up in formal regional institutions that involve a top-down process driven by government interactions. The Cold War has not disappeared. We still have the alliance structures that link certain governments, but these have been supplemented by a growing interdependence among states and a growing institutionalization of state participation in formal institutions, particularly within the economic area. This has led to an increase in inter-governmental interactions that cut across security tensions as well as the old Cold War lines that previously divided the region.

This process happened for most of the 1990s and well into the 2000s. It has led to increased interdependence and the rise in a huge number of regional institutions, many
of which are familiar to you. We have had Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the ASEAN regional forum (ARF), we have had the Chiang Mai Initiative, we have had the ASEAN-plus-three, and numerous others. In particular, these have been forming within Asia in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and 1998. The crisis led many countries to recognize that they had much more in common with one another on economic grounds. However, there has yet to be any conviction on the part of East Asian governments that they have some common enemy that would link them together on security. So there has been a much closer inter-connection institutionally in economics and finance, than there has been in security.

How does Japan fit into this emerging order, and what role does it play? One way to think about this is the tension that Japan faces between security and economics on the one hand and then bilateralism and regionalism on the other. Everyone recognizes that the starting point for Japan is to continue making the United States the major pillar for its foreign policy. It has maintained robust ties on both economics and security to the United States. Nevertheless, once bipolarity began to end in East Asia, Japan opened itself up to closer ties with China. As we know, economic relations between Japan and China grew very quickly after the normalization of relations in 1972, and then accelerated during the 1980s. Ministry of Foreign Affairs data suggests that between 1979 and early 2016, Japan sent approximately 3.3 trillion yen in loan aid, 157 billion yen in grant aid, and 181 billion yen in technical aid to China. This aid, however, represents a dependence that China has not been very vocal in articulating. Japan, on the other hand, took a great deal of pride for a very long period of time in its role in boosting Chinese economic development. There was a 30-year period of congeniality between the two countries that only began to be challenged around 2008.

Despite Japan’s deepening economic ties with China, and despite the rise in the number of regional and multilateral bodies that Japan has participated in, Japan’s foreign policy continues to be closely tied to that of the United States. As a consequence, and as a result of trying to keep the United States deeply engaged in the Asian region, Japan, along with Australia and other countries, created APEC and the ARF. These were institutional efforts to weave the United States more deeply into links across the Asia-Pacific, and to keep the United States closely engaged with Japan and with the rest of the region. This relationship came to something of a crisis in the 1997 financial difficulties when Japan proposed the Asian Monetary Fund as a way to deal with the financial turmoil. China, the United States, and the IMF were very upset, and Japan dropped its proposal. Nevertheless, Japan has been a strong proponent of regional integration through institutions and has played a powerful role in helping to create closer security relations within Asia, and in keeping the United States engaged in Asian regional institutions.

The United States and Japan deepened their bilateral security ties as part of the Obama pivot, or the re-positioning. As China’s rise has challenged previous foreign policy considerations of the United States and Japan, the US and Japan have drawn ever closer in their security relationships. Japan has taken on a much more active role in its own hard security and has re-defined what is constitutionally possible in using
its self-defense forces. However, we are coming to something of a watershed with the election of Donald Trump as president, and the possibility that many of the long-standing relationships between Japan and the United States will be up-ended as a result of his priorities. Many of the long-standing expectations about that relationship are being drawn into question. Trump has started by removing the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which for both Obama and Abe was an important part of linking the United States and Japan economically to the Asian region and to one another.

To conclude let me say that economics and finance continue to show an expanded integration, and are increasingly organized through multilateral forms and multilateral institutions. Regional security institutions, on the other hand, have not been equally forceful in pulling the countries together. I think this is a point — the lack of empathy among the various states in the region — that the next speaker, Professor Evans, will be drawing to our attention. Nevertheless, Japan has been an active and enthusiastic member of multilateral institutions. In the economics and finance areas it has worked energetically to keep the United States closely engaged with the Asian region. On security Japan has endeavored to forge a close tie with the US.

The great difficulty Japan currently faces and that Asia faces collectively, is the possibility of a serious withdrawal politically and institutionally from the continent by the United States. This is something that Donald Trump has emphasized with his promise of “making America great again”, advocating increased protectionism and isolation for the United States, and a growing reduction of the US role in East Asia. For Japan and for other countries in the region, this is going to create serious problems not only in security but also in the economic arena. So, it is with that relatively pessimistic note that I want to bring my comments to a close, and let me thank you very much for your attention.

**Relationship between Asia and Kyushu**

**Hiroyuki Okamoto (Kyushu Economic Research Center) (Figure 1)**

Kyushu is a gateway to Asia. The role of Kyushu is to connect Asia and Japan. Shanghai and Seoul are closer than Tokyo. Fukuoka airport has convenient access to the major Asian cities. (Figure 2)

Historically, in Kyushu, there were threats from the Asian continent. In the 6th century, there was Dazaifu. The imperial regional government office, Dazaifu and Mizuki were built as defense facilities against threats from the Asian continent. In the 13th century, Kyushu suffered two attacks by the Mongolian army. As Professor Ha described in his keynote speech, Kyushu has been experiencing interactions with Asian countries for a long time ago. Let us look at our history with Asian countries.

