PROGRESSIVE NORTH, CONSERVATIVE SOUTH? - READING THE REGIONAL ELITE AS A KEY TO RUSSIAN ELECTORAL PUZZLES¹

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1. GEOGRAPHIC DIMENSION OF RUSSIAN ELECTORAL POLITICS

There are numerous publications examining the geographic typology of voting behavior in Russian elections, especially after the parliamentary, presidential and gubernatorial elections held during 1995-97. It is natural to some extent that most studies try to explain variations across regions by socio-economic conditions surrounding the regional electorate, premising that the winners in the course of reforms will vote for Yeltsin, and vice versa. However, this materialist (Marxist?) approach has hardly hit the mark. Few will argue that the Vologda, Novgorod or Komi-Permyak population (who *en masse* voted for Yeltsin) live better than their Lipetsk or Krasnodar counterparts (i.e. Zyuganov's electorate). As for the often referred to level of urbanization (supposedly correlated with the "progressiveness" of the region), our regression analysis reveals that the correlation between a region's percentage of the urban population and its vote for Yeltsin was weak from the beginning (even in the 1991 presidential election) and it became even less relevant until 1996² as a natural result of the "agrarization" of Russia's party of power.

The correlation between the level of industrialization and the voting of regions also fails to meet our expectation. First of all, the famous "Red Belt" is not agrarian. The Orel and Penza Oblasts would seem to be the average among the Russian regions in terms of industrialization, and Lipetsk and Bryansk would be more industrialized than the national average.³ As is well-known, the elec-

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² The \bar{r}^2 are 0.2750, 0.1902 and 0.0728 in the 1991 presidential election, the 1993 April referendum, and the first round of the 1996 presidential election respectively.

³ The only oblast typically agrarian in the Central Black Soil Region (the core of the "Red Belt") would seem to be Tambov. However, the agrarian character of Tambov Oblast is neutralized by the concentration of higher education institutions in Tambov (in particular, the Faculty of History of the Tambov Pedagogic Institute, the present Tambov University of Humanities, was reputed to be a "smithy of democrats") and by the traditionally humanitarian cultural milieu of the oblast. So it was not by chance that the democratic movement was very vigorous in this oblast during 1989-1991 and produced a democrat such as V.N. Koval (1952-98), Tambov city mayor (1992-98), who enjoyed federation-wide fame.

torate split "fifty-fifty" in the highly industrialized Samara and Nizhegorod Oblasts (moreover, Samara is one of the most well-off regions in the present Russia).

Probably the most sophisticated example of the materialist approach to Russian elections was presented by Joan DeBardeleben and Aleksander A. Galkin. Their article⁴ is based on solid geographic knowledge: for example, they include the Central Black Soil Region as an "average" group in terms of industrialization. However, their attempt to explain regional voting behavior exclusively by socio-economic conditions surrounding the electorate sometimes leads to odd statements. For example, they think that the "currency corridor" set up by the Federal government in 1995 pushed the extractive (resource-mining) regions to the anti-reform side. It is to be hoped that these authors will visit Kemerovo, Khanty-Mansi, or Novokuibyshevsk and observe the coal and oil miners' life and way of thinking with their own eyes and ears.

We all know that post-communist Russian elections have hardly been voluntary civic activities but, rather, bear a strongly mobilizing characteristic. Why then have we not paid attention to the people who mobilize votes (the regional elite), rather than the mobilized (the electorate)? This chapter will illuminate the relationship between the realignment of the post-communist elite and voting behavior in Russian regions.

Political science has paid significant attention to regional factors in the formation and function of party systems. In our view, there are two reasons for this attention. First, party systems are one of the center-periphery political linkages. This is why the *modus operandi* of regional party systems is closely connected with both state building of the country and "brokerage" performed by its regional and local elite. Second, typological analyses of regional party systems illuminate general socio-political features of the regions. An excellent example of this method is a collection of articles edited by Karl Rohe, who explains regional variations of political parties' electoral performances in nine-teenth and twentieth century Germany by three factors: regional milieus, elites, and political mechanisms. It is noteworthy that Rohe does not mention here the socio-economic situations of the regions, probably because (according to his methodology) socio-economic situations can be politically relevant only after they are interpreted in a certain cultural milieu.⁵ "Poverty" can be proof not only of the cruelty of the government but also of the idleness of a person.

As for the history of three of the oblasts in the Central Black Soil Region (Tambov, Lipetsk, and Penza), see: K. Matsuzato and A.B. Shatilov, eds., *Regiony Rossii - Khronika i rukovoditeli* (1) "*Krasnyi poyas*" (*tsentral'noe chernozem'e*), *Occasional Papers on Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World* 33 (Sapporo, 1997).

^{4 &}quot;Electoral Behavior and Attitudes in Russia: Do Regions Make a Difference or Do Regions Just Differ?" Peter J. Stavrakis et al., eds., *Beyond the Monolith: The Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia* (Washington, D.C.-Baltimore-London, 1997), pp. 57-80. Here, p. 62.

⁵ Karl Rohe, "German Elections and Party Systems in Historical and Regional Perspective: An Introduction," Karl Rohe, ed., *Elections, Parties and Political Traditions: Social Foundations* of German Parties and Party Systems, 1867-1987 (New York-Oxford-Munich, 1990), pp. 1-25.

Thus, this chapter is structured according to these two factors (center-periphery political linkage and regional typology).

2. The "Administrative Party" as a Driving Force of Russia's State Building -Center-Periphery Linkage-

How should the Yeltsin regime be defined? Is it a democracy, whatever flaws it has? Is it a semi-polyarchy, or a semi-authoritarian regime? The concept of "government party regimes" presented by Kiichi Fujiwara in regard to Southeast Asian politics gives us a hint to answering this question. Discontent with the traditional concept of authoritarianism, which mainly derived from Latin America studies, Fujiwara contrasted political regimes in Southeast Asia with Latin American ones. In many countries in Southeast Asia democratic institutions exist, at least, at the constitutional level. But the democratic regimes in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia are more immune against a change of government than Brazilian or Chilean military dictatorships are. In Latin America political changes are, as a rule, accompanied by a radical reshuffling of the political elite (since these changes are often caused by conflicts between military and civil powers), whereas in Southeast Asia political changes, which rarely occur and are often completed within a short time, do not interrupt the continuity of the elite, as seen during the Aquino Revolution in 1986 and the Indonesian Revolution in 1998.

Fujiwara conceptualized these characteristics of political regimes in Southeast Asia as the "government party regime," in which the "government party" monopolizes and exploits state organizations, personnel, and budgets for factional purposes to the extent that the border between state institutions and the ruling party blurs. It is almost impossible for changes of government to occur, as the resource gap between the "government party" and the opposition becomes insurmountable. The opposition is presented with an unhappy choice: hunt for partial concessions by the government or, to the contrary, stick to its own "moral purity." Both attitudes are premised on the notion that the existing government cannot be removed. As government organizations serve as substitutes in the role of ruling parties in these regimes, paradoxical though it may seem, "government parties" themselves cannot develop. GOLKAR in Indonesia, UMNO in Malaysia, the PAP in Singapore, and the KBL in the Philippines under Marcos are (were) all organizationally weak.⁶

Readers may be surprised to find that Fujiwara's concept of "government party regime" also fits post-communist Russian politics. Electoral technology in the Philippines is similar to that in Russia; the fate of Suharto in 1998 reminds us of Gorbachev in 1991 ("The top leader leaves, but the elite remains").

⁶ Kiichi Fujiwara, "Seihu-to to zaiya-to: Tonan Ajia ni okeru seihu-to taisei [Government Parties and Opposition parties: the Government Party Regimes in Southeast Asia]," Nobiyuki Ogiwara, ed., *Koza Tonan Ajia* (3) *Minshuka to keizai hatten* [Lectures on Southeast Asia /3/ Democratization and Economic Development (Tokyo, 1994), pp. 229-269.

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
Actually, Fujiwara presents the concept of "government party regime" as a concept which can located in parallel to the traditional categories of totalitarianism, authoritarianism and democracy or polyarchy (see Figure 1). Fujiwara's model enables us to evade conceptual confusions such as categorizing *Beamten-Staat* under Bismarck and *trasformismo* under Giolitti in the same category of semi-polyarchy. According to this model, the *ministerialismo* under the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan would be located in Zone A, whereas the Yeltsin regime and Italian *caciquismo* would represent Zone B.

Figure 1. The Traditional Categories of Political Regimes and the "Government Party" Model

Polyarchy Semi-polyarchy	Authoritarianism	Totalitarianism
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Traditional categories


Fujiwara's "government party" model



Let us locate the "government party" regimes in Robert Dahl's polyarchy model (Figure 2). There have been a vast majority of political regimes in which (1) universal suffrage has been realized (high level of participation), and (2) the opposition is allowed to participate in elections legally but there is no fair competition between ruling parties and the opposition, in other words, the resource gap between them is *structured* (middle level of liberalization). Therefore, "government party" regimes are one of the very likely regimes to emerge.

Michael Brie adopted the urban machine concept to analyze Yurii Luzhkov's Moscow government and compared it with other typical examples of urban machine politics: North American metropolises during the first half of this century and South Italian cities after World War II. This comparison led to the conclusion that urban machines emerge on three conditions: "(1) the existence of a population dependent on mass patronage by the state, (2) the exist-

Figure 2. The Place of "Government Party" Regimes in the Dahl Model of Political Development



Inclusiveness (participation) \rightarrow

ence of political elites dependent on the results of democratic elections, and (3) the support of national elites securing an institutional environment favorable to this type of political regime."⁷ Brie remarks that in Moscow's case the centralized executive power plays the role of Luzhkov's machine and therefore party competition is almost impossible, which distinguishes the Moscow case from the other two.⁸ In our view, however, this difference is significant enough to make us doubt the adequacy of adopting the urban machine concept for the Luzhkov regime. Rather, it would make Fujiwara's "government party" concept a more reliable tool for analyzing post-communist Russian regional powers.

Nevertheless, Brie's urban machine concept enables us to combine the traditional patron-client paradigm for soviet politics with post-soviet studies and thus to explain the soviet regime's *evolution* to the post-soviet one.⁹ Moreover, it gives a clue to understanding the specific features of Russian politics in comparison with other post-communist countries. First, why only in Russia have elections become extremely important, or become something like nation-wide gorgeous drama organized with such advanced electoral technologies as can hardly be seen even in developed democratic countries? This is puzzling, if we compare Russia with the other post-USSR countries, where the significance of

⁷ Michael Brie, "The Political Regime of Moscow - Creation of a New Urban Machine?" *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB)*, P97-002, p. 64.

