The Image of Russia and the Russians
in Ukrainian Political Thought (1860-1945)


Volodymyr Potul'nyts'kyj

Copyright (c) 1998 by the Slavic Research Center. All rights reserved.


The image of Russia and the Russians in historical and political inheritance of Ukrainian scholars and political figures is important because of the general context of learning about the historical experience of the main representatives of Ukrainian political thought. The Ukrainian response to contemporary Russian and Ukrainian problems to a large extent repeats Ukrainian political thought from the beginning of the 1860s until the end of the Second World War. Therefore a study of the attitude to Russia in Ukrainian political thought is very useful for the development of the future Russian-Ukrainian relations and should present some new areas for comparative analysis and future investigations.
One of the basic sources for understanding how Ukrainians perceived Russia and the Russians is the series of Ukrainian historical and political works, written between the 1860s and the 1940s, mainly from 1918 till 1945, after the unsuccessful attempts to create the Ukrainian state in 1917-1920. Based on the analysis of this heritage of Ukrainian scholars in its evolution, one can single out the following three political trends in that period: populism (narodnytskyj), conservativism and nationalism.*1 Using Mannheim's concept of "generations", one might say that Ukrainian populism, conservatism and nationalism represented three antagonistic "generation units" within the framework of one "actual generation".*2
Since the 1840s till the revolutionary events in the Ukraine in 1917-1920, populism dominated Ukrainian political thought.*3 The representatives of this trend viewed "the people" (narod), (identified with the peasantry) as a homogeneous mass; anything or anyone that arose above the narod they condemned as parasitic, morally tainted, and essentially non-Ukrainian. They paid all their attention to the way of life of working people, and they romanticized their riots, revolts and revolutions. At the same time they disregarded the state's depiction of the Ukrainian people. Mykola Kostomarov (1817-1885) ought to be considered a founder of populism in Ukrainian political thought, however, populist ideology in works by Volodymyr Antonovych (1834-1908) and Mychailo Hrushevs'kyj (1866-1934) was most fully stated. Populists also included Ukrainian scholars, mainly historians, who were disciples of V. Antonovych and M. Kostomarovs' O. Lazarevs'kyj (1834-1902), O. Yefimenko (1848-1918), D. Yavornyc'kyj (1855-1940), M. Sumtsov (1854-1922), O. Bahalii (1857-1932) and others. Most of these renowned populist nineteenth-century intellectuals conceptualized Ukrainian culture in relationship to, and in terms of, a pan-Russian culture, which, of course, was ubiquitous in the life of every Ukrainian living in the Empire. These men posited Ukraine and Russia as regional societies within a bi-cultural (Rus') state. All populist historians and political thinkers, from M. Kostomarov to M. Hrushevs'kyj, glorified elemental peasant revolts, but they were suspicious of the statebuilding efforts of the Ukrainian elite.*4
Kostomarov held the view that the fate of each people is not determined by their historical development but by their spiritual peculiarities. Yet these "spiritual peculiarities" do not come about due to the environmental influences which constantly surround the people, but due to some pre-historic experience which has left its indelible mark. Thus the people do not change with a changing environment; they merely, sometimes passively and sometimes actively, assert their basic nature in the face of the changing situation in which they find themselves.*5
In his attempt to find an explanation and a solution to contemporary Russian and Ukrainian problems, Kostomarov wanted to find the historical foundation of the relationship between the Great Russian and Little Russian peoples. He decided that this relationship was defined in terms of the psychic condition of the nations. Thus, the basic problem of the government and the people is decided at the ethnographic level. The Ukrainians are strong in freedom of the people, self direction and nascent democracy, while the Great Russians are strong in organization and governmental elements; the Ukrainian people developed the veche system, but the Great Russians developed autocracy. Kostomarov writes in 1861 in his article "Dve Russkiya Narodnosti" (Two Russian Nationalities): "The Ukrainians are characterized by individualism, the Great Russians by collectivism... The Great Russians attempted to build on a firm foundation a collective structure permeated by one spirit. Ukrainians strove towards federation, whereas Great Russians strove towards autocracy and a firm monarchy. The Great Russian element has in it something grand and creative: the spirit of totality, the consciousness of unity, the rule of practical reason. The Great Russian can live through all adversities and select the hour when action is most fitting and circumstances most favorable... In their efforts to fulfill an ideal, once and for all, and in a concrete form, the Great Russian people are inclined to materialism and lag behind the Ukrainians as far as spiritual life and poetry is concerned... As in the social, so in the family life of the Great Russians there is little of what constitutes poetry in the life of the Ukrainians."*6
It is in terms of ethnography that Kostomarov explains that the Ukrainian people are subject to the Great Russian people because autocracy is stronger than the veche system which has elements of anarchy. Kostomarov believed that the Ukrainians, thus, cannot have their own state but must join with Russia or Poland. Despite the proposition that the Ukraine should be joined either to Russia or Poland, Kostomarov does not believe that this gives the Russians or the Poles the right to oppress the Ukraine.
Another well-known representative of the Ukrainian populism in the nineteenth century, Volodymyr Antonovych, in his essay "Try natsional'ni typy narodni" (Three national people's types), published in 1888, tried to characterize and compare three national types: the Ukrainians, Russians and Poles.*7 He summed up, that in the important area of political life the Ukrainians were characterized by a love for truth, civic equality and justice; the Russians by respect for authority and the willingness to bend before it; the Poles by aristocratism.*8 Regarding ethics, in the opinion of Antonovych, for the Ukrainians all that was ethical was equated to that which was just; Russians, on the other hand, regarded that which was strong as ethical; the Poles that which was pleasing.*9 Antonovych did not hold the view that national characters, or leading ideals of a nation, were immutable. A nation, and individuals themselves, he wrote, inherited certain features. But, characteristics were also formed, based on those inherited, in that nation's history, and in its cultural and historical upbringing.*10
Antonovych generally avoided the thorny problem of Russo-Ukrainian relations. Characterizing the national conceptions of his teacher V. Antonovych, M. Hrushevs'kyj marked that the "people's element of the Great Russian's have frightened him (Antonovych - V. P.) by its harsh, cruel force, by the cult of unlimited authority and violence".*11 Antonovych did not like to touch on the subject of Russo-Ukrainian relations, because he could not express himself freely, nor did he wish to participate in expressing forced compliments.*12
The question of Antonovych's attitude towards the formation of an independent Ukrainian state was ambivalent. On the one hand, as representative of the narodnyky, he was a severe critic of the state, which was clearly compatible with his uncompromising views on the elite and their role in Ukrainian history, as well as in contemporary Ukrainian society. The idea of the state, he concluded, should be equally dear to all of its citizens, without regard to social group, nationality, or an individual's position in society.*13 On the other hand, he wrote, that, unlike the Great Russians, who expended their energies on building a strong state, Ukrainians, although apathetic towards the idea of founding their own state, always defended their socio-political ideals in the formation of the internal structure of the state they found themselves within.*14 He stressed, that although Ukrainians did not desire to establish their own state, within these foreign state structures (Russian or Polish - V. P.), Ukrainians always defended their way of life and their autonomy.*15
The main representatives of Ukrainian populism in the first half of the twentieth century, were M. Hrushevs'kyj, and professors Roman Laschenko (1878-1929), Sergij Shelukhin (1864-1938), Ivan Ohienko (1882-1972), Oleksander Mytsiuk (1883-1943), Mykyta Schapoval (1882-1932). They considered the highest criterion of historical estimate to be people's property and people's rights, and on this basis they researched the history of Ukrainian people as an ethnic-cultural unit, the idea of its possible federation with other peoples, the problems of democratic traditions in Ukraine, and the historical-legal reasons of the Ukrainian people to have the right to form their own republic.*16