This gold seal (Figure 3), which was granted by ancient China, was found in Kyushu. There was Kolkkan which was the imperial guest house for envoys from China and
Korea in the 6th century. In the 11th century, Kyushu had the first Chinatown in Japan. In the 13th century, green tea, udon noodles and, manju sweet buns were brought from China into Japan via Kyushu. Today, all of them are common foods.

Kyushu was the first place in Japan where Christianity was introduced by Francisco Xavier. Although Japan had a period of national isolation in the Edo era (c1600-1868), Dejima in Kyushu was the only open port to foreign nations. In the Meiji Restoration, a political transformation to build a modern state, Kyushu served as a driving force in the movement, because samurai of Kyushu could get information on foreign countries. (Figure 4)

Japan’s traditional industry is also affected by Asia. The town of Arita, which is 100 miles from here, was the first place to produce porcelain in Japan. Porcelain produced in Arita is the most refined. Production began in 1600. That was supported by a Korean potter called Ri Sanpei (year of birth unknown-1655). He was one of the most respected Koreans in Japan. People in Arita built a monument to him to express their gratitude. (Figure 5)

People of Kyushu had supported Sun Yat-Sen who forged a political revolution in China, called the Xinhai Revolution, in 1911. I think this is the empathy that Professor Evans described in his speech. People of Kyushu had empathy for Sun Yat-Sen and helped him.

Kyushu is highly dependent on Asia. Kyushu’s largest trading partner is China, accounting for 20 percent of exports and 60 percent of imports. Figure 6 indicates that Kyushu’s economy is closely linked to the Asian economy. The degree of Kyushu’s economic linkage with Asia is higher than the national average, except for the value of imports. (Figure 7)

In 2015, Kyushu posted a record high number of foreigners entering, due to a sharp increase in the number of foreign cruise ships calling port at Kyushu. Most tourists who use cruise ships are Chinese. By nationality, Koreans occupy the majority. (Figure 8)

Kyushu has close relationships among local governments in East Asian countries. We have had the Japan-Korea Strait Governor meeting since 1992. In this meeting, we discuss sightseeing, environmental technology, and youth exchange programs. (Figure 9)

Kyushu, China, and Korea face the Yellow Sea. The Pan-Yellow Sea Economic and Technical Exchange Meeting has been held in this region’s coastal cities since 2001. This meeting aims to expand exchange and create investment and technology in the Yellow Sea region. It consists of ten think-tanks in Kyushu and Korea. We hold a general meeting and study meeting annually in Kyushu and Korea. (Figure 10)

Kyushu’s economy is relatively large. Kyushu’s Gross Regional Product (GRP), which has a similar meaning to Gross Domestic Product, is as large as that of Norway, which ranks 20th worldwide. It is larger than Thailand and Malaysia. Kyushu is as large as Spain and larger than Korea and Taiwan. (Figure 11)

Kyushu’s economy is known as the 10 percent economy of Japan. Key indicators
such as land area, population and GRP are 10 percent of the national figure (Figures 12 & 13). However, there are several industries with a high market share relative to the rest of Japan. Kyushu is often called the “silicon island” or the “car island” or the “food island” (Figures 14, 15 & 16). Let me briefly explain about the features of Kyushu’s main industry. In Japan, the semiconductor industry has been forced to reorganized, but 30 percent of integrated circuit production in Japan is still carried out in Kyushu. Kyushu is one of Japan’s largest automotive production bases. There are several assembly plants for Nissan, Toyota and Daihatsu. Nissan is purchasing components and materials from China and Korea. The amount of cars produced in Kyushu reached 1.3 million vehicles. Toyota is producing Lexus brands. About 70 percent of vehicles produced by Nissan and Toyota are exported to China and the United States. Motor vehicles are a top item of exported goods in Kyushu. The automotive industry creates 46,000 jobs in Kyushu. Agricultural products amounted to 1.8 trillion yen. This is 20 percent of national agricultural output. Now we are trying to export our agricultural products to other Asian countries.

For greater stability in Asia, Kyushu can cooperate with Asian countries on some issues. Firstly, air pollution issues. As cities close to Kyushu have rapidly grown, they face serious environmental issues such as air and water pollution. It is difficult to respond to these issues without inter-city cooperation and mutual networks. Kyushu has a history to overcome air pollution. We can help other Asian people and countries. Secondly, water issues. Water is a must for cities to grow. The city of Fukuoka has suffered from a serious shortage of water for years. Today, Fukuoka is a water-efficient city. The city of Kita-Kyushu has cooperated with China, Cambodia, and Vietnam to solve water leaks and water quality management. I think inter-city cooperation on environmental issues will stabilize Asia.

