

Western Europe and the Future of NATO

Yoko Iwama

This paper deals with the transformation of NATO from a Western European point of view with special emphasis on the enlargement problem. The enlargement problem has become the dominating issue of European security for the last several years. But it should be born in mind that enlargement is only a part of the process of transformation which is taking place inside NATO. NATO enlargement is not the enlargement of NATO of 1989. When NATO expands, as is expected sometime around the turn of the century, it will be a different NATO. An expanding NATO of the Cold War type would be too costly, both in terms of money and political cost. In fact, expanding the Cold War type of NATO is unlikely to be sustainable as a policy.*¹

For the expected enlargement to occur smoothly, NATO needs to change. For NATO to change, it is, among other things, necessary to find a right balance between the Americans and the Europeans. This is why the leadership of Western European countries become crucially important, both for the future of NATO and the process of enlargement.

The North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting on 3 June 1996 in Berlin took a major step towards adapting the Alliance for the 21st Century. Berlin was an appropriate place for this new step, since this was the city which suffered gravely under the Cold War division, and which will regain more and more in importance, if and only if the Continent succeeds in overcoming its division in the coming century. If Europe does not succeed in this endeavor, Berlin will remain a sad and hollow Metropolis at the periphery of what once was "the prosperous West".

In Berlin, NATO stated its main purpose as "peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area", and once again made it clear that it

was undertaking new roles in changing circumstances in addition to its traditional mission of collective defence.*² An essential part of the Alliance's adaptation to fulfill this purpose was stated to be "to build a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO".*³ Important in this respect was the impetus given to the completion of CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force) concept. Although the fundamental decisions concerning CJTF were taken at the 1994 Brussels Summit and internal studies have been proceeding ever since then, new emphasis has been given to this concept recently, especially since the return of France to the Alliance's military structure.

1996-1997 will be an appropriate time to firmly establish this concept within the Alliance and clear out ways in which the Americans and Europeans want to manage their relationships inside NATO in the future, since there is a very practical need for such a solution in post-IFOR operations. But even if there were no such practical needs, Western Europeans would need to find ways to take up more responsibility within the Alliance in order that the Alliance remain viable well into the 21st century. Only when such transformation is conducted successfully, will NATO be able to persuade the Russians that its enlargement will benefit Russia as well. The traditionalists may wish to stay within the known boundaries of the good old Alliance, but the transformation process has long started and it is no longer possible to reverse it. The important thing is not to lose the sense of purpose and direction.

NATO's Adaptation to the Post-Cold War World and Enlargement Debate

The process of adaptating the Alliance structures to the post-Cold War World began in 1990 at the NATO Summit meeting in London with the "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance". In fact, this would have been better named "Declaration on a Transforming Alliance", since it was only the very beginning of a long process, which is still continuing after 6 years. The declaration at that time did not mean much more than

the determination of NATO to stay relevant to the security situations of Europe, even after the end of the Cold War.*⁴ The subsequent New Strategic Concept, adopted at the Rome Summit in 1991, reflected its perceptions on the changing security environment. Although reaffirming the defensive nature of the Alliance, it placed dialogue and co-operation alongside collective defence as instruments for preserving peace. The document reflects the transitional nature of the Strategic Concept and also the complexities of the new strategic environment.*⁵ Unlike former concepts such as forward defense and flexible response, the New Strategic Concept is not clear cut. It is rather a document showing the direction of the transformation of NATO, and reflects uncertainty within the Alliance itself.

At the end of the Cold War, the expectations of many Europeans were that the then CSCE (present day OSCE) would play a central role for the security of Europe, and Europeans would be able to look after themselves without much help from the Americans and the Cold War tainted NATO. They were all too happy with the possibility to be able to determine their own fate, after being dependent on the Americans for decades. Not surprisingly, NATO was at pains to find a new role for itself, in order not to become a relic of the past.*⁶ The first effort to cast away the old shell was the "out-of-area" debate. It was said that NATO must go "out-of-area" or "out-of-business" and a consensus was quick to develop that NATO must take up missions also in the area outside those covered by collective defense.