The narodnyky repeatedly addressed the question of the Russians, but mainly the political or historical aspects of the development of the Russian state as the tsarist empire or the Soviet Union. In nearly all of their investigations the narodnyky tried to carry out the analysis of the Russian people. They acknowledged the ethnic and historical closeness of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, recollected the leading historical role, that Russian people played in European history.*17 But at the same time they stressed both the great historical, cultural and psychological differences, that have always separated Ukraine from Muskovy, and the Ukrainian people from the Russians, and the deep antithesis between these two peoples so close in blood, but so different in spirit.*18 M. Hrushevs'kyj assumed, that the Russian people, after they had become europeanized, were still influenced by the oriental spirit and elements. Therefore, the character of the Russian people is quite different from the European character. To support this idea, he analyzed the views of Russian slavophiles, which had contrasted Western-European (especially German) principles of law, agreement and constitution, with Great Russian patriarchy. They were indifferent to the practical side of the life, and, vice versa, showed a greater interest in moral probems.*19But at the same time, M. Hrushevs'kyj did not forget the fact that Ukrainian people over the centuries, whether under pressure or of their own free will, have devoted their forces, abilities and material means to the service of the Great Russian people. He noted, that all foundations of material and spiritual culture, law, social and political order, which lay down the basis of life of the Great Russians ("pan-russian" culture, social life and its state system) were also developed by the Ukrainian people and borrowed by the Great Russians from the Ukrainians. He noted too, that contemporary Great Russian culture, literature and even literary language were created not without a considerable participation of the Ukrainians.*20 Morever, Hrushevs'kyj remarked, that Ukrainians figured prominently in the Europeanization of Russia, primarily in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also later.*21
Hrushevs'kyj paid particular attention to the differences that sharpely distinguished Russian people from the Ukrainians. He stressed, that both the Ukrainians and the Muscovites traced their origin, at least of their languages, to the ancient Slavs, yet each of these nationalities had a different cultural and historical background. During their separate existence within the Muscovite state, (while the Ukrainians developed within the grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), the Great Russians crystallized into an entirely different ethnic type with a singular mentality. They developed different customs, psychological reflexes, and so on. Hrushevs'kyj acknowledged, that the slavophiles views contained many rational and truthful considerations, though he mocked the idealization of the Great Russian people. He listed the negative features of Russian people, that manifested themselves particularly during riots, revolutions and different collisions, namely their disregard of comfortable life, their great interest in social and cultural destruction, and their irresponsible attitude to cultural and social values, which frequently can lead to the absolute lack of the moral criteria.*22 This scholar perceived Russian bolshevism as the heir of Moscow centralism, which was destroying the historical, economic and other connections between Ukrainian and Great Russian peoples.*23 The narodnyky believed that the Ukrainian masses not only embodied the true spirit of Ukraine (that is the love of justice and liberty), but also these masses were the source of all constructive elements, which had helped to restore Ukrainian independence and saved Ukrainian culture for posterity. They held the opinion, that, apart from the clergy, all the intelligentsia, and especially the nobility, were in the service of foreign overlords.
The prohibition and punitive policy of the Russian government also enhanced the Ukrainian alienation from the Russian people. The narodnyky thought, that the ideas about separateness cannot grow among the people, whose national needs can be completely satisfied. They admitted that the free development of the Ukrainian nation was perfectly compatible with the renewed Russia.*24
The further development of Ukrainian-Russian relations made considerable alterations in the political programme of M. Hrushevs'kyj. He subjected the Russian politics in Ukraine to sharp criticism, because he considered, that it actually continued the old tsarist politics. Hrushevs'kyj wrote that the Bolshevik leaders, who had made their task to unite the Russian and Ukrainian democracies in a federation, under their federalism concealed the worst despotic centralism.*25
In 1919 Hrushevs'kyj turned to the positions of Ukrainian Sovietophilism. Estimating the perspectives of the further development of the Russian-Ukrainian state-legal relations, he wrote in 1920: "We are convinced, that the objective, real circumstances of Ukrainian life, the legacy of tsarist Russia do not give the possibility of building Ukrainian life without mutual understanding with Russia."*26 The scholar noted that "without clearing things up with socialist Russia it is impossible to create the Ukrainian independence. Without the definite reconciliation of a Ukrainian-Russian border, any wide, constructive work, whether in Ukraine or Russia is absolutely impossible".*27 At the same time Hrushevs'kyj admitted, that "Soviet Russia by means of that federation, which it has established in Ukraine by its own will (Hrushevs'kyj obviously had in mind the decree of Soviet Government of 8 February 1920 about the federation of Ukrainian Soviet Republic with Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), and which it later converted into the absolute and full dependence of Ukraine from Moscow without any real self-government, itself buried for the Ukrainians the idea of a federal Russia".*28
In the same year, in his open letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine from 7 July 1920, M. Hrushes'kyj characterized the internal situation in Ukraine, and indicated that "Ukrainian working peasants (trudove selianstvo) are organically alien to communism in its Russian form".*29
Therefore, in his conclusion about the necessity of preserving the ties between Russia and Ukraine, Hrushevs'kyj expressed his conviction, that Ukraine should be almost autonomous. The scholar did not determine which character these ties may acquire in the future: "The question about confederation or federation is a thing of the future. In the meanwhile one cannot progress further in this direction than to a military and economic treaty... The circumstances carry the question over into another area - a federation - but one of the socialist republics of Europe."*30
Thus, Hrushevs'kyj considered, that the question of Ukrainian-Russian relations would be solved in the best way under the conditions, when both republics joined the international European federation (svitova Evropejs'ka federatsia) as equal members. "Ukraine and Russia - marked the scholar - can be united only in the higher organization, as two equal units."*31
The recognition by Hrushes'kyj of the Soviet Ukraine, his return from emigration to Kiev, testified that the old federalistic idea, though in a modern form, up to the end was in the centre of political orientations and views of the scholar.*32 In 1926, during his speech at the ceremonial meeting dedicated to the fortieth anniversary of his scholarly activity, Hrushevs'kyj, in particular, stressed that he considered as the most important task to be a "more intimate and close rapprochement of not only the different parts of our temporarily subdivided Ukrainian territory, but also of all the peoples of Eastern Europe, who were often divided by the historical misunderstanding, but later more and more united by their common tasks and connected by their future".*33 Here Hrushevs'kyj, obviously, again returned to his old idea about a federal union between Ukraine and Russia, as a counterbalance to the existing soviet federation.
In their estimation of the perspectives of Russian-Ukrainian political and state relations, the narodnyky always stressed that the real circumstances of Ukrainian life and the inheritance of tsarist Russia allowed no possibility of building Ukrainian life without settling problems with Russia. Promoting the federation idea, the populists stressed that it was impossible to return completely from an independent Ukraine to federative Russia.*34 In a counter-balance to the Ukrainian-Russian federation, some of the narodniks advanced the idea of a Ukrainian-Byelorussian-Lithuanian federation, emphasizing their common state structure in the past and their repression by Poland and Russia.*35 Another competing idea was a Czech-Slovak-Slovenian-Ukrainian federation between the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian State.*36
Most of the narodniks belonged to the two parties, that were founded in Ukraine at the beginning of the twentieth century - the "Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries" (U.P.S.R.), and the "Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers Party" (U.S.D.W.P.).*37 The U.P.S.R. went through a crisis, and its extreme, "left" wing, the Borot'bisty (struggles) finally left this party and went over to the communists. Before that split the U.P.S.R. was the largest party in Ukraine. The peasantry was under its influence. Its chief slogan was nationalisation of the land, and for some time it had the upper hand. After the fall of the Ukrainian National Republic this party was declared illegal and its leaders emigrated. Later some of them returned, but they did not play any political role. The members of the U.S.D.W.P. were recruited from industrial workers. Before the First World War it had a great influence on the young intelligentsia. Many outstanding leaders of other parties in their youth belonged to the social democratic parties. At the time of the revolution and during the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic its influence was very great. Later on, the power and influence of the social democracy died out. In 1920 a great number of its adherents joined the communist movement. Furthermore, young people left its ranks to join nationalist organisations.
