

Japan in the Midst of Multilateral Negotiations on the Future Framework for Climate Change

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Introduction

In 1990, Japan hosted an International Conference on Climate Change in Tokyo. This was the first major international conference on climate change to be hosted by Japan. Since then, Japan has been enthusiastic about international dialogue on climate change.

In Japan, climate change is in many cases considered as an environmental problem and as an economic problem that firmly relates to energy use. Many publications on climate policies in Japan by Japanese authors state climate change as a problem of “trilemma” or the “3Es”, namely environment, economy and energy (Yoda, 1993; Hamakawa, 2001; Institute of Applied Energy, 2007; Kansai Electric Power, 2007). Discussions on climate change policies are thus frequently led by energy engineers and experts, governmental officials, and industry stakeholders. The problem is expected to be overcome mainly by technology, including energy efficient technology, technology to enhance the use of renewable as well as nuclear energy, and technology related to carbon capture and storage.

On the other hand, Japan merely perceives the climate change problem as an international problem that formulates a part of Japanese foreign policy. Some may even criticize seeing climate policy as a consequence of politics, saying that politicizing the problem overlooks reality, such as the costs required to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This situation is quite different from what we see in other countries, especially those in Europe. Academic experts, at least, based in countries outside Japan have observed the development of international climate change policies as one type of foreign policy (Susskind, 1994; Rowland, 1995; Harris 2000), for which explanations on the real state-of-the-art world of climate change negotiations proved to be quite convincing.

It is, however, not adequate to say that foreign policy has played no role in Japanese decision-making on climate change policies. This paper aims to show how Japan’s decision-making on climate change during international negotiations was influenced by the foreign policy aspects of the country. Foreign policy has not always affected Japan’s position, but there were times when it was influential. In addition, this paper argues that there are two distinct types of influence on foreign policy in Japan: actions taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and actions taken by politicians, especially prime ministers and Jiminto (Liberal Democratic Party, LDP). These two aspects of foreign policy have affected Japan’s position on climate change in the past, quite independently from each other. It is likely that both are going to affect Japan’s position at least until the next agreement is reached at the international level on what is to be done after 2012.

Theoretical Background

In one of the most well-acknowledged traditional papers on foreign policy by Allison (Allison, 1971), a nation-state's decision-making is explained by three hypotheses, namely "the rational actor" (Model I), "organizational behavior" (Model II), and "governmental politics" (Model III). Model I explains the behavior of national governments, assuming that the state is a unified rational actor. Models II and III look into the black box of nation-state decision-making. The former focuses on the behavior of organizations that are built upon mindless routine that does not require decision-making at individual levels. Model III looks into bargaining among players in the government and assumes a country's decision to be a consequence of such bargaining within the government. Allison has attributed the three models to explaining the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. One way of analyzing national decision-making on climate change could be to attempt to utilize the three models and to see whether any one of these is more applicable than others.

In Japan's case, it is often said that ministries and bureaucrats hold the central power of decision-making (Shiroyama et al., 1999). Numerous publications and newspaper articles describe climate change policy-making as a process of bargaining between the ministries involved (Tanabe, 1999; Takeuchi, 1999). This is not often the case when politicians have strong positions and the means to achieve agreement on their positions. If this holds true for Japan's climate policy, such policy will be influenced only by the relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and Model III would be applied to determine Japanese decision-making. The argument in this paper is that Japanese climate policy within Japan has been influenced by foreign policy periodically, and that the foreign policy influence can be separated into two distinctive elements, namely that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that of political leaders. The two aspects of foreign policy are most applicable to Models II and III, and Model I respectively, but the two do not always exert their influence synchronically.

In the next two sections, the two types of organizations and individuals that represent Japanese foreign policy are considered, to explain the history of Japanese decision-making on climate change since the late 1980s. The historical aspects are then followed by an analysis of the two types by comparing their behaviors, and by applying the three Models to the analysis.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Climate Change

Usually, in Japan, most inter-ministerial debates on climate change policies take place between MOE and METI. The Ministry of Territory and Transport (MOTT) is involved in any debates that relate to GHG emissions by the transportation sector, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) also becomes involved in debates on emissions and sequestration by land, land-use change and forestry. In any case, overall, the main role of MOFA is to coordinate the diverse views of these various ministries and to develop a common position that is acceptable to all ministries.

