Recently in Russia considerable (possibly too much) attention has been devoted to studying the so-called "Russian idea." Participants in this discussion, however, argue about different things: many do not define what they mean by the "Russian idea" in any way, and for the majority of people these arguments appear simply to be about "Russian," "Russians," or "Russia." The attempts that have been made to provide such a definition have usually been unsatisfactory.1

Granted, it is quite difficult to speak about some single "Russian idea": its adherents were and often are opponents and at times even political adversaries. Still, amongst all the different interpretations of the term "Russian idea" and the various concepts joined together by this notion, the following characteristics, in my opinion, stand out:

1. The paths of development of Russian civilization (of Russian culture and society) are fundamentally different from those of Western civilization (different authors evaluate the significance of this distinction differently).

2. Russian culture contains certain elements that not only distinguish it from all the rest of the world, but also contain the preconditions for the salutary transformation of the latter — the idea of the Russian people being "divinely chosen" and "divinely sustained," of faith in their "world-wide historic" mission.

3. Political attitudes are not separated into an independent sphere. Politics is seen through a prism of moral and moral-
religious views. The "Russian ideas" are absolutely whole, undifferentiated. Therefore, the political ideal of the "Russian idea" is also syncretic ("sobornost" "theocratic empire," "universal theocracy," etc.).

A distinctive variation of the "Russian idea" was inherent in the official ideology of Imperial Russia, especially during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II.

Discussions about the national roots of the February Revolution are today extremely ideologized. The question "Why?" is very often replaced by the question "Who is to blame?" — which is completely in keeping with Russian tradition. To a certain degree, however, this also reminds one of the controversy in Western historical literature in the 1940-50s over the interpretation of German Nazism. While certain Anglo-American authors saw the entire history of Germany as nothing more than the prehistory of Nazism, many German authors of both a conservative and liberal orientation tried to emphasize the foreign origin of the doctrines that influenced the formation of Hitlerism.

Likewise, the February Revolution is also at times interpreted as an exclusively Russian phenomenon, an evaluation usually accompanied by negative connotations. Historian Richard Pipes describes the uprising in Petrograd in the following way:

The air was thick with that peculiar Russian air of generalized, unfocused violence — the urge to beat and destroy — for which the Russian language has coined the words pogrom and razgrom....

...It was not really a military mutiny of the kind that broke out during the war in other armies, including the French and German, but a typical Russian bunt, with powerful anarchist overtones.2

It is unclear exactly how the mass disorders that accompanied political revolutions in other countries are different from the "truly Russian" pogroms.

On the other hand, the foreign nature and enmity of revolution to the Russian political tradition was and often is
emphasized. People of various ideological orientations supported and continue to support describing February as a foreign and non-Russian conspiracy against Russia. Here is a typical example taken from a publicist writing during the Civil War: "Now, however, it is clear to everyone that our entire Revolution is not of Russian origin, that it was both begun and continued by those in Russia who possessed neither Church nor Fatherland, those who from childhood were taught to spurn everything native, to treat everything that carries the stamp of Russian originality with contempt."³

N.A. Berdiaev expressed his own special view on the roots of the Russian Revolution in 1918 (he later changed his views on this question): "The Russian Revolution was anti-national in character; it transformed Russia into a lifeless corpse. Nevertheless, the national peculiarities of the Russian people are reflected in its anti-national character, and the style of our unhappy and destructive Revolution is the Russian style."⁴

More often, however, the February Revolution, which overthrew the autocracy and repudiated the ruling ideology, is interpreted simply as an unsuccessful attempt at modernizing the political and social system of the country along the lines of Westernization (a democratic, bourgeois-democratic revolution) that radically departed from the political tradition of pre-revolutionary society. A. lanov suggests that the "Russian idea" suffered a "deafening defeat" in 1917 (although he defines the "Russian idea" simply as the theoretical core of the "new Russian right").⁵ At times the disparity between the February Revolution's ideology and the "Russian idea" is thought to be the main reason for its lack of success.

Such an approach is extremely simplistic. The complex phenomenon of the 1917 Revolution arose from the interaction of several revolutionary trends that at first reinforced and then stifled one another.⁶ The February Revolution was without doubt in certain respects both democratic and bourgeois. But at the same time it was also anti-imperial, anti-war, and, to a certain degree, anti-militarist. If the ideas of a "state based on law" inspired the agents of the Provisional
Government, then anti-Western, anti-modernist attitudes were an integral part of the peasant revolution. The various components of the "Russian idea," it seems to me, were inherent in a number of important revolutionary trends.

1. Religious Revolution

Many contemporaries joyously welcomed the February Revolution and interpreted it not only as a political revolution, but as a total moral revolution as well: "...the political victory may be understood by many as just a political victory, but it was a general victory for the Russian spirit over passivity and morbidity, which prevents one from living, breathing, and creating." The fall of the autocracy was explained by its "sinfulness": "The Russian people forgot the very reason why it is necessary to live in a union and not alone. And the Russian people forgot this truth for a simple reason — they were divided into rich and poor, into the aristocratic and those without rights. All the tsar's power rested upon this terrible sin." Many contemporaries sincerely thought that after the Revolution lying and stealing, foul language and games of chance, jails and fences would disappear. They happily fixated on both actual and merely wished for changes. S.L. Frank wrote, "People became more attentive and courteous to one another; an acute, almost intoxicating feeling of general national solidarity awoke among the people." In this regard February was an extreme form of a "revolution of high expectations."

