Has Democratization Consolidated Democracies in the Former Yugoslavia?
A Political Overview
Between 1990 and 2003

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Introduction

It seems that ‘the third wave of democratization’ is still continuing, even at the beginning of the 21st century. When the elements of and route to democratization in each case are observed, a large difference can be found between situations in the 20th century and those in the 21st century. This is apparent when viewed from the perspective of external pressure. Democratization in the late 20th century was brought about by internal movements in instances such as Portugal, Spain, South Korea, Taiwan, the East European and Baltic countries, and the like. Surely, international and regional organizations and the United States influenced such cases, but only indirectly. In contrast to these countries, outside actors destroyed ‘non-democratic regimes’ in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This chapter deals with the politics in the Former Yugoslav countries between 1990 and 2003, with reference to the problems of democratization, particularly its consolidation.1

1. The Semi-Authoritarian Regime in a Multi-Ethnic State

Researchers of comparative political science have long adopted a trichotomy in political regimes: democratic, authoritar-

1 For information about the Former Yugoslav countries, refer to my previous works mentioned below and Djukic (2001), Izetbegovic (2003), Magas and Zanic (2001), Thomas (1999), and Country Reports.
ian, and totalitarian (Linz, 2000). On the other hand, they have tried with difficulty to deal with the ‘grey zone’ located between each category (Diamond, 1999). Especially when political conditionality in foreign development assistance has become important, the problem of how the ‘grey zone’ between democratic and authoritarian regimes should be dealt with emerges because donor countries demand that liberal democracy must be transplanted, particularly in the Post-Cold War era.

How should regimes with a democratic appearance and authoritarian characteristics be called? These regimes experienced ‘democratic elections’, but the methods of administrative and political management used by the leaders are similar to those of authoritarian regimes. There are many terms for such regimes, for example electoral, minimum, or formal democracy and the like. Naturally, there are some differences among the terms, but it is obvious that these regimes are neither liberal democratic nor authoritarian. Judging from their characteristics, it is convenient to call them semi-authoritarian (Ottaway, 2003).

As for the Former Yugoslav countries, the regimes in Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic and in Croatia under Franjo Tudjman could be included in this semi-authoritarian category. Milosevic was sometimes equated with Hitler, but Milosevic adopted different methods in managing his regimes. He held elections for parliament during his reign and usually failed to get a majority. His defeat in the election for president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) caused his resignation. In this sense, he was not an authoritarian but a semi-authoritarian leader.

Can a stable liberal democracy be generally realized in multi-ethnic countries? The answer depends upon various factors, but seemingly the demographic pattern is one of the most important, especially when the tragedies of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) are considered.

The key concept is the fear of ‘peripheralization’. The case of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is well known. When Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina attained their independence, the Serbs in these countries, who had had the status of a relative majority in the SFRY, now became a minority in each
country. The only alternative left for them was to get wider political autonomy or independence and be reintegrated into rump Yugoslavia.

Such a situation was similar to that of the Bosnjaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. If these countries had stayed in the SFRY, the Bosnjaks might have protested against Serbia and realized their opinion through cooperation with Slovenia and Croatia, as often happened in the SFRY. It was the case that Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, adhered to ‘the confederated Yugoslavia’, with Kiro Gligorov, the president of Macedonia.

Was democratization responsible for the dissolution of the SFRY? And if so, how did it influence the process? Two destructive factors of democratization will be pointed out. The first point is a direct influence. Democratization produces and accelerates ethnic politics. Ethnic leaders act and speak emotionally in ethnic terms, and appeal to ordinary people in order to ethnicize their minds in election campaigns and even in daily life. When people are under adverse economic conditions, ethnicity can easily infiltrate their thinking.

The second point is concerned with legitimacy. Yugoslav politics between 1990 and 1992 evidenced this strange scene. According to the constitution of the SFRY, the supreme decision-making institution was the federal presidency and supreme executive power was given to the federal government. However, their legitimacy was limited within the framework of the Communist Party. These institutions and powers could function only while the Communist Party grasped the essential power in the SFRY.