With the beginning of the Yugoslavian Crisis, the attention of the Europeans once more turned to NATO. The EU, dragged by the Germans, proceeded with the early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, and was unable to stop the further fracturing and disintegration of what once used to be Yugoslavia. CSCE was not an organization capable of quickly responding to such a crisis. In addition, the situation in the area that used to be the USSR was another source of disquiet. When NATO set up NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) with the former Warsaw Pact countries on December 20, 1991 according to the Rome decisions,

the USSR was still intact, but it disappeared the next day. NACC decided to take up its work with the separate countries that succeeded these regions, but in itself, NACC was not seen as sufficient to contain the inherent instability of these regions.

It is wholly understandable, that the Central and Eastern European countries were disquieted by these developments and grabbed the very first chance to raise a claim to enter the seemingly almighty Atlantic Alliance. This chance was offered when the Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Warsaw in August 1993. Answering questions, Yeltsin alluded that Poland was now an independent country and did not require Moscow's approval to enter the Alliance. He repeated the same message in Prague.*⁷

This message was picked up without delay by the Central and Eastern Europeans themselves, and also by the then Secretary General, Manfred Wornier. At the 35th Annual Conference of IISS, Wornier gave a speech entitled "NATO's Role in a Changing Europe". Wornier stated that one of the main roles of NATO in the future should be to project stability eastward, and he supported the idea of an eastward expansion of NATO.*⁸ Another figure to support the eastward expansion at this initial stage was the German Defence Minister Volker Riihe.*⁹

It was no coincidence that these two prominent supporters of NATO expansion were Germans. Being exposed by its geographical location to the eastern winds, Germany remains forever sensitive to the goings on of its eastern neighbors. Social and economic instability in these countries will pour over the borders into the eastern part of Germany. Germany will have to pay dearly if Europe fails in its efforts to project stability and prosperity eastwards. To block social consequences at its borders would be simply impossible. Erecting a new wall from within to block the entrance of social disquiet coming from the East would be too grotesque an undertaking after the experience of Berlin Wall.

Hence, Germany became a supporter of an eastward expansion of the EU, as a means to extend democracy and market reform. The Eastern Enlargement of NATO followed the same logic. At the same time, enlargement seemed to offer a new "raison d'etre"

for the Alliance which seemed somewhat uncertain about itself after the fulfillment of its initial mission.

However, Germany's geographical positioning also meant heightened sensitivities to Russian demands. The Russians, who gave the first impetus to start the whole debate, soon changed their attitude and decided that they were adamantly against any expansion of NATO. This coincided with a period of extreme turbulence in Russian politics (culminating in the bombing of the Russian White House in October 1993 and the Russian Parliamentary election with its Zhirinovskiy fever in December 1993) and the re-nationalization of Russian foreign policy. For a while Russia's foreign policy after the collapse of Communist empire had been incredibly Western oriented. But this was too good to last over a long period. It was inevitable that a country as great as Russia should have its own interests, and given the internal situation, some degree of nationalism was due to reappear in its foreign policy. But the change was shocking because of its suddenness, and it intensified the desire of the CEE countries for early entrance into NATO.

By the time the Russians changed their attitude, the enlargement debate had already started and it was no longer possible to stop it. Those who backed the enlargement, with Manfred Wörner at the front, were generally in favor of radically transforming the Alliance to match the new security environment. They recognized there was danger in change, but thought that staying still was no alternative. Those who were against, were above all afraid of provoking the Russians, and they also feared that NATO's effectiveness for collective defense may suffer when it became too watered down.*¹⁰

At the beginning, the Russian objection was felt to be an almost insurmountable obstacle. For a while, the enlargement problem dominated the debate about the future of NATO. But step by step, NATO groped its way towards finding a solution which would satisfy the Central and Eastern Europeans without alienating the Russians. And through this process, NATO began to refocus on the meaning of its transformation.