Of course, a similar consciousness also marked other revolutions. The Russian synthesis of moral-political expectations, however, had its own peculiarities. The Russian Orthodox Church and the autocracy were connected both institutionally and ideologically. Many believers were accustomed to treating the state religiously; the "tsar" was not only the head of state: an official cult of the monarchy was interwoven with a religious cult. Some religiously oriented
contemporaries believed that this was the most important reason for the Revolution. E.N. Trubetskoi wrote:

Why was the tsarist autocracy in Russia destroyed? Because autocracy became an idol for the Russian autocrat. He placed his authority above the Church, and in this there was both self-adulation and a grave offense to sacred objects.... Damage to the origin of spiritual life — this was the fundamental reason for [the autocracy's] downfall.8

Many believers saw the various religious experiments by a portion of the political elite, including even some representatives of the tsar's family (the infatuation with Rasputin and other intrigues), as blasphemy. Just as the social crisis on the eve of the Revolution was manifest in ecclesiastical life, so too the political revolution could not but lead to a revolution in the religious sphere as well.9

The Revolution soon influenced church services. Metropolitan Evlogii recalled:

From the very first day after the Revolution the question was put to me as the head of the Volhynia eparchy: whom to remember and how at church services? At first, before the abdication of Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich, this was quite simple. Later it became more complicated. In the end it was decided to remember the "Good-faith Provisional Government".... The deacons sometimes got confused and said "May the Good-faith Provisional Government last for many years"...10

A contemporary and member of the Irkutsk Public Committee remembered the March days of the Revolution in the following way:

Together with serious affairs we wasted a lot of time on trifles.... Along came a synodic archpriest with the question of whom "to proclaim" at the end of the ektene.

- It was suggested to the Right Reverend Bishop that the clergy conclude their proclamation: "for Russian power and the piety of her rulers"....
- So let it be proclaimed! \(^{11}\)

What this demonstrates is just how quickly priests turned to the new temporal power; only Soviet power could find a way out of this situation, could both treat this question as "trivial" and at the same time find a quick solution to the problem.

Subsequently, the Petrograd Ecclesiastic Consistory and the Synod adopted special resolutions on the unification of ceremonial "proclamations." \(^{12}\)

Many contemporaries' first reaction to the new regime was to organize a thanksgiving service. "The first swallow of the Revolution," the first news of the Revolution, for Metropolitan Evlogii was a telegram from a priest: "The workers have requested that a service be said in honor of the Revolution." Red banners with the slogan "Long Live the Democratic Republic" were carried in front of icons during ceremonial processions. \(^{13}\)

A number of priests adorned themselves with red bows. The Revolution also intruded upon the internal furnishings of churches. Z.N. Gippius' sister, T.N. Gippius, who enthusiastically participated in the activities of the Petrograd Religious-Philosophical Society, wrote:

Currently in the Kazan Cathedral at the foot of the crucifix where there is a little funereal table for the repose of the soul, someone placed at the feet of Christ a red silk scarf and flowers.... This too is a red banner. And it is very clever. I had just written about the cross, and this scarf caused me to shiver with that internal agitation that one experiences in rare moments, and I specially kissed the feet of Christ like never before. \(^{14}\)

Church administration became disorganized. In many eparchies there was at times a tendency to call laymen and lower church officials "social-deacons" and "social-psalm-readers," respectively. A wave of enthusiasm for "overthrowing bishops" and electing new ones flowed over Russia (sometimes laymen were advanced as candidates for these positions). The Synod was overwhelmed by petitions
demanding that the episcopate be elected. The policies of the "revolutionary" Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod, V.N. L'vov, who "acted like a dictator," replacing the Metropolitan of Moscow and completely reconstituting the Synod, had a contradictory influence on the development of this situation. A number of high-level church officials and priests were dismissed by local Soviets. The revolutionary masses demanded a "purge of the clergy" and the sending of church officials to the front for being a "superfluous element."

The movement for autocephaly (Georgia, Ukraine) was the central element of the crisis for the Church administration. This movement merged with national independence movements and was strongly politicized; the supporters of autocephaly had no intention of waiting for canonical decisions. Thus, the programs of a number of Ukrainian parties contained a demand for the independence of the Ukrainian Church. The Central Rada adopted a similar resolution, which it saw as a blow to the Russian counter revolution. Not surprisingly, army organizations began to examine ecclesiastical questions; thus, the Third All-Ukraine Army Congress resolved on 1 (14) November, "To recognize the need for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. Services should be conducted in Ukrainian." Sometimes the movement for autocephaly was also revolutionary in its "form": a contemporary recalled with horror the "short-haired and shaved" Ukrainian army priests with their rifles and greatcoats who played an active role in the all-Ukraine Church Assembly.

The Church administration's crisis was interwoven with the country's power crisis; the problem of dual power, for example, can be seen in believers sending every imaginable petition on religious questions to both the Soviets and committees. The monks of the Alexander Nevskii Monastery made the following appeal to the Petrograd Soviet: "Believing in your committee as a just body of truth, we appeal to you for the removal from the Alexander Nevskii Monastery of the monster tyrant governor-general of the monastery,
Archimandrite Filaret." Laymen sometimes complained about priests to the Soviets and demanded that they be removed.16

A number of priests were elected to Soviets and military committees, and sometimes they adopted fairly radical positions. Thus, P.N. Wrangel recalls having clashed with a priest who represented a group of Cossacks at a joint meeting. A.I. Vvedenskii, the future creator of the so-called "Living Church," was a member of the Petrograd Soviet. Many priests were elected to rural volost committees.17

The congresses and meetings of the Soviets and committees sometimes discussed initiatives relating to the Church. In April, for example, at a session of a congress of the Western front a priest named Elashentsev demanded that valuables be removed from churches so that they could be used for "the strengthening of freedom and the completion of the war." The assembly greeted this appeal with an ovation and resolved to print the text of his speech and have it sent to the clergy.18