Thirdly, cultural exchange in the arts and animations contribute to peace in Asia. The Fukuoka Asia Culture Prize started in 1990. It is a means of showing respect to those who have contributed to the arts and culture in Asia. Animation also contributes to understanding. For example, 60 million copies of One Piece are printed and sold in more than 35 countries. Galaxy Express 999 is also a famous animation. The best authors of these animations were born in Kyushu.
Introduction to Kyushu Economic Research Center

Kyushu Economic Research Center

- Established in 1946.
- Public interest incorporated foundation accredited by the Cabinet Office
- Private research institute (think tank) that conducts research on social economy, industrial trends, and regional policy related to Kyushu, Okinawa, and Yamaguchi
- Conducts voluntary research (including publication of monthly reports and Economic Survey of Kyushu) using contributions from supporting members, and also operates the Economics Library BIZCOLI.
- Investigative services (about 60 investigations a year) provided to national government, prefectures, cities, towns, and villages
- Holds a number of economic report meetings, seminars, etc.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Denki Building Kiosokan 5F, 2-1-82 Watana-bordori, Chuo-ku, Fukuoka City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of staff</td>
<td>56, consisting of 28 full-time officers and staff, 12 research trainees (seconded personnel), and 16 dispatched staff and part-timers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Role of Kyushu is to Connect Asia and Japan.

from Fukuoka
200km: Busan (KOREA)
500km: Seoul
1,000km: Shanghai, Tokyo
1,500km: Beijing
Taipei (TAIWAN)

Source: Kyushu Economic Research Center (KERC)
Figure - 3

Kyushu: A Window for the Interchange with Asian Nations

Gold seal, A.D.57

Source: http://museum.city.fukuoka.jp

Guesthouse in 6th century

Source: http://blog.goo.ne.jp/nambashou/te/91e693ac80823574695f1027e942b484

Figure - 4

Kyushu: A Window for the Interchange with Asian Nations

Dejima, 1636 - 1859

Source: http://blog.livedoor.jp/hongxilong/archives/52213986.html

Francisco Xavier

Source: https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/フランシスコ・ザビエル

Samurais of Kyushu in the Meiji Restoration

Source: http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/戊辰戦争
Linkage to the Asian Economy

Comparison between Kyushu and Japan’s national average in the linkage to Asia (2014)

Number of companies entering overseas markets

Export value

Import value

Number of foreign immigrants

Number of sister city affiliation

Number of international flights

Kyushu
Nationwide

Source: 2015 Data on the Internationalization of the Kyushu Economy, Kyushu Bureau of Economy, Trade and Industry

Sharp Increase of Foreigners Entering Kyushu

The number of foreigners entering Kyushu

( Unit: million people )

by cruise ship 0.79 28%
Hong Kong 0.14 5%
Taiwan China 0.28 10%
Korea 1.22 43%
Others 0.21 7%

Total 2.83 million people in 2015

Source: Statistical Survey on Legal Migrants, Ministry of Justice

Photo: City of Fukuoka

Kyushu Economic Research Center
**Japan-Korea Summit Governor Meeting**
since 1992

- Participating local government
  - Japan:
    - Fukuoka, Saga, Nagasaki, Yamaguchi
  - Korea:
    - Busan Metropolitan City, Gyeongsangnam-do,
      Jeollanam-do, Jeju Special Self-governing Province.

Figure - 9

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**Pan Yellow Sea Economic and Technical Exchange Meeting since 2001**

- The population of Pan Yellow Sea area is 400 million people, 6% of the world.
- The GDP reaches 5% of the world.

Figure - 10
### Kyushu’s Position: Top 20 Level in the World

**GDP of major countries (2014)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP (US $ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>571,099</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>568,499</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>544,959</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>543,490</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>531,547</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>529,587</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>500,519</td>
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<td>Kyushu’s 7 Pref.</td>
<td>438,135</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>340,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>336,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>307,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>303,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>290,806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "International Statistics" published by Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and JETRO Website

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### Kyushu Represents 10% of Japan Economy

- **Land area:** 44,513 km² ••• 11.8% (2015)
- **Population:** 14.4 million ••• 11.4% (2015)
  - About 30% of Korea’s population, about 60% of Taiwan’s, about 120% of those of Hong Kong and Singapore combined, and about 90% of that of the Netherlands
- **Real GRP:** 47.8 trillion yen ••• 9.4% (FY2013)
  - About 50% of GDP of Korea, and about 120% of that of Belgium/Taiwan
- **Retail sales:** 13.1 trillion yen ••• 10.7% (2014)
- **Oil consumption:** 17.2 million kl ••• 10.0% (FY2015)
- **Energy sales:** 87 billion kWh ••• 10.9% (FY2015)
- **Value of construction starts:** 2.5 trillion yen ••• 9.8% (FY2015)
- **No. of new housing starts:** 102,752 ••• 11.3% (2015)
- **Value of contracted public works:** 1.7 trillion yen ••• 11.5% (FY2015)