Brussels Summit and PfP

A temporary solution was found at the January 1994 Brussels Summit. The Clinton administration wished to give hope to the Central and Eastern Europeans without alienating the Russians. Therefore, they did not close the door to anybody, but in the meantime, offered a "Partnership for Peace" to pursue a bilateral relationship with NATO, "beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership". All CSCE and NACC countries were invited to join the new programme going "beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership".*¹¹ NATO reaffirmed that, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance remained open to the membership of other European states, but the candidates were asked to first sign up the PfP framework document and pursue further intensification of bilateral relationship before accession talks could be started.

Consequently, 27 countries joined the Partnership for Peace Programme, of which 16 has already developed an Individual Partnership Programme with NATO. These included former neutral countries like Sweden, Finland and Austria. Those countries wishing to enter the Alliance were of course among the very first to sign up, but there were other states who did not consider membership but wished to forge closer ties with NATO. Although PfP was designed in response to the enlargement problem, it turned out to have quite a mixture of relationships.

It soon became apparent that it was impossible to treat all CSCE and NACC countries on a equal footing. The potential candidate countries for enlargement would be content with nothing short of real membership. There were other states who had no interest in becoming NATO members but it was Russia in particular that refused to be treated like all the others. After procrastinating for several months, she finally signed the PfP programme on 22 June 1994. But during these several months, Russia succeeded in convincing NATO members, that Russia "has unique and important contributions to make, commensurate with is weight and responsibility as a major European, international and nuclear

power".*¹² Since then, Russia and NATO have been developing a bilateral relationship outside the PfP framework.

In fact, by 1995, it was becoming clear that all the relationships that were bundled into the PfP programme at the Brussels Summit needed to be sorted out into three categories. One was the actual enlargement by taking up new member countries; the second was the Partnership for Peace programme involving both potential members and those countries which were not directly interested in membership but wished to develop close cooperation with NATO; and the last was a special relationship between Russia and NATO.*¹³

Despite initially being seen as a 'policy for postponement', PfP developed into a framework encompassing substantial activities hitherto unknown in other security arrangements. It will continue to be useful as an instrument to conduct joint actions with European countries which are otherwise are not associated with NATO.

For the potential member countries, PfP is surely useful in intensifying the ties with NATO in order to facilitate early accession. But the NATO enlargement process is now likely to proceed separately from the PfP framework. This is becoming even clearer since the completion of "Study on NATO Enlargement" in September 1995.

This study carefully avoided the question of "when" and "who" and concentrated on "how" and "why". But by repeating so many times the commitment to let several Central and Eastern Europeans in, NATO would suffer a grave loss of credibility if it were to back down from its words now. The time needed to complete the study on enlargement has been used to form a broad consensus inside alliance. Above all, the Clinton Administration's resolve concerning NATO expansion seems to have been solidified in this period, and there now exists a strong consensus that enlargement is desirable and will happen.

In fact, with a slight softening of the Russian position recently, it seems quite probable that several Central Europeans would enter the Alliance sometime around the turn of the century, presumably on condition that no nuclear weapons are to be stationed

in these countries and that no foreign troops would be stationed permanently (they will certainly enter several times a year in order to take part in joint exercises). Russian Foreign Minister Primakov is alleged to have said in Berlin on 1 June 96 at a "16+1" meeting, that Russia has no objection in principle to NATO expansion, but that expansion of the military structures of "infrastructure" close to its borders was unacceptable.