The Communist Party’s monopoly of real power began to change following the 14th Special Conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in January 1990; and the reign of the Communist Party disappeared after its loss in the parliamentary elections in the four republics (Slovenia in April 1990, Croatia in April and May, Bosnia and Herzegovina in November, and Macedonia in November and December). The non-communist party winners had higher legitimacy than the federal presidency and government had enjoyed, because the winners had gained it
through the democratic process. The former members of the Communist Party collectively changed their loyalty from the loser to the winner. As a result of this, the substantial decision-making process moved from the federal level into the level of each republic. The federal presidency lost its integrative power, and some of the members of the presidency were replaced by the protégés of the president of each republic. Borisav Jovic and Stipe Mesic were only the puppets of Milosevic and Tudjman. A good example is shown by the change of the federal presidency’s member from Croatia. Stipe Suvar was forced to resign as the Croatian member in August 1990 because he was a communist and had lost the confidence of parliament, and Mesic, a non-communist, was nominated as his successor. It is natural that the forum for discussing the future system of the SFRY moved from the federal presidency to the ‘Yugo-summit’, the direct contact between the presidents of the six republics (Milosevic, Tudjman, Izetbegovic, Gligorov, Milan Kucan in Slovenia, and Momir Bulatovic in Montenegro).

Politicians and ordinary people did not pay attention to the policies of the federal government. The federal prime minister, Ante Markovic, energetically advocated the reconstruction of the SFRY, but when he resigned as prime minister in December 1991, many newspapers wrote only ‘goodbye’. The decision-making process and the executive power based upon the federal constitution were stripped of their content because of ‘democracy’.

Undoubtedly, if democratically elected leaders had tried to reintegrate the SFRY, there might have been a possibility to continue the SFRY, but this could not be hoped for. Milosevic and Tudjman even directly negotiated the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Democratization not only destroyed the SFRY, but also deeply influenced the politics of the successor states.
2. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

2-1. The Political Style of Milosevic

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), composed of Serbia (including Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro, was established as the successor to the SFRY in April 1992, but during the civil war the international community did not recognize this continuity from the SFRY. This was due to the impression held by international society, especially the United States, about the political style of Milosevic. However, when his style is considered, one can judge that there is a large difference between reality and their impression.

As is well known, Milosevic was originally a technocrat in the communist regime. After he filled the top management post in a gas company and the largest bank in the SFRY, he turned his career toward politics in 1984 through the constant support of his ‘godfather’, Ivan Stambolic, the president of the Communist Party of Serbia. Afterwards, disagreement between Milosevic and Stambolic occurred, especially concerning Kosovo, and he removed Stambolic from office and succeeded him in 1987. Furthermore, when he visited Kosovo and made an improvised address in front of a crowd of Serbs, he became the protector of all Serbs and continued to be until his last day as a politician. This is the reason why he was called a populist; but his popularity as an ethnic leader often forced him to play this role, and he felt this burden was too heavy and tried often to change his attitude towards ethnonationalism, particularly after the end of the civil war. He was an ethnic entrepreneur in this sense.

On the one hand, without a doubt Milosevic was the most influential politician in the SFRY and FRY from 1987 to 2000, and undoubtedly his popularity in ethnic politics was his political base, but he was also a communist. He established the Socialist Party of Serbia (the SPS) both by utilizing the property of the Communist Party of Serbia and by integrating various ethnic factors.

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2 Ivan Stambolic disappeared in August 2000 and his body was discovered in March 2003.
On the other hand, he could rarely win, as is shown in election results 1-3 in the Appendix. He absolutely won the parliamentary elections held on 9 and 23 December 1990 (his party, the SPS, won 194 out of 250 seats), but he failed to get a majority in the elections for the Serbian Parliament in 1992, 1993, 1997, and 2000. Therefore, he always had to search for a convenient partner in a coalition government. After the elections of 1992, he was able to gain the cooperation of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) without its participation in the government, but Milosevic sometimes clashed with the SRS in relation to intervention in the civil war. He also could not win the elections in 1993 and formed a coalition government with some small parties. Thus, he established his second party, the Yugoslav United Left (JUL), in July 1994 and ran a united candidate list with the JUL and New Democracy (ND) in the 1997 elections; but the results of the elections were still disastrous – his list got only 110 seats. After the bombing and capitulation associated with Kosovo, he was defeated even in the election for the Yugoslav federal president in 2000 by Vojislav Kostunica, the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), and his SPS was beaten by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).

