

## Summary

### **The Schengen Information System (SIS): Policy Implications of Evolving IT System in “Europe without Frontiers”**

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This article explores policy issues concerning the Schengen Information System (SIS) with a focus on the long overdue introduction of the second generation SIS II. It is argued that the resistance of participant states to the proposed “Europeanization” of the SIS has added to technological difficulties inherent in “updating” information technology (IT) systems.

The SIS is a computerized information exchange system that allows border management and law enforcement authorities to share data (“alerts”) on specific categories of persons and objects. Established by the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreements, the SIS went into operation in 1995 to compensate for the abolishment of internal border controls within the Schengen Area and to promote cooperative management of common external borders.

As such, the SIS was launched as an intergovernmental project among the signatory states of the Schengen accords. This intergovernmental mode of operation remained intact even after the entry into force of the 1995 Amsterdam Treaty, which incorporated the Schengen Aquis into the legal framework of the European Union (EU).

The original SIS was updated to the current SIS I+ when Nordic countries joined the Schengen regime in 1996. However, the SIS I+ was incapable of accommodating the countries that were expected to accede to the EU in 2004. Thus, the Council in 2001 decided that the SIS would be replaced with a second generation system.

Yet the migration to the SIS meant not only the enhanced system capacity but also the “Europeanization” of the SIS in terms of the development, management, and supervision of the project. Not surprisingly, several SIS participant countries insisted that they should maintain control over information that might be vital to policing and border management activities.

Conflict between intergovernmental and “European” models of the SIS project manifested itself in seemingly technical changes in the network architecture of SIS II. At the outset, the SIS II was planned as a centralized system with member states directly accessing data stored in the central system (Central SIS II). In response to pressure from participant states, however, the SIS was re-

designed and now has a more distributed, star-shaped structure with national components (N. SIS II), where participant governments have the right to possess copies of SIS data. The alternation entailed the revision of network requirements, resulting in further delay in delivering SIS II.

In sum, the recent developments of the SIS project suggest that borders have not disappeared in “Europe without frontiers” and that European states still claim authority over the movement of people into their territories.

## **A Postcolonial Border Fluctuating in the Euro–Mediterranean: Forms of “Confinement” of Excessive Mobility in the Island of Lampedusa, Italy**

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze forms to confine arriving immigrants at the Island of Lampedusa and then is to raise (post)colonial violence translated in contemporary Europe to the surface.

Recently a number of studies have been made upon the formation of the European border regime. These studies, focusing upon the issue of governing mobility, have chosen as a focal point the externalization of European borders toward neighboring countries. We need to relocate, however, such externalizing processes in postcolonial conditions particularly in the case of the Euro–Mediterranean space. Postcolonial conditions mean that a colonial governmental method of confinement in the past impacts the border regime of present Europe. Rather it is no exaggeration to say that such governmental violence has constituted postcolonial Europe.

From this perspective, Lampedusa, which is located at an European geographical border facing excessive mobility from the southern shore of the Mediterranean, can be defined as a postcolonial border. We can suppose that the camp on the island, which confines immigrants, has embodied postcolonial bordering. Hence we clarify functions of the camp at Lampedusa in each two period as follows.

In the first period from 2002 to 2005, on the one hand, the camp was a space dominated by security and policing rationales in which rights were suspended and then the classification processes of immigrants for identification were sometimes rendered meaningless. The camp in the second

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period from 2006 to 2008, on the other hand, was a humanitarian space to some extent. Under the Praesidium project, human rights organizations like the International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and Save the Children began to operate in the camp and to cooperate with police in order to realize quicker and exacter identification through classifying immigrants into various categories like asylum seekers, economic migrants, vulnerable persons and so on.

In conclusion, we can say with some certainty that historically the two types of security and humanitarian confinement at Lampedusa incarnate (post)colonial violence in the Euro–Mediterranean space.