That such extreme revolutionary sentiments were widespread within the Church can be seen from the Pomestnyi Sobor's creating a special "Commission on Bolshevism in the Church." At one of the Commission's sessions it was acknowledged that "Bolshevism has captured a large number of clergymen" (at that time "Bolshevism" was a term used for any radical movement).19

A portion of the intelligentsia had long ago suggested that the struggle against the autocracy should be carried out in the sphere of religion. A number of the leaders of the February Revolution held such views. At one of the meetings of the Petrograd intelligentsia on 29 October 1915, A.F. Kerenskii declared: "Politics is empiricism and autocracy is a religion... one must fight this religion with the same weapons, i.e., with religion, with religious consciousness." D.S. Merezhkovskii, another participant in this discussion, also expressed similar views.20 Soon, a number of different trends appeared that attempted to unify the revolutionary movement and a renewal

Attempts to combine religion and revolution or religion and socialism intensified after February (examples include the activity by part of the Petrograd Religious-Philosophical Society to organize meetings and printing houses, and the attempts to create a Society of revolutionary-religious propaganda). In these circles the overthrow of the autocracy was regarded with religious enthusiasm. T.N. Gippius wrote: "The atmosphere has been purified. The universal resurrection of the dead.... Thank God that sobornost' triumphs overpartiinost"22

A number of contemporaries, on the other hand, felt their religious convictions justified overthrowing the tsar, but saw the Revolution as the beginning of a blasphemous campaign against religion and the Church. Such feelings persist today; in 1992 Priest Aleksei Ostaev called the February Revolution "godless" and condemned the Pomestnyi Sobor of 1917-18 for accepting it. In his opinion:

The orthodox "with one voice and one heart" profess only and exclusively that which we were taught by the One and Holy Synodical and Apostolic Church, that is the Orthodox Church. In terms of the state structure this is an autocratic monarchy in harmony with Orthodoxy. Within the Church the Tsar is ascribed the special rank of bishop of world affairs.... Christianity and democracy are incompatible concepts; the very combination of the words is blasphemous.23

It is indisputable that in 1917 many priests as well as laymen thought that February was "godless," and the religious experiments discussed above contributed to this. Thus, despite the dangers many priests continued "to remember" the tsar and to carry out monarchist propaganda. For their efforts a number were even arrested.24

For many believers the news of the tsar's abdication came as a serious religious shock. F.F. lusupov recalled, "The church was full of crying peasants: 'What will become of us?"
they repeated, 'they have taken the tsar away from us'."
Metropolitan Evlogii paints a similar picture: "The manifesto
announcing the Sovereign's abdication was read in the
cathedral; the archdeacon read it and cried. Amongst the
praying many sobbed."26

One can be sure that both the supporters and the opponents
of the Revolution often interpreted this grandiose upheaval
not only as a political, but also as a religious experience.26

From the very beginning, however, the Revolution was also
directed against the participation of the Church in political
life; the February Revolution was also an anti-clerical revolu-
tion. A number of contemporaries embraced this current of the
Revolution in an extremely oversimplified way. Z.N. Gippius
wrote in her diary: "Some sincerely think that 'they overthrew
the tsar' means 'they overthrew the Church,' 'the institution is
abolished.' They are used to joining them together utterly and
inseparably. And logically... amongst the more illiterate this
was even clearer: 'I myself have seen it written: down with
the monarchy. Meaning, beat up all the monks'."27 (The
illiterates' confusion to which Gippius refers arises from the
Russian words for monarch [monarkh] and monk [monakh]
being near homonyms, trans.)

The fact that the victims of the February Revolution were
interred without priests and without services had special
significance. Burying them without a burial service aroused
indignation from some believers. The Cossacks from the
Petrograd Garrison refused to participate in the ceremony for
this reason.

A number of socio-political experiments were also directed
against the Church: for example, already on 25 March the
Nicholskii Union of Anarchist Communists decided to send
delegates to the Shmakovskii Men's Monastery with the
suggestion that they join the union, change their monastic
regime, and that those not wishing to live the life of Soviet
communism move away "to a more remote location." Rural
assemblies often adopted decisions on removing priests from
their parishes; further, many such resolutions contained a
demand that church valuables be removed to repay emancipation redemption loans.28

Many of those who held anti-clerical outlooks, however, continued to remain under the influence of a deep religious tradition, even though they often did not know it. This tradition exerted influence on the politicization of society: the mass consciousness, which in form was political, was organized as a religious consciousness. The symbols, institutions, and leaders of the Revolution became objects of quasi-religious worship.29

Contemporaries compared the Revolution to a "revival," a "rebirth," a "resurrection" of Russia and her people:

Christ has arisen! Thundering, chains have fallen, The heavens rejoice — rapturous night... Regards to you and greetings, miracle Russia — the steppes, Greetings to you my wintery, native land!
Before you — space. Before you - Glory, Hosanna! The radiant cry announces from heaven. Everything, everything is before you, Slavic Power, Russia, Eternal God, has indeed risen!30

A soldier in the Russian expeditionary corps in France wrote:

As pealing bells from trench to trench
Emotion wafts: The people have arisen.
They have begun to live. With anguish Europe looks
At deeds daring, at wonders' rapid march.31

At the same time his compatriot, fighting in an expeditionary corps in Macedonia, suggested:

The suffering face of Russia, I believe Will brighten once again and blossom splendidly. To her the long desired Messiah will come And to a new and better life will lead...32

Other paschal poems sounded similar motifs:

...For you the Messiah has come

In this bloody, awesome, and dreadful year,
Profoundly pained Russia,
Saintly martyred people...\textsuperscript{33}

It goes without saying that the poems of amateur poets are a highly specific kind of historical source. Nevertheless, both in many resolutions (sentences, orders) and in personal correspondence one can trace the same motif: faith in the rebirth (resurrection) of suffering (unhappy) Russia and her people. As one soldier wrote home: "I wish you happiness on this great holiday — The Resurrection of the Great People of all Russia."\textsuperscript{34}

The theme of resurrection and rebirth — the rebirth of a nation and of man — is present, no doubt, in the self-consciousness of any revolution. In the Russian Revolution of 1917, however, one can trace a special connection between this theme and religious consciousness.