⁸ Ibid., p. 65.

⁹ In Japan Shugo Minagawa advocates this method. See his paper: "Political Clientalism at the Centre and Primorskii Krai in the Transitional Period" presented at the International Conference on Communist and Post-Communist Societies, Melbourne, 7-10 July 1998.

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elections, in particular at the meso-government level,¹⁰ has been declining and, consequently, classic authoritarian regimes, not machine politics, are emerging.¹¹ Is it because international pressure towards democratization is more strict towards Russia than towards the other post-USSR countries? Highly implausible. It should be remembered that this international pressure was inclined towards postponing the presidential election in 1996, fearing that Yeltsin might lose it. Yeltsin and the then-incumbent governors boldly proceeded with elections in 1996 *despite* the hesitancy of the democratic international community. Therefore, it is more natural to think that the Yeltsin regime needs elections, precisely as Italian *caciquismo* did. For these regimes elections are the blood for the body.¹²

Moreover, Brie's urban machine concept sheds light on new political linkages between federal and regional powers and thus explains why only in Russia, among the post-communist countries, has the power of meso-governments risen.¹³

- 10 By the word "meso-government" I mean regions and raiony (counties).
- 11 In Ukraine, for example, regional governors and county mayors who had been elected in 1994 by the population were turned into state servants in 1995 because of the Constitutional Agreement between the President and the Supreme Rada. What was more surprising was that these governors and mayors did not resist it. In striking contrast to their Russian counterparts, it is not important for the Ukrainian meso-elite to remain in electoral posts. Rather, they are happy that their state chose to be unitary and thus the system of nationwide cadre reshuffling has been preserved. As a result, the Ukrainian meso-elites can find shelter in Kiev if their position in their regions are jeopardized, whereas the Russian meso-elite need to resign themselves to a dismal fate after possible electoral defeats.
- 12 I hit upon this idea when I witnessed E.E. Rossel', the Sverdlovsk governor, organize the "Transformation of the Fatherland" (by artificially upgrading his regional party, the "Transformation of the Urals," to a national one) and participated in the Duma election in December 1995. Shortly after the victory over the incumbent supported by "Our Home Is Russia" in the gubernatorial election in August of that year and before the historical reconciliation with Yeltsin in January 1996, Rossel's faction could not behave in the election, when they were conscious that the "Transformation of the Fatherland" would hardly be able to overcome the 5% barrier? Was this a "preceding investment" to raise Rossel's reputation to the national scale? Rather, as it appeared, Rossel' could not but use the administrative electoral machine, once he obtained it. Otherwise, patronage networks within the bureau-cracy would not be activated and the machine would rust, losing contacts with the population, and sources to pump money from big businesses would dry up.
- 13 Communist regimes were centralized but deconcentrated. In these regimes the power of meso-elites (typically, regional and county first secretaries) inevitably hypertrophied. After the collapse of communism, however, only in Russia has this deconcentration of power been preserved or even developed. It is an established practice for post-sovietologists to reread the classic by Jerry Hough (*The Soviet Prefect*) and compare the present governors with the former regional first secretaries. In contrast, in Eastern Central Europe, Ukraine, and Central Asia the power of meso-elites was significantly damaged after the collapse of the old regimes; middle administrative units have been statified or even abolished, and their chief administrators have been turned into state servants, not municipal leaders elected by the population.

Both Fujiwara's "government party" concept and Brie's urban machine concept connote that they relate not so much to political *development* as to *typology* of political regimes. The regimes of this category are not only viable but also durable, which is proved by the recent resurgence of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. When this party split and the remnant part of the party was forced out of power in 1993, many thought that the forty years of one party dominance in Japan had ended and Japanese politics would become more competitive. However, as early as 1994 the LDP returned to office, thanks to its coalition with the Socialist Party and the Sakigake (Harbinger) Party, although the LDP itself did not have the majority of Diet seats.¹⁴ Cast from office, the conservative opposition in the Diet, many members of which had belonged to the LDP until 1993, began to dissolve. Quite a few members of the conservative opposition (re)joined the LDP, and consequently by 1998 the LDP had regained the Diet majority without any electoral victory.

It is necessary to emphasize that this phenomenon is not a result of one or another politician's personal ethics; it derives from the political system. For example, in May-June 1998 it was revealed that a department of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery of Japan had been surveying petitions by local authorities addressed to the ministry for amelioration of soil and other agricultural undertakings by collecting the petitions for each electoral (not administrative) district. Such a survey method premises that its result can be influenced by the actual parliamentarian elected from the district.¹⁵ This is one example of structured resource gaps between the "government party" and the opposition.

In 1994 I advocated the concept of "administrative party," a fundamental of the Yeltsin regime, which took the place of the amorphous democratic movement in the April and December referendums and the December parliamentary elections in 1993.¹⁶ I paid attention to the role of public servants who were involved in electoral and referendum campaigns even during their office hours, exploiting their official "levers of influence" on the population and spending state and municipal budgets (although the magnitude of infringements at that time was incomparable with those in 1996), while no official pro-government party had been organized in Russia. The alleged pro-government party in the 1993 parliamentary election, "Russia's Choice," could not even overcome the 5% barrier in the 1995 Duma election. It is difficult to explain such extreme electoral volatility, if we rely only upon methods of Western political science. But the fact is simple. The real ruling party is the "administrative party," which changes the group for whom it mobilizes votes in each election as if changing gloves: in 1993 for "Russia's Choice" and in 1995 for "Our Home Is Russia."

¹⁴ From 1994 to 1996 the LDP allowed Tomiichi Murayama, the head of the Socialist Party, to be Prime Minister.

¹⁵ Asahi Shinbun, 14 June 1998, p. 1.

¹⁶ Kimitaka Matsuzato, "Gyoseihu-to toha nanika [What is the Administrative Party?]" Surabu kenkyu senta kenkyu hokoku sirizu [SRC Occasional Papers] 56 (Sapporo, 1995), pp. 10-42.

Although our concept of "administrative party" overlaps to a significant extent the concepts of "government party" and machine, we need to qualify it in specific Russian contexts. First, a social base for this "party" is the extremely open form of hiring/promotion of Russian public servants. Raikomy (county CPSU committees),¹⁷ raiispolkomy (county Soviet executive committees), and the present administration workers were and still are often recruited from collective farms and enterprises in the locales after they were "tested and disciplined by life." Moreover, the Russian open employment system, unlike the American one, lacks a strict classification of ranks and duties. However strange it may seem, despite the demise of the CPSU and privatization of enterprises, the recruitment of local cadres from industries has not declined. To the contrary, this practice was even partially reinforced by Clause 5, Article 29 of the Labor Code of the RF adopted in 1992. This Clause, apparently aimed at compensating for the demise of the nomenklatura system, sanctions head-hunting by local administrations under the legal formula of "loan" or "temporary service" (perevod).¹⁸

This continuity in handling personnel argues against the conventional view that the unique form of personnel management in the USSR was a corollary of the nomenklatura system. Rather, the nomenklatura system, which should be regarded as a subcategory of the open employment system, was only ratifying geographically and socially determined functions of Russian officialdom, which, in turn, tends to resist any attempt at introducing Western notions of meritocracy. A strict meritocracy based exclusively on qualifying examinations and ranks and duties might be desirable from the perspective of expertise and political neutrality, but it might be inferior to Russian "meritocracy" in terms of the exploitation of scarce intellectual human resources. In the Russian countryside, in particular, the vital goal of handling personnel is to find and promote vigorous and responsible young people, whom it is difficult to find by paper tests.¹⁹ For all these merits, the Russian open employment system tends to create defenselessness for public servants, who therefore become dependent on those who "picked them out." It is this intra-bureaucratic patronage that makes it easy to transform regional and local administrations into electoral machines during elections. This is why Russian public servants cannot reject the pressure

¹⁷ This chapter regards the workers of local CPSU committees as a subcategory of public servants.

¹⁸ The significance of this Clause was pointed out by N.F. Budorin, the chief administrator of the Krasnoarmeiskii Raion Administration of Samara Oblast in an interview with me on 27 June 1995 in Selo Krasnoarmeiskoe.

¹⁹ This is one of the reasons for the famous agrarian-rural emphasis in recruiting the soviet political elite. Urban youth did (and do) not wish to go through long apprenticeship in *Komsomol*, Soviets, party organs or local administrations to be promoted, since they enjoyed (and continue to enjoy) much more educational and job chances than rural youth.

from above to be involved in electoral campaigns during their office hours, even if they know that the law prohibits such involvement.²⁰

The strange tolerance on the part of the electorate towards these infringements by public servants is a legacy of communist elections. Under communism all the state institutions were mobilized to realize "turnouts of 99.9%," so members of the present Russian electorate are not surprised even if a policeman visits their apartments, campaigning for the incumbent President.

Another specific feature of post-Soviet societies is that they succeeded a standardized mass society without any relevant subcultures (in terms of classes, ethnic groups and other social groups), a requisite for making a system of *Milieuparteien* (milieu parties). Under this condition, the ruling faction prefers to exploit public institutions (thus turning itself into a "government party") rather than to endeavor to organize an official pro-government party, whereas the opposition (CPRF) can only be a *parti de militants* (activist party)²¹ which, by definition, is characterized by constant conflicts between its leadership and rank and file activists.²² During the Cold War period the Liberal Democratic Party of

²⁰ Kimitaka Matsuzato, "Aparato demokrasii - roshia no chusho-toshi, gun niokeru seiji to gyosei [Apparatus Democracy - Politics and Administration in Small Cities and Raions in Russia]," *Suravu kenkyu [Slavic Studies]* 43 (Sapporo, 1996), pp. 93-128 (English summary pp. 122-128).