Aside from the dominant populist mood in Ukrainian political thought, there was also a conservative trend, which aside from the social and national concerns, emphasized the role of the state as the principal organizing factor of society.*38 In Ukrainian political thought of the nineteenth century Ukrainian conservatives (mainly belonging to the hereditary nobility that listed Ukrainian as their mother tongue)*39 were seeking the restoration of the Hetmanate, recognition of their rights as nobles in Russian society, preserved autonomist traditions, a Little Russian regional patriotism, and thus formed a connecting link with the modern national movement. They were the descendants of the Little Russian Hetmanate's ruling class (Hetmanschyna - Ukrainian cossack state, which existed from 1648 to 1782), who had been partially coopted into the Russian nobility. A lot of them in the nineteenth century had a double (both Ukrainian and Russian) identity and loyalty, a phenomenon also observable in the largely assimilated nobilities of other nations such as the Czechs or Lithuanians.*40 This double loyalty can be compared with partly Russified people with German surnames; Baltic Germans who retained their German identity. Another example was Baron Mannerheim - governor of Finland, who only spoke Russian and Swedish. Among the Ukrainian nobility of the Left- and Right-Bank (the former territory of the First Little Russian Hetmanate's), the concept of "noble nation" just as in Poland and Hungary (a nation defined not by ethnicity but by membership in the nobility, in its Ukrainian case - "cossack - szlachta - noble nation", or starshyno-kosackaja natsiia - "the nation of cossacks and their offices") was also alive. The Ukrainian nobility, though they spoke Russian and Ukrainian and recognized the Russian government, maintained the old traditions of ethnic separateness from Russia as well as the struggle for local interests and for autonomy for Ukraine.*41 Culturally, they kept up characteristic old customs, were devoted to historic traditions, published documents of the Ukrainian past, compiled oral folk literature, and assembled collections in various museums.*42
From the 1860s until the end of the 1890s the conservative concept of Ukrainian nationality in Ukrainian political thought was represented by Mychailo Drahomanov (1841-1895). Drahomanov's thinking on Russia and the Russians in the attitude to the Ukrainian national question in the period immediately before the Ems Ukase is shown in his categorisation of the relationship between language and literature in Russia. He suggested that there was one Russian state, two languages and three literatures: the languages were the Little Russian and Great Russian and the literature was all-Russian (obscherusskaia) or (rossijska); Great Russian (velikorusskaia) or (rus'ka) and Little Russian (malorusskaia) or (ukrains'ka). The all-Russian category encompassed literature from any part of the Russian state on subjects of general significance to the history of the state and its culture and would include works such as Pushkin's Onegin, Gogol's Dead Souls and Turgenev's Rudin. The realistic school that developed after Gogol, depicted the lives of Little and Great Russians respectively and fell into the categories of Great or Little Russian literature. The tales of Pushkin, many of the comedies and dramas of Ostrovsky, the plays of Nekrasov, pedagogical publications such as Rodnoe Slovo, the tales of Petrushevskii and many others were example of Great Russian literature. Drahomanov considered Shevchenko to be one of the few Ukrainian writers whose works qualified for the category of obshcherusskaia; most others would enter the category of popular national works.*43
At the beginning of the 1870s Drahomanov had fashioned a compromise: a way in which the Ukrainians could integrate themselves into the Russian state without losing (even strengthening) their loyalty to the Ukrainian nation. In this way, Drahomanov summed up: "without ceasing to be Ukrainians, we will not lose the strength which the Russian state and culture gives us; the strength to be of use to our nation, to the Slavonic world and the world as a whole."*44 This view presupposed that culture would not be an instrument of state policy and secondly, that Ukrainian literature and culture would have the internal vitality to enter into such a role on equal terms with Great Russian culture. At the beginning of the 1890s, having reentered the Ukrainian political arena after an absence of a few years, Drahomanov elaborated in his last two major books - Chudats'ki Dumky pro ukrains'ku natsional'nu spravu and Lysty na Naddniprians'ku Ukrainu - his credo on the national question. The accumulated experiences of the past decades had led him to reaffirm the reality of a unified Ukrainian culture but consistently to deny the justification for the political unity of a national state for the Ukrainians. In principle he conceded that every small state had the right to a separate existence,*45 but as he put in: "It is difficult to gain political freedom in Russia. That is a true fact, but to tear away the whole area from the Zbruch to the Kuban is even more difficult. This is how the matter stands, either one or the other. There is no third way."*46 Drahomanov explained his objections in terms of practical politics: both the Polish uprisings of 1830 and 1863 and the Hungarian uprising of 1848 had foundered for lack of international support, while the newly formed states in the Balkans and the unified Italy had been brought about through foreign aid. In the absence of any interested foreign powers Drahomanov saw no realistic alternative for Ukrainians.
Drahomanov assessed the effects of Russification, but showed it as an extension of a certain type of state politics in that period. He compared Russia's policies towards Poland and Ukraine to France's assmuption of Alsace and Germany's of Poznan. Drahomanov argued from his experiences in Germany in the 1870s, that nationality, made the basis of a social theory, would promote chauvinism and narrow the scope of education.*47 He judged nationalism to be an outmoded and regressive ideology. At the same time, using scholarly arguments, Drahomanov demonstrated how a universal theory for solving the problem of coexistence among Russians and Ukrainians was needed, one that would supersede nationality. He described Christianity as having been such a theory in the past, but now a new cosmopolitan creed was needed.
At the beginning of the twentieth century the concept of the primacy of Ukrainian statehood as a prerequisite for the existence of the Ukrainian nation was reintroduced and renovated into Ukrainian political thought by the Ukrainian historian and politologist, Vjacheslav Lypyns'kyj (1882-1931), a representative of the Polish nobility (szlachta) from Right Bank Ukraine.*48 Lypyns'kyj introduced a change into Ukrainian political thinking, namely, the view that the state, the elite, institutions both civil and military, and defined social groups are the decisive forces in history, not the undifferentiated popular masses. The renovation of this conservativism was also caused by the necessity to work out a political-legal base of hetman's monarchical system for the Ukraine in 1918. The representatives of Ukrainian conservatism were, besides Lypyns'kyj, his many followers, who accepted Lypyns'kyj's assumptions about history and politics, among others Stepan Tomashivs'kyj (1875-1930), Vasyl' Kutchabs'kyj (1895-1944), Dmytro Doroshenko (1882-1951), Vjacheslav Zaiikyn (1896-1941), Ivan Kryp'jakevych (1886-1967), Ivan Krevets'kyj (1883-1940), Igor Los'kyj (1900-1936), Teofil Kostruba (1907-1943), Omeljan Pritsak (1919-) and others.*49
Although the above-mentioned scholars differed in attitudes to Russia, Germany and Poland, one can single out three common ideas, which are observed in the analysis of the political and social ideas of conservative thinkers of the twentieth century: 1. a critical attitude to liberal-democratic principles of social structure; 2. a determination for the state to play a dominating role in social and economic life; 3. a searching for new methods of state organisation and social relations with the substitution of democratic forms of statehood by the system, that has to be guided by the representation of the whole society. For Lypyns'kyj the state was the most important phenomenon of human society. He wrote: "I see nation as being the product of the complex reciprocal relationship between state and society. Nation is the realization of the will to be a nation. But a nation does not exist when this will and idea are present, but are not realized in the material form of the state."*50 Lypyns'kyj likened the state to a father, society to a mother, and the nation to the child that is the product of both of them.*51
In their estimation of "Russia" and the "Russians" the conservative researchers were divided into two main camps. One of them was headed by Lypyns'kyj, and the other was headed by Stepan Tomashivs'kyj. Lypyns'kyj emphasized the great role of szlachta during the entire history of Ukraine (in the meaning of the term nobility Lypys'kyj included not only a property owning upper class, but also the nobles who had other, usually urban, occupations).*52 Even during popular movements, such as the insurrection of Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyj against Poland, the most constructive section of the Ukrainian government was the szlachta.*53The masses were able to destroy foreign regimes, but were not able to reconstruct the national government. In the opinion of Lypyns'kyj, the most constructive work in Ukrainian history was achieved through the efforts of the hereditary nobility. According to Lypyns'kyj, only the szlachta can transfer the state traditions of the Hetmanate into the Ukrainian nation- and state-building, and only the Ukrainian monarchy can destroy the superiority of Great Russian and Polish circles in Ukraine and at the same time save the Ukrainian culture from the absolute domination of Ukrainian democratic representatives.*54 In a republic, governed by the Ukrainian democratic circles (narodnyky) the Moskvophilism and Polonophilism of the Russians and Poles on the one hand, and the Moskvophobia and Polonophobia of the Ukrainians on the other, would flourish, and a contempt towards Ukrainian populism would develop, and finally the Ukrainian state and nation would be politically and culturally destroyed. But in a state, governed by the Hetman, the nobles and the peasants (xliboroby - that is all the people, who are connected with agriculture), can be perceived by the Russians as legitimate. This tolerant attitude of the Russians to the nobles and the Hetman would acquire the necessary legitimation, because it would result from the fact, that the Russians are traditionally a monarchical people and have always had a respect for old traditions. According to these views, Lypyns'kyj and his adherents considered the possibility of a Union with Russia. Lypyns'kyj stressed that the "Ukrainian geographical situation and the common historical past and economic interests demand that Ukraine, as a separate independent country, conclude a military and economic union with Russia and Byelorussia, and together they must find allies in Europe".*55
As a precondition for this union, each of three "Rus'" peoples had to create their own national state. Without this condition the basic difference between Ukraine and Moscow would always exist, because this "...basic difference does not consist in language, race or religion, ...but in the different political structures, the different methods of organizing the elite, in the different relationships between the upper and the lower social classes and between state and society".*56In this union the Ukrainian state would be able to conduct its own active policy.