The Revolution led to the mass politicization of society, and this process was both harmful and self-contradictory. In compensating for their lack of corresponding political knowledge and experience, contemporaries sometimes used — consciously or unconsciously — customary and familiar ethical and religious concepts to evaluate events. And such a grandiose revolution as this was compared to (and at times also experienced) as an Easter holiday. G.N. Gippius wrote in a letter on 26 March that "The first revolutionary night was like an Easter night in its sensation of miracles near, close by, all around you." Many of those who participated in the actual events compared the Revolution to Easter in their diaries and memoirs.\textsuperscript{35} Even the rituals of Easter were often used by contemporaries to express their attitudes toward what was happening. One teacher recalled a meeting with a colleague: "This was the first time that I had seen many of my comrades since the break in classes; along with shaking their hands and greeting them I said to each: 'Christ has arisen!' and then many of us kissed three times."\textsuperscript{36} Both conscious and unconscious orientations toward the Easter holiday were manifest in people unfamiliar with each other (often soldiers) kissing on the city streets.
Such an approach — evaluating the Revolution as an important religious event - was even sanctified by the authority of religious thinkers. D.S. Merezhkovskii wrote that "perhaps since the time of the first Christian martyrs there has been no phenomenon in history that was more Christian, more Christ-like, than the Russian Revolution." The religious publicist V.P. Sventsitskii remarked during those days:

The Russian Revolution brought defeat to the "devil." And for this reason it is so clearly like a miracle.... We knew that "revolutionary organizations" existed. But let every man tell the truth — including the most extreme revolutionaries — did he ever imagine that in three days the Russian people would rise from the dead? Of course no one ever dreamed of this. But behold, they have indeed arisen!37

It is curious that a number of clerical figures also treated the Revolution in this way: "Father Ivan (from a pastoral school), despite his position, greeted me with 'Christ has arisen! Christ has arisen!' and in response to my admonitions that he be more reserved he objected, 'You don't understand anything...'. Then I understood that he had torn the tsar's portrait off the walls of the school and hidden it somewhere."38

But if the Revolution was often compared with Easter, Easter was also sometimes compared with a revolution. The celebrating of the Easter holiday became politicized: "I gave the Easter morning service in the cathedral, packed with soldiers. The atmosphere in the temple was revolutionary, awe-inspiring.... To the salutation 'Christ has arisen!' amongst the rumble of 'He has indeed arisen' a voice shouted 'Russia has arisen!!'" 39 The campaign for sending Easter and May first presents to the front was conducted under the slogan: "Send red revolutionary eggs."

The salutations sent to the organs of power (the Provisional Government, Soviets of various levels) on the Easter holiday had a political character. A group of soldiers wrote to the Provisional Government:
Christ has arisen! Most esteemed defenders of freedom, the 7th Company of the BDRP of the 35th Infantry Division wish you a solemn holiday of Christ's Easter resurrection and hope that you will meet and celebrate this holiday with the same emotion and delight with which we and the entire country met the freedom for which you fought.

The Tauride Palace was called the "Temple of Freedom," the "Temple of Revolution;" the Ministers of the Provisional Government were called "Priests of Freedom": "We swear to believe in you, to guard the brilliant sun of freedom, and to protect you, its foremost priests," declared the delegates of the 40th corps. N. Berdiaev objected to this attitude toward the Revolution: "To swear to earthly gods in the name of the Revolution is to enslave the spirit and commit idolatry."

The religious tradition also exerted an influence on the symbology of the Revolution: many flags copied the form of ecclesiastical banners; red banners sometimes portrayed angels with trumpets that seemed to be warning the oppressors of the harsh judgement to come — the Revolution.

Sacralizing is always inherent in politics. In 1917, however, the process of mass politicization merged for a time with both the anti-clerical movement and with religious revolution; political problems were interwoven with religious ones. The mass consciousness was political only in form; in its essence politics became an ideological surrogate for religion. This process of sacralizing politics was described at that time by N.A. Berdiaev: "A new kind of idolatry has begun; many new idols and earthly gods have appeared — 'revolution,' 'socialism,' 'democracy,' 'internationalism,' 'proletariat'.' The cult of revolution went on to influence the formation of Bolshevik political culture during the Soviet period.

Faith in the Miracle of the political, economic, and moral Resurrection of the country and the nation became an important element in the mass political (political-moral-religious) consciousness. When this Miracle failed to occur, its absence was "explained" by the intrigues of general political
enemies who were demonized in simplified forms (the "internal German," "enemy of the people," "bourgeois").

People often compare the 1917 Russian Revolution to revolutions of other eras, but we would do just as well to compare it to religious conflicts and battles over faith.