## **Milan Hodža’s Federalism in Central Europe: A Zone of “Small” Nations and Agrarian Democracy**

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This article draws focus to Central Europe as a zone of “small” nations between Germany and Russia (or USSR). Especially, Milan Hodža’s (1878–1944) ideas and activities will be discussed here. According to Hodža, a Slovak statesman, “small” nations located among the Great Powers would not be able to survive, unless they did not develop a cooperative relationship with each other. During the Second World War, Hodža even proposed a federation plan for Central Europe, though his idea had never actualized.

The concept of Central Europe itself is an extremely elusive concept, as Jacques Le Rider pointed out. The idea was invented and utilized amid the German unification process and growing nationalism of the nineteenth century. Concepts of Central Europe can be divided into two types, perhaps at the risk of oversimplification: German ones, and non-German ones. The former type envisions a German-oriented unit under the auspices of Prussia or the Habsburg Empire, which definitely lost the German unification game with Prussia in 1866. Such a concept was popularized even among ordinary people by the book *Mittleuropa*, published by Friedrich Naumann (1860–1919) in 1915. The German word *Mittleuropa* was eventually used as a legitimizing term for the expansion of Germany into Eastern European countries during the Nazi era, so *Mittleuropa* became something of a taboo after the Second World War.

This article, however, focuses on the latter type: the non-German concept such as Hodža’s. In

general, the Czech historian František Palacký (1798–1876) is regarded as a pioneering figure. In his famous letter to the Frankfurt National Assembly in 1848, Palacký praises the value of “Austria” (the Habsburg Empire) as a protector of its “small” nations, such as that of the Czechs, which were located between the empires of Germany and Russia. After the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, nation-states such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the remnants of the Empire, i.e. Austria, were founded. Most of the “small” nations in the area finally achieved self-determination and established democratic regimes, at least in the beginning, but they could not maintain stability in the area, except for Czechoslovakia, and helplessly watched Nazi expansion in the 1930s. During the Second World War, quite a lot of intellectuals and politicians regarded the principle of self-determination for the area as a grave mistake and agreed on the need for a federalized polity in the “corridor” between Germany and USSR.

I’m concerned here with Hodža’s concept of Central Europe as an instance of the non-German type. The first reason for considering Hodža is that he weathered three periods: the Habsburg era, the period between the two world wars, and the Second World War period. As mentioned above, Central Europe is an extremely elastic concept, so it is remarkably difficult to get a big-picture view of it. In this respect, analyzing Central Europe through the eyes of a statesman who considered many alternatives to the regional order in various periods may be a good method. Hodža was a member of the Hungarian parliament in the Habsburg Empire and a kind of collaborator with Archduke Franz Ferdinand (1863–1914), the imperial heir. After Czechoslovakia gained independence, Hodža distinguished himself as a leader of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party and became prime minister of the state just before the Munich Pact of 1938. During the Second World War, as a statesman in exile, he formulated a postwar plan for the formation of a Central European federation, though he eventually lost the struggle for power.

The second reason is that Hodža has been lost to oblivion from two perspectives. Because of his strong anti-communist stance, his views were considered taboo in the age of socialist regimes. After the systemic transformation in 1989, his name was rehabilitated and a number of symposia on Hodža were convened, especially from 2005 to 2007. However, Hodža’s name does not seem to have been fully reappraised. Why? In my opinion, his “Czechoslovakism” stands in the way of his full-fledged rehabilitation. Establishing an independent sovereignty in 1993, Slovakia seems to need new symbols that embody its own Slovakness as well as its Europeanness. In this sense, a “Czechoslovakist” such as Hodža, who had been committed to a harmonious relationship between Czechs and Slovaks, might not be fully welcomed in the new Slovak historiography.

In this article, I present a comprehensive view of Hodža’s life in three sections, i.e. the Habsburg era, the Interwar period, and the Second World War period, and also to examine his idea of Central

Europe that was conceptualized in order to cope with Germany and Russia (or USSR).