In his estimation of Russia and the Russians Lypyns'kyj first of all wished to solve the problem, which was very important in Ukrainian history, and had not been solved for Ukraine for many centuries. This problem was formulated by the Lypyns'kyj as the task "to separate the Ukraine from Poland, but in such a way, so as not to drown in a Russian sea". Trying to explain the reasons of Ukrainian failures, Lypyn'kyj came to the conclusion, that there had always been two main destructive forces in the way of solving Ukrainian problems: "the war against Moscow and the aid from Moscow."*57 Therefore, Lypyns'kyj concentrated his main efforts on the elaboration of the model of Ukrainian-Russian relations. "A union with Moscow in foreign policy, without aid from Moscow in internal policy", - in such a way Lypyns'kyj imagined the "formula of state Ukrainian politics against Moscow".*58
At the same time Lypyns'kyj always stressed the cultural and national distinctiveness of the Ukrainians, their difference from the Russians. He wrote, that "despite the common Byzantine origin of both cultures, the further development revealed significant differences between them. But they are not so irreconcilable to stop them being used, such as our democrats imagine, for the political aims of state building. The national emotions towards Moscow, which resulted from these differences, don't have the same force in Ukraine as the national emotions of the Czechs towards the Germans, the Poles towards the Russians, or the Bulgarians or Serbs in their relations with the Turks."*59
Therefore, Lypyns'kyj confirmed, that when, after the creation of the Ukrainian state, for example, the question of the necessity to defend this state from the aggressive policies of Russia would arise, it would be impossible to organize an all-Ukrainian anti-Russian front. The concrete historical facts demonstrate, that the war against Russia has always split the Ukrainians into two hostile camps.
Lypyns'kyj examined the temporary provisional union between Russia and Ukraine as one of the necessary conditions for the relatively quiet work, which must be directed towards the process of strengthening the independence and national self-consciousness of the people. He noted: "The political union with Moscow in our foreign politics is only one step on the way to Ukrainian independence, against the interference of Moscow in our internal politics. To receive real independence, one must create, under the cover of union with Moscow, a local Ukrainian administration, under our own steam without Moscow's assistance."*60
Lypyns'kyj emphasized, that he had in mind exactly a union, but not a federation with post-Bolshevik Russia. He stressed, that "if we wanted to be a nation, we must obtain the state independence and reject any federation". The federation with Russia, which Hetman Soropads'kyj (1873-1945) proclaimed in his decree (universal) from 14 November 1918, Lypyns'kyj labeled as "treason".*61 He foresaw, that "especially a future post-Bolshevik Moscow will be inclined to conclude such a union with Ukraine. This post-Bolshevik Russia will be too weak to restore the old centralized Petersburgian state. Ukrainian statesmen must use this respite, which will be given to them by the union with a weak Moscow with the aim of building a strong Ukrainian state."*62
While Lypyns'kyj felt, that the strength and well-being of Ukrainian culture lay in its connection to Russia and Byelorussia, Stepan Tomashivs'kyj and all his adherents from Western Ukrainian Galicia - I. Kryp'jakevych, I. Krevets'kyj, T. Kostruba and others, saw in the Great Russian only negative influences, which they called "oriental" (oriental'ni vplyvy) on the Ukrainian culture. In their opinion the negative influences upon the Ukrainian spirit started with the Byzantine culture, and Orthodoxy played an entirely negative role in the whole of Ukrainian history, because it brought the Ukrainians closer to the Russians and weakened their national strength. Tomashivs'kyj considered only the occidental (Western-European) influences, as positive elements of Ukrainian culture and therefore became an extreme occidentalist in modern Ukrainian political thought. The western influences were strongest in the "Western Ukrainian Kingdom", (that is Halician-Volhynian Principality) during the rule of the Romanovich dynasty in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the period that Tomashivs'kyj therefore considered to be the first true Ukrainian state.*63
In his political activity Lypyns'kyj tried to bring the "denationalized" Ukrainian nobility (the nobility, who had become strongly Polonised, but by the nineteenth century it felt Russian), and the double-loyalty Ukrainian nobility, as well as the Polish and Russian nobility, who lived on the Ukrainian territory, back into the ranks of the Ukrainian nation. He found considerable support. In 1917 a group of large landowners were organized in the "Ukrainian Democratic Agricultural Party".*64 This was a conservative party, representing the interests of the Farmers; ideologically (Lypyns'kyj was their ideologist) it considered territorial interests, traditions and "classocracy" (for Lypyns'kyj the classocracy is the basic form of political rule over a well-differentiated class society in which each class directly commands the means of production while at the same time possesing strong traditions, its own definite style of work, and its own psyche) as the foundations of the state in Ukraine.*65 Aside from social and national concerns, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, the representatives of the Ukrainian nobility of the Russian-ruled Ukraine together with their Polish and Russian counterparts, belonged to the national awakeners and brought the state traditions of the Hetmanate into the national movement. During the time span of the Second Ukrainian Hetmanate (April - December 1918), which was based on Hetman Skoropads'kyj dynasty,*66 and also in the interwar emigration the double (Ukrainian and Russian) identity and loyalty of the Ukrainian nobility yielded to primary Ukrainian identity, though all of them preserved the interplay between Ukrainian and Russian lifestyles. Before the creation of the Second Hetmanate in 1918 multiple identities were possible between the majority of the representatives of Ukrainian traditional elite, whereas after the war they were impossible.
S. Tomashivs'kyj and his adherents belonged to a new movement in Ukrainian life in Galicia, which aimed at securing the influence of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Galicia on political life.*67 These endeavours showed two different tendencies, according to the different centres, from which they have originated. The apostolic "Catholic Union", founded by those surrounding the Metropolian Count Andrei Sheptyts'kyj, aimed at infusing a Christian spirit into all Ukrainian public life. The other, a purely clerical movement, founded its expression in the "Ukrainian Catholic National Party", which was established in 1930. In 1932 it had accepted the name of the "Ukrainian National Regeneration". Outside some of the clergy it had not found any adherents.