2. The "Russian" Revolution

The February Revolution provided an impetus for movements in non-Russian regions of the Empire — movements for reform in those areas, for autonomy, and in a number of cases even for leaving the Russian Empire. But at the same time many contemporaries saw February as a revolution for Russian liberation:

We soldiers, fearless and brave
Against the tsarist lackeys went!
For the great Russian cause! For a land's great joy!46

The Revolution was sometimes interpreted as a particularly Russian phenomenon without analog in world history, as proof of Russia's special mission. In his article "The Russian People's Revolution," E.N. Trubetskoi wrote: "This Revolution is the only one or almost the only one of its kind. There have been bourgeois revolutions and proletarian revolutions. But up to now there have been no national revolutions in the broad sense of the word like the Russian revolution."47

S.L. Frank believed that the Revolution manifested an "instinct for national self-preservation." His treatment of the Revolution contained mystical tones: "... the people's soul, full of great suffering and insulted in this suffering by unscrupulous tsarist power, overthrew this power in a single burst." P.B. Struve, according to his friends, spoke of the "patriotic necessity" of a coup.48 This is how the authors of the "Vekhi" circle evaluated the February Revolution.

Many contemporaries tenderly saw in the Revolution's being "great and bloodless" a confirmation of the special unique character of Russians. One often heard: "Just
imagine!... in Russia there was a great revolution and not a drop of blood was spilled! This is an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of revolutions. The Russians are a holy people...”

In the "Declaration" of the Petrograd intelligentsia the Revolution was interpreted as "the most miraculous of all known revolutions in the history of the world." It is instructive that the Revolution was immediately called the "Great" February Revolution.

A number of politicians expressed similar views. Prince G.E. L'vov, the head of the first Provisional Government, declared on 9 March: "Honor and glory to all Russian people. The sun of freedom shined on Russia and immediately illuminated the profound depths of the lake of the Russian people's genius." Characterizing L'vov's attitude during the Revolution, his biographer wrote: "The 'Mother Country' was on the brink of destruction.... And could he possibly doubt at this hour the 'profound wisdom' of the Russian people, the divine principles living in her soul, her benevolence, her love for peace, and her humility?" A similar idealization of Russia and her people also influenced the process of adopting political decisions. The ideology of Slavophilism exerted great influence on the formation of L'vov's world view. The idea of "revolutionary messianism" found reflection in a number of his speeches:

The Great Russian Revolution is truly miraculous in its majestic, calm procession. It is miraculous in its non-fairy-tale upheaval, its lack of colossal change, its lack of force and haste in its onslaught and assault on power, and in the very essence of its leading ideas. The freedom of the Russian Revolution is permeated by elements of a world, universal character. An idea, which grew out of small seeds of freedom and equality thrown on black-earth soil a half century ago, captured not only the interests of the Russian people, but the interests of all peoples of the entire world. The soul of the Russian people turned out to be a universal democratic soul by its very nature. It is prepared not only to merge with the democracy of the whole world, but to stand
at the head of it and lead it along the path of developing humanity on the great principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity.62

Many people believed that the greatest accomplishment of the Revolution was the creation of a truly national government. The future ideologue of the smenovekhovstvo N.V. Ustialov wrote: "From now on in Russia there will be no border between power and country. From now on the Russian government and the Russian people are one, and this unity is the Russian nation." N.A. Berdiaev, in assessing the Provisional Government and its head, remarked: "In this government... there is something characteristically Russian, the Russian dislike for governing."53

The Revolution was seen as a signal to fulfill the historic mission of Russia. M.Ia Fenomenov, who described himself as a socialist, declared: "Our Russian patriotism is very different than crude German chauvinism.... The liberation of people is the historic task of the great Russian people."54

The Revolution was often seen as a patriotic revolution encompassing all peoples, a "revolution in the name of victory" summoned to avert a national catastrophe, to suppress "conspiracies" and "treachery," and to replace the anti-people power. After February N.A. Berdiaev wrote: "The Russian Revolution was patriotic in terms of its foundations and its character." "The Russian Revolution was a highly national, a highly patriotic, a highly inclusive revolution, in which all classes and groups who opposed the anti-patriotic system of power participated...." "It was not the social class struggle that led us to a political revolution, but rather the intransigent clash between the old power and all the classes of society, all the Russian people, all nations."55

Many rank-and-file participants in the events of the Revolution described the situation after the Revolution as a distinctive kind of opposition, a confrontation between the "Russian people" and the "enemies of the people," the "traitors to the people's cause."56
The theme of victory over the "internal enemy" was sometimes interwoven with the theme of "resurrection":

Much blood, torment, suffering, and tears Russia's patient people endured through years — Until her cup of patience overflowed! Russia has arisen, her internal enemy broken, From its nightmarish dream the country has awoken, And glory to her resurrection bestowed.\(^{57}\)

The victory over the "internal enemy" was interpreted as the most important factor in the victory over the "external enemy": "Once they had dealt with the internal enemy, the liberated people turned their sights toward a more crafty and clever enemy — Wilhelm and his faithful robbers, who had always helped the autocracy keep the Russian body and soul in bondage."\(^{58}\)

Even a number of representatives of the royal house shared this view. According to F. lusupov, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich declared upon being named to the post of supreme commander in chief: "Finally, we can now triumph over the enemies of Russia."\(^{59}\)

That anti-Germanic sentiments permeated an important part of post-revolutionary attitudes cannot be disputed: the Revolution was sometimes interpreted as a patriotic anti-German revolution, and pre-revolutionary anti-monarchist agitation was marked by features of Germanophobia and rumors about a change of religion. Anti-German sentiments were also manifest during the February Revolution: appeals were made against the Empress-German, and many officers, bureaucrats, and simple civilians who had German surnames were arrested and even killed. The well-known publicist D.V. Filosofov wrote in his diary on 1 March:

At ten o'clock yesterday NuveF telephoned. Soldiers came and dragged him and his brother into the street under arrest because they had "German surnames." Out on the street they explained that their name was French. Then [the soldiers] said to him: "Ok, scram." A member of the
State Council, IkskuF (the former Secretary of State?), who was living with them was arrested because of his surname and dragged on foot to the Duma; there, they sorted it out. Even foreign newspapers wrote about this. The English *Times* reported that "a strong anti-German mood predominates in the population." Foreign newspapers (English and German) reported on the persecution of people with German surnames.  