## **Absence of the Volga from the Russian Poetry of Gennady Aygi**

GOTO Masanori

Gennady Aygi (1934–2006) was a poet from Chuvash, the Middle-Volga basin in Russia. During the Soviet era, Aygi had little chance of getting his works published in his home country. However, he was well-known to readers outside of Russia because many of his works had been translated into various languages.

It is widely known that Aygi started his career by writing in his native language, in Chuvash, and later he began to write poetry in Russian on the advice of his mentor, Boris Pasternak. On the other hand, only few are aware that Aygi continued to write in Chuvash. His Chuvash poems are not as well known, because few, except the Chuvash people, understand the language.

If we compare the Chuvash works of Aygi with his Russian poetry, we realize at a glance the difference between his writing styles. First, his works in Chuvash are filled with regular meter, whereas the Russian works lack this. Second, many names of places and people were described, and consequently readers get a more concrete view of the poet's homeland in his Chuvash poems. These qualities are absent from his Russian language works. For example, the name of the Volga can hardly be found in his Russian works, except in a few cases, whereas it is easy to find the Volga mentioned in his Chuvash poetry. In fact, some works even make the river a subject of creation.

Aygi was called "Mallarmé from the Volga" by his French friend. Some episodes in his biography show that Aygi himself considered the Volga to be irreplaceable in his life. There is a difference in terms of the way he deals with the Volga in his Russian works and Chuvash poetry, because Aygi regarded the two languages as quite incompatible in his creation. This paper initiates discussion by a citing of one of Aygi's Chuvash poems on the Volga. Based on the poem, this paper will discuss the extent to which the words reflect Aygi's whole poetic view. At the same time, the absence of the Volga in his Russian works will be weighed.

Some of his statements in interviews support the contention that Aygi regarded Russian words as visual, auditory, and even tactile things. A sense of words as things that conjure material images is the point on which his interests in Russian avant-garde art intersect with his interests in Chuvash folklore. The two genres, which seem to be in contrast to each other, reconcile themselves for Aygi in the concrete manner of his poetry.

He sometimes remarked on the two-sidedness of poetic words. One side is the *impressionist* side, which is based on personal impressions and experiences. The other is the *monumental* side, which is regulated by general and social codes. This pairing can be compared to Blanchot's dichotomy between *raw and immediate* words and *essential* words. The *raw and immediate* words represent things as they are, and they are held as the pragmatic criteria of our daily lexicon. On the other hand, the *essential* words are not based on the contents or meanings of things as objects, but in the existential aspects of words themselves. They capture the world through an absence of things. According to Blanchot, these two sides of words should be realized simultaneously in poetry.

Aygi was sensitive to the two-sidedness of Russian poetic words, essentially because Russian was not his native tongue. Aygi's shift of his main language from Chuvash to Russian was therefore not for pragmatic purposes, but a natural consequence of his pursuit of poetry. Writing in Russian, he could get closer to the border between the two sides of words; between words for representation of things on the one hand, and words on the basis of absence of things on the other.

The difference between his Russian and Chuvash works when making the Volga imagery stems from the different ways in which he composed poems; particularly, how much the works reflected an awareness of the border between the two sides of his words.

## **The Resisting Palestinian Mayors: Non-Violent Struggles in the West Bank**

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This article focuses on Palestinian mayors in the occupied territories in the context of "civil resistance." Although there are many studies on the Palestinian resistance movement, only a few have broached the subject of the resistance movement within the occupied territories before the First Intifada (1987–1993). Since the West Bank forms the border between Israel and Jordan, this article analyzes the political struggle between these two states and pro-PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) supporters in the territories.

Chapter 1 illustrates the historical background of the mayors in the West Bank. The Ottoman Empire's *Tanzimat* allowed Arab notables to assume positions in the local government as well as the army. Hence, there were also some notable Palestinian families such as the al-Husayni, al-Nashashibi, and al-Ja'abari. After the Arab–Israeli War of 1948, King Abdullah of Jordan eventually

annexed the West Bank to his country in 1950. At that time, the notable mayors in Nablus and Hebron supported the annexation because they allied themselves with King Abdullah owing to his patronage and client relationships. The Israeli government intended to reproduce and co-opt this connection; hence, it permitted municipal elections in 1972. This election resulted in the victory of the traditional elite, who maintained a quiet, cooperative attitude toward Israel.