²¹ This concept was advocated by Yohei Nakayama to analyze the French party system under the Fourth Republic. In his view, partis de militants are more organized than traditional partis de cadres (defined by M. Duverger) but less authoritarian (in the sense that there are elements of intra-party direct democracy) than Milieuparteien in Northern and Central European countries. Nakayama defines as partis de militants the Socialist Party (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière) and the Republic Popular Movement (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) in the French Fourth Republic, and many parties in Northern and Central European countries after the end of the 1960s, when Milieuparteien in these countries began to be challenged by the weakening of subcultures and the influx of new activists defiant of the party leaders. In this sense, the French party system under the Fourth Republic, which has been despised in historiography for its "unorganizedness," was a harbinger of party systems of post-industrial societies. I introduce readers to Nakayama's dialectic view since it might shed new light also on "unorganized" Russian parties. See: Nakayama Yohei, "Huransu dai-yon kyowasei to 'soshiki-seito' - Huransu gikai-taisei no sasshin to sono airo [The French Fourth Republic and 'Organized Parties' - The Renovation of the Parliamentary Regime in France and Its Difficulties]," Kokka-gakkai zasshi [Journal for Government Studies] 110 :9/10 (1997), pp. 699-768; 111:3/4 (1998), pp. 332-408.

²² Usually *partis de militants* are characterized by constant tension between the party leadership (controlled by activists) and its parliamentary group (which tends to be more compromising). But this is not the case for the present CPRF. Because of its victory in the 1995 Duma election, the CPRF Central Committee was "absorbed" into parliamentary activities, since a significant number of Central Committee members became Duma deputies or their private secretaries. As a result, tension between the party leadership and the party's parliamentarians, a necessary mechanism for *partis de militants* to coordinate its radical and moderate wings, was lost. Thus, a more serious conflict between local militants and the "parliamentarianized" top leaders of the CPRF became inevitable. So the present (1998) crisis of the CPRF would seem to be a result of its victory in the 1995 election. For an example of local militants' criticism of the CPRF Central Committee, see a discussion at the

Japan organized electoral campaigns, relying upon corporations and enterprises (which, in turn, often mobilized "their" trade unions for the campaigns). In contrast, newly-born Russian bourgeois support the Yeltsin regime at best only financially, not organizationally. This is why regional and local administrations turned out to be the only reliable electoral vehicle for Yeltsin.

The emergence of the nationwide "administrative party," which controls state institutions from behind, in the Russian political landscape has not so far contradicted the official adoption of federalism and local self-government. This is because the functioning of the present "administrative party," in contrast to that of the CPSU, involves a centrifugal force. First of all, the "administrative party" was founded by Yeltsin's appointment policy of governors, which integrated the victors who survived the fateful years of 1990-91 into a nationwide party in power. After the "Big Bang" in the Spring of 1990 caused by the elections of republican and local Soviets, the union-wide leadership of the USSR practically disappeared, and the regional party leaderships became something like the "Central Committees" for regional elites.²³ The role of these "Central Committees" was to provide slogans and tactics for the survival of the regional elites. These struggles for survival put an end to the outward ideological homogeneity characterizing the CPSU elite, and Yeltsin's governors revealed a range of variation in their political narratives (from leftist Yu.F. Goryachev in Ul'yanovsk, to nationalist M.Sh. Shaimiev in Tatarstan, to radical "marketist" V.P. Solov'ev in Chelyabinsk) that had been unimaginable under the CPSU regime.

True, as Table 9 shows, in the first appointment of governors Yeltsin revealed a certain level of defiance towards regional elites, since it was naturally influenced by purge-mania after the attempted August coup and "dizziness from success" among Russian democrats.²⁴ In several cases Yeltsin, against his own decree, appointed regional governors without even gaining the agreement of the regional Soviets. As early as the last months of 1992, however, painful results of the "Shock Therapy" forced Yeltsin to appease the regional elites, and from this period to the Spring of 1993 several governors notorious for their incompetence and garrulous revolutionary democratic speeches were removed.²⁵

⁴th Conference of the Tambov CPRF organization held in April 1997 (*Tambovskaya zhizn'*, 10 April 1997, p. 2).

²³ As for the "Big Bang" effect of the 1990 local elections, see: Joel C. Moses, "Saratov and Volgpograd, 1990-1992: A Tale of Two Russian Provinces," Theodore H. Friedgut and Jeffrey W. Hahn, *Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics* (Armonk-New York-London, 1994), pp. 96-137; Kimitaka Matsuzato, "The Split and Reconfiguration of Ex-Communist Party Factions in the Russian Oblasts: Chelyabinsk, Samara, Ulyanovsk, Tambov, and Tver (1991-1995)," Demokratizatsiya - The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 5:1 (1997), pp. 53-88.

²⁴ Nevertheless, I need to add the qualification that the number of these defiant appointments was much smaller than would be supposed from the revolutionary euphoria at the moment.

²⁵ During this period such "democratic" governors as V.N. D'yakonov (Krasnodar Krai), V.S. Kuznetsov (Primor'e Krai), A. Dobryakov (Pskov), V. Fedorov (Sakhalin) were removed.

A more serious concession on the part of Yeltsin was to allow eight regions, in which the governors had been appointed without agreement of the regional Soviets, to have gubernatorial elections. Seven of these eight elections ended in the defeat of Yeltsin's appointees.²⁶

The result of the April referendum invigorated revolutionary romanticism again, and Yeltsin and his entourage rushed into armed conflict with the Supreme Soviet. It was to some extent natural for them to think that the 53% of the Russian electorate who supported Yeltsin's reform policy even after the painful days of the Gaidar reforms would vote for "Russia's Choice" even after the coercive dissolution of the Soviets. The result of the December election betrayed this anticipation, and the epoch of revolutionary romanticism finally ended. The second wave of appeasement towards regions began, and this time cadre reshuffling influenced not only governors²⁷ but also regional Presidential Representatives, who were often replaced by one of the governor's men.²⁸ It was during this period that (1) so-called budget federalism²⁹ developed; (2) the Federal Council proved its unexpected ability to coordinate center-periphery conflicts; (3) the interregional associations began to accentuate pragmatic proposals rather than political declarations which had characterized them in 1991-93; and (4) the discrimination between ethnically Russian regions and national republics was levelled to some extent.³⁰ As a whole, Yeltsin had become a tolerable President for the regions.

It would be misleading to regard Yeltsin's appeasement towards regional elites only as a forced compromise. On the contrary, it was in the periods of revolutionary attacks upon the regional elites that Yeltsin and his entourage were tormented by a paranoia that the Russian regional elites could only be anti-reform and pro-socialist and it was necessary to "divide and rule" them, discriminating between progressives and conservatives, to govern Russian prov-

²⁶ The only Yeltsin appointee elected was V.M. Zubov, Krasnoyarsk governor, who would be defeated by General Lebed' in 1998.

²⁷ V.D. Babenko (Tambov), V. Raifikesht (Altai Krai), E.S. Kuznetsov (Stavropol' Krai) were the governors who were replaced by more conservative figures during this period.

²⁸ During this period radical Presidential Representatives such as V. Butov (Primor'e Krai), R.A. Kasymov (Liprtsk), V.V. Davituliani (Tambov), G.I. Stupnikov (Ul'yanovsk) were fired. See also: A.B. Shatilov, "Put' k 'partii vlasti': regional'naya elita Rossii v 1987-1996 gg.," "Novaya" Rossiya: politicheskie realii i politicheskie mify - Materialy mezhvuzovskoi nauchnoi konferentsii 29-30 noyabrya 1996 g. (Moscow, 1996), pp. 47-50.

²⁹ Its most important component was that the federal government began to aid regions more by transfers, which have a standard for inter-regional distribution and can be spent autonomously by the regional governments, than by the previously prevailing subsidies (*dotatsii*) and subventions.

³⁰ Vera Tolz and Irina Busygina, "Regional Governors and the Kremlin: the Ongoing Battle for Power," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30:4 (1998), pp. 401-426, here p. 407. See also: Mark Zlotnik, "Russia's Governors: All the President's Men?" *Problems of Post-Communism* 43:6 (1996), pp. 24-34, here pp. 28-29.

inces. But history proved that the Russian regional elites were able and earnestly willing to adapt themselves to capitalist society. This fact convinced the President and his entourage that it was useless to offend regional elites by "divide and rule" tactics and it was better to make deals with entire ex-nomenklatura communities in regions. Moreover, losing the common patronage of the Supreme Soviet, potential contradictions between left-nationalist and regionalist oppositions came to the fore. The latter identified itself as His Majesty's opposition.

If any revolution cannot be eternal, *Thermidor* is inevitable. But Russian revolutionaries have a unique, excellent ability - they can achieve *Thermidor* by themselves, rejecting change of government. Once they realize that the population is tired of changes, they do not hesitate at all to change the letters on their banner from "reform" to "stability," from "democracy" to "experienced managers (*khozyaeva*)." Thus Russian revolutionaries can evade the tragedies which other revolutionaries in world history have been forced to face at the end of revolutionary cycles. We witnessed examples of this *self-Thermidor* in 1921 and 1994-95. The *self-Thermidor* by Russian democrats during 1994-95 was summarized by the foundation of "Our Home Is Russia." The influence of this *self-Thermidor* on regional voting behavior will be analyzed in the following section.

If the two waves of appeasement towards regions (1992-93 and 1994-95) were aimed at policy adjustments after revolutionary offensives, i.e. after the Gaidar reforms and the October Incident, the third one was a byproduct of the 1996 presidential election. This time it was subregional (local) leaders at which the appeasement was targeted. And fortunately for Russian raion (county) selfgovernment, this appeasement coincided with the climax of local reforms. The Federal Law of Local Self-Government adopted in August 1995 did not specify counties as territorial units for local self-government.³¹ Therefore, it was supposed that this law opened the way to resolve the protracted dispute on the fate of county meso-governments in Russia according to the Czech, Polish and Ukrainian precedents, i.e. to abolish or statify them. But this solution was unrealizable in 1996, when Yeltsin and incumbent governors desperately needed the assistance of local elites to win the elections. A significant number of municipal (county) charters adopted after the Federal Law of 1995 deprived the population of the right to elect village and town officials, turning them into positions appointed by the county chief administrators (glavy raionov). Thus, the basic administrative units, villages and towns, which the presidential bill of the Federal Law of Local Self-Government expected to become the only units of rural

³¹ The precise name of the law is the "Federal Law on General Principles to Organize Local Self-Government in the RF." This law prescribes subjects of local self-government very abstractly - "urban and rural settlements and other municipal formations" (Clause 1, Article 3).

self-government, ceased to exist as such, and the control by county elites over their territories was even strengthened.³²

This appeasement towards local elites should not be regarded only as a forced compromise on the part of Yeltsin. As with his regional policy, it was during the period of attacks on county self-government (1994-95) that Yeltsin and his adherents were suffering from a paranoia that counties were the bastions of procommunist force, so that there should only be state institutions at this level. It is fresh in our memory that after the October Incident Yeltsin allowed only cities (not counties) to reestablish representative organs. True, county leaders were anti-regime in 1992-93, but this was provoked by the Federal government's adventuresome policy to individualize Russian agriculture forcibly and harass collective farms. When the government abandoned this adventurism, it was not difficult for it to gain rural elites' support, since collective farm managers are strongly dependent upon the subsidies and resources distributed by local administrations.