An anti-German mood also predominated amongst the supporters of renewing the Church: "The regime of the German police state established in Russia during the so-called 'imperial' period of its history could not help but exert its deadening, chilling influence on ecclesiastical life."  

A committee of the 9th Finish Rifle Company declared: "Greeting the great historical fact of the fall of the monarchy, and along with it the pernicious domination of the Germans..." One also encounters similar attitudes in personal correspondence. One soldier wrote home, "Greetings on the occasion of the new Russian and non-German government." A review of soldiers letters prepared by the military censor pointed out: "The opinion is often repeated that the overthrow of the old regime was the salvation of Russia from the Germans, who would inevitably have acquired Russia under the former Minister-Traitors."  

Anti-monarchist and anti-German attitudes were interwoven in the cheap, mass-produced "anti-Rasputin" literature, in analogous theatrical productions, and in folklore:

... You led a campaign  
    With Wilhelm one and all,  
    And the simple people cursed  
    You scoundrels. Eh, you  
princes, my princes  
You butlers!  
True Holsteins  
You Germans!  

The wide-spread belief in a conspiracy between the Tsar and Germany left a profound imprint on the mass historic
consciousness: even decades later many tourists who visited the former imperial palaces tried to figure out exactly where the telephones were located that the Tsar and Tsarina used to "give away secrets" to the Germans.

The question of the presence of xenophobia in the ideology of the Russian liberation movement is one that needs special study. In 1917, however, such attitudes had an even more immediate source: chauvinistic and militaristic agitation during World War I influenced many interpretations of February. In the "patriotic" literature of the war period victory over the "internal German" was seen as a precondition for victory over the "external German." This is precisely the terminology that we encounter in many of the resolutions after February.

The logical construction "Germans are our enemies, our enemies are German" influenced the political struggle after the February Revolution. Political opponents were accused of Germanophily and treason. Initially, such accusations were aimed at left socialists and later even at moderate ones. Many soldiers, however, accused the Supreme Commander of treason: they were convinced that L.G. Kornilov, who had escaped captivity, had actually been allowed to escape.

Before February many authorities had pointed out that unrestrained anti-German propaganda represented a danger for state security. After the revolution anti-German propaganda was supported in all kinds of ways by the army command. A "Letter to the Motherland," printed and distributed by a sailor, said: "Germans living in Russia and the old government committed a great treason.... But one should not forget that even now in our country there is a German for whom Russian freedom is nauseating."65

It was precisely this interpretation of the Revolution (as a patriotic revolution in the name of victory, as an anti-German revolution) that was advanced by the propaganda of the allies in Russia.

It should be pointed out that Russian soldiers, and in a number of cases Russian workers, were sometimes the
initiators and conduits of the radicalization of revolutionary movements in the non-Russian outlying areas at the same time that local social activists were assuming more moderate positions. This, it would seem, also left an impression on perceptions of the Revolution as a Russian revolution.

3. Anti-bourgeois Revolution

Neither the "religious revolution" nor the "patriotic revolution" was a fundamental current of the Revolution. Socialist parties of various persuasions played a most active role in this process; they were the ones who exerted the greatest influence on the formation of the language of the Revolution and on the origin of its symbols. In this respect the "bourgeois" February Revolution was from the beginning also an anti-bourgeois revolution. One might think that the internationalist ideology of socialists would oppose the "Russian idea." The red flag literally became the state flag, and even the liberal press viewed attempts to demonstrate under the national banner as "monarchist demonstrations." N.A. Berdiaev reproached socialists for their lack of patriotism:

International social democracy is completely German in spirit. It is, in fact, one of the German influences that is preventing the Russian people from comprehending that there is a great world-wide historic struggle taking place between the Slavic and the Germanic peoples, between two hostile forces of history, that the Slavic race will either emerge from this struggle victorious, will repel the pretensions of Germanism and fulfill its mission in history, or it will be degraded and pushed aside.

Nevertheless, we do encounter traces of the "Russian idea" in studying the socialist subculture of 1917. Even N.A. Berdiaev himself pointed out in 1917 the connection between socialism and the Russian political tradition: "Russian revolutionary socialism is a completely reactionary
phenomenon; it is merely the legacy of the processes that have been breaking down old Russia.\(^{67}\)

Even many moderate socialists considered Russia to be the center of international revolution. I.G. Tsereteli declared in one of his speeches, "... with the joint efforts of all the living forces of the country we will carry our Revolution through to the end and, perhaps, spread it to the rest of the world."\(^{68}\)

The revolutionary masses, assimilating the propaganda of the socialists, began to see themselves as the "vanguard" of the international workers' movement — this is precisely how the soldiers of the reserve battalions in the Russian Guard called themselves. "The most democratic in all the world," is how many resolutions described their country. "Oppressed peoples of all countries," they constantly summoned, "should follow the example" of Russia, or the Russian people: "German people, follow our example in the struggle with your government."\(^{69}\)

Revolutionary messianism was manifest in the creation of symbols for the new Russia: on many of the banners and emblems of that time one encounters representations of the earth, where the planet was sometimes adorned with the figure of a Russian worker carrying a red flag. Representations of the globe also appeared in the drafts of a new state coat of arms for Russia.\(^{70}\) This also had an influence on the formation of coats of arms during the Soviet period.

