1. Introduction

In this paper, I will focus on the discourse on India proposed by certain famous “Orientalists” in the late eighteenth century and examine the ambiguous attitudes of these pro-Indian British towards India. It was during this period that Indology as a systematized modern discipline was established due to the demands that arose from British rule over India. The “Orientalists” were the dominant faction in the Indology of this time. The term “Orientalist” as used here requires some explanation. In the history of the British Raj,¹ there were two major schools of thought concerning the system of rule over India. One was the “Anglicist” camp and the other was the “Orientalist” camp. The former believed in the supremacy of the English language and English culture. Hence, they tried to establish a system of rule fashioned on that of Britain itself, particularly through the introduction of English-language education. In contrast, the Orientalists placed major importance on Indian culture and sought to rule India based on its own traditions. In the history of the British Raj, this Orientalist attitude was predominant toward the end of the eighteenth century, before it was replaced by the Anglicist attitude early in the nineteenth century. When not defined otherwise, I use the term “Orientalist” to indicate the meaning above throughout this paper.

Although the subject of this symposium is “Orient on Orient,” this paper instead comes from the perspective of “Occident on Orient.” However, I believe that the ultimate underlying goal of this endeavor is to diversify the monolithic understanding of what constitutes the Orient and the Occident, a lopsided understanding that is based on a powerful East-West dichotomy ignoring the actual cultural diversity of each category. In this paper, I will therefore take the opportunity to analyze the complex nature of eighteenth-century Orientalists’ understanding of India, as their comprehension of India did not reflect such a simplistic dichotomy between West and the East.

The above might make it sound to some readers that I am arguing that eighteenth-century “Orientalists” were exceptions to the kind of “Orientalists” that Said critiqued, and that, unlike such ordinary Orientalists, they had a realistic understanding of India. However, my aim is simply to draw attention to the diversity within the category of “Orientalism.” We often hope to clearly distinguish the good from the bad in our work, but human relationships cannot easily be reduced to such a clear-cut scheme. Of course, the political dimension of Orientalism certainly forms part of

¹ To be precise, the terms “British India” and “British Raj” should be used only for the era after 1858, but here, I use these terms loosely for the era before that as well, as the East India Company started functioning as the political sovereign in India in 1757.
the hegemonic political structure governing the world, but we should not forget that Orientalism also represents an attempt to foster mutual understanding between people.

In this particular case, I want to examine the sentiment of “sympathy,” which I believe is commonly regarded as the best means to understand others. Eighteenth-century Orientalists formulated such a sympathetic view of India and tried to maintain this sympathetic position. However, since India was brought into the fold of the familiar by these Orientalists, they still needed to create something that could serve the role of the Other. Here, we can see a kind of inherent limitation in a sympathetic understanding of others. During the same period, there was also an alternative way of understanding others among the Orientalists, of which the outstanding example is Edmund Burke’s idea of “prejudice.” I will focus on these two concepts, “sympathy” and “prejudice,” and examine these two different modes of understanding others as found in the discourses of British Orientalists on India. By doing so, I hope to show how complex so-called Orientalism is and how it differs from the simple cultural dichotomy usually attributed to it, and thus to diversify and enrich our understanding of it.

2. Sympathy and Antipathy: Orientalists and Anglicists

(1) Eighteenth-century “Orientalists” and Said’s “Orientalism”

Since Edward Said’s Orientalism (Said 1978), various arguments have been developed concerning the essentialist stereotypization of the East found in many Western discourses. At the core of these stereotypical images lies a strong and multidimensional dichotomy. Orientalism is not just a system for simply turning the East into the Other of the West, but a system in which all “Other-”ness—whether Oriental or Occidental—becomes the object of alienation, which constitutes a comprehensive worldview, and which provides a self-image for the modern Western world. Richard King has added an important argument to the debate on Orientalism, focusing on religion and the image of a “mystic India” (King 1999). He points out the typical factors constituting the dichotomy inherent in modern thought saying, “In fact, if one examines the dichotomies of Enlightenment thought (and hence of modern Western society), one can see the following oppositional model at work.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Religion</td>
<td>Personal Religion (Mysticism?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Sacred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>Irrational/Non-rational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(King 1999: 13)

To this dichotomy, we can easily add West and East. The left-hand side indicates the self-image of
the modern Western world and the right-hand side indicates what it has tried to remove from its self-image and referred to as its Other.