International experience suggests that the electoral skills of the party of power work better in rural than urban areas. After the final collapse of democratic romanticism there is no reason that Russia alone should be an exception to this law. As a matter of fact, a series of elections during 1995-97 revealed a tangible tendency of "agrarization" (or "*raionization*") of the party of power. If Yeltsin reconciled with regional elites in 1994, so he did with local elites in 1996.

As illustrated above, the formation of the "administrative party," the backbone of the Yeltsin regime, was closely combined with Russian electoral politics from 1990-97. Although through trial and error, Yeltsin combined his appointment and electoral policies tactfully. This is why he was able to salvage the Russian regional and local elite from post-communist chaos. Through this process, the requisites both for a "government party" regime (politicization of state and municipal institutions) and for machine politics (the support of national elites securing local machines) have been realized.

3. REGIONAL TYPOLOGY OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR -WHITE, RED, GRAY, AND "EXPLOSIVE"-

Despite the short period of its existence, Russia's competitive party system experienced two critical realignments: 1992-93 and 1996. The first one was caused by the Gaidar reforms and the second by *Self-Thermidor* of the party of power. As has been the case with critical realignments of the American party system, these two realignments were combined with significant changes in

³² This process is analyzed by K. Matsuzato and S.I. Ryzhenkov in the collection of articles: K. Matsuzato, ed., *Tret'e zveno gosudarstvennogo stroitel'stva Rossii - podgotovka i realizatsiya Federal'nogo zakona ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii mestnogo samoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Occasional Papers on Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World 73* (Sapporo, 1998). See Ch.1 and Ch.5.

Russia's electoral geography. The realignment in 1992-93 witnessed revolts of many southern regions against Yeltsin (see Graph 1'), as a result of which the famous north-south axis in Russian electoral geography emerged. During the realignment in 1996, in particular in gubernatorial elections, the presidential faction was able to consolidate the Volga and southern industrial regions (such as Yaroslavl', Samara, Saratov, Rostov, and Tatarstan), while it yielded many "gray" regions to the opposition. As a result of these two realignments the progressive-conservative axis characterizing the elections and referendums during the democratic revolution (1989-91) was significantly destroyed.

It is widely accepted that the American party system experienced six critical realignments which culminated in the presidential elections in 1800, 1828, 1860, 1898, 1932, and 1980. In these critical elections the inertial stability of the American party system is "abruptly shattered by sudden, major reorganizations of mass voting behavior in which high levels of sociopolitical tension are closely associated with abnormally intense political conflict at all stages, often preceded by third-party uprisings against the existing major parties and followed by "abnormal" mass movements - mobilization of hitherto inactive strata in the potential electorate and the movement of decisively large minorities of already active voters from one-party commitment to another."³³ The methods adopted by V.O. Key, Walter D. Burnham and other founders of the "critical elections" school in the American political science are marked by holistic features, in other words, they illuminate the combination of socio-economic, subcultural and leadership factors.³⁴ Unfortunately, the shortness of the history of the competitive party system in Russia and its post-communist specifics do not make this approach possible. Rather, I prefer to conduct a middle range analysis of the regional elite's strategies, using regional subcultures as a given and federal government policies as a variable.

The second point of methodological background of this chapter is its attention to "inconsistencies" in regional voting behavior between presidential and gubernatorial elections. There are discussions of this problem among post-Sovietologists. Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov (1997)³⁵ and Steven L. Solnick (1998)³⁶ unanimously note that there is no relevant correlation of regional vot-

³³ Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York, 1970), p. 67.

³⁴ In Burnham's view, the 1896 realignment was mainly caused by socio-economic factors, i.e. the emergence of the north-eastern industrial metroplex and the southern and eastern domestic "colonies," whereas the 1932 realignment was largely the product of F. Roosevelt's leadership in the same regional settings established in the 1890s. The realignment in 1980 can be regarded as a combination of R. Reagan's leadership with a secular tendency in American economic geography during the second half of the twentieth century (i.e. the decline of the Snow Belt and the upsurge of the Sun Belt).

³⁵ Michael McFaul and Nikolai Petrov, "Russian Electoral Politics After Transition: Regional and National Assessments," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 38:9 (1997), pp. 507-549.

³⁶ Steven L. Solnick, "Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997," Post-Soviet Affairs 14:1 (1998), pp. 48-80.

ing behavior between presidential and gubernatorial elections.³⁷ Although qualifying their findings in terms of the well-known international tendency that "local politics tends to be less polarized, party dominated, or ideological than national politics,"³⁸ McFaul and Petrov conclude that Yeltsin's victory in the presidential election put an end to polarized, ideological politics in Russia and, consequently, the electorate voted in gubernatorial elections from a pragmatic perspective, paying attention, for example, to managerial abilities of the candidates.

Anton Aleksandrov, a sociologist in Samara, conducted consistent sociological surveys of electoral behaviors throughout the presidential, gubernatorial, and mayoral elections in Samara Oblast in 1996. This study led to the conclusion that the Samarian electorate relied upon different criteria for different elections: in the presidential election "programmatic-ideological orientation" was dominant, whereas "situational-political orientation" was dominant in the gubernatorial election.³⁹ In short, one voted for or against Yeltsin because he was offended by or pleased with what happened in the country after 1992, while one voted for or against Konstantin Titov because he appreciated or did not appreciate the concrete results achieved by Titov, irrespective of his ideological affinity.

Thus, all the authors mentioned above discern ideological features of the presidential election, and pragmatism in gubernatorial ones. However, if McFaul, Petrov, and Solnik accentuate the chronological changes between the two elections, Aleksandrov emphasizes the different criteria adopted by voters for each election (national, regional or local). Although I agree with McFaul and Petrov that Russia's capitalist transition was completed in 1996,⁴⁰ I prefer Aleksandrov's method of electoral analysis, since a clue to understanding the relationship between elite realignment and voting behavior in regions seems to be embedded in the "inconsistency" of voters' choices in different levels of elections. To be more precise, the terms "strong governors" or "strong regional

³⁷ Moreover, Solnick could not discern a relevant correlation between regional economic performances and probabilities of the incumbent governors' victories. See Solnick, op. cit., pp. 68-70.

³⁸ McFaul and Petrov, "Russian Electoral Politics," p. 537, fn.24.

³⁹ A. Aleksandrov, "Politicheskii protsess v Samarskoi oblasti (1996 g.)," K. Matsuzato, ed., *Vzryvnyi poyas-96: rossiiskie regiony i electoral'noe povedenie, Occasional Papers on Regional/ Subregional Politics in Post-Communist Countries* 3 (Ekaterinburg, 1999), Ch. 3. A further criterion, i.e. "status-dispositional orientation" (a voter's status in the society and his sociopolitical interests determined by it), according to Aleksandrov, played a small role in both elections.

⁴⁰ However, I do not share McFaul and Petrov's view attributing the polarity of Russian electoral politics during 1991-96 to ideologies in the narrow sense (the choice between capitalism and socialism). Rather, motives polarizing Russian society have not been so much ideological as "civilizational" or cultural-anthropological. Of course, this is not to say that the Popular Patriotic Union is the only legitimate representative of the Russian *Sonderweg*. I note this simply because some Western and westernized Russian political scientists seem to be too dismissive of cultural-anthropological factors in Russian politics.

elites" mean those who can create the rhythm of regional political life independent from national political conjunctures, and convince the regional electorate that regional elections are different from federal ones. Moreover, they can show themselves not simply Yeltsin's appointees (after 1996, mere supporters of the reforms conducted by Moscow) but rather centrists who can insist on regional interests. By contrast, "weak governors" were those who remained till the end no more than Yeltsin's appointees in the eyes of the regional electorate despite their desperate endeavors to pretend to be something more and were thus defeated in the gubernatorial elections. Therefore, I will not regard victories of Yeltsin's appointees in anti-Yeltsin regions (or their defeats in pro-Yeltsin regions) as a sort of deviations, but rather analyze the meaning of these "inconsistencies".

The "strength" of incumbent governors proved in the gubernatorial elections in 1995-97 should be measured qualitatively, not quantitatively. Let us set up four categories in regard to this strength of incumbents: victories in the first round, victories in the second round, defeats by non-left challengers, and defeats by left challengers supported by the Popular Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR). As for the presidential election, in contrast to McFaul, Petrov, and Solnick, I prefer to rely upon the data from the first (not final) round, since I do not know how to quantify factors specific to the final round such as "landslide phenomenon," the Lebed' factor, and extremely suspicious results in several ethnic republics. Although I am conscious that it is highly problematic to group the results of gubernatorial elections held in 1995 and 1996-97 (before and after the presidential election) into a single table (Table 1), there is no other way in order to simplify our explanation.

According to Table 1, gubernatorial elections did not indicate the development of non-left oppositions in Russian provinces. Although the number of their victories (15) does not compare badly with that of the NPSR opposition (19), five of these cases are from national *okruga*, and another one is Chechnya, whereas NPSR candidates won in solid regions. This fact makes us question McFall and Petrov's view on the end of ideological politics in Russia.

As already noted, there are cases of defeats of incumbents in pro-Yeltsin regions (in the upper right corner of the table) and of the opposite (in the lower left corner of the table). It is obvious that the upper right cases are less numerous than the lower left ones. Moreover, the upper right cases were often caused by atypical regional situations. First, here we find a significant weight of national *okruga*, in addition the poorest of them - Koryak, Evenki, and Nenets -, the politics of which are supposed to be closer to local (*raion*) than to regional politics in the sense that any split in the tiny ruling elite might cause a change of government.⁴¹ Probably the most extreme and significant example of these up-

⁴¹ This is more probable if one of these elite factions was backed by a federal politician, as was the case with Koryak. See Solnick, "Gubernatorial Elections," p. 60.