Source: Outline of Kyushu Economy
Figure - 13

**Kyushu’s Industries Representing over 10% of the National Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Value (2014)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural product</td>
<td>1.8 trillion yen</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production of forest raw materials</td>
<td>4.64 million m³</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish catch including fish farming</td>
<td>830,000 tons</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude steel production</td>
<td>15.70 million tons</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel ship production</td>
<td>3.78 million gross tons</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>FY2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated circuit production</td>
<td>0.6 trillion yen</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>FY2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle production</td>
<td>1.33 million vehicles</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Outline of Kyushu Economy*

Figure - 14

**Silicon Island Kyushu: 30% Share of the Nation**

**Trends of IC production volumes**

*Source: Outline of Kyushu Economy*
Figure - 15

Car Island Kyushu: 14% Share of the Nation

Passenger Cars Production

Source: 2017 Outline of Kyushu Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Established (Year)</th>
<th>Production Capacity (10,000)</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NISSAN MOTOR KYUSHU</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Fukuoka Prefecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISSAN SHATAI KYUSHU</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Fukuoka Prefecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOYOTA MOTOR KYUSHU</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Fukuoka Prefecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAIHATSU MOTOR KYUSHU</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Saga Prefecture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure - 16

Food Island Kyushu: 20% Share of the Nation

Agricultural production by bloc and by food material (2014)

Source: Outline of Kyushu Economy
I am going to begin where Professor Pempel ended, which is with a view of the gloomy skies of 2016. What I would like to do is paint a global picture and then bring it down to the local situation, about which Professor Ha opened the conversation.

Why do I say, “gloomy global skies?” Historians may well look back on the year 2016 as the moment when the liberal world order that we have lived under and supported for most of the last 70 years reached a tipping point. It is not going to collapse, but it is going to change. If we look at the output of the world economy, we are getting growth estimates of 1.2 percent for the past year. More than that, liberal democratic institutions have not had a good year. Several countries are sliding backwards, Turkey, Thailand and the Philippines among them. Populism, extremism, xenophobia, and distrust of institutions are eroding support for moderate politics. Simply use the word “Brexit” to summon to mind the challenge presented by anti-globalization views, extremism, populism, and the fractures within democracies.

Professor Pempel, I apologize in advance (the Canadian way) because I am going to make some comments about Canada’s nearest neighbor, its President elect, and what this means for the world democracies.

The unease about Mr. Trump’s victory is palpable in Canada, Japan and the other countries I have visited in the past month including China, Indonesia, and Singapore. The anxiety is not just about Mr. Trump as President but the social forces in the United States revealed during the campaign. We all saw new fissures and divisions within American society, deeper polarization, a dysfunctional Congress. America has a wonderful system but it is not perfect and this may have been one of its most imperfect years.

Some of the forces at play are not unique to the United States. The backlash against globalization, anger about the 1 percent and inequality, intertwine with elements of racism, xenophobia, protectionism, and “us first”-ism. Multiple forces will constrain the new President from acting on his election promises. But one thing of which we can be very sure is that the United States will be more unpredictable for friend and foe alike. There will be major disruption to the patterns of expectations and relationships about American behavior and the US role in underpinning the liberal world order that it has anchored since the Second World War.

This world order will not suddenly collapse but it is going to demand leadership from new quarters and in new ways, often without the United States or around the United States on matters including climate change, the multilateral trading system, multilateral institutions, alliances, and peace keeping operations.

Let me give an example at the regional level: the American pivot, or re-balancing to Asia-Pacific. As I spoke last month with people at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs...
and at Japan’s Self Defense Forces, it became very clear that everyone was deeply uncertain and anxious about the alliance system and the US role in the region. The Obama policy had been built on three foundations.

One of them, the most important — at least the most evident, was a slow but steady build-up of military capacity across the Pacific. My sense is America is not going to back away from that military build-up. There is every indication that, in fact, we have the kind of leadership group which is about as close to a military-industrial complex as we have ever seen in an American cabinet, that the idea of more American ships, more American troops, in this region, are very strong possibilities.

Where we see potential disengagement is in the realms of trade and institution building. As Professor Pempel indicated, there are clear signs of protectionism and an America First approach. Mr Trump will likely withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and possibly NAFTA. These will likely be replaced by new sets of bilateral negotiations.

As Canadians who live next door to the United States, we love our American neighbors dearly but do not always trust them and expect them to act largely on their immediate self-interests. At the same time, we have admired the United States as the creator of public goods and a country that lives largely by the rule of law and treaties. The United States is not going to withdraw from its trading arrangements with individual countries or its involvement in multilateral agreements — but it does appear poised to play a different game in trade matters, more transactional and US-centric. Officials in Ottawa, Tokyo, Singapore and virtually every other capital will scramble to secure their bilateral understandings and agreements with the US even as their knees shake about the future of the multilateral trading system that is so central to their economic well-being.