In characterizing these kinds of attitudes many publicists began to speak of "inside-out Slavophilism." The well-known sociologist P. Sorokin wrote:

When you see how the ignorant proletariat — up to 80% of whose members are illiterate and whose remaining part is just barely able to read and write Russian — being under the hypnosis of revolutionary phraseology, seriously begins to think that he is indeed the "vanguard," the most enlightened and best detachment of the International — when you see all this, it involuntarily reminds one of the Slavophiles and Dostoevskii's "Russian schoolboy."\(^{71}\)
It is also possible to discuss the mutual influence of the religious and the anti-bourgeois currents of the Revolution. This shows up, in particular, in the creation of various models of Christian socialism and in analogous combinations of parties and religious organizations. Thus, the Union of New Christian-Socialists, while characterizing the overthrown order as "completely anti-Christian," considered it their task to establish the kingdom of God on earth. Various attempts were made to create Christian-socialist and "Church-socialist" parties. A number of contemporaries even criticized V.N. L'vov for "dressing" the Orthodox Church "in the clothes of Christian socialism."

On the other hand, the movement for religious renovation also developed under the influence of the "fashion for socialism." A union of democratic clergy and laymen expressed their support for the struggle with capitalism, and a pre-assembly meeting of the Russian Orthodox Church came out in favor of abolishing capitalism.

The socialist and anti-bourgeois mass consciousness was also connected to religious tradition. In a paper entitled "The Revolution and the Russian National Self-Consciousness," read before the Solov'ev Moscow Religious-Philosophical Society on 18 October 1917, A.M. Ladyzhenskii wrote:

As yet nothing is at all certain. Are the masses animated only by personal egoism, does our Revolution lack ideals, are the refusals of regiments to go on the attack provoked only by a desire to escape danger. No, in the masses, along with purely self-interested motives, at the present moment there is a deep faith that they are creating an extraordinarily just system, that within a few years and maybe even a few months the kingdom of God on earth will emerge. There are people who relate to Bolshevism with a purely religious faith. [It is not by chance that soldiers force priests to add before the final words of their prayers to the Lord for world peace the phrase "without annexations or indemnities."]
In his work "The Religious Foundations of Bolshevism," N.A. Berdiaev expresses a similar idea: "Bolshevism is socialism reduced to religious tension."\(^75\)

Various models of Russian "national socialism" appeared under the "fashion for socialism." The Union of Evolutionary Socialism presented a liberal version with its motto which stated "Through a people's Great Russia — to socialism." At the same time the trashy right, chauvinistic Malen'kaia gazeta (to which even V.P. Sventsitskii contributed) called itself "the paper of non-party socialists."\(^76\)

It should be pointed out that both xenophobic ideas and extreme forms of anti-bourgeois ideology shaped a similar mentality at the center of which one finds the idea of a powerful conspiracy of "dark forces": in one case a conspiracy of the "internal enemy," in the other, a conspiracy of the bourgeoisie. P.B. Struve wrote about this phenomenon even before the Revolution:

The essence of both white and red Black Hundredism (Chernosotnestvo) consists of an educated (cultured) minority of the people being contrasted to the people as an evil force, a force that was, is, and should be culturally alien to it. Just as Marxism is the study of the class struggle in societies, Black Hundredism of both colors is its own kind of study of cultural struggle.\(^77\)

Of course, anti-bourgeois, "anti-burzhui" attitudes were sometimes shaped not only by class conflicts, but also by socio-cultural ones: people with anti-Western, anti-urbanist attitudes used the term "bourgeois" as a derogatory label for any opponent.\(^78\)

But even the propaganda of left socialists at times contained elements of xenophobia. Thus, anti-bourgeois and anti-imperialist agitation was directed to a large degree against French and, especially, British capitalists, who oppressed the Russian people, used them for their own purposes, etc. Such propaganda overlapped with German military agitation printed in Russian in which anglophobic motifs predominated.
It appears that the elements of the "Russian idea" that I singled out at the beginning were characteristic of various political tendencies in 1917. They are found in a wide variety of sources. These components were present in both program and propaganda materials and in the mass consciousness. Parts of them were used subsequently by official Soviet ideology at various stages of its development.

But how broadly disseminated were the diverse versions of the "Russian idea?" During which stages of the Revolution did they enjoy popularity? To what degree were they "programmatic" components of ideology, and to what degree were they merely tactical devices? These problems demand special investigation.

In so doing it would be worth examining the question of the correlation between ideology and traditional political culture and between the mass consciousness and the political mentality. For example, in a number of cases a democratic ideology was superimposed on an authoritarian mentality; fashionable political slogans interacted with deep religious and communal traditions. One might conjecture that the political tradition often deformed and adapted the external ideological systems that were hostile to it. In this respect it is instructive that within a few weeks of the radical anti-monarchist revolution there arose in Russia — without the influence of any kind of external coercive power — a cult of the omnipotent leader-savior, the cult of A.F. Kerenskii. This cult then influenced Bolshevik and Soviet political culture.