	Wi	nners in the gubernate	orial elections 1995-1997		
**	Incumbe	ent	Challen	ger	
**	Victories in the 1st round	Victories in the 2nd round***	Non-left	NPSR	
More than +30	R Sakha 52 R Tyva 60 Moscow city 61 Taymyr AO 50 Khanty-Mansi AO 53 Chukchi AO 49 Yamalo-Nenets AO 55	Perm' 55	R Chechnya 65 Sankt-Peterburg city 50 Sverdlovsk 60 Koryak AO 46		
From +20 to +30	Vologda 45 Komi-Permyak AO 53	Arkhangel'sk 41 Moscow Oblast' 44	Magadan 37 Murmansk 41 Evenki AO 43 Nenets AO 43		
From +15 to +2	Khabarovsk K 39	Kamchatka 34			
From +10 to +15	Novgorod 36 Tomsk 35 Yaroslavl' 33	Tyumen' 39	Kaliningrad 34 Leningrad 38	Chelyabinsk 37	
From +5 to +10	Ivanovo 30		Aga-Buryat AO 45		
From -5 to +5	R Kabardino-Balkariya 40 Primor' e K 30 Samara 36 Nizhegorod 35 Omsk 33 Evreiskaya AO 30	Sakhalin 30 Nizhegorod ('97)	Tver' 32 Ust-Orda Buryat AO 37	Vladimir 31 Kaluga 31 Kirov 31 Kostroma 28 Tula 30	
From -10 to -5	Rostov 29 Astrakhan' 30		R Khakasiya 29 Pskov 25	Kurgan 24 Novosibirsk 26	
From -15 to -10	Saratov 28	Chita 25		Krasnodar K 26 Volgograd 29	
From -20 to -15	Orenburg 26			R Marii El 24 Amur 27 Ryazan' 25	
From -30 to -20	Belgorod 23	Ul'yanovsk 24		Altai K 22 Stavropol' K 22 Bryansk 26 Voronezh 23 Kursk 2	
Less than - 30	R Adygeya 20			Tambov 21	

Table 1. Correlation between the 1996 Presidential and the 1995-97*Gubernatorial Elections

The numbers next to the names of regions indicate their percentage vote for Yeltsin in the first round of the 1996 presidential election.

* Regions where gubernatorial elections were held from August to December 1995 are underlined.

** P(y) – P(z) P(y): the % of Yeltsin's poll in the 1st round of the presidential elections 1996 P(z): the % of Zyuganov's poll in the 1st round of the presidential elections 1996

*** I include the cases in which in 1996-97 the incumbent governors foresaw their difficulties in the elections and, therefore, adopted the single-round system, namely, Sakhalin, Chita, and Ul'yanovsk.

per right cases is Chelyabinsk. It is extreme in the sense that a Popular Patriotic challenger, P.I. Sumin, won overwhelmingly in this pro-Yeltsin region. However, the defeated incumbent, V.P. Solov'ev, served out his tenure until 1996 exclusively because of his close ties with Viktor Ilyushin and the strategic importance of the region,⁴² which induced Moscow to station its yes-man there, however problematic he was. Without these conditions, Solov'ev, a typical revolutionary democrat, would have been fired much earlier than 1996, and the political history of Chelyabinsk Oblast could have developed in a different way. As for Sverdlovsk, E.E. Rossel's comeback in August 1995 was no more than a rehabilitation of his honor injured by the "Ural Republic" incident in 1993.

The relative numerousness of the lower left cases indicates that Zyuganov's electorate could possibly vote for pro-Yeltsin incumbents, whereas it was very improbable for Yeltsin's electorate to vote for challengers (even including non-left ones) in gubernatorial elections. More correctly, even the governors who had not been able to mobilize a significant number of votes for Yeltsin only several months before could do that for themselves, but not vice versa. This is the substance of the argued political stabilization of Russia during the period between the presidential and gubernatorial elections in 1996-97.

In our view, the regions included in Table 1 can be divided into four groups according to the balance of power between regional administrative parties during 1992-96 and regional NPSR oppositions.

		Administrative parties 1992-96		
		Strong	Weak	
NPSR	Strong	The Explosive Belt	The Red Belt	
oppositions Weak		The White Belt	The Gray Belt	

Let us hypothetically mark these four belts on Table 1 and thus compose Table 2. A more simplified figuration of Table 2 is given in Figure 3.

As is well known, the White and Red Belts are located geographically opposite to each other along the north-south axis. Strangely at first sight, the White Belt is composed of two polarized groups: important and insignificant. The important group consists of highly developed, resource-mining and border regions, namely Sakha, Moscow, Khanty-Mansi, Yamalo-Nenets, Khabarovsk, Perm, Kamchatka, Tyumen, Saint-Petersburg, Sverdlovsk, Magadan, and Murmansk. The members of the insignificant, poor group are Komi-Permyak, Novgorod, Tomsk, Koryak, Evenki, and Nenets.

The Gray Belt is made up of relatively undeveloped, middle-scale regions surrounding highly developed regions: Vladimir, Kaluga, Tula, Tver as satellites of Moscow; Leningrad and Pskov as satellites of Saint-Petersburg; Ul'yanovsk and Kostroma as peripheries of the Mid-Volga metroplex; Kirov as a periphery of the Ural metroplex; Chita and Sakhalin as peripheries of the Far East metroplex. This location gives the elites and masses of these regions an inferiority complex (a sense of their own insignificance), which seriously hin-

⁴² Chelyabinsk became a border region after the collapse of the USSR, has gold deposits, and produces and stores nuclear weapons.

Table 2. The White, Red, Gray, and Explosive Belts W inners in the gubernatorial elections 1995-1997* Incum bents Challengers ** V ictories in the Non-left N PSR V ictories in the 1st. 2nd round *** round M ore than +30 R Sakha Perm ' R Chechnya R Tyva Sankt-Peterburg city M oscow city Sverdlovsk Taym yrAO Koryak A O Khanty-MansiAO ChukchiA0 Yam alo-N enets A O From +20 to +30 Vobqda A rkhangel'sk M aqadan Kom i-Perm yak AO M um ansk Moscow Oblast' EvenkiA0 N enets A O 111 ani 1 ani 1 ani 1 ani 1 ani 1 a From +15 to +20 Khabarovsk K Kam chatka From +10 to +15 Novgorod Chelyabinsk Tyum en' Kaliningrad <u>Tom sk</u> Leningrad <u>Yaroslavl'</u> From +5 to +10 Aga-BuryatAO Ivanovo From -5 to +5R Kabardino-Balkariya Sakhalin <u>Tver'</u> V lad im ir Prim or'e K Nizhegorod (97) Ust-Orda BuryatA O Kaluqa K irov Sam ara <u>N izhegorod</u> Kostrom a <u>Omsk</u> Tula Evreiskaya A O From -10 to -5R Khakasiya Kurgan Rostov <u>N ovosibirsk</u> A strakhan' Pskov Krasnodar K From -15 to -10 Saratov Chita Volgograd From -20 to -15% <u>O renburg</u> R M ariiEl Amur

*Regions w here gubernatorial elections w ere held from A ugust to D ecem ber 1995 are underlined. **P(y) - P(z) P(y): the % of Yelts in 's poll in the 1st round of the presidential elections 1996 P(z): the % of Zyuganov's poll in the 1st round of the presidential elections 1996

U l'yanovsk

***I include the cases in which in 1996-97 the incum bent governors foresaw their difficulties in the elections and, therefore, adopted the single-round system , nam ely, Sakhalin, Chita, and U l'yanovsk.

Red Belt

Less than - 30

From -30 to -20 Belgorod

W hite Belt

R A dygeya

Explosive Belt

The other regions belong to the G ray Belt

Ryazan'

A ltaiK Stavropol'K Bryansk Voronezh Kursk

<u>Tam bov</u>




Figure 3. Four Belts in Russia's Electoral Geography

ders the development of strong regional elites who can create an independent rhythm of regional political life. However paradoxical it may seem, this lack of independence makes Gray Belt regions, manifestly inert in their normalcy, of "excitable temperament" and excessively sensitive to national political conjunctures. It was in these regions which had been calm in 1992-95 that the incumbent governors were defeated catastrophically or experienced serious crises in the 1996-97 gubernatorial elections.⁴³

The opposite can be said for the Explosive Belt, which consists of relatively developed regions, stretching almost in a row from Northern Caucasus through the Volga Basin to the Southern Urals⁴⁴ and crossing Siberia and the

⁴³ Detailed characteristics of Gray Belt regions are given in our introduction to *Regiony Rossii* - *Khronika i rukovoditeli /5/ Ryazanskaya, Vladimirskaya i Tul'skaya oblasti, Slavic Research center Occasional Papers* 63 (Sapporo, 1998), pp. 7-12. See also V. Avdonin, "Ryazanskaya oblast'," Organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub"ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow, 1998), pp. 92-102, here, pp. 96-97. The significance of regions' "self-estimation" was pointed out by II'ya Malyakin, and this promising approach needs further elaboration. See his "The New Political Situation in Russia's Regions: the View from Saratov," Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the AAASS (Seattle, 20-23 November 1997).

⁴⁴ Volgograd should be regarded as a marginal region between the Red and Explosive Belts. Had the ruling faction not split in 1996 and had Moscow not intervened in the gubernatorial elections, an "Ayatskov phenomenon" could have taken place in this region too. See A. Rogozhin and S. Ryzhenkov, "Volgogradskaya oblast' v 1995-97 godakh: Novyi raskol sil i izmenenie politicheskoi orientatsii," K. Matsuzato, ed., *Vzryvnyi poyas-96....*

Far East by the stepping stones of Omsk, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast', and Primor'e. The location of the Explosive Belt cannot but remind us that it occupies regions which used to be strategic points and, therefore, the severest battle-fields during the Civil War in 1918-21.

