In single-party mobilizational systems -such as the Yugoslav system
after 1945 -interregional policy, or any other policy, cannot be
dissociated from its ideological underpinnings. This is particularly
true of interethnic and interrepublican relations, whose framework and
direction was set by an explicit, full-fledged national politics
derived from the Marxist-Leninist ideological postulates of the system.
Lenin argues that "all definitions in general have only a conditional
and relative meaning,"and so does the definition of nation,
particularly with regard to its dialectical-historical connections with
class and society. These connections are not defined by any universal
rule. Labour parties are entitled to "differentiated"political
strategies, Lenin points out. So, labour parties of an "oppressive
nation"are entitled to insist upon the "right of an oppressed nation to
secession,"whereas the labour party of "an oppressed nation"should
insist on "the right to unification." A big nation has to accept a
certain inequality in relation to a small nation. In this way, it would
give up the advantages that it unjustifiedly gained during the previous
period of historical development as well as the advantages stemming
from the mere fact of its numerical superiority to small nations. The
right of each nation to self-determination, uncompromisingly defended
by Lenin, coincides with the interests of the proletariat, i.e. of the
communist revolution. The latter has international aspirations and in
this regard the "national question"itself becomes a global issue -it is
directly associated with the establishment of the Communist New World
Order. Therefore, wherever nationalism is subversive of an existing
(noncommunist) order, "the right of oppressed nations to
self-determination"should be "unwaveringly"supported. For Lenin,
national self-determination means "political self-determination, the
right to secession and establishment of an independent state." The
right of a nation to self-determination, according to Lenin, is an
uncompromising principle of political democracy. But it also means a complete
equalization (?!) of nations in terms of economy, culture and
education. In a multinational community, with markedly uneven
development, "under socialism,"this implies an active policy of
national equality, in other words a considerable redistribution of the
"conditions and results"of development or, in regional policy terms, an
"even regional development."
Despite assertions of official ideologues that the politics dealing
with the national question was consistent at least since 1925, several
stages in the development of the Yugoslav communists' national politics
are noticeable.17
These are: (1) 1919-1923: defence of centralism and unitarism, the
concept of the three-name (Serbo-Croat-Slovene) people; (2) 1923-1928:
internal disputes between the left wing and the right wing of the
Party; (3) 1928-1934: the period of the Comintern, marked by the
Comintern order to split Yugoslavia into separate, ethnically
homogenous national states; (4) 1934-1943: recognition of the right to
national self-determination, coupled with the desire to preserve the
unity of the socialist Yugoslavia; (5) 1943-1964: federalism
characterized by the disjunction of the republics and nations, and the
more implicitly than explicitly formulated idea of Yugoslavism; (6)
1964-1974/1992: dismissal of Yugoslavism and the identification of
nations with republics and, consequently, of interethnic with
interrepublican relationships; and (7) 1974-1992: consensualism and the
disintegration of the state.
The idea of national economies (i.e. economies of republics and
provinces in which national working classes -through their /party/
states -freely use their national surplus values) emerged in the "sixth
stage"of the evolution of the Party's national politics, beginning in
1964 when the 8th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
laid the ideological foundations for the identification of nations with
republics, i.e. of interethnic with interrepublican relations.
The idea and the practice of "national economies"was accompanied by
a variety of ideological rationalizations. Two fundamental attitudes
that provided plausible grounds for republican and provincial economies
to become "national economies"were: (a) that "national economies"...
"are a safeguard against unequal relationships and against any attempts
at exploitation"(Hasan HadHad�iomerovi18; and (b) that "national
economies"promote national independence and state sovereignty. Thus,
the economy was defined in strictly functional terms, in terms of
promoting state sovereignty: the completion of protected economic
structures of republics and provinces, i.e. the creation of "national
economies,""springs out of a natural need to secure the strongest and
safest possible foundation for the economic independence implied by
sovereignty"(Hasan Had�iomerovi19
).
The degrees of external dependence and of autarky, however, did not
prove to be inversely proportional, as was believed by the break-up
theorists. That dependence and autarky are not mutually exclusive (i.e.
that autarky is no remedy for dependence) is illustrated by numerous
examples of underdeveloped countries whose dependence has grown
shifting from consumer goods to production goods. As imports and
particularly technological dependence increased, so did the overall
dependence. Also, dependence is usually associated with the market as
-in Marxist terms -an exploitive institutional mechanism per se. Did
the market enable transfers of income from underdeveloped to developed
Yugoslav regions? Perhaps it did, inasmuch as the market existed. It
should be noted that in Yugoslavia certain functions of the market (the
allocative function, for instance) were hardly ever performed. The
market was parcelled: interrepublican trade kept declining. Actually,
there was no single Yugoslav market for goods, let alone for factors of
production. Besides, developed regions (potential exploiters) and
underdeveloped regions (potentially exploited) were closing their
respective regional markets with an almost equal intensity.