These conditions are not to be considered discriminating, since the changed security environment simply does not require the massive concentration of troops and nuclear weapons of Cold War times. In fact, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana has been quoted as saying that NATO has cut its nuclear forces in Europe by 80% since the end of the Cold War, "we no longer have nuclear missiles in Europe; we have no intention of reversing that trend," it is "not true" that NATO is planning to deploy nuclear weapons in the East after its enlargement.*¹⁴ A recent issue of *NATO Review* has made public that all ground-launched systems and all nuclear weapons for surface ships have been removed from Europe and the only remaining land-based nuclear weapons are bombs for dual-capable aircraft. It stated that NATO judges that "its current nuclear posture will, for the foreseeable future, continue to meet the requirements of an enlarged Alliance, and "there are no plans to change the nuclear posture of the Alliance upon enlargement".*¹⁵ This statement was no doubt made in response to the above-mentioned Russian reactions. NATO no longer relies heavily on nuclear deterrence as in the Cold War days, although it is wrong to think nuclear deterrence no longer plays any role. The change in nuclear strategy is also a part of the transformation of NATO. For many of its new tasks in enhancing the stability of Euro-Atlantic area, nuclear weapons would play hardly any role. Together with collective defense, nuclear strategy can be considered to have been put in "back pocket" for the time being. This can be cited as another evidence that NATO has in fact transformed. If it would reassure the Russians, then NATO should consider putting this into some form of agreement.

It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that Russia has

security interests in developments beyond its western borders. This is not to say that Russia would be admitted a veto, but the West has an interest in trying to obtain Russian acceptance of its policies as far as possible.

14 countries are reported to have taken part in the individual dialogue that NATO offers to interested countries in view of enlargement, of which 10 have submitted their "discussion papers". There is not much point in speculating how many of these would succeed in jumping in to the Alliance. The first few should not be so difficult to decide, so long as the dialogue with the Russians keeps on going well. Finding a solution for the Baltic countries would be a much more delicate task, but need not be daunting.*¹⁶ Much will depend on what kind of relationship develops between NATO and Russia (which will certainly depend very much on what kind of Russia emerges in the 21st century), and how much internal transformation occurs inside NATO.

Russia / NATO Relationship

Much has occurred between Russia and NATO in these 2 years. After the acceptance of the PfP Framework document by Russia in June 1994, Russia and NATO agreed on an Individual Partnership Programme under PfP, and a document called "Areas of Pursuance of a broad, enhanced NATO / Russia Dialogue and Cooperation" at a meeting in Noordwijk on 31 May 1995.*¹⁷ At the same time, they agreed to sign a "political Framework for NATO-Russia Relations". A draft proposal document was handed over to Ambassador Churkin on 26 September 1995. When NATO Secretary General Janvier Solana visited Russia in March 1996, he called upon the Russians to continue the work of developing a political framework. On this occasion, a Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness was signed between NATO and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM).

Thus Russia and NATO had been working steadily on

strengthening their ties, and the "16+1" formula had become a regular basis for consultation. But still, the Russian attitude concerning NATO enlargement remained very stiff. And because 1996 was an election year, the West tried to avoid making this an election issue.

The situation in Bosnia seems to have done much to help melt the icy attitude that existed, especially on the Russian sides. When the Dayton Peace agreement over Bosnia was reached, Russia, as a great power, could not afford to stand idly by. It decided to take part in IFOR, and for this purpose, it was forced to develop a habit of cooperating on day to day basis with NATO. On 13 March 96, Russia's participation agreement in IFOR was finalized, and formalized through the exchange of letters at NATO Headquarters between Russian and Atlantic Alliance representatives.

Russia's Participation Document governs military cooperation between the two partners, practical, financial and legal questions, as well as the question of the political control of IFOR operations. The Document provides for regular consultations, according to the formula of the "16+1" meetings (i.e. the Alliance Council with Russia). Russia has some 1600 Soldiers in North eastern Bosnia, within the multinational division under American Command.

Since the start of IFOR operations, the relationship between NATO and Russia seems to have changed for the better, in spite of the sensitive period preceding the Russian presidential election. In March, NATO and Russia reached agreement in principle on Russia sending a permanent representative to SHAPE Headquarters near Mons. NATO is hoping that Russia will also be represented at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, where the partners have a wing reserved for Russia in order to have more intensive, day to day contacts.

It was presumably the cumulation of all these efforts, that led to the above-mentioned softening of the Russian attitude towards the enlargement problem.*¹⁸ The West should keep up its effort to broaden the ties between NATO and Russia, so the suspicion held

on the Russian side about the Alliance will keep on diminishing. Of course no one can be sure that the opinion inside Russia would not take an abrupt turn for the worse. But at present, the Russians seem to be at least willing to continue the dialogue concerning enlargement. Russian opinion will depend very much on how much internal reform goes on inside the Alliance. The on-going transformation of NATO, especially its efforts to strengthen the ESDI, should also help the Yeltsin administration in convincing Russian public opinion, that NATO is in fact changing and its enlargement need not necessarily be a threat to Russian security.