There were two patterns for the "inconsistent" voting behavior in Explosive Belt regions. First, a significant number of voters had already been accustomed to dual electoral criteria (i.e. radicalism in federal elections and pragmatism in regional elections) before the gubernatorial elections, as was the case with Nizhegorod and Samara.⁴⁵ Second, something revolutionary actually happened between the presidential and gubernatorial elections in 1996 - the famous Saratov case, which was nicknamed the "Ayatskov phenomenon."⁴⁶ Rostov would seem to be a mid-point between these two extremes.⁴⁷

Why did these two different patterns emerge? With regard to the Samara-Nizhegorod pattern, we can discern common features between the two regions. Both experienced harsh political turmoil in 1989-90 and the obkom leaderships were quickly estranged from the regional political scene. In both regions Yeltsin marked out a marginal nomenklatura (K.A. Titov and B.E. Nemtsov) for the gubernatorial post, and these governors, conscious of the weakness of their positions, never defied the old elite and conducted a discreet cadre policy, and even won over the regional Soviet by 1993. Thus Titov and Nemtsov consolidated the upper strata of the regional elites, exploiting the relatively abundant economic resources of their regions. Precisely because of this, however, the former lower elites were estranged from the mainstream of regional politics and gathered under the banner of the CPRF. In particular, Samarian communists appeared to be one of the centers of the anti-Zyuganov radical opposition within the CPRF, precisely as they used to be one of the centers of the anti-Gorbachev oppisition within the CPSU in 1991.48 This vertical split of regional elites (successful capitalist transformation of the upper strata and radicalization of the lower strata) affected the electoral behavior of the regions. Many voters appreciate the CPRF's propaganda in federal elections, but support the regional establishment in regional and local elections.

In contrast, the rules of game in Saratov politics can be formulated, ac-

⁴⁵ On the contrary, the majority of the Chelyabinsk electorate has been accustomed to vote for Yeltsin at the federal level and for Sumin and his adherents at the regional and local levels. They feel no contradiction in this.

⁴⁶ As for the revolutionary landslide in Saratov politics, see: S.I. Ryzhenkov, "Saratovskaya oblast' (1985-1996) - politika i politiki. Materialy k politicheskoi istorii regiona," K. Matsuzato and A.B. Shatilov, eds., *Regiony Rossii - Khronika i rukovoditeli (2) Rostovskaya oblast' i Saratovskaya oblast', Occasional Papers on Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World* 34, (Sapporo, 1997), pp. 83-331, here pp. 215-222.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 14-28 (by David Subichus).

⁴⁸ See an interview and a speech given by V.S. Romanov, the first secretary of the Samara *obkom* of the CP RSFSR (and the future *obkom* first secretary of the CPRF and the main challenger to Titov in the 1996 gubernatorial election) in the regional newspaper "Volzhskaya kommuna": 2 August 1991, pp. 1-2 ("K obnovleniyu, no ne lyuboi tsenoi"); and 16 August 1991, pp. 1-2 ("Krepit' partiinoe tovarishchestvo, postigat' nauku politicheskoi bor'by").

cording to Sergei Ryzhenkov, as the "struggle for an *obkom* position." All the battles in regional politics ended in elimination by the winners of the defeated as a political faction. But the winner always allowed one or another former challenger to occupy a leading position in regional politics. This is why Saratov politics had already been Soviet-like before 1996 in view of the coexistence of constant skirmishes (which reshuffle leaders) and inclusive elite alignments (i.e. lack of structured factions). Thus the soil which produced the "Ayatskov phenomenon" in 1996 had been cultivated for a long time, and D.F. Ayatskov took only a step further towards the traditional Brezhnevite politics by distinguishing reconcilable from irreconcilable (drawing a line between agrarians and communists) and adopting harsh measures in regard to the latter.

Belgorod and the Republic of Adygeya belong to a tiny enclave of the Red Belt in Table 2. Outside of these cases, Orel, Ul'yanovsk (before 1995), and Lipetsk (before 1995) belong or used to belong to this enclave, in which the split of preferences of the regional electorate between federal and regional elections becomes extreme. This enclave can be termed an "authoritarian outpost" of the Red Belt, in contrast to its "rebellious keep," the column from Kurgan to Tambov in Table 2. The conditions for the regional elite to make their regions enter this "outpost" are, to name a few, paternalistic protectionism in regard to the population, centrist economic policies aimed at the appearance of popular capitalism (so-called "soft landing on market economy"), populist authoritarianism based on maximum exploitation of mass media, and a traditional, moral approach to politics. Based on these devices, the governors in these regions became, at least temporarily, extremely popular in their homelands which have, in substance, leftist tendencies.

Readers may think that any politician is rebellious when he is a challenger, but becomes authoritarian in power, so that the Popular Patriotic governors who seized power in 1996-97 in the "rebellious keep" of the Red Belt will try hard to shift their regions to the "authoritarian outpost" by the 2000 elections. Therefore, the "authoritarian outpost" (the minority) in 1996 might become a new "authoritarian keep" (the majority) of the Red Belt by 2000. I need to give two reservations about this, to some extent, natural hypothesis. First, economic conditions for a "soft landing on market economy" have almost been exhausted since the mid-1990s. The regions which used to enjoy a relatively high living standard because of the regional authorities' "soft landing" policies during the first half of the 1990s are suffering even more than other regions. A typical example of this is Ul'yanovsk Oblast in which the economic situation became manifestly worse in 1995, and the regional CPRF organization abandoned its appeasement towards Governor Goryachev, criticizing him for his "dismissive attitude towards small businesses"! As a result, Ul'yanovsk Oblast became "degraded" from the "authoritarian outpost" of the Red Belt to a pink (leftist) periphery of the Gray Belt during the following year. The second reservation is that there are examples of ideologically devoted governors (for example, those of Tambov and Krasnodar) who continue to be rebels in power even after their victories in 1995-97. Moreover, the regional electorate does not always bless the transformation of rebels into pragmatists, as was shown by the results of

Table 3. The Reshuffling of Governors Between the Introduction of theAppointment System (1991-92) and the Gubernatorial Elections (1995-97)

	W inners in the gubernatorial elections 1995-1997							
**	Incum b	ents	Challer	Igers				
	V ictories in the 1st round	Victories in the 2nd round***	N on -left	N PSR				
M ore than +30 From +20 to +30	R Sakha R Tyva M oscow city Taym yrAO Khanty-M ansiAO ChukchiAO Vologda Kom i-Perm yakAO	Perm ' Arkhangel'sk <u>Moscow Oblast'</u>	Sankt-Peterburg city <u>Sverdlovsk</u> Koryak A O M agadan M um ansk Evenki A O					
			N enets A O					
From +15 to +20	Khabarovsk K	Kam chatka						
From +10 to +15	<u>Novgorod</u> <u>Tom sk</u> Yaroslavl'	Tyum en '	Kaliningrad Leningrad	Chelyabinsk				
From +5 to +10		9 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100		******				
From -5 to +5	R Kabardino-Balkariya <u>Prim or'e K</u> Sam ara <u>N izhegorod</u> <u>Om sk</u> Evreiskaya A O	Sakhalin	<u>Tver'</u> Ust-Orda Buryat AO	V ladim ir Kaluga Kirov Kostrom a Tu la				
From -10 to -5	Rostov Astrakhan′		R Khakasiya Pskov	<u>N ovosibirsk</u>				
From -15 to -10	Saratov	Chita		Krasnodar K Volgograd				
From -20 to -15	<u>O renburg</u>			R M ariiEl Am ur Ryazan'				
From -30 to -20	Belgorod	U l'yanovsk		AltaiK Stavropol'K Bryansk Voronezh Kursk				
Less than – 30	R A dygeya			<u>Tambov</u>				

<u>Underlined</u>: regions where gubernatorial elections were held from August to December 1995. Bold and italicized: regions where the governor changed once between the introduction of the appointment system and the gubernatorial elections in 1995 or 1996.

Shaded : regions where the governor changed twice or more during the same period.

the 1998 gubernatorial elections in Penza and Lipetsk. It is indicative that out of the three governors in the Red Belt who won the 1993 gubernatorial elections (Penza, Lipetsk and Orel) only Stroev of Orel could survive the 1998 elections.⁴⁹

Table 3 shows the frequency of reshuffling of governors from their first appointment (i.e. introduction of the position) in 1991-92 to the gubernatorial elections in 1995-97. Tables 4 and 5 summarize Table 3. Table 4 testifies to Yeltsin's unexpected circumspection towards using his prerogative to remove and appoint governors. Except for Red Belt regions, in regard to which Yeltsin and his adherents indulged themselves in "cadre games" probably in desperation,⁵⁰ 70.8 to 75.0% of the first appointed governors served out their term until the electoral trial. However, as far as the odds in these gubernatorial elections are concerned, the long-lived governors in the Gray Belt were almost eliminated (only one out of the ten survived), whereas their counterparts in the White and Explosive Belts recorded excellent electoral performances (Table 5).

	Only one governor from 1991 to the 1995-97 elections	Only one change	More than two changes	Subtotals
White Belt*	17 (70.8%)	7 (29.2%)	0 (0.0%)	24 (100%)
Explosive Belt	9 (75.0%)	3 (25.0%)	0 (0.0%)	12 (100%)
Gray Belt**	10 (71.4%)	3 (21.4%)	1 (7.1%)	14 (100%)
Red Belt***	4 (28.6%)	5 (35.7%)	5 (35.7%)	14 (100%)
Subtotals	40 (62.5%)	18 (28.1%)	6 (9.4%)	64 (100%)

 Table 4. Frequency of Reshuffling of Governors

* Chechnya and Yamalo-Nenets are not included.

** Nizhegorod ('97) and Aga-Buryat are not included.

*** Kurgan is not included.

Table 5. Frequency of Reshuffling and Probability of Incumbents' Victory

	Only one governor from 1991 to the 1995-97 elections	Only one change	More than two changes	Subtotals
White Belt	12/17 (70.6%)	5/7 (71.4%)	0/0 ()	17/24 (70.8%)
Explosive Belt	8/9 (88.9%)	3/3 (100.0%)	0/0 ()	11/12 (91.7%)
Gray Belt	1/10 (10.0%)	1/3 (33.3%)	1/1 (100.0%)	3/14 (21.4%)
Red Belt	1/4 (25.0%)	1/5 (20.0%)	0/5 (0.0%)	2/14 (14.3%)
Subtotals	22/40 (55.0%)	10/18(55.6%)	1/6 (16.7%)	33/64 (51.6%)

49 A.B. Shatilov, "Osobennosti regional'noi izbiratel'noi kampanii v 1998 g.," K. Matsuzato, ed., *Vzryvnyi poyas-96....*

⁵⁰ As Table 5 shows, in the Red Belt frequent reshuffling of governors did not raise the incumbents' odds in gubernatorial elections.