Most of the officials that work for MOFA are interested in various international affairs. The

global environmental problem is merely one of them. In many cases, negotiating environmental problems requires expert-level knowledge. This may be one of the reasons why most MOFA officials were not really interested in environmental problems. Even when countries started negotiating the Kyoto Protocol, initiated by the Berlin Mandate agreed to at COP 1 in 1995, the chief manager of MOFA, whose role is to coordinate the relevant ministries, was posted from another ministry, mainly the Meteorological Agency.

At the time of COP1, in a statement made by the Minister of the Environment, Sohei Miya-shita, Japan stated its willingness to host the third or the next COP in Japan. This was an initiative mainly of MOE and MOFA. At the time, because most of the actual work was performed by people outside MOFA, MOFA was not aware of how difficult the negotiations leading up to COP3 would be. It was a time when Japan was striving to become a permanent member of the UN Council. In order for Japan to receive support from other countries, it was important for Japan to host some significant international conferences. MOFA considered that holding an international conference on climate change could be an opportunity for Japan to show its leadership, and its capability of playing a mediator's role between developed and developing countries. Perhaps Japan was not able to consolidate its determination to host COP3 unless ministries other than MOFA were interested in hosting the conference. MOE was supportive because holding an international conference would be covered by the media, and this was a good opportunity to raise public awareness on climate change.

As the time for COP3 drew near, MOFA became increasingly aware of the significance and difficulty of the problem. In March 1997, the EU announced its position on emission reduction targets. Other countries expected Japan, as the host of COP3, to announce its position by taking a leadership role. However, serious internal disputes among various ministries hampered Japan in meeting this expectation. MOE (the then Environment Agency), as the ministry responsible for environmental effectiveness, called for a 6-7 emission reduction target. METI (then called MITI), which was responsible for the protection of Japanese industries, insisted that any absolute reduction in emissions was unrealistic, and called for the stabilization of emissions from 1990. MOFA, which was responsible for foreign affairs, cared about other countries' expectations of Japan taking a leadership role, and adopted the position that at least a 5% reduction was necessary for Japan to play its role as host of COP3. Japan's position, which was submitted in October, was somewhat of a mixture of the three positions.

After the United States announced its position, MOFA became more serious about the involvement of the United States. Because the United States was, and still is, the largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO₂), MOFA believed that the participation of the United States was indispensable for COP3 to be considered a success. At the same time, MOFA also started to see negotiations from a foreign affairs perspective. Since the end of World War II in 1945, Japan has been an ally of the United States in terms of security in the Far East. It was most important for MOFA, from a security perspective, to maintain healthy relations with the United States. During the COP3 meeting, the United States expected to see some meaningful participation by key developing countries. MOFA supported the U.S. position and the developing countries were offended by the Japanese

position. They became firmer on the issue of no new targets for developing countries. Japan was also supportive of the U.S. position that the stabilization of emissions from a 1990 level was the most it could agree to. However, at the final moment, the U.S. accepted a 7% reduction target, and this was when Japan had to accept its 6% reduction target (Grubb, 1999; Oberthür and Ott, 1999).

After COP3 was concluded, a major debate concerning climate policy shifted the arena to the domestic implementation stage. It was again MOE and METI that were mainly at the center of the debate. MOFA withdrew from such argument. The agendas for COP4 and the succeeding COPs until COP7 were mainly on detailed rules for the implementation of what was agreed to in the Kyoto Protocol. There was no role for MOFA.

The Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005. Until then, Japan had maintained silence in the international arena. The EU's position was rather consistent, even after 2001. It wanted to see the Kyoto Protocol become effective. In order for the Protocol to prevail, Russia needed to ratify it. The EU used every foreign affairs diplomacy trick between itself and Russia to entice the latter to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Harris, 2007). On the other hand, Japan remained silent and watched events around the world. Internally, there were clearly two voices. One saying Japan should take further steps to support the Kyoto process because climate change is a serious issue, because Japan can benefit from selling its energy-efficient technology, and because Kyoto is the name of an ancient Japanese city and the Kyoto Protocol is actually the only multilateral agreement named after a Japanese city. The other voices insisting that Japan should remain silent until Kyoto collapses, because the 6% emission reduction target set by the Kyoto Protocol would be difficult to achieve, if it was ever achievable in the first place. This was a dispute between the environment and economy, and MOFA found no place to settle the debate, from a foreign policy perspective (Schreurs, 2002).

At COP11, held in Montreal, countries started discussing ways of moving forward on an international institution after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012). The positions of the various Ministries were, as usual, diverse. The only common position that could be drawn from various ministerial positions was that Japan was seeking the participation of major emitting countries, namely the United States, China and India. MOFA was not able to say anything further: for example, on the elements of a future climate regime. The then Ambassador, Mutsuyoshi Nishimura, was personally heavily engaged in the climate change debate.

He had personally read various proposals for a future climate regime, and tried to come up with his own ideas. This was effective in stimulating positive feedback from other ministries, but it was still difficult to mediate ministerial positions to construct a uniform Japanese position.

The irrelevance of MOFA as an institution for dealing with the climate change debate was terminated as the G8 process became an important part of climate regime building. This process started at the Gleneagles Summit meeting held in 2005. The then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, initiated a new process on climate change in the G8 Summit. The Summit initiated dialogue on this global problem and also determined the duration of the process to be two years. Because each country receives a turn to host the G8 Summit, it was already clear that Germany, the host of the G8 Summit in 2007, would be at the forefront of the process, and that Japan,

the host of the subsequent G8 Summit in 2008, would need to take responsibility for the outcome of the climate change process. This became the new incentive for MOFA to work on the climate change problem. In early 2007, MOFA officials started internal discussions on how Japan could play a leadership role in the process and formulate a successful outcome. At the Heiligendamm Summit in June 2007, Japan called for the halving of global GHG emissions by 2050, compared with current levels. This debate on a long-term target was supported by MOFA.

MOFA believed that in order for Japan to succeed in the Toyako G8 Summit in 2008, a major agreement would have to be achieved at the COP13/CMP 3 in Bali. The same rule that was applied during COP3 emerged again. In order for any agreement to be reached, MOFA considered the involvement of the United States to be indispensable. The Japanese government submitted its original draft proposal for a possible COP decision on what was then called the Bali Road Map. The proposal was never officially distributed during the Bali meeting, but the paper investigated ways for the United States to accept the decision. When the United States distributed its counter-proposal against the Co-chairs' proposal on a COP decision on future cooperation, MOFA supported the position taken by the United States.

Early in 2008, Japan's awareness on climate change negotiations as well as on Toyako G8 Summit began to grow. Soon after the Bali meeting, the Japanese government began to discuss consolidating Japan's position on whether to accept the emission reduction target at the national level. This closed meeting involved ministers of four ministries, MOE, METI, MOFA and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), so the meeting was unofficially dubbed the "four-ministers' meeting on climate policies". Ministers from MOE, MOFA and MOF were basically supportive of setting the emission reduction target at the national level, but the minister of METI was strongly opposed to taking such an option, as he was in sympathy with industries' view. In particular, the Minister of MOFA was concerned that Japan would be left out of the negotiation table discussions if Japan did not accept any emission reduction target in absolute terms.

After the final decision was made by the then Prime Minister Fukuda himself that Japan would accept an emission reduction target at a certain level, MOFA was keen on setting focus on the debate on the long-term global emission target. This was to be the main element of discussion on climate change at the Toyako G8 Summit. The Toyako G8 Summit, held between 7-10 July 2008, highlighted agreeing on the 2050 global target, but the United States did not accept such an emission target. The final Chair's summary wrote, "we seek to share with all Parties to the UNFCCC the vision of, and together with them to consider and adopt in the UNFCCC negotiations, the goal of achieving at least 50% reduction of global emissions by 2050, recognizing that this global challenge can only be met by a global response, in particular, by the contributions from all major economies, consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities."