When viewed from his struggle in elections, he was a ‘democratic’ politician in one sense. He almost always accepted the results of the various elections and eventually recognized his defeat in 2000 for the federal presidency. There were sometimes illegal activities in the election campaigns, but he normally respected legal procedure. One exception might be the election for the Serbian president in 1992 (between Milosevic and Milan Panic, the federal prime minister). Besides his political style, there was one factor limiting Milosevic’s power – Montenegro.

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3 It may be too provocative to say that Milosevic was a ‘democratic politician’ in one sense, but it could correct the fact that one side of his political style, the dictatorship, has been simply and excessively emphasized without a detailed analysis of the other side.
2-2 Serbia and Montenegro

As is well known, Montenegro, together with Serbia, comprised the FRY. Undeniably Montenegro was absolutely inferior to Serbia in size, population, economy, and the like, but there were some constitutional guarantees in equality between Serbia and Montenegro. One of them came from the composition of the Chamber of Republics in the federal parliament. In contrast to the Chamber of Citizens, both republics elected the same number of seats in the Chamber of Republics. This system functioned most markedly in 1992 when the problem of a no-confidence motion against the federal prime minister, Panic, occurred. He had emigrated to the United States when young and was the owner of a large medical drug company. He was elected as the first prime minister of the FRY in July 1992, but was soon criticized, especially by the SRS, because of his policy toward cooperation with the Western powers.

The SRS brought a no-confidence motion against Panic, and in November 1992 the motion was approved with support from the SPS in the Chamber of Citizens (the result was 93 for and 24 against the no-confidence motion). However, Panic won the vote of confidence in the Chamber of Republics, mainly owing to the support of the members from Montenegro. The FRY constitution demanded the agreement of both Chambers in a no-confidence motion against the federal government. Therefore, Panic was not sacked from the post. Panic lost the confidence of both of the Chambers in December 1992 after his defeat by Milosevic in the election for the Serbian presidency.

The dissatisfaction of Montenegro came from international isolation. ‘Why is Montenegro isolated from international society only because it forms the FRY together with Serbia? Montenegro is not responsible for Milosevic’s policy’. The political struggle in Montenegro has been conducted between Bulatovic and Milo Djukanovic, and both of them are former communists. Djukanovic is more Western-oriented, and the friendly relationship between Bulatovic and Milosevic is well known. Djukanovic was inaugurated as the president of Montenegro after the second
round of voting in October 1997 and proceeded towards the substantial independence of Montenegro.

**2-3. Serbia and Kosovo**

It was Kosovo that the researchers and watchers of the SFRY considered the most dangerous flashpoint. Uprisings had often occurred, even in the age of Tito’s rule. Under the 1974 constitution, the autonomous province of Kosovo within Serbia was granted equal or similar status with the other republics. Ethnic Albanians, the majority in Kosovo, put various kinds of pressure on the minority Serbs, and the exodus of Serbs from Kosovo continued.

Albanians in Kosovo declared their republic independent and elected Ibrahim Rugova as president in May 1992, during the process of the dissolution of the SFRY, but the moderates, the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK), held the initiative. As its basic strategy, the DLK tried to link the solution of their future with the peace process of the civil war. Its strategy often received a positive response from the big powers, especially the United States, but finally the problem of Kosovo was ignored in the Dayton Agreement signed in November 1995.

As a result, Albanians changed their strategy toward a more radical one. Moreover, it is said that a large quantity of arms was transferred from the battlefield of Bosnia. The DLK lost the initiative and yielded to the radicals, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

From the viewpoint of Milosevic, there was a large difference between Serbs in Kosovo and Serbs in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milosevic used the latter as an instrument for winning the political struggle, both domestically and internationally. He could abandon the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina because he respected the future of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs as a domestic issue in each republic.