The nationalist trend in Ukrainian political thought in Galicia, as ideological base of the pre-war "nationalism" current among the Ukrainian revolutionary intelligentsia, was represented by scholar and political thinker Stanislav Dnistrians'kyj (1870-1935) and his followers - Stepan Rudnyts'kyj (1877-1937) and Volodymyr Starosol's'kyj (1878-1942). The time span of the national statehood direction lasted from the beginning of the twentieth century.*68 One can include among the representatives of the nationalist trend in Ukrainian political thought the whole cluster of researchers from Eastern Ukraine and Galicia, the majority of whom began to investigate the political processes in Ukraine, while living as emigrees, and who were directly influenced by S. Dnistrians'kyj: S. Rudnyts'kyj, V. Starosol's'kyj, and also Ol'gerd Bochkovs'kyj (1884-1939), Oton Eihelman (1854-1943), Oleksander Lotots'kyj (1870-1938), Andrij Yakovliv (1872-1955), Maksym Slavins'kyj (1868-1945), and others.*69 According to Dnistrians'kyj, who elaborated his theory of society relations under the influence by both Austrian and German scholars Georg Yelinek (1851-1911) and Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), the national statehood (natsional'no-derzavnyts'kyj) movements occur among groups, who live in multinational states, where a language, culture and identity other than their own are dominant, and the group's leaders - the nationalist intelligentsia - seek to convince the group's members, that they form a distinct nationality and as such deserve at the very least cultural autonomy, if not political autonomy or independence.*70 His theory served as the basis for the national statehood concept in Ukrainian political thought, according to which the law and social-ethical (sotsial'no-etychni) standards of organic (organichni) social relations give a nation the right to autonomy and state independence.*71 Scholars of this national statehood trend corroborated the right of people's self-determination by their research of the history of the national-democratic (natsional'no-demokratychni) traditions of the Ukrainian people. These traditions were formed as a fusion of the Western-European and Russian cultural influences that were a constant feature of Ukrainian history.
In the opinion of the representatives of national statehood, it is necessary to differentiate, among the western and eastern influences which reached Ukraine from an earlier time, those elements which were a basic part of the character of the Ukrainian nation and those which were alien to it. For example, the academician Stepan Rudnyts'kyj, though considering the Russians to be the main people of Eastern Europe, remarked, however, that northern and eastern influences led to such a circumstance, that the Moscow state and society, already in seventeenth century, had so distinguished themselves from the Ukrainian Hetmanate state, society and people, that all positive influences were excluded. Rudnyts'kyj wrote that the political culture of the Russian people is characterized by its "coarseness, brutality, and even cruelty and inclination to extremities".*72 This political culture "cemented the peculiar development of the Russian imperial despotic state and was, in its turn, the product of the internal development of this state. As a result, Russia has always been governed by a social and political oligarchy. This oligarchy was represented before the revolution by a handful (zhmen'ka) of nobles and capitalists, headed by the tsar. After the revolution of 1917 it was headed by the handful of communist oligarchs."*73
Rudnyts'kyj promoted the point of view, that any future form of power in Russia will have the same oligarchial basis, and that "by the formation of a federation will fatally and destructively influence the political culture of the Ukrainian common people, a culture marked by comradely and humane forms and features".*74 As long as the support of the future state comes from the peasantry, destructive influences of Russian political culture become stronger, because the Ukrainian peasantry will never identify itself with the dominating Russian or Polish cultures, even on a moral-psychological (moral'no-psychologichnomy) level.*75
Another representative of the national statehood trend in Ukrainian political thought, Volodymyr Starosol's'kyj, marked that: "Being exposed to constant invasions from Russia and Poland, Ukraine had not always been able to solve her social problems by her own free will. Russian, Polish and other foreign forces invading Ukraine would take advantage of social antagonisms and social struggles, and, by intervening in those struggles, would entirely break or weaken the unity of the national forces, and having broken it, would succeed in imposing their own dominant social order along with their own government."*76
The representatives of national statehood thought, that most of the ethnic differences between Ukraine and Russia can be explained by the fact, that until eighteenth century (i.e., until the establishment of Russian rule) Ukraine was influenced by the culture of the Western European countries and participated in European social and cultural process. The annexation of Ukraine was a great event, that had enriched the life and culture of Muscovy (Moskovii), prior to the Muscovite's (Moscovyty) coming into direct contact with Western standards and ideas after the dismemberment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
In their political activity most nationalist political thinkers from the Eastern Ukraine were organized in 1917 into the "Ukrainian Party of Socialist Federalists".*77 This party was represented by the Ukrainian intelligentsia, who at the same time represent the Ukrainian bourgeoisie. They were included in the government in the last months of the Ukrainian National Republic, after the fall of which, their leading members fled with Symon Petliura beyond the confines of Ukraine. Among the emigrants this party continued the struggle for the liberation of Ukraine by means of international propaganda. In the Western Ukrainian lands there was a "National Democratic Party", which later changed its name into the "Working Party", and was finally in 1925 reorganized into the "Ukrainian National Democratic Union". It consisted of the majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, bourgeoisie and peasantry and was the strongest Ukrainian Party in Poland. It was formed of three groups, and united various, sometimes contradictory elements. Socially it was the party of the "Middle classes" and the intelligentsia, who may be divided into liberal bourgeoisie and wealthy peasants.*78
A qualitatively new Ukrainian political movement arose in the decade following the First World War. Specifically labelled "Nationalist" by its adherents, the new movement represented a radical rejection of the pre-war "nationalism" current among the Ukrainian intelligentsia.*79 Dmytro Dontsov (1883-1973) was its main ideologist. This nationalism simply replaced the concept of an undifferentiated "people" with that of a monolithic "nation", adhered to the conception of a homogeneous society, with no allowance for any variety of social strata or political trends.
One of the fundamental elements of Dontsov's maturing world view was the vision of Russia as the Ukraine's foremost enemy. Under post-war conditions the nationalist movement reflected the general sentiments of the younger generation of Ukraine. It propagated an uncompromising struggle against all the enemies of Ukraine, and used all its energy for the preparation of a "national revolution". This movement was formally organized in Vienna in 1929 into the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalism", which united the then existing separate nationalist groups.
Aside from the three above-mentioned directions in Ukrainian political thought there also existed a communist trend. The development of this trend had only a distant connection to Ukrainian nationality. The demands of the Ukrainian communists for the autonomous Ukrainian state were primarily derived from their Marxism. Towards other nations they perceived the well-known Marxist point of view.
Conclusions
Ukrainian identity, which is the basis of cultural and political activity, as well as the drawing force for the new generation, cannot normally exist without the determined aid of above three trends in Ukrainian political thought. Ukrainian historians and political thinkers were playing important roles in legitimizing and shaping identities, though they had different ideas of Ukrainian statehood, national history, culture and language policies.
In their estimation of the relationship among the three processes: regime-building, state-building and nation-building on one hand, and of the possibilities, means, ways and methods to renovate the old and to create a new Ukrainian identity on the other, the different directions in Ukrainian political thought were quite distinct from each other. Their different image of Russia and the Russians to a large extent emerged from all these above-mentioned differences.
From the beginning of the 1860s until the end of the 1890s the populists conceptualized Ukrainian culture in relationship to, and in terms of, an all-Russian culture and posited Ukraine and Russia as regional societies within a bi-cultural (Rus') state. The representatives of the conservative direction of that time conceded that Ukraine had the right to a separate existence, but perceived the point of view, that it will be difficult to gain political freedom in Russia, taking into consideration the political and especially territorial fragmentation and heterogeneity of the Ukrainians and the absence of any interested foreign power block.
Estimating the heritage of all the three trends in Ukrainian political thought of the first half of the twentieth century (including the new-national-statehood Galician trend), one should single out three common moments. The first is the scent of the ethnocentric inclinations existing in the works of the representatives of Ukrainian political thought. The second aspect indicates the direct relation between the image of the nation and the context of the mutual relations in which this image is presented. The more that both Russia and its people are perceived in the context of close mutual relations, the less positive their image will be perceived in Ukrainian political thought. The third aspect indicates that all Ukrainian political thinkers have grasped the fact, that as long as there was no independent Ukrainian state, the pressure of Russian state forces would always stand in the way of the development of sound social conditions.