NATO, Bosnia, and Europe

Another concept adopted at the Brussels Summit was the concept of CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force). This was conceived as a means of strengthening the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance, by making NATO assets available to operations which may not involve the Americans. Nobody was quite sure at that time what this would actually look like, and although the importance of developing this concept was repeated time and again as the member countries met, the substance was slow to develop. Whereas the PFP developed quickly into a gigantic undertaking, the CJTF moved out of focus for a while, although internal studies continued.

It was again Bosnia, and the comeback of France to the Atlantic Alliance, which suddenly brought this concept back on the agenda. France's relationship to the Atlantic Alliance had never been an easy one, and France had dissociated itself from the NATO military structure since the 1960s.*¹⁹ Continuing this stance gradually lost its meaning as NATO evolved since the end of the Cold War, and France took part in the actual military operations in former Yugoslavia. The change in France's attitude towards the Atlantic alliance had been gradually developing since the end of the Cold War, but a truly new impetus for the rapprochement between France and NATO had to wait for a new government. This occurred at last when President Chirac succeeded

Francois Mitterand as president.

In December 1995, at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, France announced that she would resume her role in appropriate NATO military bodies which do not encroach on her sovereignty. Henceforth, France has fully resumed her involvement in the Military Committee, is participating in the Council of Defence Ministers, and is intensifying working relations with other military bodies. This was a consequence of a long period of policy shift, but was given new impetus by the Chirac administration, and the developments in Bosnia.*²⁰

Deciding to become more active in the NATO military structure, France has also demanded more internal reform, to reflect her views about NATO. She wishes the political military decision-making procedures reviewed on two levels; bringing together the defence ministers within the Council; and strengthening the role of the Military Committee. France's desire to see a much stronger European Security and Defence Identity is a long established one. For a while after the end of the Cold War, she tried to establish a degree of European independence concerning security outside NATO, but through experience, she has learned that it would be much wiser to do this inside the Atlantic cooperation framework.

In the long run, it is known that France hopes to see EU and WEU combined in some way to become the center of European decision-making concerning defence and security. But this will need to happen in agreement with the Americans, utilizing necessary resources of NATO whenever desirable.*²¹ There may be operations in Europe which the U. S. supports in principle but does not wish to participate in. Hence, the NATO command structure needs to become flexible enough in order to be able to function in a "European mode" from time to time. This is where the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept becomes important. The actual experience in Bosnia already points to the need of such a structure*²² As the end of 1996 and the final date of IFOR operation draws near, NATO will be forced to decide, what it will leave behind in 1997. If the elections in the autumn go reasonably well, then there will be no need to maintain the present 60,000

strong force after IFOR mandate runs out. What will be needed would probably be a relatively small force to cooperate in policing and reconstruction. This will be an appropriate chance to launch the first CJTF, since machinery can best be adapted to needs when actually used, and this is also true about military machinery. Besides, giving a boost to the ESDI at the end of the century will bode well for the building of a more equal Atlantic partnership in the 21st century.

The North Atlantic Council's decision at the Berlin Council meeting has pointed in the right direction. It has committed itself to the completion of the CJTF concept, setting up the PCG (Policy Coordination Group) to formulate political and military guidelines with regard to CJTFs. It asked the Military Committee to continue its work on the Long-Term Study concerning command structure better suited to current and future security situations. Also, though the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) met on 13 June without France, it was shortly afterwards followed by "North Atlantic Council in Defence Minister Session" with French participation. This meeting was greeted as a "historic event".*²³