However, the image held by Westerners in regard to India was not so monolithic, because we can find not only attempts to discredit India by turning it into the West’s Other, but also sympathy and admiration for India by the West. The eighteenth-century Orientalists represent a good example of this latter tendency. Orientalists like Nathaniel Brassey Halhed, Charles Wilkins, and William Jones formulated pro-Indian views in their studies of India, and the work of these individuals in many ways reflects the ruling policies of the British East India Company. With the victory at the Battle of Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764), the East India Company acquired Diwani rights (revenue authority and civil jurisdiction) in Bengal (1765), and practically began its rule over India. It wanted to establish a ruling policy that was easy to implement and did not cause much friction with the indigenous society. It was the first Governor General of India (1772-85), Warren Hastings (1732-1818), who inaugurated this principle and promoted the study of India as a means to rule the country according to India’s own culture and systems. It is in this context that the Orientalists began their studies of India, and it is thus only natural that their work had a pro-Indian bent from the beginning.

It is frequently argued that this “sympathetic, nonreductive Orientalist tradition” (Clifford 1988: 261), or “affirmative Orientalism” (Fox 1992: 152), was an exception to the “Orientalism” Said has criticized, and that his omission to cover this form of Orientalism represents a major fault in his discussion. Some scholars have praised these Orientalists as advocates of Indian culture who enabled the Indians to rediscover their own traditions and establish their national identity. On the other hand, others argue that the Orientalists were ultimately acting in complicity with European imperialism and ignored the agency of the Indian people, even if their rhetoric seemed sympathetic. The attitude of these Orientalists toward India was certainly ambiguous and it is difficult to simply say that it was either positive or negative. I will first examine the “sympathetic” side of their views of India and compare this with the “antipathy” found in the thought of the Anglicists. I will furthermore compare this “sympathy” with the idea of “prejudice” proposed by Edmund Burke, a famous Orientalist.

(2) William Jones’ Sympathetic Indology and the Significance of Comparison

The sympathetic understanding of India owes much to Sir William Jones (1746-94), the famous Orientalist (I use the term here to mean a scholar studying the Orient), who was also a judge at the Supreme Court in Bengal as well as a poet. Indeed, Jones was the founder of the Asiatic Society and the modern discipline of Indology. After being appointed judge of the Supreme Court and coming to India, he began an intensive study of India. He mastered Sanskrit, and approached Indian culture through Sanskrit texts. Hence, his understanding of India was basically a religious and Brahmanical one. His view of India was also quite sympathetic, because Jones not only revered Indian culture, but also concluded that it had the same origin as European culture.

---

2 Hastings first became Governor of Bengal in 1772, and was appointed as first Governor General of India in 1773.
This conclusion was supported by his idea of the Indo-European linguistic family. Among Jones’ wide-ranging work, the idea of the Indo-European linguistic family and the “discovery” of Sanskrit, which enabled him to construct this linguistic hypothesis, were the most famous and influential of his achievements. He proclaimed this theory in a paper entitled “On the Hindus,” which he read as the Third Anniversary Discourse at the Asiatic Society in Calcutta, in 1786. He first compared Sanskrit with Latin and Greek, and found it to be a “wonderful” and “refined” language like these classical languages. He also compared it with contemporary European languages, and, as a result, proposed the concept of an Indo-European linguistic family, which made it possible to see the culture of India and that of Europe as sharing the same origins.