The narodnyky as well as V. Lypyns'kyj and his followers (the conservatives from Right and Left Bank Ukraine) did not exclude the possibility of a union with Russia; the trend among conservatives, headed by S. Tomashivs'kyj (the conservatives from Polish-ruled Galicia), as well as nationalists and D. Dontsov was to orient themselves to the West. In the image of narodnyky and the eastern Ukrainian conservatives, Russians are described as being less unfriendly when the distance between Russians and Ukrainians is assumed to be larger in Ukrainian perception. Relevant to this problem the narodnyky considered that the question of Ukrainian-Russian relations would be solved in the best way when both republics joined the European federation as equal members so that they can be united only in the higher organization, as two equal units; the Lypyns'kyj faction perceived the point of view, that the real strength and well-being of Ukrainian state lay in its connection to Russia and Byelorussia, but only as a connection between independent and equal states. In the image of western conservatives and nationalists those elements which are negative towards Russia dominate.
The representatives of all the parties, who were oriented to peasants, industrial workers or the nobility (both cossack or szlachta origin) admitted a union with Russia. The representatives of the parties who sought support from the intelligentsia, clergy, middle class and liberale bourgeoisie (the last three mainly in Western Ukrainian Galicia), were against any union with Russia and perceived it as alien to Ukrainian statehood and national spirit.

Notes

  1. More widely about the works examined here and the very assumptions of "Russians", "Germans", "Poles" and "Ukrainians" as meaningful categories and attitudes to those conceptions of statehood and federation, that Ukrainian political thinkers had put out and elaborated, see: Volodymyr Potul'nyc'kyj. Das ukrainische historische Denken im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Konzeptionen und Periodisierung, in: Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas 45 (1997), H. 1, S. 2-30; Idem. Istoriia ukrainskoii politologii. Kiev, 1992, pp. 26-230; Idem. Narysy z ukrainskoii politologii (1819-1991). Kiev, 1994, pp. 41-286.
  2. See: Mannheim K. "The Problem of Generation", in: Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. London, 1952, pp. 302-304. Mannheim indicated, that Weltanschauungen, as phenomenons of the collective consciousness, are essentially atheoretical, they need not be expressed through concepts, but find a variety of expressions, thus enabling the investigator to use the tool of comparative analysis and to search for the "common detominator" in many formally different and apparently heterogeneous cultural products. Idem. "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung", in: Ibid., p. 38.
  3. The new populist concept of Ukrainian nationality throughout all the time from 1840 till 1991 served as an alternative to the older, Malorussian conservative concept. See: Volodymyr Potul'nyc'kyj. Das ukrainische historische Denken..., S. 13-30.
  4. On the development of Ukrainian political thought in the nineteenth century see: Rudnyts'kyj I. L. Essays in Modern Ukrainian History. Cambridge, Mass. - CIUS, 1987; Potul'nyts'kyj V. Teoriia ukrainskoii politologii: kurs lektsij. Kiev, 1993; Idem. Narysy..., pp. 5-40; Wynar L. Michael Hrushevskyj's Scheme of Ukrainian History in the Context of the Study of Russian Colonialism and Imperialism, in: Russian Empire. Some Aspects of Tsarist and Soviet Colonial Practices. Edited by Michael S. Pap. Cleveland, Ohio, 1985, pp. 19-41.
  5. Kostomarov N. I. Geografiya i etnografiya, in: Kostomarov N. I. Sobranie sochinenii N. I. Kostomarova, Istoricheskiya monografii i izsledovaniya. Vol. III. St. Petersburg, 1903, pp. 721-731.
  6. Translation as found in D. Doroshenko. A Survey of Ukrainian historiography (A Special Issue of the Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.). New York: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. 1957, Vols. V - VI, 1957, No. 4 (18).1, 2 (19, 20), pp. 137-138.
  7. See: Antonovych V. Try natsional'ni typy narodni, in: Antonovych V. Tvory. Edited by Kateryna Mel'nyk-Antonovych. Vol. I. Kiev, 1932, pp. 196-210. About the political views of V. Antonovych see also: Potul'nyts'kyj V. Narysy..., pp. 13-17; 35-37.
  8. Ibid., pp. 204-205.
  9. Ibid., pp. 209-210.
  10. Ibid., p. 197.
  11. Hrushevs'kyj M. Z social'no-natsional'nych kontseptsij Antonovycha, in: Ukraina. Kiev, 1928, Knyha 5, pp. 7-8.
  12. Ibid., p. 7.
  13. See: Antonovych V. Polsko-russkie sootnosheniia XVII v. v sovremennoi polskoi prisme, in: Tvory, p. 164.
  14. Antonovych V. Pohliady ukrainofiliv, in: Tvory, pp. 245-246.
  15. Antonovych V. Kharakteristika deiatel'nosti Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo, in: Chteniia v Istoricheskom Obshchestve Nestora Letopistsa 1899. Book 13, Otd. 1, pp. 102-103.
  16. About the representatives of the populist trend in Ukrainian interwar political thought see: Ohloblyn O. Volodymyr Antonovich and His historical School, in: Minutes of the Seminar in Ukrainian Studies. Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Cambridge, Mass. (1973/74), No. IV, pp. 3-19; Potul'nyts'kyj V. Narysy..., pp. 82-150; Pritsak O. Istoriosofija ta istoriografija Mychaila Hrushevs'koho. Kiev-Cambridge, 1991, pp. 5-22.
  17. See, for example: Hrushevs'kyj M. Z bizychoi chvuli. Kiev, 1907, pp. 10, 13; Scheluchin S. Ukraina. Praha, 1937, pp. 34-36.
  18. These views were reflected in well-known M. Hrushevs'kyj's work "Zvychaina skhema "Russkoii" istorii i sprava ratsionalnoho ukladu istorii skhidnoho slovianstva", in: Sbornik statej po slavyanovedeniu. St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1904, pp. 298-304. The English translation, edited by A. Gregorovich, of this treatise, entitled "The traditional Scheme of Russian history and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the East Slavs", appeared in Slavistica. No. 55, Winnipeg: Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, 1966, pp. 7-16.
  19. Hrushevs'kyj M. Na porozi novoii Ukrainy. Hadky i mrii. Kiev, 1918, p. 13.
  20. Hrushevs'kyj M. Z bizychoi chvuli, p. 39-40.
  21. Ibid. See about this views also: Bilas Lew. Geschichtsphilosophische und ideologische Voraussetzungen der geschichtichen und politischen Konzeption M. Hrusevskyjs, in: Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas. N. F. 4 (1956), S. 262-292.
  22. About this reflections of M. Hrushevs'kyj on the Russian people see: Hrushevs'kyj M. Na porozi novoii Ukrainy..., pp. 10, 13, 19-20, 79, 86; Idem. Z socialno-natsionanych konseptsij Antonovycha..., p. 7.
  23. Hrushevs'kyj M. Na porozi novoii Ukrainy..., pp. 79, 85-86.
  24. The narodnyky reflected their ideas on the possible federation among the Ukraine and the other peoples mainly in: Hrushevs'kyj M. Jakoii avtonomii i federatsii chotche Ukraina. Wien, 1918, pp. 20-21; Idem. Ukrains'ka partiia sotsialistiv-revoliutsioneriv ta ii zavdannia, in: Boritesia - poborete. Wien, 1920, No. 1, pp. 48-49; Idem. Miz Moskvoju i Warshavoju, in: Boritesia - poborete. Wien, 1920, No. 2, pp. 13-14; Laschenko R. Do pytannia pro jurydychni zasady pryjednania Ukrainy do Moskvy, in: Tsentral'nyj Derzavnyj Istorychnyj Archiv Ukrainy u L'vovi, F. 370, Op. 1, Spr. 14, Ark. 12-54; Idem. Avtonomnyj Statut demokratychnoi Ukrainskoi respubliky, in: Ibid, Spr. 25, Ark. 1-16; Sheluchin S. Natsional'nyj Universytet, in: Tsentr. Derz. Archiv Ukrainy u Kyievi, F. 3695, Op. 1, Spr. 125, Ark. 213, 220; Idem. Ukraina. Praha, 1937, pp. 82-84; Idem. Ukraine, Poland and Russia and the Right of the Free Disposition of the Peoples. Washington, 1919, pp. 59-60.