After the Toyako G8 Summit was over, MOFA started to lose its leadership role in determining the Japanese position at multilateral negotiating meetings on climate change. In October 2008, a new committee was set up under the "Council on the Global Warming Issue", which had been established in the Prime Minister's Office since early 2008. The goal of the committee was to

discuss levels of Japan's mid-term emission reduction target, and to develop several options of such target. The final choice among the options was to be made by the prime minister himself. The committee involved experts and stakeholders from various fields, and it was mainly MOE and METI that supported modeling works to show emission reduction potentials and economic cost to achieve a certain emission reduction target (PMO, 2009). Similarly, also in October 2008, a pilot-phase of the domestic emissions trading scheme was initiated. Policy-making on this scheme was also led by MOE and METI. MOFA had no role to play because this was a domestic matter.

Political Leaders on Climate Change

Japanese political leaders are mainly influenced by two voices: one derives from domestic stakeholders and ordinary citizens, through elections; the other voice from outside Japan. It is often said that Japan is sensitive to *Gaiatsu* (pressure from outside the country). It was often the case that the Japanese position became reactive rather than proactive, because Japan takes a position only after obtaining sufficient information on how other countries are acting.

The first political leader who became aware of climate change as an issue in international politics was Noboru Takeshita who was the Japanese prime minister from 1987 to 1989. Initially, he had not been very eco-friendly in his early years as prime minister, and was surprised to hear other heads of state discussing climate change during the Toronto Summit in 1988. Thereafter, Takeshita started encouraging the Japanese government to prepare for environmental negotiations in the near future. His personal instinct that global environmental problems would be placed high on the political agenda at an international level shifted his party, the LDP, to a pro-environmental position. This shift in the LDP's position was maintained throughout Toshiki Kaifu's administration from 1989 to 1991.

In the late 1980s, some countries in Europe started setting national targets for their CO₂ emissions. The Japanese Environment Agency believed that Japan should also set a national target, aiming to at least stabilize emissions at the 1990 levels by 2000. This was vigorously opposed by MITI, stating that such stabilization is unrealistic. The argument between the two ministries was difficult to solve internally. The LDP showed strong political leadership in concluding this debate and the Japanese government announced an *Action Plan to Address Global Warming* in the autumn of 1990, when the plan set a national emission stabilization target for CO₂, as was supported by the LDP. The target was actually set at two levels, first the stabilization of per capita emission, and then the stabilization of overall emissions. The first level target was incorporated to address MITI's concerns. The next Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, was also basically supportive of global environmental activities. Nevertheless, he was not able to attend the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992, because at that time the Japanese Diet was poised to adopt the International Peace Cooperation Bill, legislation that was critical for Japan to participate in a Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) under the United Nations. As political interest at an international level started to decline after UNCED, the willingness of the LDP to take the lead in environmental policies also started to diminish.

A new wave from the international arena struck the LDP in 1997 during negotiations leading up to the third Conference of the Parties (COP3) held in Kyoto. Japanese government officials were negotiating emission reduction targets for the period around 2010. Three ministries, namely MOFA, MITI and EA, all held different positions and were not able to reach consensus. The Japanese government consolidated its position in late September 1997. This was led by the then Hashimoto administration. On the final night of COP3 in Kyoto, it was actually heads of state that agreed to emission reduction targets.

After adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the main debate on climate change policy shifted to domestic legislation, which would be necessary to achieve the agreed emission reduction target. Unlike debates on emission reduction targets, discussions on minute rules and procedures to install the Kyoto Protocol were not very enticing for political leaders to take the initiative. It was mainly ministries that discussed the rules of implementing emissions trading, or for counting emissions and sequestration by land use, land-use change and forestry.