In contrast, the problem of the Serbs in Kosovo was centrally placed in his mind. There were several reasons for this. The first reason originated from the difference between Serbia’s relations with Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand, and
the relations with Kosovo on the other. Milosevic still considered Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia, so it was a domestic problem for him. The second reason concerned the fact that the political myth of Milosevic began in Kosovo, as mentioned above.

In any case, Milosevic started the battle against the KLA through the security forces of Serbia in February 1998. As is well-known, negotiations between Milosevic and the Albanian leaders were conducted through the mediation of the Contact Group, but they were sometimes interrupted by reports of the brutality of Milosevic’s forces, for example at Cacak.

Finally, the negotiations ruptured in March 1999 and the air forces of NATO attacked, not only against the Serbian forces in Kosovo, but also against Serbia proper – Belgrade, Nis, Novi Sad, Kragujevac, and the like. After the air strikes continued for three months, Milosevic completely capitulated and the end of his political career began.

2-4. The Defeat and Arrest of Milosevic

Milosevic wanted to maintain the post of president of Serbia because the FRY and Serbian constitutions gave the substantial power in domestic politics not to the federal president, but to the Serbian president. Therefore, he offered the post of federal president first to a novelist, Dobrica Cosic; and after Cosic, one of Milosevic’s protégés, Zoran Lilic, was elected. However, the constitution of Serbia prohibited the same person from being elected as president for a third term. Milosevic had been elected as president of Serbia in 1990 and 1992, thus he could not even stand as a candidate in the 1997 presidential election. He tried to overcome this hurdle through the amendment and interpretation of the constitution of Serbia, but failed. Thus he decided to become federal president. Once he made up his mind, it was easy for him to realize this goal because the federal president would be elected indirectly.

Milosevic decided to run for federal president in 2000 as well. According to an amendment of the federal constitution, the same person could run for president for a second term, but at the same
time, the election for the president would be held not indirectly, but directly. The date of the election would be 24 September.

The Federal Election Committee announced the result that Kostunica from the DSS received more votes than Milosevic, however neither of them received the majority of votes. This meant that a second round of elections would be held, but the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), which was supporting Kostunica, rejected a second round and insisted that Kostunica won a majority.

The tension between the regime and people supporting DOS grew rapidly, and a general strike commenced at the beginning of October. DOS held a protest meeting in front of the federal parliament building on 5 October. The crowd rushed the building and the pro-Milosevic Radio and Television Serbia (RTS) was occupied, while the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army determined that his troops remain neutral. Milosevic announced his resignation as president, but he continued to live in the official residence.

On 31 March 2001, a special unit of the Serbian police dashed into his residence. After some small clashes between the special units and the supporters of Milosevic, he was arrested and was extradited to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague.

2-5 Conflicts within the DOS
The DOS had two leading politicians: Kostunica from the DSS and Zoran Djindjic from the Democratic Party (DS). Although the DOS broke the Milosevic regime, there was potential conflict within the party, mainly originating from the difference in political orientations of Kostunica and Djindjic. After the defeat of Milosevic, Kostunica was inaugurated as the federal president and Djindjic as the prime minister of Serbia.

On the one hand, Kostunica was a Serbian nationalist and, in one sense, more nationalistic than Milosevic, an ethnic opportunist. On the other hand, Djindjic, who received a Ph.D. in sociology under Jürgen Habermas, was a Western-oriented politician. Their conflict had already existed during the period of the Mil-
osevic regime, and it was one of the reasons for the difficulty in integration and cooperation among the opposition parties.

Their conflict erupted over the extradition of Milosevic to the ICTY. While Kostunica opposed it, Djindjic strongly supported it because he regarded the rapid normalization of relations between the FRY and the international community as most important. The internal conflict within the DOS continued, and Kostunica even unilaterally announced the secession of the DSS from the DOS in July 2002.