The third pillar is support for multilateral diplomatic process like the UN at the global level and the various ASEAN-centered security and political processes in the region. Professor Pempel provided a wonderful map of these cross-cutting and overlapping institutional footprints. To be sure, there has always been an American preference for bilateral agreements. But Washington has also supported nascent regional processes for several decades. Under Obama US diplomats gave a strong boost to regional multilateralism, trying to support rather than dominate or erode them. Mr. Trump’s government will not abandon all of these processes but neither will it make them priorities.

Those who work on regional institutions in Asia know how slowly they are developing, how much patience is necessary to see them get traction on economic or security issues. So, for all of those reasons, I think that governments, including in Tokyo, are very concerned about what comes next, recognizing we are simply guessing.

It is in that context that this project is so important. I only know what I have heard in the two hours, mainly about what is happening at the ground level and in people-to-people contacts in Northeast Asia. What a wonderful project! I have been hoping this would happen for many years. But these micro-projects are going to be affected by what I fear is a coming geo-political tension of the sort we have not seen since the Cold War and even back to the 1930s when liberal democracies turned in against themselves,
the international institutions of the day collapsed and a naked form self-interest and strategic competition flourished.

And I am going to make two suggestions on what we do under that gloomy sky. The first of them is in the paper that I am tabling today but not presenting (See Appendix 2). It is about trust-building and confidence-building, through empathy in Northeast Asia. I am humbled and just delighted to see what this process is doing. Whatever else, it is making connections at the intellectual level, at the historical level, at the cultural level — connections among people that allow them to see the world through the lenses of others in the region. This is a topic we have been exploring with Chinese colleagues for the past three years and about which we recently published a special volume of the magazine *Global Asia*. The idea of empathy is a much under-valued concept in international relations and appears to be one of the things you are seeking to generate in this project.

But let me suggest a second thing that can be done. And this time I can speak with some pride, as a Canadian. Canada has a new government. Canada has a liberal government, a liberal internationalist government that defines itself in part by its “sunny ways” optimism. It came with a new approach to governance domestically. It has come in with an agenda that focuses on support for multilateralism and multilateral institutions. Canada is returning to peacekeeping and peace support operations. It is committed to open borders, reception of refugees and immigrants, free-trade arrangements, and fundamentally, a rule-based international order. Some say Canadians are acting like Canadians again. Canadians may be playing a Middle Power role again but it has 21st century characteristics and involves a new approach to mainland China.

Prime Minister Trudeau made a trip to China in August and September. And Premier Li Keqiang then visited Canada. We have had a quiet reset of the bilateral relationship, some of it focused on economics, including the first steps toward a free trade agreement. Some of it was on educational exchanges and other things. But the bigger picture was that we need to engage China at the global level on global issues, with the potential for responsible leadership on several key ones including climate change, environment, global health issues, and now, peacekeeping and peace support issues, China is not on the periphery. China is coming close to the center. And what Robert Zoellick referred to as China becoming a “responsible stakeholder” almost now seems passé. We need it as a responsible leader as America steps back from the role it has long played.

Some of the things China is doing are not so nice from that perspective, particularly in its maritime boundary issues. But in general, the argument is that we need to bring China more deeply into key institutions and regimes. What Mr Trudeau’s group is thinking about is the next level of that process. If any of you followed the G20 meetings in Hangzhou, and saw the dynamics of those meetings, the three countries that had the most ambitious agenda for institution-building in the G20 were the Germans, the Canadians, and the Chinese. The experience of interactions with China on high finance issues sees them now playing a role in producing public goods as important as any other major power.

Let me then conclude that we are now in an era that has been variously described
as multi-polar or multi-centric. We cannot count on the United States as we have in earlier times and will need to look for new types of leadership and coalitions of the willing and the relevant to address major global and regional issues. China will need to be a central part of that new order. It is the Canadian bet that with the right mix of firmness and accommodation China can play a constructive, indeed essential role in shaping it.

Thank you.

**Discusants’ Comments**

*Beom-Shik Shin (Seoul National University)*

Professor Pempel explained how security and economics have various dimensions in the region. In addition, he suggested the kinds of institutional results that exist in the region. I think his theory has raised important and serious theoretical challenges. First of all, the issue of the relation between security and economy, and the theoretical task of understanding the security-economy nexus in international relations theory. As Professor Ha elaborated in his speech, international relations theory has evolved mainly from the experiences of the Western European states. As a result, IR theory cannot sufficiently explain the security-economy nexus in this region. At the risk of over-simplification, the realist perspective tends to understand security as leading the economy. A liberalist perspective, especially the functionalist group, tends to emphasize the economy’s leading role over security. Nevertheless, both theories posit that security and economy move in the same direction. However, we need to consider what kind of condition underlies this coupling process of economy and security.