Jones’ sympathetic image of India is based on a comparison between India and Europe. It was this comparative perspective that created a sympathetic interest in India among Europeans, and it became a driving force for the development of the study of India. Jones’ approach to the study of India was not limited to India alone, but was deeply connected with an understanding of the West and the whole world. He conducted his comparative study not only in the field of linguistics, but in many realms. As early as 1772, more than ten years before arriving in India, he wrote an essay entitled “On the Poetry of the Eastern Nations.” In this essay, he insisted on incorporating the rich images found in the poetry of the East into Western poems in order to breathe new life into them (Jones 1993 [1772]: X, 329-60). He actually translated or composed some poems in the form of hymns for Indian Gods, such as the “Hymn to Camdeo” (Jones 1993 [1784]: XIII, 236-39). In “On the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India” written in 1784 (Jones 1993 [1788]: III, 319-97), he pointed out the strong resemblance among the myths of these areas, and even those of Egypt, Persia, Phrygia, Phoenice (Phoenicia), Syria, and also some areas of America. He attempted to formulate a kind of comparative mythology, and suggested “a general union or affinity between the most distinguished inhabitants of the primitive world” (Jones 1993: III, 320). He also compared the local chronologies of these various areas, and tried to reconcile them with the Mosaic chronology. All these attempts show that Jones always tried to establish similarities rather than differences among the objects of his cultural comparisons. His interest lay in showing the commonality between East and West, and the point of departure of his comparative method lay in a sympathetic attitude towards other cultures. However, the same attempt at cultural comparison could also lead to a totally different conclusion, as can be seen in the case of James Mill (1773-1836).

(3) “Orientalist” Jones and “Anglicist” Mill: Two Different Directions of Comparative Study

During the era of the Orientalists, positive images of “religious India” had a large impact and became popular in Europe. It even gave rise to the so-called Aryan Myth in the nineteenth century. Among nineteenth-century British thinkers, however, the situation was reversed and the old image of “ despotic India” reemerged in a new form. During this period, the era of the Orientalists ended...
and that of the Anglicists began. James Mill was a typical Anglicist and played an important role in this intellectual shift.

Mill’s understanding of India is based on a common theory of despotism. According to him, the deplorable state that India was in was the natural result of Indian society and culture, the essence of which he defined as despotism. This was not a new idea, but a new version of the old image of the East that had been held by Europeans for a long time before the period of the “Orientalists.” According to this image, India was a realm traditionally ruled through the arbitrary power of a despot. As despots had complete ownership over their realm, there was no concept of private property in India, and hence it was a stagnant world without any possibility of development. For example, François Bernier’s *Travels in the Mogul Empire* and Montesquieu’s *The Spirit of the Laws* are typical examples of works presenting such an image of India. Mill inherited this image and further developed it.

To construct his negative understanding of Indian culture as a culture of despotism, he repeatedly discussed and refuted the ideas of Jones in his *The History of British India*. Both Jones and Mill made comparisons between Indian culture and other cultures including their own, but their conclusions were totally different. While Jones found many points of similarity between them and constructed a narrative of a shared Indo-European cultural history, Mill tried to “ascertain the true state of the Hindus in the scale of civilization” (Mill 1990 [1817]: I, 456). Based on this approach, he concluded that Indian culture was positioned on a far lower rung of this “scale” than European culture. This unified concept of what constitutes “civilization” focusing on evaluating the level of modernization and evolution of a society or culture is totally different from that used by Jones. Both Jones and Mill compared India and other regions from a variety of angles, but the comparative approach chosen by Jones was different from Mill’s strict and consistent comparative framework. Mill aimed to measure the position of individual cultures on a single, unified scale and he defined his own approach through a critique of Jones’ ideas as exemplified by the following quote.