The next phase that called for political leadership occurred in 2001, when the United States under the new Bush administration announced that it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. As soon as this news spread among climate-related stakeholders in Japan, two voices were heard. On one side, there was a group that supported the Kyoto Protocol and believed that Japan should move forward with the EU and Canada and agree on detailed rules. The other group insisted that the Kyoto Protocol would no longer be environmentally effective without the participation of the largest emitter, and that Japan should follow the United States. The former was based mainly on the principle of environmental effectiveness, while the latter was most concerned about economic damage in Japan that might be caused by trying to reach a 6% emission reduction target without US participation. The latter group also mentioned that any climate regime without the participation of the United States, as well as major emitting developing countries, could never be environmentally effective.

The debate in Japan on this issue was not agreeable to government officials. During the resumed COP6 meeting in Bonn in July 2001, the then Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, is said to have taken the final position that Japan would adhere to the Kyoto regime. The Parties attending the meeting agreed to what was named the Bonn Agreement, and also agreed to the Marrakesh Accord at COP7 in late 2001. Koizumi was followed by Shinzo Abe. Abe had been appointed prime minister in September 2006 but had rarely expressed opinions on climate change and was not known for being enthusiastic about environmental protection. In his address on administrative policy on January 16, 2007, he mentioned a plan for achieving the goals of the Kyoto Protocol and giving support to developing countries but only after talking about creating a sound and safe society. Just before giving his speech, Abe visited European countries to seek their understanding on the abductions by North Korea. At that time, the EC proposed a package of climate and energy policies, and climate change was the central topic in all the countries he visited, thus sparking Abe's interest in climate change.

After the visit to EC, Abe became interested in the climate change debate. He announced his first slogan "Cool Earth 2050" in May 2007 (PMO, 2007), where he stressed three themes in

which progress needed to be made in Japan: (i) long-term strategies for halving global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, (ii) medium-term approaches on the framework after 2012, and (iii) policies for fulfilling the 6% reduction commitment of the Kyoto Protocol. The position on the long-term target in (i) was consistent throughout the Heiligendamm Summit in June of the same year. However, the Abe administration did not endure. He resigned as prime minister in July 2007 due to health problems. The next Prime Minister, Fukuda, was more interested in domestic issues, such as the collapse of the pension fund. Nevertheless, he was also aware that the Toyako Summit in July 2008, hosted by himself, was going to be an important forum in which to finalize discussions on climate change, a process that had started at the Gleneagles Summit back in 2005. Fukuda thus took a position that was fundamentally in line with Abe's proposal on long-term global emission targets. This position did not affect the Japanese position much during the COP13 held in Bali, Indonesia in late 2007, because the meeting focused mainly on short-term emission mitigation targets.

At the time of the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP13) that took place in Bali, the Japanese government had not been able to consolidate its position on whether to support what is called the "cap & trade" system, as industries strongly rejected such an approach. The industry group emphasized the "failure of the Kyoto Protocol" and called for a new international commitment that included another type of commitment, such as a voluntary sectoral approach (Sawa, 2007). In an agreement reached at COP13, the Bali Action Plan, included a paragraph on the "sectoral approach" (UNFCCC, 2007), but Japan's suggestion to discuss the "sectoral approach" was not reflected in a way Japan had expected. A paragraph on the "sectoral approach" in the Bali Action Plan stated; "cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in order to enhance implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c) of the Convention." This meant that the "sectoral approach" under the Bali Action Plan was mainly intended to motivate technology transfer in developing countries, and not to discuss it as a part of the commitments of the developed countries.

Soon after the Bali meeting, the Japanese government began to discuss consolidating Japan's position on whether to accept the emission reduction target at the national level. The final decision was made by then Prime Minister Fukuda himself. In his speech made at the annual meeting of the World Economic Meeting in Davos in January 2008, he made a proposal called the "Cool Earth Promotion Programme," which basically accepted a quantitative emission reduction target at the national level (PMO, 2008a). Such national target for each country should be set based on calculation of the amount of emission reduction potentials in each country. He said, "Japan will, along with other major emitters, set a quantified national target for the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions to be realized from now on. In setting this target, I propose that the equity of reduction obligations be ensured. The target could be set based on a bottom-up approach by compiling on a sectoral basis energy efficiency as a scientific and transparent measurement and tallying up the reduction volume that would be achieved based on the technology to be in use in subsequent years. This methodology has become a new definition of the "sectoral approach" in Japan.