In the case of Yugoslavia one could hardly speak of a classic
(market) exploitation, in view of the fundamentally anti-market
orientation of the system in all its forms -from the centrally planned
to the consensual. Exploitation was a matter of position and status,
involving, first, the monopoly to create institutions and, then, the
very place in the power structure. As the power centres were mostly
located in the sphere of politics rather than of the economy, the
crucial role in both social and regional (national) exploitation was
played by the privileged social groups, republics and nations.
The domination of political over economic sphere, from the point of
view of Yugoslav regional development, manifested itself in the strong
action of the political oligarchy of the loosely connected federal
units towards an increasing closure of the republican/provincial
economies. Republican nomenklaturas' insistence on the creation of six
"national"economies meant an anachronic, antidevelopmental
fragmentation of the Yugoslav economic (and not only economic) space.
The creation of "national"economies provided the basis for a
qualitative change in the organization of the state: the creation of
several independent, sovereign states vis-a-vis the federation.
The process of putting into practice the concept of national
economies (with corresponding autarkic tendencies) led to a continuous
slowdown in Yugoslavia's economic growth, its diminishing
competitiveness and growing dependence. Concurrently, the process was a
source of constant political instability and harsh conflicts. The
concept of national economies brought diverse "passions"into the
economic sphere, which more than any other sphere should be ruled by
reason. So, this sphere (otherwise the primary, and in developed
countries almost exclusive source of conflicts of interests) lent
additional strength to an already strong and objectively determined
secondary line of conflicts (race, religion, nation and language) so
characteristic of developing countries.
The two ideological and political cornerstones of the post-war
Yugoslav "commonwealth"were the following: (a) that the socialist
society solves the problem of uneven (economic) regional development,
unsolvable under capitalism; and (b) that only socialism makes national
harmony and equality possible. Was the regional problem solved (or at
least alleviated) in the socialist, federal republic of Yugoslavia?
Were national equality and harmony achieved? The answer is definitely
negative: Yugoslavia's development after 1945 and after 1965 showed the
end of the path of a road of decentralization without democracy and
without efficient mechanisms of economic cohesion, with an arbitrary
interregional redistribution and a permanently suboptimal global
allocation of resources. The heightening effect of centripetal forces
led Yugoslav economy, state and society, etc. into disintegration,
eventually taking the form of an explosion.
The role of nation and nationalism in the break-up of Yugoslavia is
twofold. It has its (a) international and (b) internal aspects.
In more recent history, because of its subversive nature,
nationalism has been the most suitable vehicle for breaking up large
(especially multi-national) states. Today, the leading actors in world
politics use it, before all, to dismantle the Soviet (communist)
empire. Here, Yugoslavia served as guinea pig for testing the mechanism
of the New World Order (NWO). In the vocabulary of the NWO protagonists
both the Russians and the Serbs are referred to as expansionist and
conquering, i.e. as imperialistic ("oppressive") nations. This is not
the only correspondence between the NWO and Marxist-Leninist
(communist) terminologies. The latest NWO, like communism, also has
planetary ambitions and, in its purpose and essence, though not in
terminology (which is democratic), is equally revolutionary, because
the change is so universal and radical that it can only be effected by
force. Therefore it is concerned neither with legality nor with
legitimacy. The fight against communism is used as a justification for
secessionism -anticommunism is an alibi not only for separatism, but
also for various kinds of selective (inconsistent, i.e. ad hoc) foreign
intervention. The NWO means a victory of the bourgeois principle over
the proletarian principle and therefore nationalism is always supported
because it is now primarily anticommunist in nature. The New World
Order uses nationalism to score a victory over communism but,
fundamentally, not to promote the nation, but rather to negate it. Just
as the nation (nationalism) is a temporary aid to the proletariat in
its struggle against capitalism and for the Communist New World Order,
so is it to the Anticommunist New World Order. The New World Order is,
thus, not only anticommunist but also antinational (it advocates "a
confederation of regions,"which is why it is being introduced into the
"Old Continent"as "the Europe of regions").