> The term civilization was by him [William Jones], as by most men, attached to no fixed and definite assemblage of ideas. With the exception of some of the lowest states of society in which human beings have been found, it was applied to nations in all the stages of social advancement. It is not easy to describe the characteristics of the different stages of social progress. It is not from one feature, or from two, that a just conclusion can be drawn. In these it sometimes happens that nations resemble those which are placed at stages considerably remote. It is from a joint view of all the great circumstances taken together, that their progress can be ascertained; and it is from an accurate comparison, grounded on these general views, that a scale of civilization can be formed, on which the relative position of nations may be accurately marked.
> (Mill 1990 [1817]: I, 458)

---

5 In this paper, I use the reprint edition published in India, which consists of three volumes.
As can be seen, the comparative approach chosen by Mill always focused on difference and evolution. In this way, it was totally different from the approach taken by Jones, which focused on similarity and held that India and the West shared the same ancient cultural origins.

While their understanding of India and its culture thus contrasted strikingly, we can also say that they both basically followed the same overall theoretical approach. They both tried to understand India through a comparison with other cultures, especially their own. It is true that one of them emphasized the similarities and the other, the differences existing between the cultures, but similarity and difference are actually just two sides of the same coin. Logically, it is impossible to find similarities without finding differences, and vice versa. It is the existence of similarities and differences that enables us to compare two things in the first place. Although what they did may seem contrary, it is also evident that Jones and Mill were similar in trying to understand other cultures based on a comparison with their own culture. Ultimately, their difference merely lies in their conclusions.

Thus, it is possible to find the same way of understanding Others in the sympathetic understanding of India of the Orientalists and in the antipathetic understanding of the Anglicists. By this, I do not mean to say that the Orientalists were in fact as biased as the Anglicists, or vice versa. What interests me is the ambiguous attitude toward the “Other” displayed by both camps. We tend to expect that sympathy is the best way to understand other cultures, but this is not entirely the case. When we develop sympathy toward something, we are necessarily forced to find something else to turn into the alien Other. In the next section, I will examine what it was that the Orientalists alienated to maintain their sympathetic view of India.

3. A Sympathetic Understanding of Others and its Difficulties

(1) Rifts among the Orientalists: The Impeachment of Hastings and Edmund Burke

Although the Orientalists shared a sympathetic understanding of India, in the case of the impeachment of Warren Hastings, we can also discern a deep rift dividing them.

The process of impeaching Hastings was started in 1786 in the House of Commons, with a motion made by Edmund Burke (1729-1797), a famous statesman and conservative thinker, and his friends in the Fox group of the Whigs. Hastings was charged with abuse of his authority as Governor General and misrule of India. Burke produced twenty-two “Articles of Charges of High Crimes and Misdemeanors” against Hastings. Some of them were passed and Burke succeeded in persuading the House of Commons to impeach Hastings. In 1788, the impeachment trial before the House of Lords started. At first, many people showed a tremendously large interest in the trial held at Westminster Hall, but this interest lasted for that year only and after 1789, people rapidly lost interest. Hastings was ultimately acquitted in 1795. At the time of his acquittal, only twenty-nine members of the House of Lords were in attendance.

As part of this long trial, a vast number of arguments concerning India were produced. However, both the accusers and the accused were famous “Orientalists,” sharing a pro-Indian attitude. How and why did such a long and bitter dispute flare up between people fundamentally
adhering to the same stance, and what was the main issue at stake? To answer these questions, we have to turn to the two key concepts of “despotism” and “nabob.”

The entire affair started with a careless remark made by Hastings. In his defense against a charge leveled against him, he said that the “whole history of Asia is nothing more than precedents to prove the invariable exercise of arbitrary power” (Journals of the House of Commons [2, Maii, 1763]: xli, 696). This statement seems out of character for him, as he was a great patron of Oriental studies in India and sought to rule India following indigenous law and custom. In fact, it has been argued that this part of his defense was not written by himself, but by N. B. Halhed, an Orientalist and writer for the East India Company. The intention of the statement was to show that some of Hasting’s policies that appeared despotic were in fact merely a continuation of the authority that the local ruler had had over the area that came under the rule of the East India Company. However, this was clearly an ill-advised strategy, as this statement allowed Burke to harshly attack Hastings himself as a despot.