Fukuda also went on to start climate change debate at the domestic level. He established the

“Council on the Global Warming Issue” under the Prime Minister’s Office in February 2008. This council consisted of twelve members, who were either from academia, the business community, or other related organizations. The council met once a month until the G8 summit in July 2008. It discussed various aspects of the issue, including a long-term target, a vision for a low-carbon society, technology transfer, etc. Japan had already proposed halving global emissions by 2050 at the time of Abe administration a year ago. The next step was to investigate the long-term emission target for Japan. In early June, Fukuda announced a proposal called “the Fukuda Vision”, which included Japan’s emission target for 2050 (PMO, 2008b). He said that Japan was ready to aim at reducing its emission 60-80% of the current level by 2050 and develop a low-carbon society. The Council on the Global Warming Issue also published its own proposal called the “Proposal of the Council on the Global Warming Issue, in pursuit of Japan as a Low-carbon society” (Council on Global Warming, 2008). With “the Fukuda Vision” and its long-term emission goal in hand, Prime Minister Fukuda was proved to be eligible for hosting the Toyako G8 Summit in July 2008.

Soon after the Toyako G8 Summit, however, Fukuda suddenly resigned his position as Japanese prime minister. Mr. Taro Aso succeeded the position and became the new Japanese prime minister. Japan’s decision-making including that related to climate change policies stalled until the new administration began to take action in fall 2008. Prime Minister Aso generally accepted Japan’s positions on future climate policies that were determined under Abe and Fukuda administrations. He also maintained the Council on the Global Warming Issue, which met after several months’ interval, in October 2008, to establish a new committee called the “Committee on Mid-term Emission Target” under the Council. This newly established committee has been given the task of using several economic models to develop several scenarios that reflect Japanese people’s concern such as by how much Japan would be able to reduce GHG emissions at a certain cost, and how that certain level of effort could be compared with the efforts of the EU or of the United States. The several scenarios will be used as references for the prime minister to make the final decision on Japan’s mid-term emission reduction target.

The committee worked intensively in early 2009. In April 2009, it finalized its role by proposing six options for the Japanese GHG emission reduction target for the year 2020, which were +4% (extension of current climate policy), +1~-5% (-25% Annex I as aggregate, distribution among Annex I countries according to equalizing the marginal abatement cost), -7% (installment of the best available technologies in terms of energy efficiency), -8~-17% (-25% Annex I as aggregate, distribution among Annex I countries according to equalizing the abatement cost per GDP), -15% (rapid introduction of the best available technologies) and -25% (assuming all Annex I countries committing to the same figure), all percentages having been based on emissions in the year 2000. On 10 June 2009, Prime Minister Aso suggested -8% from 1990, explaining that his choice was -7%, plus an additional 1% by the additional introduction of solar PV panels. His choice was somewhere in the middle of the six options, expressing his position that was somewhere in the middle between the position of industries and that of environmental NGOs.

Discussion: Explanation on Two Types of Foreign Policy Element on Climate Change

Relations between foreign policy and its consequence, decision-making of a nation state or a government, have been explained by different theories, as was given in the examples in the earlier section of this paper. One type of explanation is to see national decisions as a result of organizational behavior. Another type of explanation is to see it as a result of government politics at the domestic level. The former can be applied to explain the activity of MOFA in the context of involvement in climate policy-making. However, neither the former nor the latter adequately explain the actions taken by Japanese political leaders. This is a type of cultural shock that is experienced by political leaders individually, and that can alter their mindset in a short period of time.