  25. Hrushevs'kyj M. Na porozi novoii Ukrainy..., pp. 77-78.
  26. Hrushevs'kyj M. Ukrains'ka partiia sotsialistiv-revoliutsioneriv ta ii zavdania..., p. 48.
  27. Hrushevs'kyj M. Miz Moskvoju i Warshavoju..., p. 13
  28. Hrushevs'kyj M. Ukrains'ka partiia..., p. 49.
  29. Tzentr. Derz. Archiv Ukrainy v Kyievi, F. 1, Op. 1, Spr. 194, Ark. 33-34.
  30. Hrushevs'kyj M. Ukrains'ka partiia..., p. 49.
  31. Ibid.
  32. More widely about this political orientations see: Potul'nyts'kyj V. Hrushevs'kyj jak sotsiolog, in: Visnyk Kyivs'koho Universytetu. Seria istoryko-filologichna. Kiev, 1991, No. 1, pp. 1-23; Idem. Naukova diial'nist' M. Hrushevs'koho v emigratsii, in: Ukrains'kyj istorychnyj zurnal (1992), No. 2, pp. 48-58.
  33. Juvilej akademika M. S. Hrushevs'koho. 1866-1926. Kiev, 1927, p. 27.
  34. See, for example: Hrushevs'kyj M. Ukrains'ka partiia..., p. 44, 46; Idem. Zi z'jizdu natsional'nostei v Kyievi, in: Ukrains'ke slovo. Lviv, 1917, November, 3; Idem. Le Congres des Peuples allogenes de Russie, in: L'Europe Orientale (1919), No. 5, pp. 129-135; Sheluchin S. Pravo Ukrainy na svoiu derzavnist', in: Tzentr. Derz. Archiv Ukrainy v Kyievi, F. 3695, Op. 1, Spr. 38, Ark. 93-94; Idem. Jak my dovodyly, csho Ukrainu treba vyznaty, in: Ibid., Spr. 37, Ark. 105-111.
  35. See: Hrushevs'kyj M. Ukraine, Weissrussland, Litanen, in: Ukrainische Rundschau (1909), No. 2, S. 49-52; Idem. Vil'na Ukraina: Statti z ostannich dniv. Kiev, 1917, pp. 12-13.
  36. This idea was supported by a historical hypothesis, according to which the ancient Celts strongly influenced the ethnogenesis of the Proto-Slavic peoples. See: Sheluchin S. Vstypna chastyna promovy na sviati v Prazi, in: Tzentr. Derz Archiv Ukrainy v Kyievi, F. 3695, Op. 1, Spr. 40, Ark.153-159.
  37. See about this parties: Jurij Borys. The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine (A Study in the Communist Doctrine of the self-determination of nations). Stockholm, 1960, pp. 72-74; 92-99; Idem. Political Parties in Ukraine, in: Taras Hunczak (ed.). The Ukraine. 1917-1921. A Study in Revolution. Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Cambridge, Mass., 1977, pp. 137-142; James E. Mace. Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation. National Communism in Soviet Ukraine. 1918-1933. Cambridge, 1973, pp. 17-19; 53-55.
  38. The older, conservative Malorussian concept of Ukrainian nationality lasted from the beginning of the nineteenth century, and was developed mainly in the works of Mychajlo Maksymovych and Mychajlo Drahomanov. See: Volodymyr Potul'nyc'kyj. Das ukrainische historische Denken..., S. 5-7, 16-20.
  39. About the political views and identity of the representatives of this Ukrainian nobility in the first half of the nineteenth century see: Zenon E. Kohut. Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy. Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate. 1760-1830s. Cambridge, Mass., 1988; David Saunders. The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture. 1750-1850. Edmonton, 1985; in the second half of the ninetenth - at the beginning of the twentieth century see: Kappeler A. The Ukrainians in the Russian Empire 1860-1914, in: Kappeler A. (Hg.): The Formation of National Elites, Aldershot - New York, 1992, S. 105-132, esp. S. 114-115, 117-119, in: Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol. 6; Die Nationalitaten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszahlung von 1897. Hg. von H. Bauer, A. Kappeler und B. Roth, Bd. A - B. Stuttgart, 1991, here Bd. B, S. 198; Idem. Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine. Munchen, 1994; Volodymyr Potul'nyc'kyj. Das ukrainische historische Denken..., S. 14-28; Idem. Teoriia..., pp. 56-72; Idem. Narysy..., pp. 5-40; in the interwar period see: Potul'nyts'kyj V. Narysy..., pp. 151-226.
  40. See: Kappeler A. A "Small People" of Twenty-five Million: The Ukrainians circa 1900, in: Journal of Ukrainian Studies 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer - Winter 1993), pp. 85-92, esp. pp. 87-88; Idem. Ein "Kleines Volk" von 25 Millionen: Die Ukrainer um 1900, in: Kleine Volker in der Geschichte Osteuropas. Festschrift fur Gunther Stokl zum 75. Geburstag. Hg. von Manfred Alexander, Frank Kampfer und Andreas Kappeler. Stuttgart, 1991, S. 33-42.
  41. Ohloblyn O. Liudy staroi Ukrainy. Munchen, 1959; Zbirnyk na poshanu O. Ohloblyna. New York, 1977; N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko. Do istorii Het'mans'koi Ukrainy XVII - XX vv., in: Zbirnyk na poshanu Ivana Mirchuka (1891-1961). Munchen, 1974, S. 121-139, esp. S. 137-138; Himka J-P, Swyripa F. Researching Ukrainian Family History. Edmonton, 1984.
  42. See: Pritsak O. Reshetar J. The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building, in: Slavic Review 22 (1963), pp. 224-255; Pritsak O. The Present State of Ukrainian Studies, in: Omeljan Pritsak. Why Endow Chairs in Ukrainian Studies at Harvard? A Selection of Articles concerning Ukrainian Cultural Policy. Cambridge, Mass. - New York, 1973, pp. 124-125; Ohloblyn O. Mykola Vasylenko i Vadym Modzalevs'kyj, in: Ukrains'kyj istoryk. New York - Toronto - Munchen, 1966, No. 3/4, pp. 5-25; Polons'ka - Vasylenko N. Op. cit.; Ukrains'ka Genealogiia: teoriia, metodologiia, istoriia ta praktyka. Materialy Perchych genealogichnych chytan' pam'jati Vadyma Modzalevs'koho. Edited by M. Dmytrienko. Kiev, 1996, pp. 3-165.
  43. Drahomanov had already explored this theme in his articles on literature since 1873, but he gave this concise explanation in his "Po voprosu o malorusskoi literature" (Vienna, 1876), published in: Struve P. (ed.). Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii M. P. Dragomanova. Paris, 1905-1906, Vol. II, p. 172.
  44. Drahomanov M. P. Literatura rossiis'ka, velykorus'ka, ukrains'ka i halyts'ka, in: Dei O. I. (ed.). Mychailo Petrovych Drahomanov. Literaturno-publitsystychni pratsi u dvoch tomach. Kiev, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 186.
  45. Drahomanov M. P. Lysty na Naddniprians'ku Ukrainu. L'viv, 1915, pp. 42-43.
  46. Drahomanov M. P. Chudats'ki dumky pro ukrains'ku natsional'nu spravu. L'viv, 1915, p. 103.
  47. About the Drahomanov's comparison of France's and Germany's policies towards Russia and Ukraine see: Potul'nyc'kyj. Deutsche Einflusse auf die Entwicklung des ukrainische historische Denken im 19. Jahrhundert, in: Zeitschrift fur Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung (1997), in print.
  48. About V. Lypyns'kyj and his heritage in the field of Ukrainian historiography and political thought see: Pelens'kyj Y. Geschichtlishes Denken und Politische Idee V. Lypyns'kyj, in: Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas (1961), No. 2, S. 223-246; Idem (ed.). Political and Social Ideas of Vjacheslav Lypyns'kyj, in: Harvard Ukrainian Studies (Special Issue) 1985, vol. IX, No. 3/4, pp. 237-508; Potul'nyts'kyj V. Politychna doktryna V. Lypyns'koho, in: Ukrains'kyj istorychnyj zurnal (1992), No. 9, pp. 37-45; Idem. Vjacheslav Lypyns'kyj i problema politychnoii kultury, in: Ostannij Hetman. Zbirnyk pam'jati Pavla Skoropads'koho. Kiev, 1993, pp. 123-137; Idem. Vjacheslav Lypyns'kyj - politolog, in: V. Lypyns'kyj: Historical and Political Heritage and Contemporary Ukraine. Kiev - Philadelphia, 1994, pp. 103-114.