Mr Hastings comes before your Lordships not as a British Governor,… but as a Soubahdar, as a Bashaw [Pasha] of three tails. He says: I had an arbitrary power to exercise; I exercised [it]… It was disagreeable to me, but I did exercise it, and no other power can be exercised in that Country…. Here he has declared his opinion that he is a despotic prince, that he is to use arbitrary power, and of course all his acts are covered with that shield…. He to have arbitrary power!… We have no arbitrary power…. We are all born in subjection…to one great, immutable, pre-existent law…. All power is of God…. I do insist upon it that Oriental Governments know nothing of this arbitrary power…. The law is given by God, and it has the double sanction of law and of religion, with which the Prince is no more to dispense than any one else. (Burke 1991 [1788]: 346-53)

Hasting’s careless statement gave Burke ample ammunition for criticism. Burke wanted to take the side of the Indian people and attack Hastings from this position. For this purpose, it was advantageous to depict Hastings as a despot. In order to take the side of India and maintain a positive image of it, it was necessary to avoid the old negative image of Indian despotism. Hence, Burke attributed all the negative elements in the image of India to Hastings and to the East India Company. With this argumentative move, India could be treated not as a culture of despotism, but as a religious culture ruled by law.

(2) A Critique of Nabobs and the Distorted Structure of Sympathy

The attitude outlined above has much to do with criticism leveled in wider British society at the group of so-called nabobs. The term “nabob” is derived from “nawab,” meaning a Mughal governor or nobleman. “Nabob” was the name given to wealthy retired British who had returned from India with a large fortune. This new class of social upstarts became the target of envy and criticism, as their existence was a threat to the old British social hierarchy. In fact, the impeachment of Hastings was in a sense an indirect attack on these nabobs, and antipathy towards them was one of the main motivational factors in the impeachment. When people began to criticize
this new class of nouveau riche, they used the word “nabob.”

In the attacks on the nabobs, we can discern the same pattern as that found in Burke’s critique of Hastings. The intention was to criticize a class of upstarts while showing a sympathetic attitude toward India at the same time. However, to do so, the critics used existing negative images of Indian society and simply attributed them to the nabobs and to Hastings. There were some contradictions inherent in this strategy. On the one hand, the critics denied the existence of indigenous despotism in India, but on the other hand, they used the image of Oriental despotism itself to criticize the nabobs and maintain a sympathetic image of India. Everything negative that could be said about India was simply attributed to the nabobs, who were not only social upstarts but can also be described as representing a group of Indianized British. In this sense, it can be said that the arguments of the critics of the nabobs actually betray a hidden fear and antipathy toward India. Under the veneer of their Indophilia lay an Indophobia that had to be dealt with through a subtle manipulation of their distribution of sympathy and antipathy.

The antipathy toward the nabobs was quite useful in helping them maintain a sympathetic attitude toward India. It also shows how difficult it is to maintain sympathy toward different cultures. To do this, we normally tend to create a hypothetical enemy to which we can attribute all the “bad” elements of the culture with which we seek to sympathize.

4. Sympathy and Prejudice: Different Orientalist Perspectives on the Understanding of Others

(1) Burke’s Concept of “Prejudice” and an Alternative Way to Understand Others

The Orientalists’ understanding of India was a quite sympathetic one. However, to create and maintain this sympathy required the construction of an alternative “Other” onto which any negative elements could be deflected—such as the nabobs and Hastings. It is true that sympathy can be an important tool for understanding and accepting the Other, but it is also true that the same sentiment can result in the creation of a new Other.

However, an example of the ideas of a further Orientalist shows yet another possibility. Edmund Burke’s idea of “prejudice” is of great interest in regard to the Orientalists’ attempts to understand other cultures.