The election for president of Serbia from September to December 2002 symbolized this situation. Kostunica, the federal president, decided to be a candidate for the president of Serbia because he understood that the federal president could not intervene in the domestic politics of both republics. As a countermeasure, Djindjic nominated as a candidate Miroljub Labus, an economist and the federal deputy prime minister. Elections were held until the third round on 8 December, but every round was invalidated (Labus did not participate in the third round). Natasa Micic, the parliamentary speaker, has served as acting Serbian president since January 2003.

2-6. The Assassination of Djindjic and the ‘Divorce’ between Serbia and Montenegro

Djindjic was assassinated on 12 March 2003. He was promoting economic reforms and conducting an eradication of the underground society, the Mafia, because the Mafia was not only the cause of corruption and criminality, but was also an obstacle to economic reforms. It was also claimed that Milosevic and his associates had close relations with the Mafia. The assassins belonged to the biggest Mafia group in Serbia.4

Immediately after the assassination, a state of emergency was declared by the acting president, Micic, but large disturbances did not occur. One of the reasons was that the military maintained its outside standing and remained calm.

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4 The leader of this Mafia was the former commander of the special unit of the Serbian police, the ‘Red Berets’.

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One month earlier, the FRY ended its 11-year history. The union of the republics ‘Serbia-Montenegro’ was established in February 2003. In June 2002 the federal parliament agreed upon the transformation of the FRY, following the decision of the parliaments of both republics. The representatives of the three parliaments – the federal, Serbian, and Montenegrin – and the EU had been drafting the constitution since then. There is the possibility of dividing even ‘Serbia-Montenegro’ because the right of secession will be recognized after three years.

3. The Republic of Croatia

3-1. Tudjman’s Ambition

It could surely be judged that Tudjman was ‘the founding father’ of the Republic of Croatia. He always emphasized the protection of all Croats inside and outside of Croatia. Apparently, his insistence was equal with that of Milosevic, to a certain degree; but in comparing Tudjman with Milosevic, it is easy to find a difference in their attitudes toward ethnonationalism. On the one hand, Milosevic utilized Serb nationalism for winning the political struggle; on the other hand, Tudjman seemingly believed in the rightness of Croat ethnonationalism. He was an ethnic activist. The most important aims for him were the protection of all Croats and the recovery of the pre-war territory of Croatia.

Tudjman was a former military officer and participated in World War II on the side of the ‘Partizans’, but it was said that Partizan soldiers killed his parents. After giving up his job in the Army, he became a historian. Nevertheless, he was criticized because of excessive pro-Croat opinion and was purged from almost all public posts in 1967.

Tudjman organized the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in June 1989, and he was the president of the HDZ continuously from its inception to his death in December 1999. The HDZ was a forum party and included reformist-communists and ethnonationalists. Therefore, the HDZ was similar to Milosevic’s SPS.

When the election campaign for parliament began in April 1990, Tudjman made a speech which included ‘the genuine and
inalienable right of the entire Croatian nation, within its historical and natural borders, to self-determination – including secession (from Yugoslavia)’ (Synovitz, 1999). He maintained this attitude towards his co-ethnics until his death.

According to the Vance Peace Plan signed in January 1992, forces of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) were dispatched to the Republic of Srpska Krajina (RSK), which comprised one-third of the territory of Croatia. Tudjman could not accept this situation because, besides the infringement on Croatia’s sovereignty, the process of disarmament was made difficult. Tudjman chose to solve this problem by having Croatia liberate itself by force under his command. The Army of Croatia attacked the territories of the RSK and ‘pink zones’ in June 1992, January and September 1993, and May 1995. Finally, Tudjman demolished the RSK in August 1995. Because of his victory in the battlefield, he won the parliamentary elections as well.

In contrast to the recovery of Croatian territory, his determination to intervene militarily in the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not received positively, even in Croatia, but he did not change his mind. Clinton, the president of the United States, supported Tudjman’s choice, at least indirectly. After the conclusion of the two ‘Washington Agreements’ in March 1994 (the establishment of the Muslim-Croat federation and the establishment of the confederation between Croatia and the Muslim-Croat federation), Tudjman publicly dispatched his army into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Especially after the conclusion of the agreement on military activity between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1995, the Army of Croatia, the Army of the Bosnian government, and the armed forces of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat Defence Council, HVO) cooperated with each other on the battlefield. However, as is well known, even before the agreements, Tudjman militarily and financially assisted the HVO.