*Translated from Russian by Gregory D. Crowe*

**Notes**

1 'In our view, the real 'Russian idea' is the entire aggregate of Russian history, culture, and philosophy, and just a little bit more. This 'little bit' is a certain irrational subjective-objective 'I,' which gives a qualitative definitiveness to our self-perception through our national character," V.A. Bobakho, S.I. Levikova, and L.T. Retiunskikh, "'Russkaia ideia' v igre (0 nekotorykh mekhanizmakh
formirovaniia natsional'nogo samosoznaniia),” Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Series 12: Sozial'no-politicheskie issledovaniia, No. 6 (1993), p. 44.
3 Cited in V.P. Ivanov, Tserkov' i revoliutsiia (Tomsk, 1919), p. 3.
Following Kharuki Vada, the author suggests that we look at the Russian Revolution as "a complex of revolutions during an era of world wars."
9 Concerning a number of aspects of this crisis see: G. Freeze, "Tserkov', religiia i politicheskaia kul'tura na zakate starogo rezhima," V.S. Diakin et al. (ed.), Reformy i revoliutsiia? Rossiia, 1861-1917: materialy mezhdunarodnogo kollokviuma istorikov (StPetersburg: Nauka, 1992), pp. 31-43. Religious, political, and social contradictions were also interconnected during the 1905 Russian Revolution. On this see: P.N. Zyrianov, Pravoslavnaia tserkov' v bor'be s revoliutsiei 1905-07gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1984).
12 G.L. Sobolev, Revoliutsionnoe soznanie rabochikh i soldat Petrograda v 1917 godu (Period dvoevlastii) (Leningrad, 1972), pp. 188-189; E.S. Osipova, Abstract to "Politika pravoslavnoi tserkvi v period podgotovki Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii (mart-oktiabr' 1917 g.)," (Dissertation for the degree of Kandidat of Historical Sciences, Moscow, 1968), p. 10.
13 Evlogii, Put' moei zhizni, p. 284. Manuscripts' Division, Rossiiskaia natsional'naia biblioteka (hereafter, OR RNBB), f. 481, op. 1, d. 174,1. 20(ob). On the thanksgiving services see also: Sobolev, Revoliutsionnoe soznanie, p. 41.
U OR RNB, f. 481, op. 1, d. 174, 1.15: letter from T.N. Gippius to D.V. Filosofov dated 17 March 1917.


16 Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Sankt-Peterburga (formerly TsGAOR Leningrada), f. 7384, op. 9, d. 148, 1. 1; Sobolev, *Revolutsionnoe soznanie*, pp. 193-194.


18 Kieviianin, 16 April 1917.

19 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (hereafter RGIA; formerly TsGIA SSSR), f. 833, op. 1, d. 33, 1.29.

20 OR RNB, f. 601, op. 1, d. 1606, 1.112, 115.


22 OR RNB, f. 601, op. 1, d. 1635.


25 F. F. Lusupov, *Pored izgnaniem, 1887-1919* (Moscow: AO Moskovskii tsentr iskusstv, 1993), p. 187; Evlogii, *Put' moei zhizni*, p. 285. In the reports of the military censor it is pointed out: "Almost all the peasants' letters expressed the desire to see the tsar at the head of Russia. It is obvious that monarchy is the only form of rule capable of being understood by peasants." Here is another example: "We want a democratic republic and a tsar-father in three years," OR RNB, f. 152, op. 3, d. 98, 1. 34. One soldier's letter, cited in a review by the military censor, stated: "It would be great if they would give us a republic with a sensible tsar," Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennoo-istoricheskii arkhiv (hereafter RGVIA; formerly TsGVIA SSSR), f. 2003, op. 1, d. 1494, 1.14. It would seem that many peasants saw the terms "kingdom" [tsarstvo] and "state" [gosudarstvo] as synonyms, just as many people today believe that the words "state" and "country" are synonyms.

26 On this score S. L. Frank wrote:
Of all the achievements of Western European culture Russia from time immemorial embraced only one: strong state power, which originally grew in her not from a process of secularization and not in a struggle with theocracy, but rather from the very depths of orthodox faith: the "Tsar-Father," the anointed sovereign of God, was in the people's consciousness the only bearer and the supreme instance of the empirical-social realization of religions truth, the only link that united religious faith with historic construction.... From the moment when the monarchy, that unique support in the people's consciousness for the entire state-judicial and cultural structure of life, collapsed — and it crashed down on the people's religious faith in the "Tsar-Father" with the force of a wreck — all the principles of state and social life in Russia must have collapsed, because they lacked an independent foundation, they were not implanted in spiritual soil.


28 Russkoe slovo, 28 March 1917; Osipova, "Politika pravoslavnoi tserkvi," pp. 16-17, 19.


30 Lu.L. [Luri Lisovskii], "Khristos voskres!," Voennaia gazeta: dlia russkih voisk voFrantsii, No. 21 (1917).


33 B. Kamenskii, "Khristos Voskrese!,"/zuesflua Soveta deputatov armii, flota i rabochikh Abo-Olandskoi ukreplennoi pozitsii, 2 April 1917.

34 Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi federatsii (hereafter TsGARF), f. 6978, op. 1, d. 244, 1. 27.

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37 D.S. Merezhkovskii, "Angel revoliutsii," Russkoe slovo, 1 April 1917; V. Sventsitskii, "Krest i pulemet," Malen'kaia gazeta, 7 March 1917.

38 Evlogii, Put' moei zhizni, p. 285.


40 TsGARF, f. 1778, op. 1, d. 80,1.15.

41 Malen'kaia gazeta, p. 8 March 1917; TsGARF, f. 1778, op. 1, d. 80,1.50.


49 Evlogii, Put' moei zhizni, p. 290.


...
September 1917; see also Reck', 18 April 1917; and Delo naroda, 20 April 1917.


74 Manuscripts' Division, Institut russkoi literatury (Pushkinskii dom), f. 185, op. 1, d. 1576,1.4. The section enclosed in square brackets was crossed out in the manuscript version in the archives.

75 N. Berdiaev, "Religioznye osnovy bol'shevizma," Russkaia svoboda, Nos. 15-17 (1917), p. 3.

76 B.A. Gurevich, Cherez narodnuiu Velikuiu Rossiiu k sotsializmu (Petrograd, 1917); R.Sh. Ganelin et al. eds., Natsional'naia pravaia prezhde i teper': Istoriko-sotsiologicheskie ocherki, Part I: Rossiia i russkoe zarubezh'e (St. Petersburg: Institut sotsiologii RAN, 1992), pp. 111-124. See also Partiiia russkich natsional'nykh sotsialistov: Osnovy partii (Moscow, 1917), 1 p.