If the present French endeavors concerning ESDI are to succeed, it is not enough for France alone to lead. It is also important that Germany stands by her side to lead together. Despite some worries after the end of Kohl-Mitterand era, the relationship between France and Germany seems to be going sufficiently well. Germany is still very unsure of how big a role it wishes to play in the security field in the coming century, but it has already taken its first very cautious steps, sending some 4000 soldiers for the first time since the Second World War into Bosnia on 23 January 1996 (these forces are stationed mainly in Croatia). Although its record of cooperation in peace-keeping has been long, by sending forces to IFOR, Bonn has shown a political willingness to be an active and leading member of NATO.*²⁴

Chancellor Kohl sent a personal message indicating in which direction Germany wants the Alliance to develop, by personally opening the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on 4 June in

Berlin. He did not forget to stress the special interest Germany has to its east, by mentioning that Germany had 350,000 refugees from the Yugoslavian Civil War and that German taxpayers spent some 10 billion D-Mark on these people.*²⁵

Germany cannot afford to displease either the Central Europeans or the Russians. By taking such a stance, it risks being mistrusted by all sides. But one must have understanding for her difficult position, being in the middle of a continent with a problem-laden past to live with. Helmut Kohl pleaded for a partnership and cooperation agreement with Russia, maybe some kind of a "charter" to be drawn up to form the nucleus of the security architecture in Europe. At the same time, he warned that the enlargement question should not be made an election issue, and hinted that he expected a decision to be taken in 1997. As the Europeans gain in weight within the Alliance, the Germans will need to learn to take up more responsibility and from time to time provide leadership. But it will be in the interests of the Alliance that this proceeds in a cautious and balanced manner, rather than a sudden jump to the leadership. It is therefore all the more welcome that France has resumed its role in the Alliance. And in order for the Franco-German leadership to function, it is essential that the vision of a united Europe be kept alive and active.

Although Britain has provided substantial forces in Bosnia, she has played rather an intermediary role concerning the transformation of NATO. This comes partly from her empiricist tradition and partly from the lack of clear cut European policy.*²⁶ Building ESDI is not an integrationist policy, but it is closely connected with the development of a Common Security and Defence Policy inside the EU, and also with the development of WEU. Hence, if Britain wishes to play a larger role in the transformation process, it will need to share the convictions of Paris and Bonn concerning a united Europe. Of course, this is not to play down the significance of the intermediary role she can and does play between the continental Europeans and the U.S.

A New Start from Berlin

When one recalls in present day Europe what was proposed in the Europe of late 1950s in the name of disengagement, the parallels and differences are striking. It may be useful to recall what the alternatives to the Cold War were imagined to be in the heyday of East-West tensions, and compare it with what the people are aiming at now. The ideas proposed at that time by proponents such as Adam Rapacki, Hugh Gaitskell, or George F. Kennan were composed of several or all of the following components:

- (a) withdrawal of Soviet and American and other foreign troops from a zone embracing the two Germanys or beyond;
- (b) arms reduction, limitation, and control in such a zone (very often, nuclear control had an important meaning);
- (c) a political settlement unifying Germany and determining the restrictions, if any, upon her armament and upon her political commitments;
- (d) some guarantee by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other powers of these three components.

These proposals were aimed at regaining the unity and autonomy of Europe, and eventually to overcome the Cold War division.*²⁷

Many of these components already exist in present day Europe, as a result of the unfolding of events after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The military machinery of the former Soviet Union no longer exists, the threat from Russia is only potential at this stage. In Europe, Western forces in general have been considerably reduced since the Cold War. United Germany exists as a fait accompli, whether one likes it or not. Nuclear weapons no longer play a dominant role in the strategy of NATO. In fact, there is a kind of a nuclear-restricted zone emerging in Central Europe as a result of disarmament and voluntary reductions.

Of course the difference between disengagement proposals and the situation today is also as striking as the similarities. The West has obtained a united Germany *within* NATO, with the continuance of an American presence in the middle of Europe.

The West, with the acceptance of the Russians, has thereby chosen to preserve the essential features of the security structure of post-Second World War Europe that provided stability for four decades. It is important that one does not lose sight of this fact. The enlargement strategy connects with this tradition and tries to extend stability further eastward.