In spite of the economic difficulties originating from the legacy and damage of the civil war in Croatia, he spent some parts of the budget on Bosnian Croats. It was natural that this policy faced much protest and opposition in Croatia; but one of his basic aims,
the protection of all Croats, was practically realized because the rights of Croats in Bosnia would be guaranteed within the framework of the Dayton Agreement, when the Bosnian Civil War ended in November 1995.

3-2. The Death of Tudjman and the Return to the International Community

After the end of the Bosnian Civil War, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) was established, and these regions were returned to Croatia in January 1998. The pre-war territory of Croatia was recovered. Therefore, both of the most important aims for Tudjman were realized.

Ironically, after realizing his basic aims, it was difficult for Tudjman to regain his popularity. Tudjman could not mount any concrete and popular policy or slogan. Besides, he was faced with the economic and financial damage of the wars from 1991 to 1995. This damage could be ignored because Tudjman was able to consider Croatia to be in an extraordinary situation. Certainly, Croats in Croatia consented to Tudjman’s semi-authoritarian measures, as is well shown in the results of elections (see election results 4-5 in Appendix); but now Tudjman had to take responsibility for the results of the politics which he himself had initiated.

Tudjman died in December 1999 after several months’ intensive medical care. The rumour that Tudjman was in bad health, possibly because of cancer, had already spread in 1996, at least among the foreign community. It was reported around the world that he received a medical operation in the United States.

Tudjman did not obviously show any positive performance in politics after the end of the Bosnian Civil War, especially after the realization of both of his basic political aims. To a certain degree, Croatia under the Tudjman regime became isolated from the international community. Even before his death, it was predicted that the HDZ would lose the elections for the House of Representatives of the Parliament in January 2000. The HDZ did lose and received only 46 out of 151 seats (see election results 4 in Appendix). Even if Tudjman had lived, the results could never have been reversed.
Instead of the HDZ, a centre-left coalition government was formed. Mesic, who was a former protégé of Tudjman and who had later formed his own party, became the president of Croatia, succeeding Tudjman. There are two leading parties in the government—the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS). Croatia made advances in its return to the international community. For example, NATO recognized in May 2001 that Croatia would participate in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and laid out a road map for its membership in November 2002. The World Trade Organization also admitted Croatia as a member. The main agenda for Croatia is entry into the European Union, and in January 2003 the European Commission gave its support for Croatia’s entry into the EU within five years. Perhaps Croatia can join the EU in ‘the second wave’ with Bulgaria and Romania.

Seemingly, the Westernization of party politics is proceeding in Croatia in parallel with the return to the international community. After the death of Tudjman and the defeat of the HDZ in elections, the split within the HDZ became obvious. The moderates left the HDZ and formed their own party, the Croatian Democratic Centre (HDC), in April 2000. The HDC could be classified as a Christian Democratic party. If the HDC gains popularity to a certain degree, the political scene will become similar to that in Western countries. It means that there will emerge two political blocks – centre-left and Christian Democrats. In this way, Croatia may follow the same path as Slovenia.

4. Bosnia and Herzegovina

4-1 Legacies of the Civil War

Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most tragic battlefield in the civil wars. It was Bosnia and Herzegovina that was affected the worst by the process of the dissolution of the SFRY. Therefore, among the former Yugoslav republics, the recovery from damage was the most difficult in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As is well known, the Dayton Agreement divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into two entities – the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska. The sphere of the central government is strongly limited, and the power of almost all fields of ‘domestic’ politics is devolved to the government of each entity. Moreover, in spite of the existence of the presidency (the head of state), there is a ‘high representative’ with authority substantially superior to that of the presidency. The post of high representative has been occupied by a person sent by the international community, and he has a veto against the decisions of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The original scheme of the Dayton Agreement was to promote the reintegration of war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina; but the basic principle, the division into two entities, has itself ironically become a serious obstacle to reintegration.