The role of the United States is very important. After World War II, until the end of the Cold War, the United States was the leading hegemon. It had responsibility for maintaining world security and the economic structure. Under these conditions, security and the economy could move in the same direction. However, with the advent of the post-Cold War era and the rise of China, the United States can no longer dominate the world economy. Changing international relations have come to challenge the existing situation. In Northeast Asia, security and the economy cannot go together. Even though security competition goes higher, economic cooperation goes further. In other words, hot economy and cold security co-exist. Some call this contradictory phenomenon to traditional Western IR theory the ‘Asian Paradox’. Professor Pempel has appropriately pointed out that the combined changes in the external security order plus the increased significance of the cross-border economy and financial ties pose serious challenges to the deeply institutionalized combination of security and economy power positions, and the policies that were previously in play.

Adding to these findings, I will now consider the security-economy nexus and dynamics along with its conditions in the region. This can provide us with a more creative platform for building a new regional IR theory — a hope that Professor Ha expressed
in his speech. We need to study the following factors. First, we need to study how transformations in regional states impact on the regional order. If we look only through the great power politics framework, we cannot grasp and evaluate appropriately the changes in regional international politics. Of course, since the post-Cold War Era, Northeast Asia has been changed in a sense, but at the same time, it remains unchanged. The main rules or the actors may change, but the structure continues. However, regional player transformations have a strong impact on the regional mode of international interactions. Therefore, the task ahead is to explain the impact of regional states’ transformations, such as democratization, marketization, or industrialization on the regional order.

Second, Professor Pempel’s emphasis on the role of Japan in the region is interesting. Some may say that the rivalry between the United States and China will be the basic framework of the regional order. However, besides the United States and China, we need to pay more attention to relations between the so-called middle ground states, such as Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Russia. If we put aside the extraordinary case of North Korea, cooperation between the middle-ground states can ultimately be the foundation of the future regional order. Especially if we accept that neither the United States nor China can prevail in this region for the time being, cooperation among the middle-ground states may have a decisive role in the process of regional transformation. In this respect, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s efforts to improve relations with Russia, or the re-consolidation of South Korea and Japan’s relations that have been fluctuating in recent years, can have a significant impact on the regional dynamics in the future. Furthermore, if Japan, South Korea, and Russia cooperate tri-laterally this will contribute greatly to stabilizing the regional order. They may take the buffer function between the United States and China. In this respect, we need to pay more attention to the significance of tri-lateral cooperation and unilateralism in the region. Concerning this, I would like to ask Professor Pempel two questions: firstly, whether, or not, the role of the United States will diminish in this region? And; secondly, if the American role diminishes, what role or strategy would be appropriate for Japan?

My third point is the importance of leadership and ideas in the formation of regional cooperation and institutions. I want to ask Professor Evans, besides the leading role of the United States in the region, who or what can take the capitalist role of cooperation in Northeast Asia?

Finally, I want to point out the under-represented importance of various actors besides the nation-state in the region. Mr. Okamoto’s presentation showed the position and the possible role of Kyushu in the region. I fully understand the importance of the city, and the region, and the locale can be solid grounds for regional cooperation. Some say that this kind of interaction in low politics may have some meaning, but that it is not so important, and cannot overcome the lead that comes from high politics. However, many scholars have found various examples of how continuous pressure from below became a resource for high political change. In addition, many East Asian businesspeople have a tendency to invest despite existing geopolitical competition and instability in the region. Furthermore, although time does not permit me to explain in detail, we should consider the importance of the construction of city networks and local networks.
Such networks are increasing in the region. Therefore, pressure from below will continue to be influential. This would leave security and the economy in such a way that East Asia is different from other regions. If the coming Trump administration pursues a so-called ‘US-first diplomacy,’ which is an isolationist diplomacy, the significance of pressure from below will need to be discussed more seriously among the regional states.

Sergey Sevastyanov (Far Eastern Federal University)

We have heard from several very famous speakers, and it is a great honor to respond to some of their ideas. I will elaborate on how Russia can contribute to improving Northeast Asian security. As we know, the main strategy for Russia in the Asia-Pacific and Northeast Asia is to use regional economic integration to boost economic development of the vast and under-populated territories of the Russian Far East. In addition, Moscow is interested in promoting initiatives to shape the new security architecture in Northeast Asia. Security should be based on a balance of bilateral mechanisms and multilateral diplomacy that exclude any closed or restricted systems or blocs. This is the peaceful principal position for Moscow and Beijing, and it is important for discussions in our session.

According to Professor Pempel, one important component of the emerging Asian order is represented by the rapid increase in formalized governmental links that mark new institutional commitments reflecting enhanced regional interdependence. This is absolutely true. I also agree with him that at the same time, security arrangements such as the Asian Regional Forum and the Six-Party talks are not working so well. Furthermore, Track II, Track 1.5 and Track 1 diplomacy have become less effective. What we see is that Cold War views still exist. They demonstrate different visions of the East Asian security order and shape modern security relations.