  49. More widely about the representatives of the conservative trend see: Potul'nyts'kyj V. Teoriia ukrainskoii politologii..., pp. 76-78; 82-85; Idem. Narysy z ukrains'koii politologii (1819-1991)..., pp. 151-226.
  50. Lypyns'kyj V. Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv, pro ideju i organizatsiju ukrains'koho monarchismu. Wien, 1926, p. 387.
  51. Ibid., p. 382.
  52. Lypyns'kyj meant not only the Ukrainian-speaking nobles of the Left Bank Ukraine (the territory of the former Hetmanate), but the formerly East Slavic nobility of the Right Bank Ukraine, which had long since been Polonized, but preserved a regional consciousness, that could be activated in individual cases. About the Right Bank trend of Ukrainian szlachta, which had a double (both Ukrainian and Polish) and even multiple (Ukrainian, Polish and Russian) identity and loyalty, see: Rudnyts'kyj I. L. Op. cit.; Daniel Bouveau. Le Noble, le Serf et le Revisor, la noblesse polonaise entre le tsarisme et les masses ukrainiens. 1831-1863. Paris, 1985, Chapter 2; Idem. La bataille de la terre en Ukraine. 1863-1914, les Polonais et les conflicts socio-ethniques. Paris, 1993, Chapter 3.
  53. Lipinski W. Szlachta na Ukrainie. Kracow 1909; Idem. Z dziejow Ukrainy. Kracow, 1911-1912.
  54. Lypyns'kyj V. Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv, pp. 375-376; 387-388; 391.
  55. Ibid., pp. 329-330.
  56. Ibid., p. XXV. This tendency to view the Russian-Ukrainian differences in historical and psychological, rather than linguistic terms, was quite common in nineteenth century, particularly in Ukrainian political thought (for example, see the works of M. Kostomarov, V. Antonovych, M. Drahomanov).
  57. Lypyns'kyj V. Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv, p. XXV.
  58. Ibid.
  59. Ibid., pp. XXIV, 537.
  60. Ibid., p. 569.
  61. Gyrs'kyj D. Dyvni sposoby vypravdovuvania antyderzavnoii polityky. Toronto, 1973, p. 160.
  62. Lypyns'kyj V. Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv, p. 570.
  63. Tomashivs'kyj S. Galytchyna. L'viv, 1915. Idem. Ukrains'ka istoriia. L'viv 1919, pp. 1-2, 6-8, 28, 89-91, 111-112; Idem. Istoriia i polityka, in: Xliborobs'ka Ukraina. Wien, 1921, No. 5/6, pp. 167-169; Idem. Vlada i kultura, in: Ibid, No. 6/7, pp. 309-310; Idem. Pid kolesamy istorii. Berlin, 1922, pp. 26, 30, 42-45, 74-76.
  64. About this party see: Shemet S. Do istorii Ukrainskoii Demokratychno-Xliborobs'koii Partii, in: Xliborobs'ka Ukraina. Wien, 1920, No. 1, pp. 1-56; Jurij Borys. The Russian Communist Party..., pp. 94-95.
  65. Lypyns'kyj V. Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv, pp. 191-192.
  66. As Takayuki Ito makes clear in his differentiation among "nation-state" and "national state", a term of "national state" would be more appropriate to the state based on ethnicity. "Obviously, - noted Ito, - "nation-state" is different from "national state". The nation-state is and should be ethnically rather neutral. In my understanding the nation-state is a state with a people who actively identify themselves with the state in their rights as well as responsibilities. It is often based on a certain ethnicity, but not necessarily. Some other things may substitute for ethnicity. For instance, dynasties..." See: Takayuki Ito. Comments and Reflections on Papers: Interacting Crises of Nation, State and Regime, in: Tadayuki Hayashi and Geoffrey Jukes (ed.). Building Nation, State and Regime: Some Post-Communist Examples. Sapporo, 1997, pp. 123-124.
  67. See: Potul'nyts'kyj V. Narysy z ukrains'koii politologii (1819-1991), pp. 204-205; Tzentr. Derz. Istorychnyi Archiv u L'vovi, F. 359, Op. 1, Spr. 18, Ark. 2-6.
  68. The theoretical background of the national statehood direction was reflected in: Dnistrians'kyj S. Zvychajeve pravo ta sotsial'ni zv'jazky, in: Chasopys pravnychyj ta ekonomichnyj. L'viv, 1902, Vol. 4, 5; Idem. Natsional'na statystyka. Mova jak kryterij narodnosti. L'viv, 1910; Idem. Das Gewohnheitsrecht und die sozialen Verbade, in: Festschrift zur Jahrhundert Feier des Allgemeinen burgerlichen Gesetzbuches. Berlin - Wien, 1911, S. 23-57; Starosol's'kyj V. Prychynky do teorii sotsiologii, in: Chasopys pravnychyj na ekonomichnyj. L'viv, 1904, No. 3; Rudnyc'kyj. Ukraina und die Ukrainer. 2 Aufl. Berlin, 1915; Idem. Die Geographie der Ukraine. Wien, 1916.
  69. About the representatives of the national statehood trend in Ukrainian interwar political thought see: Potul'nyc'kyj V. Istoriia ukrains'koii politologii, pp. 169-227; Idem. Narysy z ukrains'koii politologii, pp. 226-299.
  70. This views were reflected in: Dnistrians'kyj S. Zahal'na nauka prava i polityky. Praha, 1923, pp. 9-37; 61-62; 176-181.
  71. More widely about this conception see: Dnistrians'kyj S. Pohliad na teorii prava ta derzavy. L'viv, 1925, pp. 58-65; Idem. Nova derzava. Wien - Praha - L'viv, 1923, pp. 16-23; Idem. Samovyznachennia narodiv, in: Volia. Wien (1919), Vol. 5, No. 2, 3, 5; Starosol's'kyj V. Teoriia natsii. Wien, 1922, pp. 73-89, 94-97, 102-109, 136-139; Idem. Derzava i politychne pravo. Podebrady, 1924, Vol. 2, pp. 15-134; Bochkovs'kyj O. Do problemy ukrains'koii natsii, in: Vysvolennia. Wien - Praha (1923), No. 3, pp. 17-24; Idem. Probuzeni, obrozeni a sebeurcem narodu. Lazne Podebrady, 1931, pp. 2-9, 14-23; Idem. Narodzennia natsii. L'viv, 1939, pp. 10-18, 25-31; Zyttia natsii. L'viv 1939, pp. 21-31, 49.
  72. Rudnyts'kyj S. Do osnov ukrains'koho natsionalismu. Wien - Praha, 1923, p. 143.
  73. Ibid., p. 144.
  74. Ibid., p. 145.
  75. Starosol's'kyj V. Suspil'no politychni ruxy ta ich nosii, in: Tzentr. Derz. Istorychnyj Archiv u L'vovi, F. 360, Op. 1, Spr. 466, Ark. 7-9; Bochkovs'kyj O. Probuzeni, obrozeni a sebeurcem narodu, pp. 2-3.
  76. Starosol's'kyj V. Suspil'no politychni ruxy ta ich nosii, p. 7.
  77. The history and ideology of this party was studied by Jurii Borys. The Russian Communist Party..., pp. 93-94; See also: James E. Mace. Op. cit., pp. 18-20.
  78. See: Lozyns'kyj M. Galytchyna. Wien 1922; Janush Radziejowski. The Communist Party of Western Ukraine. 1919-1929. Edmonton, CIUS, 1983, pp. 83-88; 140-144.
  79. More widely on this topic see: Alexander J. Motyl'. The turn to the Right: the ideological Origins and development of Ukrainian nationalism, 1919-1929. New York, 1980, pp. 1-4; 61-85.