If Gray Belt governors had not been able to build up strong electoral machines by 1996, why had they not been fatally challenged even before that, for example in 1992-94, as was the case with Red Belt governors? The reason is that in Gray Belt regions, in their normalcy, not only the administration but also the opposition is weak and, accordingly, political life is inert. If it were in defiant Red Belt regions, the opposition would not have allowed such visibly weak governors as A.S. Belyakov (Leningrad), Yu.S. Matochkin (Kaliningrad), Yu.V. Vlasov (Vladimir), V.A. Desyatnikov (Kirov), and N.V. Sevryugin (Tula) to serve out their tenures. If it were in self-conscious Explosive Belt regions, not only the opposition, but also rivals in the ruling faction would have pulled down these governors.

Table 6 shows the periods when the incumbents in the gubernatorial elections were appointed. Its contents are systematized in Tables 7 and 8, both of which show the same pattern as Tables 4 and 5. In all White, Explosive, and Gray Belts almost three quarters of the incumbents had been long-lived (appointed at least before the October Incident in 1993), but in Gray Belt regions they could not turn their almost five year tenures into reliable political resources to win the election, in contrast to their colleagues in the White and Explosive regions. If we sum up all the cases from the four belts, however, long-lived incumbents, not surprisingly, did better in gubernatorial elections than appointees after 1993, although the odds for the "first appointed governors" were lowered by the overwhelming defeats of this category in the Gray Belt (only one out of the ten won).

The portion of "relief governors" appointed as late as 1996 in the incumbents was impressive: 21.2%! In the White Belt these extraordinary appointments salvaged as many as three of the four regions which had been in danger of sharing the disgrace of Chelyabinsk⁵¹ because of their unpopular governors (B.Yu. Kuznetsov of Perm', N.M. Podgornov of Vologda, P.N. Balashkin of Arkhangel'sk). In the Explosive Belt this reshuffling created two "miracles" in Ivanovo⁵² and Saratov. In the Red Belt, sad to say, miracles did not happen; all five "relief governors" were defeated.

Let us examine the historical genesis of these four belts. Table 9 illustrates the correlation between regional votes in the first presidential election in 1991, the first appointment of governors, and the subsequent political development of the regions. We can discern, first and foremost, that the vertical axis of this table reflects the "progressiveness" of regions much more proportionally than that of Table 1 (composed from elections in 1995-97) does. The north-south cleavage had not appeared in 1991, and Yeltsin gained votes mainly in progressive regions. This was a golden age for the Russian democratic movement. Moreover, Table 9 reveals much less regional polarization of votes than Table 1. At that time people voted according to their convictions, not according to what region they lived in (more correctly, under whom they lived).

⁵¹ I refer to the defeats of incumbent governors in pro-Yeltsin regions.

⁵² As for the "miracle" in Ivanovo, see: Solnick, "Gubernatorial Elections," p. 70, fn.34.

	W in	ners in the guberna	torialelections 1995-199	97
	Incum be	-	Challe	
**	V ictories in the 1st round	Victories in the 2nd round***	N on -left	N PSR
M ore than +30	R Sakha R Tyva M oscow city Taym yr A O Khanty-M ans: A O Chukch: A O Yam alo-N enets A O	Perm' (1/96-)	Sankt-Peterburg city Sverdlovsk Koryak A O	
From +20 to +30	<i>Vologda</i> (3/96-) Kom i-Perm yak A O	Arkhangel'sk (3/96-) <u>M oscow O blast'</u>	M agadan M um ansk Evenki A O <i>Nenets AO</i> (3/96-)	
From +15 to +20	Khabarovsk K	Kam chatka		ſ
From +10 to +15	<u>N ovgorod</u> <u>Tom sk</u> Y aroslav]'	Tyum en '	Kaliningrad Leningrad	Chelyabinsk
From +5 to +10	Ivanovo (2/96-)		(10/96-) ¹	
From -5 to +5	R Kabardino-Balkariya Primor'eK Sam ara N izhegorod Om sk Evreiskaya A O	Sakhalin	Tver' U st-O rda Buryat A O	V ladim ir <i>Kaluga</i> (3/96-) K irov Kostrom a Tu la
From -10 to -5	Rostov A strakhan '		R Khakasiya Pskov	<u>Novosibirsk</u>
From -15 to -10	Saratov (4/96-)	Chita (2/96-)		Krasnodar K (7/96-) Volgograd
From -20 to -15	0 renburg			R M ariiE] Amur (5/96-) Ryazan' (10/96-)
From -30 to -20	Belgorod	U ľyanovsk		A ltaiK Stavropol'K <i>Bryansk</i> (8??/96-) <i>Voronezh</i> (9/96-) Kursk
Less than – 30	R Adygeya			<u>Tam bov</u>

Table 6. Periods of appointment for the incumbentsin the 1995-97 gubernatorial elections*

*Regions w here gubernatorial elections w ere held from A ugust to D ecem ber 1995 are underlined. **P(y) - P(z) P(y): the % of Yelts in 's poll in the 1st round of the presidential elections 1996 P(z): the % of Zyuganov 's poll in the 1st round of the presidential elections 1996

***I include the cases in which in 1996-97 the incum bent governors foresaw their difficulties in the elections and, therefore, adopted the single-round system, nam ely, Sakhalin, Chita, and U lyanovsk.



W hite Belt



The other regions belong to the G ray Belt.

In this okrug the elections were held twice (in O ctober 1996 and in February 1997).
 The incum bent elected in O ctober 1996 was defeated in the first round of the February elections.

Circled and italicized : regions where the governors or the presidents were elected by the population in 1991-92 and remained until the elections in 1996.

Shaded: regions, where the first appointed governors remained in their post until the gubernatorial elections in 1995-97.

Italicized: regions where the governors appointed during the "first wave of appeasement" (1992-93) remained in their post until the gubernatorial elections in 1995-97.

Bold: regions where the governors appointed in the aftermath of the October Incident (1993) remained until the gubernatorial elections in 1995-97.

Not emphasized: regions where the governors appointed during the "second wave of appeasement" (1994-95) remained in their post until the gubernatorial elections in 1995-97.

Bold and italicized: regions where the governors were reshuffled in 1996, i.e. directly before the gubernatorial elections.

Table 7. Composition of Incumbents Facing the GubernatorialElections in 1995-97 by Period of Appointment

	Elected in 1991-92	First appointed governors	Appointed in the 1st wave of appease- ment 1992- 93	Appointed in the aftermath of the October Incident 1993	Appointed in the 2nd wave of appease ment 1994- 95	Appointed in 1996	Subtotals
White Belt*	3 (12.0%)	14 (56.0%)	2 (8.0%)	1 (4.0%)	1 (4.0%)	4 (16.0%)	25 (100.0%)
Explosive Belt	1 (8.3%)	8 (66.7%)	1 (8.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (16.7%)	12 (100.0%)
Gray Belt**	0 (0.0%)	10 (66.7%)	1 (6.7%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (6.7%)	3 (20%)	15 (100.0%)
Red Belt***	2 (14.3%)	2 (14.3%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (14.3%)	3 (21.4%)	5 (35.7%)	14 (100.0%)
Subtotals	6 (9.1%)	34 (51.5%)	4 (6.1%)	3 (4.5%)	5 (7.6%)	14 (21.2%)	66 (100.0%)

* Chechnya is not included.

** Nizhegorod ('97) is not included.

*** Kurgan is not included.

Table 8. Periods of Incumbents' Appointment and Probability of Victoryin the Gubernatorial Elections in 1995-97

	Elected in 1991-92	First appointed governors	Appointed in the 1st wave of appeasement 1992-93	Appointed in the aftermath of the October Incident 1993	Appointed in the 2nd wave of appeasement 1994-95	Appointed in 1996	Subtotals
White Belt*	2/3 (66.7%)	10/14 (71.4%)	2/2 (100.0%)	0/1 (0.0%)	1/1 (100.0%)	3/4 (75.0%)	18/25 (72.0%)
Explosive Belt	1/1 (100.0%)	7/8 (87.5%)	1/1 (100.0%)	0/0 ()	0/0 ()	2/2 (100.0%)	11/12 (91.7%)
Gray Belt**	0/0 ()	1/10 (10.0%)	0/1 (0.0%)	0/0 ()	1/1 (100.0%)	1/3 (33.3%)	3/15 (20.0%)
Red Belt***	1/2 (50.0%)	0/2 (0.0%)	0/0 ()	1/2 (50.0%)	0/3 (0.0%)	0/5 (0.0%)	6/14 (14.3%)
Subtotals	4/6 (66.7%)	18/34 (52.9%)	3/4 (75.0%)	1/3 (33.3%)	2/5 (40.0%)	6/14 (42.9%)	34/66 (51.5%)

* Chechnya is not included.

** Nizhegorod ('97) is not included.

*** Kurgan is not included.

Table 9. Relationship Between Votes in the Presidential Election in 1991, the FirstAppointment of Governors, and the Future Political Development of Regions

	Previous positions of the governors						
	"Conserv	vative choices"	"Radicalch	inires"			
	Chairofthe	Chair of the regional	Challengerw ithin	M arginal			
**	regionalSoviet	ispolkom	the nom enklatura	nom enklatura			
From +20 to+30		Sverdlovsk*					
From +15 to+20			Chelyabinsk				
From +10 to +15		Khanty-M ans AO		N izhegorod Perm '* Sam ara			
From +5 to +10		M oscow O blast'	Tula	Salli ala			
From \pm 0 to +5	Tom sk)	K habarovsk K	Penza	Primor'eK*			
From I 0 to +5	TOIL DI	Kam chatka Taim yr A O Chukch: A O	(Tom sk)	V ladim ir Lipetsk			
From -5 to± 0	N ovosibirsk* Tyum en /* U l'yanovsk	A rkhangel'sk A strakhan' Volgograd Voronezh** Ivanovo* Irkutsk Omsk Ryazan **	M um ansk O renburg R ostov Y aroslav]'	Bryansk** Kaluga* Saratov* Sakhalin**			
From -10 to -5		Belgorod)* Kirov Kostrom a <kursgan?> Kursk Magadan</kursgan?>		Leningrad O bl.			
From -15 to -10		Tver'	Stavropol'K	A ltaiK KrasnodarK N ovgorod Tam bov N enets A O *			
From -20 to -15		Evenk: A O	Kem erovo Kom i-Perm yak A O	Amur** Kaliningrad Evreiskaya A0			
From -30 to -20		Chita* U st-O rda Buryat A O		Pskov*			
Less than - 30		<aga-buryata0?></aga-buryata0?>					

O rel, Sm olensk, and Yam alo-N enets are not included in this table. Voronezh, Lipetsk, Penza and Kem erovo are categorized in the future Red Belt. We do not know the frequencies of reshuffling of governors in Kurgan and Aga-Buryat.