Table 1 summarizes the influence of MOFA and political leaders in Japanese climate change policy-making. Some elements are worth discussing. First, the influence of foreign policy by the involvement of MOFA is mostly observed whenever Japan hosts international conferences of a high significance. This is observed especially when Japan announced it would host the third or the subsequent COP, in 1997 up to COP3, and in 2007-8 for preparation of the Toyako G8 Summit. The role expected to be taken by MOFA is to conclude significant international meetings in a successful manner. In the case of climate change, MOFA's evaluation criteria of the level of "success" are based on whether the United States is on board. The United States is not merely the largest emitter of GHG that needs to be part of an agreement on mitigation activities. For Japan, the United States is the largest partner in terms of security, trade, and politics. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, agreed in 1960, remains the basis of Japanese defense policy. The United States is the largest buyer of Japanese goods, purchasing nearly one-fifth of the total exports from Japan (Ministry of Finance, 2007). As a result, MOFA officials in any section experience US-Japan relations one way or another. Thus, the influence of MOFA does not always conclude in pro-environmental positions.

Second, the influence of foreign policy by the involvement of political leaders can be observed whenever the climate change debate attracted international attention, as well as whenever decisions were not achievable among ministries. The involvement of political leaders is likely to shift Japan's position on climate change towards a pro-environmental position. This was observed in decisions taken by Takeshita, Hashimoto, Koizumi, Abe and Fukuda.

On the other hand, whenever Japanese climate change policy-making does not encounter such leadership from foreign policy, Japanese decisions are mainly influenced by the economic perspective. For instance, the Marrakesh Accord in 2001 was agreed in such a way as to count on sequestration by forests and also by utilizing Kyoto Mechanisms. Emission reduction targets for the year 2020 were discussed in terms of marginal abatement cost in 2008-9. MOE therefore expects the involvement of foreign policy in climate change decision-making.

Table 1

Year	Events	Influence by leadership of MOFA	Influence by leadership of political leaders	Japan's position as a nation state
1990	Action Plan to Address Global Warming (stabilization target)	No	Yes	Japan announced emission stabilization target
1992	United Nations Conference for Environment and Development (UNCED)	Partially	No	UNFCCC adopted a month before UNFCCC
1995	Announcement to host COP3	Partially	No	Japan determined to host COP3
1997	Japanese proposal on emission targets	Partially	Partially	Japan proposed -5% reduction with differentiation formulae
	Adoption of Kyoto Protocol	Partially	Yes	Japan committed -6% target
2001	Bonn Agreement	No	Yes	Japan's position on sink sequestration was accepted
	Marrakesh Accord	No	No	
2005	Kyoto Protocol entered into force	No	No	
2006	Abe's Statement "Cool Earth"	No	Yes	Japan called for halving global emission by 2050
2007	COP13 and Bali Road Map	Partially	No	Japan called for "sectoral approach"
2008	Japan's decision to consider emission reduction target	Partially	Yes	
	Toyako Summit	Yes	Yes	Japan called for halving global emission by 2050
2008	COP14	No	No	
2009	Discussion on Japan's emission reduction target	No	No	Japan elaborated six options
	Determination on Japan's emission reduction target	No	Partially	Japan announced -8% from 1990 for 2020

Conclusion

Much of the literature suggests that the foreign policy aspect of decision-making on climate change brings about a positive influence on the country's position in terms of environmental consciousness, but this proposition proved to fit only partially for Japan. The first type of Japanese foreign policy on climate change is to view national decisions as a result of organizational behavior. This can be applied to explain the activity of MOFA in the context of involvement in climate policy-making. Whenever MOFA exerted its influence, it respected the U.S. involvement in the

scheme, as MOFA considered the United States to be the most significant partner for Japan. On the other hand, the actions and decisions taken by Japanese political leaders were difficult to explain by various theories on foreign policy. This is a kind of cultural shock, which is experienced by political leaders individually, and that can alter their mindsets in a short period of time. Political leaders, once they became aware of climate change debates, sought political leadership in the negotiations, which resulted in shifting Japan's national position towards the pro-environmental direction.

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