But one must also not forget the concerns that the proponents of disengagement ideas had; namely that it was unnatural for Europe to remain divided and deprived of its own political will between the American and the Russian world. That is why when enlargement happens, it must happen in a way which would strengthen the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. Pushing forward the ESDI at the same time as enlargement may also help to alleviate Russian fears about enlargement. It is highly desirable that fundamental decisions about CJTF be taken later this year, before discussions about "who" and "when" of enlargement begin in 1997. Such decisions will undoubtedly reinforce the strength of the Alliance by allowing for more flexibility and thereby giving more satisfaction to both Europeans and Americans. The Russians will have concrete evidence to show that NATO is serious about its transformation.

Europe of today has the necessary preconditions to allow a solid and independent European identity within the Atlantic framework. What is needed now is the political will to bring about necessary cooperation and coherence among the European states, and also the determination to maintain economic competitiveness in order to sustain these efforts, in this way Europe can regain its unity and political entity that was lost after the Second World War.

This is a daring vision, but a necessary one, if one wishes to see the Atlantic Partnership to continue into the next century, since the NATO of the Cold War, with the predominance of the Americans, would not stand much chance of lasting beyond the next decade or so. In order to survive over a longer period, even in the absence of an overwhelming threat as in the former days of Soviet danger, the partnership needs to be placed on a more equal

and balanced footing. Of course, care must be taken that the U.S.A. does not become too disentangled that it retreats back into isolation. But it will not be realistic to expect that the United States will always take part in all the operations on an equal footing with the Europeans, especially when non-article 5 operations become the main area of NATO activities as expected. The Americans are more likely to intervene at a decisive moment, such as in ending the Bosnian war, and let the Europeans take care of the rest.

The Leadership of the main European countries, especially France and Germany, would be essential. What role the United Kingdom wishes to play remains to be seen, since her European policy remains very divided, but it is certainly desirable for London to join Bonn and Paris in the leadership role.

None of the tasks mentioned above will be easy to attain. But it is up to the Western Europeans to decide what kind of future they wish to have. They have responsibility for themselves, and also for the whole Continent. This sounds a little condescending in tone-is that the effect you are aiming at?

Notes

If the traditional collective security aspect of NATO is emphasized, expanding NATO becomes logically more difficult. See Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed logic of NATO Expansion", *Survival*, vo, 37, no. 1, Spring 1995.; Stephen J. Cimbala, "NATO Enlargement and Russia", *Strategic Review*, Spring 1996. However, it is most likely that for the foreseeable future, NATO's main activities would be those which do not fall under Article 5's collective defense mandate. As Stanley Sloan rightly points out, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty has been put in the "back pocket". Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense*. McNair Paper 46, December 1995 (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D. C.) Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic

- Council, Paragraph 4, 7. *NATO Review*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1996).
- 3 Ibid., paragraph 5.
- 4 *NATO Review*, vol. 38, No. 4 (August 1990).
- 5 *NATO Review*, vol. 39, No. 6 (December 1991).
- 6 See for example, Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe", *Survival*, vol. 32, n. 2 (March / April, 1990); Manfred Worner, "Die Atlantische Allianz in den Neunziger Jahren". *Europa-Archiv*, Folge3/1991.
- 7 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26. August 1993, 27. August 1993.
- 8 *International Herald Tribune*, 11-12 September 1993; Flora Lewis, "NATO: A New Mission Await in the East", *International Herald Tribune* 18-19 September 1993; Manfred Worner, "NATO's Role in Changing Europe", *Adelphi Paper* 284 (The content has been altered from the initial speech in September).
- 9 Volker Riihe, "Adapting the Alliance in the face of great challenges", *NATO Review*, Vol. 41, No. 6 (December 1993). For his recent views, see, "Die Neue NATO", Speech held at John Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies / American Institute for Contemporary German Studies on 30 April 1996 in Washington, *Bulletin* (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung), Nr. 34, 2. Mai 1996.
- 10 For an analysis of the debate, see Yoko Iwama, "Partnership for Peace:NATO Saisei ha seikou suruka?" (Paper presented for the Fellowship Programme of Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1994, Tokyo). See also, Takako Ueta, "Kitataiseiyou jouyaku kikou no Touhou kakudai mondai", *Kokusaihou gaiko zasshi*, Vol. 94, no. 3 (1995), for an analysis of the enlargement problem.
- 11 Partnership for Peace: Invitation; Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, *NATO Review*, vol. 42, no. 1 (February 1994).
- 12 Summary of the discussions between the Council and Mr. Kozyrev. 22 June 1994. *NATO Review*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (August 1994).