**P(y') - P(a) P(y'):the % of Yelts in 's poll in the region in the presidential elections in 1991
P(a):the average % of Yelts in 's poll in the RF in the presidential elections in 1991

Shaded : regions w hich w ould belong to the W hite Belt in 1995-97.

Circled: regions which would belong to the Red Belt in 1995-97.

Bold and italicized: regions which would belong to the Explosive Belt in 1995-97.

 ${\tt N}\xspace of the N \xspace of the Stappointment to gube material elections.$


* The governorw as changed only once. ** The governorw as changed m ore than tw ice.

As for the first appointment of governors, neutral and pro-Yeltsin regions (where he polled not less than –5 points under the national average) split almost fifty-fifty (18-17) between conservative and radical appointments, whereas Yeltsin preferred a radical cadre policy in anti-Yeltsin regions. The regions in which votes for Yeltsin were less than the national average by more than 10 points split 5-12 between conservative and radical choices. The proportion of governors who served out their tenures until the 1995-97 gubernatorial elections was: only one out of the three former chairs of regional Soviets (33.3%); 17 out of the 24 former regional chief executives, i.e. chairs of regional *ispolkomy* (70.8%); 8 out of the 10 challengers within the regional nomenklatura (80%); and 8 out of the 20 marginal nomenklaturas (40%). This "life expectancy" of each category is quite understandable.


Table 9 shows that the White Belt was molded out of two "materials": regions which were super-progressive in 1991, where Yeltsin made a *conserva-tive* choice by betting on the existing chief executives and continued to value these cadres until 1996; and regions which were anti-reform in 1991, where Yeltsin's recruitment of governors was made on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, the Red Belt emerged from two origins: constantly anti-capitalist regions where Yeltsin's defiant cadre policy only worsened the situation; and "disappointed" regions which were relatively progressive in 1991 but afterwards became anti-Yeltsin (Penza, Lipetsk, Bryansk, Voronezh, Ryazan', Volgograd, and Novosibirsk). It is noteworthy that in four of these seven regions gubernatorial elections were held in 1993 and, moreover, two of the four victors in these elections were removed by Yeltsin soon after the October Incident by reason of their support for the Supreme Soviet.

The compositions of the Explosive and Gray Belts were more homogeneous. The Explosive Belt originated from regions which used to be relatively *progressive* in 1991 (except for the Jewish Autonomous Oblast'), whereas the Gray Belt regions were formerly *conservative* (except for Tula and Vladimir which had been politically active in 1989-91 probably under the strong influence of Moscow).

Graph 1 illustrates the correlation of regional votes between the RSFSR presidential election in 1991 and the April referendum in 1993, while Graph 2 does so between the 1993 April referendum and the 1996 presidential election. A relevant correlation can be observed between the 1993 April referendum and the 1996 election, but not between the 1991 election and the 1993 referendum. There was a manifest realignment of regions in terms of voting behavior during 1991-93. First, a significant number of regions which used to be anti-Yeltsin (in several cases, even manifestly pro-Ryzhkov) in 1991 began to support Yeltsin in April 1993. Most of these "penitent" regions circled by a solid line in Graph 1' (Tyva, Kalmykiya, Tatarstan, Sakha, Komi, Kaliningrad, Yaroslavl', Arkhangel'sk, Magadan, Murmansk, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast', Komi-Permyak, Taimyr, Chukchi, Nenets, Evenki, and Koryak) belong to the "North."




Vote for Yeltsin in comparison with the RF average (1991)



Support for Yeltsin in comparison with the RF average(1993)







 $\overline{R}^2 = 0.5649$

Vote for Yeltsin minus vote for Zyuganov(June 1996)

173






Defiant regions

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sible, the voluntariness of voters in most of these regions arouses suspicion.⁵³ Let us call them "controlled" regions. It is remarkable that 13 out of these 18 regions would compose the White Belt in 1996 and, accordingly, 13 out of the 25 future White regions⁵⁴ grew from this "controlled" group.

Another group of "deviations" circled by a broken line in Graph 1' consists of Dagestan, Karachaevo-Cherkassk, and Kabardino-Balkar (from Northern Caucasus); Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, Penza, and Lipetsk (from the Central Black Soil); Mordova, Samara, and Nizhegorod (from the Mid-Volga); and Orenburg (from Southern Urals). These regions were pro-Yeltsin in 1991, but by 1993 they became disappointed by the results of the Russian Democratic Revolution. Five of these 12 regions would enter the Red Belt in the future, while four of them would compose the Explosive Belt. It is difficult to resist a risky desire to attribute the rapid disenchantment of these regions to their defiant political tradition. These regions were against the tsar, against communism, and now are against capitalism in the Russian manner. As for Samara and Nizhegorod, their progressiveness spelled their ruin. Those who had protested the construction of a nuclear power station (Nizhegorod) or a plant for the liquidation of INF (Samara) a few years before, not surprisingly began to behave in the same manner against Russian post-communist injustice.

Thus the emergence of two groups of deviations, "controlled" and defiant, destroyed the progressive-conservative axis, instead forming a north-south axis.⁵⁵ This cleavage continued to be stable until the 1996 presidential election. Only the landslides in the Volga Basin in gubernatorial elections of the same year made this cleavage fluid, of course, to Yeltsin's advantage. This is not to say that *Self-Thermidor* of the administrative party (combined with the second and third waves of appeasement to regional and local elites) did not bear fruit until that time. No doubt, *Self-Thermidor* did effect Yeltsin's "historical" counteroffensive between the 1995 Duma election and the presidential one, but it was only in the phenomena of Titov (Samara), Ayatskov (Saratov), Chub (Rostov) and Sklyarov (Nizhegorod, 1997)⁵⁶ that the political narratives and skills of *Self*-

⁵³ Only in Kaliningrad visible privileges given to the region under the official regional policy at that time might possibly change its political atmosphere in a "democratic" way.

⁵⁴ Not including Chechnya.

⁵⁵ I cannot share McFall's and Petrov's view that "[during 1991-96] Russian voters have not been as volatile in their voting patterns as the conventional account implies" (op. cit., p. 510). As shown here, in many regions voting patterns became stable only after 1993, not before that.

⁵⁶ Ivan Petrovich Sklyarov succeeded Nemtsov in his post of Nizhegorod governor. Born in 1947, Sklyarov graduated from the Moscow Aviation Institute. From 1980 he worked in party organs, from 1989-91 he was the first secretary of the Arzamass *gorkom* of the CPSU and the city Soviet chair. From 1991-94 he was vice-governor and from 1994-97 mayor of Nizhnii Novgorod (Sergei Borisov, "Nizhegorodskaya oblast'," K. Matsuzato and A.B. Shatilov, eds., *Regiony Rossii - Khronika i rukovoditeli (6) Nizhegorodskaya oblast' i Ul'yanovskaya oblast', Occasional Papers on Regional/Subregional Politics in Post-Communist Countries* 1(Sapporo, 1999), pp. 148-149. In contrast to Nemtsov, who proved to be blessed with a unique

Thermidor were exploited to the extent that they marked the beginning of the second round of "Russia's democratic transition."

IV. CONCLUSION

Machine politics was not alien to post-communist regimes, since communist regimes had, at least, two of its requisites: patronage networks among public servants and electoral technology aimed at extreme mobilization of voters. Regional and local history in post-communist Russia proved that it was much more wise and natural for regional and local elites, if they wished to win elections, to preserve their *khozyain* (master) character than to transform themselves into "Western-style" politicians, as had been irritatingly demanded by M. Gorbachev in the waning years of the CPSU.

Two critical realignments in Russia's party politics - the Gaidar revolution and the consequent *Self-Thermidor* - affected its electoral geography. The progressive-conservative axis had been destroyed by 1993, resulting in the emergence of a north-south axis. Remainders of the former progressive regions and the northern "controlled" regions compose the present White Belt, the foothold of the Yeltsin regime. In its conception *Self-Thermidor* was aimed at remedying the post-October (1993) situation to win the presidential election, but it bore visible fruit in gubernatorial elections. In the course of these elections the administrative party succeeded in making the north-south axis fluid and building a bridgehead to the defiant "South" in the Volga regions, which are respected in national politics much more than the miserable northern national *okruga*. On the other hand, defeats of Yeltsin's appointees in the Gray Belt will hardly affect national politics.

This chapter has focused on regional administrative parties in 1992-96, so that the geographic typology of regional oppositions remains to be studied. Moreover, this chapter has focused on elections of executives and referendums seeking confidence in executives. It will be necessary to analyze elections of legislators, which are less conductive to mobilization (more voluntary) so that the progressive-conservative axis has still been viable, and compare these elections with those of executives. Last but not least, this chapter has not included local elections (in particular, mayoral elections in 1996) in its perspective, although many researches suggest that Russian electoral politics develops in triple (federal-regional-local) relations. With these supplements the model presented here will become more useful.

ability to keep a reformative aura even after his *Self-Thermidor* (which occurred probably in 1994), Sklyarov is a typical party functionary with technical education. Nemtsov did not recommend Sklyarov as his successor, joking that "I won't give 'Ivan' (i.e. an ordinary man - K.M.) this oblast." The 1997 election was marked by rampant corruption. A significant number of the total votes had already been cast before the voting day, most of them at voters' homes. As for the authoritarian transformation of Nizhegorod politics, see: N.P. Raspopov and V.I. Lysov, "Vybory i izmenenie politicheskogo rezhima v Nizhegorodskoi oblasti v 1995-98 gg." published in the same volume of the *Regiony Rossii*.