Burke, the famous conservative thinker, placed great importance on tradition, which he understood to be the result of cultural refinement achieved through a society’s long history. This idea is clearly shown in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Burke 1989 [1790]). He rejected the French Revolution, as it aimed to realize an ideal society through the destruction of the old social system. What Burke wanted was a gradual reform based on a continuation of tradition. He thought that societies should rest on a basis that was formed by “inheritance” and “prescription.” For him, without the refinement brought by these two factors, any idealism is empty and dangerous, where “Men would become little better than the flies of a summer” (Burke 1989 [1790]: 145). Burke referred to this approval and refinement of culture provided by history as “prejudice.” For Burke, those elements rejected by the French Revolution as old abuses were in
fact the most important things.

When antient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot possibly be estimated. From that moment we have no compass to govern us; nor can we know distinctly to what port we steer. (Burke 1989 [1790]: 129)

YOU see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess that we are generally men of untought feelings, that, instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. (Burke 1989 [1790]: 138)

His understanding of religion is also based on this concept of prejudice.

First, I beg leave to speak of our church establishment, which is the first of our prejudices, not a prejudice destitute of reason, but involving in it profound and extensive wisdom. (Burke 1989 [1790]: 142)

We know, and it is our pride to know, that man is by his constitution a religious animal; that atheism is against, not only our reason, but our instincts; and that it cannot prevail long. (Burke 1989 [1790]: 142)

According to this idea, culture, especially religious culture, needs no rational basis. It is “prejudice,” and hence, it is important.

When we think of the Orientalists’ understanding of India, Burke’s understanding of culture and religion is quite interesting and important because his ideas enable the acceptance of all kinds of different religious culture. As different cultures are perceived through the lens of the concept of “prejudice,” adherents to Burke’s position can accept other cultural traditions without any rational reasoning or sympathetic understanding. Through this way of thinking lies the possibility of breaking out of the stereotyped dichotomy between a rational Occident and a religious Orient. As King argues, it is certainly true that this Orientalist dichotomy has been and still is dominant. However, this argument does not apply to the same extent to eighteenth-century Orientalists’ ideas of India. What Burke rejected was not the religious Orient, but a too-rational and -idealistic French Revolution. For him, compared to a rational revolution, a religious India was easier to understand and accept. Here, the dual concept is not rational Occident versus religious Orient, but religious/conservative society versus rational revolution.

(2) Outside the Framework of Sympathy and Prejudice

However, there are elements existing outside this dichotomy of sympathy and prejudice. They are those aspects that appeared barbaric to Westerners, something even Orientalists could not sympathize with, and wanted to remove from their image of India. The Orientalists tried to include
India in their sphere of the “Self,” but this ultimately proved to be practically impossible. We can find one example of this difficulty in the following quote by Jones.

> With all my admiration of the truly learned Brahmens, I abhor the sordid priestcraft of Durga’s ministers, but such fraud no more affects the sound religion of the Hindus…. (Jones 1970: vol. 1, 856)

Even for Jones, not all aspects of India were acceptable. Another example can be seen in Burke. The quote below is part of a speech by Burke on Fox’s India Bill. Here, too, we can see a strong effort to include India in the sphere of the “Self” by trying to bring it into the realm of the familiar and exorcising elements from his image of India deemed “barbaric.”

> This multitude of men does not consist of an abject and barbarous populace; much less of gangs of savages, like the Guaranies and Chiquitos, who wander on the waste borders of the river of Amazons, or the Plato; but a people for ages civilized and cultivated;… If I were to take the whole aggregate of our possessions there, I should compare it, as the nearest parallel I can find, with the empire of Germany…. It is an empire of this extent, of this complicated nature, of this dignity and importance, that I have compared to Germany…; not for an exact resemblance, but as a sort of a middle term, by which India might be approximated to our understandings, and if possible to our feelings; in order to awaken something of sympathy. (Burke 1991 [1788]: 389-90)