Chapter 2 discusses the changing political environment in the territories that resulted in the victory of a new generation of mayors in the election of 1976. In particular, three critical changes occurred: there was an increase in the PLO's popularity, a decline in Jordan's authority, and an expansion in voting rights in the election. The PLO established the Palestine National Front (*al-Jabha al-Waṭanīya al-Filasṭīnīya*) in 1973 in the occupied territories, marking the beginning of a full commitment toward political activity in the territories. As for Jordan's authority, it began to decline after the Black September events of 1970. Then, the 1973 Arab–Israeli War confirmed that Jordan could not assume a positive role in Palestine's liberation because it did not have a presence in the war. Further, constituency populations expanded threefold from 1972 to 1976 because of a revision of the municipal law. These critical changes in the political environment, as well as the 1976 uprising in which former mayors had to play the role of non-violent resistance actors, paved the way for pro-PLO candidate victories in the 1976 election.

Chapter 3 deals with the pro-PLO mayors and their political activities in the West Bank. In the second election, which was held in 1976, pro-PLO candidates won, and they adopted important political roles in the occupied territories. For example, Karim Khalaf of Ramallah and Bassam al-Shak'a of Nablus demonstrated a strong nationalistic political attitude toward the occupation and expressed their support for the PLO. A repercussion of the signing of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978 was the establishment of the National Guidance Committee (NGC, *Lajna al-Tawjīh al-Waṭanī*), which opposed the accords. Besides the mayors as its supporters, the NGC was also supported by trade union leaders, women's organizations, and the student union.

Chapter 4 investigates the effect of Israeli policy on political activities in the occupied territories. The Village League (*Rawābiṭ li-l-Qurā*) was a puppet organization of the Israeli authority in the occupied territories. It was designed as an organization to counter the power of the mayors and the NGC. Once it became clear that this attempt was failing, the Israeli authority adopted more harsh measures toward the mayors, such as deporting them to lands outside the West Bank and discharging them from their duties. In 1980, Fahd al-Qawasmi of Hebron and Muhammad Milhim of Halhul were deported to Jordan. They were outstanding mayors in the occupied territories and were thus targeted by the Israeli authorities. The mayors also faced threats from Jewish settlers. For instance, Shak'a and Khalaf were victims of assassination attempts when bombs were planted in their cars.

Shak‘a lost both his legs and Khalaf lost one leg, but they retained their positions as mayors, which resulted in their becoming the most popular leaders in the territories. Then, in 1982, the Israeli authority decided to discharge most of the Palestinian mayors including Shak‘a and Khalaf. This marked the end of the era in which mayors had been political leaders.

This article sheds light on the non-violent resistance in the occupied West Bank from the 1960s to 1982, by analyzing the role of Palestinian mayors. Since the West Bank is bordered by Israel and Jordan, these two states strongly influence the territories. However, an increasing number of PLO supporters challenged the hegemony, and they finally received strong support from the people, as can be observed in their victory in the 1976 municipal elections. As it became clear that the pro-PLO political wing was growing stronger, Israeli authorities attempted to purge the country of the nationalist mayors and finally discharged most of them. This is a very important fact because after the discharge of the mayors, there were some “leaderless” uprisings in the territories. These uprisings could be considered the precursors to the Intifada of 1987.

## **Colonial Power and Cross-Border Politics: Rethinking of German Rule in the Kiaochow Leasehold**

ASADA Shinji

At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, during the imperial world order, there were various types of colonies that had been demarcated with different types of boundaries. The Kiaochow leasehold under German rule, which will be discussed in this article, was one of these colonies. The leasehold was considered to have an “open door,” and was expected to serve as a trading colony (“*Handelskolonie*”) that would link regional economies to the world market and support the imperial economic order of free trade in East Asia on one hand. On the other hand, it was to serve as a military base to help maintain imperial order through the use of arms. Because of this, the activities of the Germans in the Kiaochow leasehold, a limited territory, had a strong influence far beyond its boundaries from the very beginning.