As for multilateral economic cooperation projects, those involving Russia, North Korea, and South Korea, are making little progress. This is a big setback for Northeast Asia and for Russian plans to realize these projects as an option for economic integration with Northeast Asian countries. On the other hand, a positive development is the improving relationship between Japan and Russia. There is a good chance for these economic and political ties to improve. There are some interesting projects under discussion such as the proposal to connect Sakhalin and Hokkaido with a gas pipeline, electricity grid and rail transportation, and many others. They are to be further discussed during the forthcoming visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe to Vladivostok in early September 2017 to participate in the annual Eastern Economic Forum.

Now, about the experience of 1.5 Track diplomacy on security in Northeast Asia. First of all, the Six-Party talks are now dormant, but we have two other structures. These are the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Forum (NEAPCF). The NEACD is well-known; it is about traditional security, mostly North Korean security issues. It is attended by active diplomats, most of whom also represented their country at the Six-Party talks. It is an important mechanism to keep alive intellectually the process of discussions on Northeast Asian security and Korean peninsula security issues at times when Six-Party talks have...
not been operational.

I do not think anyone has mentioned the NEAPCF. It was launched three years ago by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is a strong initiative. They discuss non-traditional security issues with the full support of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Again, the leaders of these NEAPCF delegations are the same diplomats who participate in the NEACD and the Six-Party talks. Lately, however, there have been some problems due to the difficult geopolitical situation in the region. For example, three years ago I was asked by the NEACD leaders to arrange a conference in Vladivostok. We started preparations, but because of events in the Ukraine in the spring of 2014 the conference was cancelled. More or less the same happened with the NEAPCF. The conference was arranged for October 2016 in Washington DC. However, the Russian and Chinese diplomats did not attend, because they were unhappy with recent South Korean initiatives to install a new American air defense system. These geopolitical aspects influenced 1.5 Track diplomacy in a negative way.

The prospects for these mechanisms are mixed. The NEACD is not a high priority project for the American State Department, while the Korean initiative is fully supported by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I think Korea has a good position and I am sure that the new presidential administration of South Korea will continue to develop this resource.

My first conclusion is that overall Northeast Asia could not avoid or postpone finding a solution to the nuclear security threat posed by North Korea. Some people say if North Korea does not want to cooperate then we should do nothing. I think that is not the right idea. So far, Beijing has been the most consistent proponent of the idea that something should be done. What may have a positive effect is to arrange multilateral exercises including not only US military allies in the region, but also China and Russia. Another effective step is to decrease the level of US-South Korea exercises in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula so as to not directly provoke North Korea. I agree with Professor Evans’ point that the missing ingredient in moving from confidence to trust is empathy. We do not have enough empathy. We are frustrated with North Korea because Pyongyang as of late, has been lacking empathy, too. Empathy needs cultivation and I think Seoul has no choice but to change this in some positive way. Newly-elected President Moon Jae-in has already declared such plans.

My second conclusion is that, taking into account the dangerous security situation on the Korean peninsula, in a short term perspective multilateral cooperation projects in the Russian Far East could become an interim substitute for the idea of Northeast Asian economic integration. China is already active in this context. Several recent summits between Putin and Abe brought Japan into this scenario as well, and Korean business should engage too. It is an innovative and promising idea for forging trust and cooperation between key actors in Northeast Asia.

Lastly, Russia and Northeast Asian countries have great potential for developing cooperation in security, science and education. According to Professor Evans, the university is a natural place to cultivate empathy. My view is that the newly formed Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok is particularly relevant to promote dialogue.
with universities and research institutions from Northeast Asia. We are ready and like to discuss different aspects of soft security, including nuclear safety, energy security, the environment and climate change to develop empathy that is lacking in the region.

I have one question for our speakers. It could sound a little bit provocative, taking into account that most of our speakers are from North America. Professor Pempel spoke about the emerging regional order. According to him, it involves the recognition that any Asia-Pacific security order will depend on two things: a balance of power and an accepted set of norms. This is certainly true. However, he says that such a set of rules could be agreed upon only in the distant future. I suggest that if President Trump realized only some of his presidential campaign promises, for example, to focus mainly on domestic politics, and to be less interested in multilateral institutions in East Asia, then maybe China, Russia, Korea, and Japan, could play a more important role in Northeast Asian security. As you know, Russia has a double identity. We are an Asian and European country, but as far as cooperation norms go, Russia is happy to follow the “Asian way”. These countries are able to develop new norms for multilateral security to make our region safer.

**Discussion with the Audience**

*Marcin Kaczmarski (University of Warsaw & Slavic-Eurasian Research Center)*

I have a question for Professor Evans. You said that there is a need to reach out to China to make it a kind of responsible leader, but my question is to what extent China is really interested. Professor Ha warned us about being too Western-centric. Aren’t we projecting our own expectations, Western expectations, when we speak about China having potential to be a “responsible” leader?