It seems that the legacies of the civil war are classified into two patterns – objective and subjective. Indubitably, Bosnia and Herzegovina has received a large amount of economic aid from various countries since the end of the civil war, and the process of reconstruction has advanced to a certain degree; but the attention paid by the world to Bosnia and Herzegovina has recently decreased, especially after the violent tragedies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina is faced with a decline of aid in-flow.

The more serious is the subjective aspect. The governments tried to promote the return of international and domestic refugees back to their original residences, with the aim of the restoration of the multiethnicity which existed before the civil war, but there are at least three obstacles. Firstly, in some cases, newcomers are living in the refugees’ original houses and have no house elsewhere. Secondly, there are cases when refugees will not return even if their houses are unoccupied. The refugees returning home find it difficult to rebuild their bases of daily life, and their houses often reawaken the memory of the tragedy. Finally, the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina hinders their return. The situation is improving, but only slowly.
4-2. Politics after the Conclusion of the Dayton Agreement

The 1990 elections witnessed the absolute victory of ethnic parties – the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and the HDZ. These three parties occupied more than 80 per cent of the parliamentary seats. Basically, this situation did not change in the election of September 1996, the first election after the end of the civil war. Three ethnic parties totally received 36 out of 42 seats.

Afterwards, non-ethnic parties sometimes won elections, but the main political trend has depended upon the activities of the ethnic parties. Splits often occurred within each ethnic party. The driving force of ethnic parties basically originated from the ethnic hostilities, and each party included various streams. Thus, after the ethnic euphoria passed away (even during the civil war), the cleavages in each party became apparent. The SDA split into the SDA, the Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) and the Democratic People’s Community (DNZ). The Serbian People’s Union (SNS) was born from the SDS, and the SNS subsequently splintered into the SNS and the Democratic People’s Union (DNS). The HDZ also split into the HDZ and the New Croatian Initiative (NHI).

The main reason for these divisions was the conflict between the main and the moderate factions. In most cases, the latter seceded from the ‘mother party’ and organized its own party. Therefore, although the sum of the seats of the SDA, SDS, and HDZ decreased, (as shown in election results 6), the total number of the seats of ethnic parties did not dramatically change between the 1996 and the 2002 elections. Nevertheless, the distance between the three ethnic communities has undoubtedly become narrower as a whole.

The performance in elections shown by the non-ethnic leftist party has not been good. The main party, the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDPBiH), won nine seats in 2000, but only four in 2002. Several reasons can be hazarded: the unpopularity of its candidates, the dislike of the leftists shown by constituents, and so forth; but seemingly, the main reason was the territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Concluding Remarks

Has democracy been consolidated in each of the countries of the Former Yugoslavia? Table 1 was shown in ‘Nations in Transit’ by Freedom House. It is very difficult for us to measure the ratings of democracy, but the ratings in ‘Nations in Transit’ can be one supplementary resource.\(^5\)

As described above, Croatia mainly finds itself in the process of consolidating democracy and rejoining the international community. Table 1 also shows the improvement in the ratings of Croatia, especially after the death of Tudjman and the defeat of the HDZ.

The FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is also consolidating democracy. The improvement is obvious, particularly after the destruction of Milosevic’s regime and the defeat of the SPS. The assassination of Djindjic did not raise as large a scale of disturbance as what had been expected, and this is evidence of a certain maturity in democratic consolidation. It could even be judged that the failure to elect a Serbian president came from ‘democratic deficits’. The main cause of the inconclusive election was that the majority of registered voters did not go to polling stations.

Before looking at Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would be better to touch upon the other two countries which comprised Yugoslavia – Slovenia and Macedonia. Slovenia has always been the frontrunner in the race for democratization among the Former Yugoslav countries. The rating of Table 1 also shows that Slovenia is one of the top-ranked countries among the former Soviet and East European countries. Presently, Slovenia has a consolidated democracy.