- 13 See for example Robert E. Hunter, "Enlargement: Part of a strategy for projecting stability into Central Europe", *NATO Review*, vol.43 no. 3 (May 1995). Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?", *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1996) takes the view that PfP is a "framework that accommodates several different purposes and is flexible enough to futher those purposes simultaneously".
- 14 *Atlantic News*, 22 May 1996.
- 15 Facts on NATO's Nuclear Posture, *NATO Review*, vol. 44, no. 4 (July 1996).
- 16 See Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurik, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States", *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996).
- 17 *NATO Review*, vol. 43, no. 4 (July 1995).
- 18 The news from Moscow is still very contradictory and cannot be stated clearly. Primakov insisted after the Berlin meeting that he had been misquoted. *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, vol. XLVIII, No. 23, July 3, 1996, pp. 11-13. In this interview, he repeated that "NATO's military infrastructure must not move any closer to our territory", but the singling out of this element indicates that "there is a certain space within which an accord is possible". Despite maintaining a hardline appearance, Russia seems to be willing to strike some sort of a compromise. See also Thomas L. Friedman, "Russian Hints at Compromise on Larger NATO", *International Herald Tribune*, Thursday, July 25, 1996.
- 19 On this subject, see Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally. France and Atlantic Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
- 20 See for example, Robert P. Grant, "France's New Relationship with NATO", *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1996; Charles Millon, "France and the renewal of the Atlantic Alliance", *NATO Review*, vol. 44, No. 3 (May 1996).
- 21 That the Europeans decided to pursue their Security Identity inside NATO should be seen as a sign that they admitted their

reliance on the U. S. Hence, there is not much fear of U. S. and Western Europe becoming decoupled as a consequence of ESDI developments. See "Allies look impotent without U. S., NATO says", *International Herald Tribune*, July 30, 1996. Of course, the European security scene can only be considered in conjunction with other security organizations like WEU, OSCE and Council of Europe. See Karstens D. Voigt, "Die Osterweiterung der NATO" and Peter Schlotter, "Die Miihen der stillen Diplomatie. Konfliktpravention und Krisenmanagement durch die OSZE", in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B5 / 96. On the relationship between enlargement and realignment of European security framework, refer to Takako Ueta, "Kitataiseiyu jouyaku kikou no Touhou kakudai mondai", pp. 72-77.

- 22 Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice", *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996).
- 23 Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session on 13 th June, 1996, Final Communique, Paragraph 1.
- 24 The special issue of *SAIS Review*, vol. XV (Fall 1995) titled 'The New Germany in the New Europe' provides interesting essays concerning this issue. In the introduction, David P. Calleo points out that "the absence in our essays of any serious practical discussion of eastern policy or military engagements is disturbing. It should perhaps remind us of just how much the prosperous West Germany of the Cold War was shielded from the responsibility for difficult choices." *Ibid.*, p, 21.
- 25 Tagung des Nordatlantischen Kooperationsrat, Ansprache des Bundeskanzlers, *Bulletin*, Nr. 47, 12. Juni 1996.
- 26 Sir John Goulden emphasizes the "practical" nature of Britain's approach, that they "start with the reality, the real challenges, and work out institutional conclusions from there." Sir John Goulden, "The WEU's role in the new strategic environment", *NATO Review*, vol. 44, No. 3 (May 1996)
- 27 See for example, Robert Osgood, *NATO. The Entangling Alliance* (University of Chicago Press, 1962).