*David Wolff (Slavic-Eurasian Research Center)*

I was very struck by the introduction of how the economic research institute here in Kyushu comes directly from the research department of the South Manchurian Railroad, and I thought that resonated very nicely with Professor Ha’s point about how the persistence of tradition has up-ended our predictions about modernity. I wanted to invite members on the panel to talk about ways in which they can imagine tradition being guided into useful or not useful channels, if they can see those kinds of visions in the future. And I was also very struck by Professor Evans’ idea about the middle power with 21st century characteristics, and I’m wondering if Canada’s potential effectiveness comes from being a middle power or from being not fully in the region? I wanted to invite him to elaborate upon that.
Naomi Chi (Hokkaido University Public Policy School)

The first question is directed to Dr. Evans. I fully support the Trudeau administration on trying to engage China, but we need to be cautious. Isn’t it dancing with the devil, so to speak, in trying to engage with China? The second question goes to all the panelists. We talked about empathy. We talk about this in conferences and people say that it’s important. But we never really talk about how we do this. Do you have any ideas as to how we can go about increasing empathy?

Professor Pempel

I am going to make one very broad observation and hope that it picks up some of the threads in the questions. There is, I think, a central tension that goes on between what we tend to think of as operating at the macro level and what happens at the micro level. It is very interesting to me to recognize that, as an American with a particular focus on what is going on between the major powers, we hear a great deal about what goes on at the lower level, for example, in the case of Kyushu and relations with the rest of the region. But the difficulty that I think needs to be confronted is the question of whether these micro-level interactions are successfully operating below the radar or whether they are going to be up-ended or interfered with by national-level political considerations. I am very conscious of the fact that a number of efforts were made to improve ties with Hokkaido and Manchuria, Russia, North Korea, and they tended to be up-ended by the failures of national politics to go along with the very creative efforts at the local level. I would love to see a situation in which local-level efforts can go forward and build a kind of bottom-up regional cooperation mechanism, but my fear constantly is that national politics and national finance, will make it difficult if and when those local initiatives do not parallel or are not compatible with what the national leaders (who may be driven by xenophobia, by nationalism, by animosity) decide are relations that they do not want to see go forward.

Professor Evans

Let me deal with two of the questions to lay a foundation for what comes ahead in the next day and a half. I think it is an interesting question about empathy-building measures. What do we do? Well, my guess is that the process that you are involved with in this project is a valuable contribution in its own right. I wonder how far and how often people speak outside their national positions. One of the things when I go to a meeting that I find interesting is how many seconds does it take me to tell what country someone is from. Not necessarily their accent, but how fast do they identify with their national positions. And I think all of us have been at many meetings where this is pretty quick. I found it quite interesting that for part of the discussion earlier today I could not recognize where Professor Ha comes from. I mean by that, his position. If I heard Professor Pempel talk, and I put him in a Korean mask, most of what he said could have been from Korea. Cultivating such cosmopolitanism is something we do with our students, and something universities are good at.
As for empathy-building I sit on the group called the ASEAN Regional Forum Experts and Eminent Persons Group. One of the things we have been talking through is the logic of preventive diplomacy. What are the measures that are appropriate? Moving from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy to conflict resolution. We have been talking about what actual empathy-building measures can be created, and it is nice when people study in other countries and that sometimes works. But we have a very concrete idea we are working on now, it is mainly with militaries, and with map exercises and simulations, where we do a simulation of a particular kind of crisis, but we make sure that the players do not play their own national role. So you put a Chinese as the head secretary-general of the United Nations, dealing with a humanitarian crisis that demands huge intervention into that outside position. Japanese are not quite as strong at playing other roles. In any case, those are little kinds of examples, and in the sweep of things, we know they are not determinant, but they can be the kind of things that open up possibilities.

Now let me get to this middle power-ism with 21st century characteristics. Because the twist — a middle power is not just in the middle. This is middle power-ism 3.0. And its principal feature that distinguishes it from the other is — you are interested in a rule-based order, but you are willing to have some flexibility on who makes the rules. The idea of a principled security order, is a really great idea, if the principles are made by more countries than the United States. This is the era where that kind of input is needed, and it takes enormous judgment to dance with the devil. Now, those of you in international relations: you tell me who the devil is? I am quite happy to say that most super-powers are devils. And that we like some devils more than we like other ones, but do not think there are angels out there. And I will conclude with this observation: China is a devil. It is doing things domestically that are working to make it a more repressive government, a more authoritarian government. It is doing things internationally that sometimes make us very nervous. But — and its global role on climate change, already, now on peacekeeping and peace support operations — what it is doing looks very much like a responsible international actor, not because it is embracing Western norms, but because it is dealing with practical problems that need creative solutions that just sometimes look like Western norms.