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\(^5\) In ‘Nations in Transit’, the ratings of democracy are the averages of ratings of four factors: political process, civil society, independent media, and governance. The rating of each factor between 1 (the highest) and 7 (the lowest) is calculated from answers to a checklist of questions. Each rating is the result of research from the previous year.
Table 1. Nations in Transit Scores 1997 to 2003

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(has Democratization Consolidated)

As for Macedonia, the rating is not good, but it seems that this country is also in the process of consolidating democracy, as shown by the process of organizing a governing coalition last year. As a result of negotiations, even the political party having close relations with an Albanian armed group participated in the government.

The rating of Bosnia and Herzegovina is even better than that of Russia under Vladimir Putin. Probably, Bosnia and Herzegovina is also advancing towards a consolidated democracy, but it is a long way from that goal. People and commodities can move across the border between the two entities, but the political process is divided and the subjective border cannot easily be recovered.

Peace in ‘peace-keeping’ is not equal with peace in our common understanding. It only means that large-scale armed conflict does not exist. Peace-keeping sometimes freezes a still dangerous situation. Besides the disarmament of paramilitary groups and the reconstruction of infrastructure, peace-building must also be conducted in parallel with the activity of peace-keeping. Through peace-building, territorial division within a country often works as an obstacle to national reintegration. The international community should persistently support the process of peace-building. The scheme of ‘power-sharing’ has been very positively evaluated for solving the problem of multiethnicity and was adopted in Bosnia, but it is still premature to judge the result of ‘territorial power-sharing’.

Appendix: Election Results

(mainly from Bugajski 2002)

Election Results 1: the Chamber of Citizens, the Parliament of FRY, 1992-2000


Serbia (108 seats): SPS(73), SRS(30)
Montenegro (30 seats): DPS(23), SRS(3)
HAS DEMOCRATIZATION CONSOLIDATED

Serbia (108 seats): SPS(47), SRS(34), DEPOS(20), DS(5)
Montenegro (30 seats): DPS(17), SPCG(5), NSCG(4), SRS(4)

Serbia (108 seats): SPS+JUL+ND(64), SPO+DSS(22), SRS(16)
Montenegro (30 seats): DPS(20), NSCG(8)

SNPCG(28), SRS(5)

Election Results 2: the Chamber of Republics, the Parliament of FRY, 1992-2000

Serbia (20 seats): SPS(12), SRS(8)
Montenegro (20 seats): DPS(15), NSCG(3), SRS(2)

Serbia (20 seats): SPS(7), SRS(6), SPO(4), JUL(2)
Montenegro (20 seats): DPS(14), NSCG(6)

Serbia (20 seats): DOS(10), SPS+JUL(7), SRS(2), SPO(1)
Montenegro (20 seats): SNPCG(19), SRS(1)


SPS(101), SRS(73), DEPOS(50), DS(8)
SPS(123), DEPOS(45), SRS(39), DS(29), DSS(7)
SPS+JUL+ND(110), SRS(82), SPO(45)
DOS(176), SPS(37), SRS(23)

Election Results 4: the House of Representatives, the Parliament in Croatia, 1992-2000

HDZ(85), HSLS(14), LCC(11), HNS(6), HSP(5)
HDZ(75), HNS+α(20), HSLS(11), SDP(9)
SDP+HSLS+α(71), HDZ(46), HSS+IDA+α(24)
Election Results 5: the House of Districts, the Parliament in Croatia, 1993-1997
   HDZ+HSP+HKDU(40), HSLS+HSS(15), SDP(4)

Election Results 6: the Parliament in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996-2002
[1] September 14, 1996 (42 seats): SDA(19), SDS(9), HDZ(8)
   SDA+α(17), HDZ(6), SDS(4), SDPBiH(4)
   SDPBiH(9), SDA(8), SDS(6), HDZ(5), SbiH(5)
   SDA(10), SbBiH(6), SDS(5), SDPBiH(5), HDZ+α(5)

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**Country Report Bosnia and Herzegovina**  
**Country Report Croatia**  
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