East Asia was a mixture of European, American, and Japanese colonies; the German colonial authorities in the leasehold executed their rule by keeping in mind the interests of not only their own nation-state or colonial empire. German colonial rule included transnational factors, which influenced German activities. An analysis of the literature on the German rule of the Kiaochow

leasehold has been limited to a binary framework — one of German–Sino relations. In this article, however, I discussed how German rule was influenced and enforced keeping in mind the East Asian transnational factors of the time, and how this caused an international conflict in the end.

First, I determine the importance of transnational factors in stabilizing colonial order, especially in urban districts. The population of Qingdao, an urban district, was distinctive because it had a higher proportion of men, constituting German soldiers stationed in the leasehold. At the beginning of the occupation, sexual violence against Chinese women in the area was rampant and venereal diseases started spreading among the German troops. This led to the German authorities institutionalizing prostitution in the leasehold. At the same time, Japanese brothel-brokers started transporting Japanese prostitutes. German rule depended on the Japanese women across the border of the territory to avoid a destabilization of the colonial social order.

Second, I analyze how the German authorities dealt with Korean political refugees who criticized the Japanese rule in Korea after the Russo–Japanese War and had escaped to the German leasehold in order to evade Japanese authorities. Despite their support of the Japanese government, German authorities could not refuse the Korean refugees entry to the leasehold since they had put up an “open door” flag. The aim of the German authorities was to put the refugees under constant surveillance in order to monitor the political activities of anti-colonialists. This was done to make the “open door” policy compatible with international control and surveillance and maintain colonial order in East Asia.

Finally, I discuss how, after the outbreak of the First World War, German rule in the Kiaochow leasehold gave Japan a pretext for invading Shandong province, including the Kiaochow leasehold, as a result of the change in international relations in East Asia. This military station of the Germans, with its “open door” policy, was a target of Japanese expansion in China, invoking international conflict and involving Shandong province in a disastrous war.

## **“One Island, Two Countries”: A Sino–Russian Bordering Disputed Space**

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A large delta between the Ussuri and Amur rivers is world famous for the seabed that was the source of serious challenges in Sino–Russian relations for centuries. The delta, almost 350 square

kilometers and near Khabarovsk, a capital city of the Russian Far East, is called Bol'shoi Ussuriiskii in Russian and Heixiazi in Chinese. The delta that had been occupied by Russia since 1929 hindered Sino–Soviet negotiations on border delimitation during the 1960s by China's strong claim on the delta. It finally triggered the Zhenbao/ Damanskii military clash in 1969.

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, negotiations on border delimitation were resumed under Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev. Talks continued in a constructive way to overcome the past deadlock, but again the delta issue disturbed it. China and Russia agreed to disagree in the process and excluded the delta from the 1991 Sino–Soviet eastern boundary agreement and shelved it for future negotiations.

The deal on the delta in November 2004 between Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin shook the world, however. Few expected a sudden solution to the most difficult challenges in the history of the Sino–Russian borderlands. The method for the solution sounded more provocative than the solution per se — dividing the disputed islands in half. This aroused many questions: How would they divide the space? Would they manage “one island” separately or jointly?

As for the future of the divided islands, it remains uncertain. Historical lessons on the Sino–Russian trans-border cooperation generally do not suggest a bright outlook for the divided spaces. For Russia and China, the border has not been a “tool” for cooperation between neighbors, rather, a kind of “fort” against a potential aggressor. Securing the border directly relates to security while economic benefit is often a secondary concern.

China and Russia officially “promote” the delta's outlook of “One Island, Two Countries,” but the details have yet to be apparent. Will the project really go beyond the limitation of the current Sino–Russian cooperation? Could they manage a space divided after the border solution? The paper investigates the realities on the ground using local resources and the latest field research.