Even Orientalists like Burke needed something to which they could attribute all the negative images that India was associated with, all the things that went beyond their understanding and ability to familiarize. As seen before, Hastings and nabobs could serve as this “something.” In the above speech, the role of this “something” was fulfilled by “Guaranies” and “Chiquitos.” Had Burke coherently adhered to his own principle of “prejudice,” he would not have treated these societies as barbaric and used them as a negative cultural marker. He should have equally understood and accepted the significance of these cultures. This was, however, apparently impossible for him. As he tried to incorporate India into his sphere of understanding, he simultaneously needed to produce something that lay outside this sphere of sympathy and familiarity to which India could be favorably compared.

Even Burke himself showed the limits and difficulty inherent in understanding another culture based on his own concept of “prejudice.” If we strictly adhere to this concept, we are forced to accept all forms of different values, regardless of our own likes and dislikes, simply because they represent the “prejudice” of the culture. As we have seen, this extreme relativism was in the end unacceptable to the Orientalists in their understanding of India. However, we can also see that it was in this relativism that lay the possibility of breaking down the simplistic dichotomy between East and West that proved equally to be part of their thought. Orientalists in this period established their understanding of India standing on two different bases. While they sought to understand India based on sympathy, they also showed the possibility of just accepting other cultures without the help of sympathetic understanding, although it proved practically impossible.
to maintain such a relativist attitude. Here, we can see two different and conflicting ways of facing
the Other coexisting in a subtle and fragile balance.

The example of eighteenth-century Orientalists’ understanding of India brings to mind that
one should avoid a reductionist approach to the concept of Orientalism. The stereotyped, dualistic
way of grasping East and West is indeed influential, and the significance of Said’s work cannot be
denied. However, when we observe the various strands of so-called Orientalism, we can see that
this dichotomized perception of East and West assumed different forms and created complex
situations. It seems true that we grasp the world based on a simple dichotomy between the Self and
the Other, removing anything we cannot “understand” from the realm of our sympathy. However,
what is perceived as the Other itself can differ from time to time according to the situation and our
intention. What we are faced with, therefore, is not a simple question of a division between East
and West, but a complex process incorporating many ways in which sympathy towards other
cultures, as well as the relationship between the Self and many different Others, can be framed.

No matter how much we seek to “understand” something, there will always remain something
that we cannot “understand.” If we give up sympathetic understanding and just accept the Other as
it is, this dilemma will be solved. Can such a cultural relativism, however, really lead to good
relationships between different cultures? Will it not lead us to abandon the possibility of
approaching and understanding the Other? The two approaches taken by the Orientalists’ discussed
in this paper present us with a basic and difficult problem in facing and “understanding” cultural
Others. We have inherited from them not only a distorted notion of the East, but also a distorted
way of constructing images of Self and Other. What we can do is to not simply criticize the
Orientalism of our predecessors, but instead to try to find clues that will deepen our
comprehension of how we understand cultural Others.

REFERENCES


Tomizawa, Kana. 1999. “Kirisuto-kyo sekai toshiten no Indo: Yoroppa no jiishiki to senryaku ni okeru Indo no imi” [India as a World of Christianity: Significance of India in the Strategy and Self-Consciousness of Europe], in Elmar R. Gruber and Holger Kersten, eds., *Iesu ha Bukkyoto data?: oi naru kasetsu to sono kensho* [Der Ur-Jesus: die buddhistischen Quellen des Christentums (The Original Jesus: The Buddhist Sources of Christianity)], translated by Hiroshi Ichikawa and Keiko Kobori (Tokyo: Dohosha, 1999).

Tomizawa, Kana “Orientalist no Indo-kan ni miru shukyo to shukyoshi heno shiza” [Perspectives on Religion and Religious History in the Discourses of British Orientalists on India], in Hiroshi Ichikawa et al., eds., *What is the Religious History* (Tokyo: Lithon, 2009).